segfaults with bind RPZ?

2011-12-16 Thread Phil Mayers

All,

I had a use-case for bind RPZ today, so enabled it on our internal 
testing DNS servers (running 9.8.1-P1).


I had already created and deployed the rpz zone, as a sub-zone of our 
(DNSSEC-signed) main zone.


As soon as the cfengine job ran, which basically added:

  response-policy { zone rpz.main.zone.com; };

...and issued an rndc config, I got a segfault.

Hmm. Ok, restart the process. 20 minutes later, another segfault.

Hmm. Open GDB, and I get errors trying to attach:

../../gdb/linux-nat.c:1361: internal-error: linux_nat_post_attach_wait: 
Assertion `pid == new_pid  WIFSTOPPED (status)' failed.


Bah. So I can't supply a traceback unfortunately.

Has anyone else seen problems deploying RPZ in a DNSSEC-validating 
recursive resolver, running 9.8.1-P1? Platform is x86_64, RHEL5.

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Re: Cache only and reverse mapping

2011-12-16 Thread John Wobus

On Dec 15, 2011, at 3:07 AM, sasa sasa wrote:
For an ISP, is there any risk in configuring BIND DNS as cache only  
and adding customer's reverse mapping zones?


If this copy of the reverse zone is for the world's use (i.e. in the  
delegation tree), then your DNS server would
be answering queries from the world, and a caching server answering  
queries from the world is vulnerable to known
cache vulnerabilities in the DNS protocol.  On the other hand, if this  
copy of the reverse zone is only to answer
your customer's queries, and the DNS server is configured not to  
answer queries from the world, then you've avoided
the DNS protocol vulnerabilities and there's no special risk attached  
to serving this zone.


Aside from the issue of preventing known cache vulnerabilities in the  
DNS protocol, folks often separate
caching from authoritative (specifically, in the delegation tree) as  
an insurance policy against bugs and
vulnerabilities that haven't been found yet.  It's hard to quantify  
risks associated with bugs and vulnerabilities

that no one has found yet and may not even exist.


Any other possible implementations?


We'd have to know what you're trying to accomplish.

John Wobus
Cornell U
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Re: CNAME only zone?

2011-12-16 Thread John Wobus

If CloudFlare is similar to Akamai's solution, recursive servers never
see the CNAME record.  Instead, when the auth server receives the  
query

for the A record of the apex, it performs its own query for the CNAME,
and returns the result of this.


In other words, if your theory is correct, this CNAME
is window dressing for the customer (yes, they gave me a
CNAME, I'm happy!) while actually they serve A records
that they've specified to give the same answer as whatever
address the A record of such-and-such name has.  What they
present in their customer interface or store in their
zone-file-equivalent is arbitrary.

Makes DNSSEC interesting.

It's always helpful to be able to tell your customer yes, we gave
you a CNAME, just like you asked for.  We do it even if our competitors
say no!

John Wobus

P.S. Hm, I wonder if a TLD will give me a three part CNAME:
if they've given me example.com. CNAME foo, will they also give
me www.example.com. CNAME foo?

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Re: Cache only and reverse mapping

2011-12-16 Thread sasa sasa
I'm trying to setup a DNS for an ISP, this ISP's DNS is in delegation tree 
(answering world), and I know about cache vulnerabilities so I was wondering 
what is the best solution for ISPs?
By separating cache from authorities, you mean implementing 2 DNSs (2 different 
IPs)? This doesn't sound practical.

Thanks,
Sa

On Dec 15, 2011, at 3:07 AM, sasa sasa wrote:

 For an ISP, is there any risk in configuring BIND DNS as cache only and 
 adding customer's reverse mapping zones?

If this copy of the reverse zone is for the world's use (i.e. in the delegation 
tree), then your DNS server would
be answering queries from the world, and a caching server answering queries 
from the world is vulnerable to known
cache vulnerabilities in the DNS protocol.  On the other hand, if this copy of 
the reverse zone is only to answer
your customer's queries, and the DNS server is configured not to answer queries 
from the world, then you've avoided
the DNS protocol vulnerabilities and there's no special risk attached to 
serving this zone.

Aside from the issue of preventing known cache vulnerabilities in the DNS 
protocol, folks often separate
caching from authoritative (specifically, in the delegation tree) as an 
insurance policy against bugs and
vulnerabilities that haven't been found yet.  It's hard to quantify risks 
associated with bugs and vulnerabilities
that no one has found yet and may not even exist.

 Any other possible implementations?

We'd have to know what you're trying to accomplish.

John Wobus
Cornell U
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Re: Cache only and reverse mapping

2011-12-16 Thread John Wobus

On Dec 16, 2011, at 11:22 AM, sasa sasa wrote:
I'm trying to setup a DNS for an ISP, this ISP's DNS is in  
delegation tree (answering world), and I know about cache  
vulnerabilities so I was wondering what is the best solution for ISPs?
By separating cache from authorities, you mean implementing 2 DNSs  
(2 different IPs)? This doesn't sound practical.



Then I suspect you know all this, but...

The practicality certainly depends upon your site's situation.  Many
sites have enough IPs to allocate a few more to DNS, and enough server
capacity to run more bind instances, but I imagine some don't.

Two such bind instances could be on different hardware or the same,
but two IPs would be necessary.  Bind typically runs on OSes that,  
without
tricks such as natting, generally support just one program listening  
to a specific
port/ip.  Bind's view feature allows a single bind instance on a  
single IP to
act like a bit like two instances, offering some of the advantages of  
isolating

their respective functions.

Aside from this, a bind instance can be configured not answer queries
to non-authoritative data from outside your address space.  This also  
gives
you some of the risk advantages you'd get from running separate  
instances.


John Wobus
Cornell University
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Re: Cache only and reverse mapping

2011-12-16 Thread J
sasa sasa wrote:
 I'm trying to setup a DNS for an ISP, this ISP's DNS is in delegation
 tree (answering world), and I know about cache vulnerabilities so I was
 wondering what is the best solution for ISPs? By separating cache from
 authorities, you mean implementing 2 DNSs (2 different IPs)? This doesn't
 sound practical.

 Thanks, Sa

Why not?  Your customers don't need to know about the authoritatives
directly; the only addresses they'll require are the caching servers'.

I'd bet on small efficiencies to be gained only by mixing the two, but not
worth the potential troubles, IMHO.
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