HE DID IT!
Ours--not yet!
mm
From: Chan Mahanta <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: assam@assamnet.org
Subject: [Assam] NY Times Editorial
Date: Tue, 24 Oct 2006 10:23:34 -0500
>This is a watershed editorial from the country's most prestigious
>paper. Along with Bush's abandonment of the "stay the course" slogan
>during the last couple of days, the rabidly right-wing columnist Noah
>Goldberg's admission on print yesterday that he was wrong about the
>war and numerous other right-wingers heading for the tall-grass
>looking for cover; the pigeons have come home to roost.
>
>As we can see there is nothing to be happy about the sordid mess we are in.
>
>Just like there is nothing for Indians to be happy about the mess it
>is in, be it Kashmir, be it Assam; except that its intelligentsia
>continues to remain smug in its ignorance and its appalling apathy.
>
>The lesson, that even overwhelming force cannot extinguish hatred of
>the intruder fits Indian military operations like a glove . Time
>alone will tell if they have the wisdom to pay heed.
>
>cm
>
>
>
>
>
>
>http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/24/opinion/24tues1.html?_r=1&oref=slogin&pagewanted=all
>Editorial
> Trying to Contain the Iraq Disaster
>
>
>Published: October 24, 2006
>
>
>No matter what President Bush says, the question is not whether
>America can win in Iraq. The only question is whether the United
>States can extricate itself without leaving behind an unending civil
>war that will spread more chaos and suffering throughout the Middle
>East, while spawning terrorism across the globe.
>
>The prospect of what happens after an American pullout haunts the
>debate on Iraq. The administration, for all its hints about new
>strategies and timetables, is obviously hoping to slog along for two
>more years and dump the problem on Mr. Bush's successor. This fall's
>election debates have educated very few voters because neither side
>is prepared to be honest about the terrible consequences of military
>withdrawal and the very long odds against success if American troops
>remain.
>
>This page opposed a needlessly hurried and unilateral invasion, even
>before it became apparent that the Bush administration was unprepared
>to do the job properly. But after it happened, we believed that
>America should stay and try to clean up the mess it had made - as
>long as there was any conceivable road to success.
>
>That road is vanishing. Today we want to describe a strategy for
>containing the disaster as much as humanly possible. It is hardly a
>recipe for triumph. Americans can only look back in wonder on the
>days when the Bush administration believed that success would turn
>Iraq into a stable, wealthy democracy - a model to strike fear into
>the region's autocrats while inspiring a new generation of democrats.
>Even last fall, the White House was dividing its strategy into a
>series of victorious outcomes, with the short-term goal of an Iraq
>"making steady progress in fighting terrorists." The medium term had
>Iraq taking the lead in "providing its own security" and "on its way
>to achieving its economic potential," with the ultimate outcome being
>a "peaceful, united, stable and secure" nation.
>
> If an American military occupation could ever have achieved those
>goals, that opportunity is gone. It is very clear that even with the
>best American effort, Iraq will remain at war with itself for years
>to come, its government weak and deeply divided, and its economy
>battered and still dependent on outside aid. The most the United
>States can do now is to try to build up Iraq's security forces so
>they can contain the fighting - so it neither devours Iraqi society
>nor spills over to Iraq's neighbors - and give Iraq's leaders a start
>toward the political framework they would need if they chose to try
>to keep their country whole.
>
>The tragedy is that even this marginal sort of outcome seems nearly
>unachievable now. But if America is to make one last push, there are
>steps that might lessen the chance of all-out chaos after the troops
>withdraw:
>
>Start at Home
>
>For all the talk of timetables for Iraq, there has been little
>discussion of the timetable that must be handed to George W. Bush.
>The president cannot leave office with American troops still dying in
>an Iraq that staggers along just short of civil war, on behalf of no
>concrete objective other than "get the job done," which is now Mr.
>Bush's rhetorical substitute for "stay the course." The
>administration's current vague talk about behind-the-scenes
>agreements with Iraqi politicians is next to meaningless. Americans,
>Iraqis and the rest of the world need clear, public signs of progress.
>
>Mr. Bush can make the first one by firing Secretary of Defense Donald
>Rumsfeld. There is no chance of switching strategy as long as he is
>in control of the Pentagon. The administration's plans have gone
>woefully wrong, and while the president is unlikely to admit that, he
>can send a message by removing Mr. Rumsfeld. It would also be a
>signal to the military commanders in the field that the
>administration now wants to hear the truth about what they need, what
>can be salvaged out of this mess, and what cannot.
>
>The president should also make it clear, once and for all, that the
>United States will not keep permanent bases in Iraq. The people in
>Iraq and across the Middle East need a strong sign that the troops
>are not there to further any American imperial agenda.
>
>Demand Reconciliation Talks
>
>Iraq's prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, has indefinitely
>postponed reconciliation talks among the nation's top politicians. He
>must receive an immediate deadline to start the process. Tomorrow
>would not be too soon; the end of the year would be too late.
