There is a windows box configured to use your domain name
and it is trying to lookup/update the active directory
configuration.
Send a Cease and Desist letter stating that you are the
registered owner of the domain name in question and they
should cease using it.
Mark
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Keve Nagy writes:
Hi Everyone,
I see some oddities frequently showing up in our BIND logfiles.
This is on the official primary NS for our domain.
*Oddity_type#1*
... view external-in: query: server.EXAMPLE.COM IN SOA -E
Please note that the only thing I changed here is the domain name. I did
not capitalize it, the original domain name also got logged this way.
And yes, the original hostname queried was server, I did not change
that either. These are repeatedly coming from the same source IP
address, once in every 10-70 minutes.
We have never had a host named server. So why would an external
machine keep asking for a hostname we never had? Especially with such an
obvious name! Also, why is the domain part capitalized for these
queries, and not in any proper/legitimate query? I assume this is what
the query was for. The original request must have been for
server.EXAMPLE.COM, having the domain part this way capitalized in the
query itself.
So why would a remote system look for a never existed host named
server in our system, with the domain name capitalized?
Any legitimate reason you could think of?
*Oddity_type#2*
... view external-in: query: server.EXAMPLE.COM IN SOA +
... view external-in: updating zone 'example.com/IN': update unsucces
sful: server.EXAMPLE.COM/A: 'RRset exists (value dependent)'
prerequisite not satisfied (NXRRSET)
Again note, that I only changed the name of the domain and I did not
alter the capitalization or the hostname. These are from another source
IP address, but always the same one. For some reason, also looking for
the host named server. And a few minutes later, it seems to try to
update the domain database.
By the way, no host is allowed to update our DNS records. The zone files
are updated by hand only. And this has always been the case, no exceptions.
*Oddity_type#3*
... view external-in: query: gc._msdcs.EXAMPLE.COM IN SOA -E
... view external-in: query: _ldap._tcp.gc._msdcs.EXAMPLE.COM IN SOA
-E
... view external-in: query: _ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.EXAMPLE.COM IN SOA
-E
... view external-in: query: _kpasswd._tcp.EXAMPLE.COM IN SOA -E
... view external-in: query: _kpasswd._udp.EXAMPLE.COM IN SOA -E
... view external-in: query: _ldap._tcp.Alapertelmezett-elso-hely-neve.
_sites.dc._msdcs.EXAMPLE.COM IN SOA -E
... view external-in: query: _ldap._tcp.d819d059-6674-4c56-899c-e6a7aee
fb77f.domains._msdcs.EXAMPLE.COM IN SOA -E
... view external-in: query: d476b9e8-6916-483e-ac68-2329bfac49b1._msdc
s.EXAMPLE.COM IN SOA -E
... view external-in: query: _kerberos._tcp.EXAMPLE.COM IN SOA -E
... view external-in: query: _gc._tcp.EXAMPLE.COM IN SOA -E
Look at these add hostnames which are queried for!
These are all systematically returning queries. And these come from
multiple source IP addresses.
Are these queries legitimate? I mean, do you know of any system that may
be doing this? Are these strange hostname queries part of some standard
way identifying services and I just don't happen to know about this
standard?
I would very much appreciate some feedback on these.
Best regards,
Keve Nagy * Debrecen * Hungary
--
if you need to reply directly:
keve(at)mail(dot)poliod(dot)hu
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--
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742 INTERNET: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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