Mailman and bounces...

2009-01-18 Thread Alan Clegg
While off-topic to BIND, as a point of list management, I would like to
present the following commentary:

The topic of bounces was brought up recently and I'd like to expound a
bit on some of the issues that the change in mailing list managers has
caused.

It seems that the previous mailing list software did no list bounce
management what-so-ever.  If an address was on the list, it was on the
list forever, even if it was disabled, removed, put behind a
spam-bouncing device, etc.

The new software does a very good job of catching bounced e-mail which
now includes things like:

   554 Sorry, this message appears to be spam (#5.6.0)

   550-5.7.1 rejected content, black listed

   554 Sorry, message looks like SPAM to me

   554 5.7.1 Message failed spam test: Incident ID 1xx0

   554 5.7.1 Message scored extremely high on spam scale.  No incident
 created.

ALL of the above responses were to legitimate e-mail that were NOT spam,
but did contain config files, BIND error messages, output from dig, etc.

The combination of messages with high spamity ratings and a list
manager that now actually cares about bounces is causing people to have
their list memberships disabled, and then their addresses removed from
the lists.

We (ISC list managers) do our best to keep the list spam-free, but many
posts are being tagged as junk by over-sensitive filtering software.

If there is anything that you, as users of the list can do to limit the
number of this looks like spam bounces that your mailers generate by
adding ISC to the appropriate white-lists, we would much appreciate it.

This e-mail will probably not make it to the people to-whom it is
addressed because it contains things that their filters will not allow
to pass.

Alan Clegg
bind-*/dhcp-* list manager



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Re: Unified Root - Domain Configuration Issue

2009-01-18 Thread Mark Andrews

In message 496fb92d.5050...@peter-dambier.de, Peter Dambier writes:
 Hi ozgurs,
 
 can you give me your address so I can settup a zone for you?
 
 e.g.
 
 ozgursA   127.0.0.1
 
 Then you have the proof that it is working.

http://tld and u...@tld can *never* work *reliably* as they
would cause namespace clashes.   Single label represent local
names not global names.

Mark
 
 Please have a look at
 
 http://www.cesidianroot.net/
 
 to find how to settup your DNS for the test.
 
 If you have a dynamic ip address things are a little bit
 more complicated but can be solved too.
 
 Cheers
 Peter
 
 
 ozgurs wrote:
  We want to buy a unified root domain,
  but they say we can not use the domain only one word.
  like
  ozgurs
  =
 
  so that it opens
  http://ozgurs
  =
 
  =
 
  but we have to use a connected word to this TLD, like
  example.ozgurs
  =
 
  here, my quetion comes! :)
  =
 
  i bet with my friend that we can not use the domain itself.
  NOW
  I NEED A PROOF :
  =
 
  We want to know the reason why we can not use TLD alone itself,
  without a word in connected to it.
  =
 
  =
 
  =
 
  ( I mean: instead of the URL
  =
 
  =
 
  =
 
  ozgurs
  =
 
  =
 
  =
 
  we have to use
  =
 
  =
 
  =
 
  example.ozgurs
  =
 
  )
  =
 
  =
 
  =
 
  =
 
  =
 
  We want the reasons, with exact documents (for example a university=92s
  DNS managerment document from their site link or a scientific article
  regarding this issue (about the must of usage and reasons why we must
  use a word connected to the domain.)
  =
 
  =
 
  =
 
  =
 
  =
 
  Note: We will buy these products after we are satisified with the
  explanations and documents=92 reliability about the explained issue
  above. (the usages, rules of domains, configurations, DNS)
  =
 
  I mean I have to prove this that it is impossible to use the domain as
  one word (like ozgurs) with very reliable indications and strongly
  that no one can deny it any way of idea)
  =
 
  =
 
  =
 
  =
 
  =
 
  =
 
  With best regards,
  =
 
  =
 
  OzgurS
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 -- =
 
 Peter and Karin Dambier
 Cesidian Root - Radice Cesidiana
 Rimbacher Strasse 16
 D-69509 Moerlenbach-Bonsweiher
 +49(6209)795-816 (Telekom)
 +49(6252)750-308 (VoIP: sipgate.de)
 mail: pe...@peter-dambier.de
 http://www.peter-dambier.de/
 http://iason.site.voila.fr/
 https://sourceforge.net/projects/iason/
 ULA=3D fd80:4ce1:c66a::/48
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-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742 INTERNET: mark_andr...@isc.org
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Avoiding being used as DDoS reflector.