>
>Whatever decisions Iraqi leaders reached over the past few years were
>achieved by pushing aside all the critical questions that were
>hardest to address. The Bush administration must demand not only that
>new talks start, but that they continue until some agreement is
>reached on protecting minority rights, dividing up Iraq's oil
>revenues, the role of religion in the state, providing an amnesty for
>insurgents willing to put down their weapons, and demobilizing and
>disarming the militias.
>
>More outside aid could increase their incentive to talk. Even then,
>the threat of an American withdrawal may be the only way to extract
>real concessions. In parallel with the reconciliation talks, the
>United States should begin its own negotiations with the Iraqi
>leadership about a timetable for withdrawing American troops - making
>clear that America's willingness to stay longer will depend on the
>Iraqis' willingness to make real compromises. Iraqi politicians have
>to know that they have even more to lose if their country plunges
>into complete civil war.
>
>We are skeptical of calls to divide the country into three ethnically
>controlled regions, using the model that finally ended the Bosnian
>war. Most Iraqis, except for the Kurds, show little enthusiasm for
>the idea. Clear ethnic boundaries could not be drawn without driving
>many people from their homes - though an intolerable level of ethnic
>cleansing is already pushing things in that direction. Any effort at
>reconciliation will almost certainly require a transfer of power and
>resources to provincial and local governments. But it must be up to
>the Iraqis to decide the ultimate shape of their country.
>
>Stabilize Baghdad
>
>Most Iraqis have forgotten what security is - or if they remember, it
>is an idealized vision of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship. Since
>neither the government nor the American occupation is able to provide
>basic services or safety, it is little wonder that Iraqis have turned
>to the militias for protection. In such a world, retribution will
>always take precedence over the uncertainties of political compromise.
>
>American commanders have launched a series of supposedly
>make-or-break campaigns to take back the streets of Baghdad. The
>problem is not one of military strategy; their idea of "clearing" out
>insurgents, "holding" neighborhoods and quickly rebuilding
>infrastructure is probably the only thing that could work. The
>problem is that commanders in Baghdad have been given only a fraction
>of the troops - American and Iraqi - they need.
>
>There have never been enough troops, the result of Mr. Rumsfeld's
>negligent decision to use Iraq as a proving ground for his pet
>military theories, rather than listen to his generals. And since the
>Army and Marines are already strained to the breaking point, the only
>hope of restoring even limited sanity to Baghdad would require the
>transfer of thousands of American troops to the capital from
>elsewhere in the country. That likely means moving personnel out of
>the Sunni-dominated west, and more mayhem in a place like Anbar.
>
> But Iraqis need a clear demonstration that security and rebuilding
>is possible. So long as Baghdad is in chaos they will have no reason
>to believe in anything but sectarian militias and vigilante justice.
>Once Washington is making a credible effort to stabilize Baghdad,
>Iraqi politicians will have more of an incentive to show up for
>reconciliation talks. No one wants to be a rejectionist if it looks
>like the tide might be turning.
>
> Convene the Neighbors
>
>America's closest allies in the region are furious about America's
>gross mismanagement of the war. But even Iran and Syria, which are
>eager to see America bloodied, have a great deal to lose if all-out
>civil war erupts in Iraq, driving refugees toward their borders. That
>self-interest could be the start of a discussion about how Iraq's
>neighbors might help pressure their clients inside Iraq to step back
>from the brink. Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich neighbors - whose own
>stability could be threatened by an Iraqi collapse - need to be
>pressed into providing major financing to underwrite jobs programs
>and reconstruction.
>
>Enlightened self-interest is a rarity in the Middle East. The Bush
>administration will most likely have to go further to elicit real
>help, showing a serious willingness to expand its dialogue with
>Damascus and Tehran beyond the issue of Iraq and to be a genuine
>broker for Middle East peace. That should be the easiest part of the
>strategy - only this White House regards the willingness to talk to
>another country as a major concession.
>
>Acknowledge Reality
>
>While the strategy described above seems the best bet to us, the odds
>are still very much against it working. At this point, all plans to
>avoid disaster involve the equivalent of a Hail Mary pass. In
>America, almost no one - even the administration's harshest critics -
>wants to tell people the bitter truth about how few options remain on
>the table, and about the mayhem that will almost certainly follow an
>American withdrawal unless more is done.
>
>Truth will only take us so far, but it is the right way to begin.
>Americans will probably spend the next generation debating whether
>the Iraq invasion would have worked under a competent administration.
>Right now, the best place to express bitterness about what may become
>the worst foreign policy debacle in American history is at the polls.
>But anger at a president is not a plan for what happens next.
>
>When it comes to Iraq the choices in the immediate future are scant
>and ugly. But there are still a few options to pursue, and the
>alternatives are so horrible that it is worth trying once again - as
>long as everyone understands that there is little time left and the
>odds are very long.
>
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