2009-01-18 Thread Nathan Ollerenshaw

Hi,

I've searched around a bit, and noticed some others have similar  
problems as this but nobody has come up with a decent solution, or at  
least, I've not found one.


I have an Authoritative BIND server. It is configured to only allow  
recursive queries from localhost, with recursion disabled for any  
remote clients.


If you attempt to perform a recursive query against this server, it  
will respond with a query refused packet, as this is what BIND does  
if you try to recursively query a server configured to disallow  
recursive queries.


Kiddies, however, are exploiting this behaviour to provide a level of  
indirection in their DDoS efforts.


Jan 19 10:12:34 mars named[7683]: client 69.50.142.110#40346: query  
(cache) './NS/IN' denied
Jan 19 10:12:35 mars named[7683]: client 76.9.16.171#47713: query  
(cache) './NS/IN' denied
Jan 19 10:12:37 mars named[7683]: client 76.9.16.171#53205: query  
(cache) './NS/IN' denied
Jan 19 10:12:38 mars named[7683]: client 76.9.16.171#2340: query  
(cache) './NS/IN' denied
Jan 19 10:12:39 mars named[7683]: client 76.9.16.171#53417: query  
(cache) './NS/IN' denied
Jan 19 10:12:41 mars named[7683]: client 76.9.16.171#38593: query  
(cache) './NS/IN' denied
Jan 19 10:12:43 mars named[7683]: client 69.50.142.110#61075: query  
(cache) './NS/IN' denied
Jan 19 10:12:43 mars named[7683]: client 76.9.16.171#54721: query  
(cache) './NS/IN' denied
Jan 19 10:12:45 mars named[7683]: client 76.9.16.171#12764: query  
(cache) './NS/IN' denied
Jan 19 10:12:47 mars named[7683]: client 76.9.16.171#59043: query  
(cache) './NS/IN' denied
Jan 19 10:12:47 mars named[7683]: client 76.9.16.171#55282: query  
(cache) './NS/IN' denied
Jan 19 10:12:49 mars named[7683]: client 76.9.16.171#54628: query  
(cache) './NS/IN' denied
Jan 19 10:12:51 mars named[7683]: client 76.9.16.171#34097: query  
(cache) './NS/IN' denied
Jan 19 10:12:52 mars named[7683]: client 69.50.142.110#63662: query  
(cache) './NS/IN' denied


Each of these requests send back a packet to the IP the spoofed query  
coes from. I've contacted network operators (not necessarily those  
ones listed for these IPs) and they've confirmed, separately, that  
they've been under attack for several weeks by these DNS reply packets.


Obviously the amount of load here is negligible to me, and if I didn't  
care about anyone else, then I could just suppress the log messages  
and move on with my life. But, I don't think thats the appropriate  
response.


Even though my nameserver seems to be correctly configured, there  
seems to be no way for me to ignore these spurious requests or rate  
limit them, so therefore I'm aiding the attackers, however obliquely,  
in their efforts.


I've considered using views blackhole recursive requests, but  
blackholes can only be specified in the global configuration, not in  
views. I've considered using iptables/netfilter and the u32 extension  
to match the specific DNS flags that denote a recursive query, and  
then apply a rate limit; but I really don't know the best way forward.


I currently manage these attacks by adding a blackhole entry for each  
IP that the kiddies try to attack, but this is a stop-gap, and I'd  
prefer something that can work in an automatic way to deny kiddies the  
use of my authoritative nameserver as a reflector.


The ideal solution for me, would be a bind configuration option that  
could rate limit responses based on type; so you could specify that a  
REFUSED reply will only be sent to a given host once per hour, or  
something like that.


Any ideas? Anyone facing this same problem found a solution? I'd be  
glad to hear it :)


--
Nathan Ollerenshaw :: http://www.stupendous.net/
Anyone who has never made a mistake has never
 tried anything new. - Albert Einstein



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