Re: [bitcoin-dev] Generalized covenants with taproot enable riskless or risky lending, prevent credit inflation through fractional reserve
It’s an exceedingly poor example. First, value is subjective. It matters not what other people may consider, only those who act. Given that people trade them (ICO tokens), they have value to those people. Second, the scenario would not function given that the value, as with money, is based on the ability to trade perpetually. I said that I would make no further comment given the belief that no new ideas were surfacing. However, after giving it some more thought on my own, I believe I have found the one case in which a person could value such encumbered coins. In the case of tracking an asset that becomes worthless at a specific time, one could value a record of ownership, and the ability to trade ownership of the asset during the period. Consider colored coin type tracking of a theater ticket for a specific show, where the ticket is worthless by the end of the show. Now consider the value attributable to renting coin (e.g. to the tick issuer) in order to track the ticket. First, there is no net value in renting coin to pay confirmation (mining) fees on transfers. The cost of a fee is driven by competition and remains the same whether the coin used for payment is encumbered or not. In other words, even with value in tracking there is no *cost advantage* to renting of such coins for use as money. But tracking an asset in this manner has required not only a fee for each trade, but also the burning of coin. By allowing the lender to recover the coin when the asset expires, this part of the cost of on-chain tracking can be time-shared (rented), and without depreciation of the coin. In this case the lender is achieving both a time-locked hoard/speculation and a pre-paid rental return. The return to the lender would be the rental price minus the opportunity cost of not investing (ie, in production) this coin otherwise during that period. This is of course based on the economic principle that both hoarding and speculation are expected to produce no predictable return. As such the cost of the rental would be driven (by competition) toward the cost of capital (e.g. annualized 10% of the coin price) for the same period. Depending on the term, rental will be cheaper than the outright cost of burning the same minimum amount of coin (i.e. dust+1, assuming policy compliance) as required for tracking. As soon as the rental cost exceeds the minimum tracking burn, rental becomes more expensive than just purchasing the coin. So, for example, at 10% market return on capital (rental cost), purchasing the coin is cheaper than rental at any tracking term beyond 7.2 years. As discussed previously, there can be no monetary value of such encumbered coins. And as shown above, the non-monetary (tracking) scenario is limited to fixed-term tracking. This use of Bitcoin would of course reduce the average cost of non-monetary blockchain storage. I’m not sure that is a use people want to facilitate with a protocol change, but that’s for the community to decide. Best, Eric > On Jun 30, 2019, at 13:26, Tamas Blummer wrote: > > My argument does not need the comparison with ICOs. > > They were just an example that people pay for the utility of register even > though others think the tokens they keep track of are worthless. > > Tamas Blummer > > >> On Jun 30, 2019, at 22:13, Eric Voskuil wrote: >> >> ICO tokens can be traded (indefinitely) for other things of value, so the >> comparison isn’t valid. I think we’ve both made our points clearly, so I’ll >> leave it at that. >> >> Best, >> Eric >> >>> On Jun 30, 2019, at 12:55, Tamas Blummer wrote: >>> >>> On Jun 30, 2019, at 20:54, Eric Voskuil wrote: Could you please explain the meaning and utility of “unforgeable register” as it pertains to such encumbered coins? >>> >>> I guess we agree that some way of keeping track of ownership is >>> prerequisite for something to aquire value. >>> We likely also agree that the security of that ownership register has great >>> influence to the value. >>> >>> The question remains if a register as utility in itself gives value to the >>> thing needed to use that register. >>> I think it does, if people are interested in what it keeps track of, for >>> whatever reason, even for reasons you find bogus. >>> >>> It was not intentional, but I think I just explained why Ethereum aquired >>> higher market value by being register of ICO tokens. >>> >>> Now back to the coins encumbered with the debt covenant: >>> Transactions moving them constitute a register of covered debt and you need >>> them to update that register. >>> Should some people find such a register useful then those coins needed to >>> update this register will aquire value. >>> Does not matter if you think the concept of covered debt is just as bogus >>> as ICOs. >>> >>> Here some good news: If they aquire value then they offer a way to generate >>> income for hodler by temporarily giving up control. >>>
Re: [bitcoin-dev] Generalized covenant to implement side chains embedded into the bitcoin block chain
Any meaningful covenant must be one that is reducing control by the current owner. I can think of countless predicates reducing control, but try to explore the least invasive first, and see if they unlock a new use. Offering alternate control paths is what taproot was designed for, therefore a covenant that requires that a control path is inherited seems a fit. That is all the debt covenant needs. There are other predicates with exciting use, such as one on total work performed by miner which I tried to explore earlier. Pieter Wuille said it could be a candidate for the annex. Tamas Blummer > On Jun 30, 2019, at 19:50, Tamas Blummer wrote: > > I made an error proposing the new covenant. It should be unchanged as in the > original example: > > ‘covenant or(and(_, pk(Transfer)) covenant transitive, and(pk(Exit), _) > covenant drop)’ > > since the placeholder stays for the control of the rightful owner without > transfer signature on or off chain. > > The exit could be alternatively automatic allowing to exit a stalling > unchained platform: > > ‘covenant or(and(_, pk(Transfer)) covenant transitive, and(delay(100), _) > covenant drop)’ > > There remains the question why the rightful owner is not enforcing the > covenant instead of having it enforced by on-chain consensus. > > I do not yet have a good answer for that as in contrast to the debt example, > here it is aligned with the interest of the current owner to have the > covenant. > > Tamas Blummer > >> On Jun 30, 2019, at 18:57, Tamas Blummer wrote: >> >> Hello ZmnSCPxj, >> >> Yes, representation of debt is more interesting here as it requires the >> covenant, wheras this example, as you point out, was less convincing given >> alternatives. >> I created this example to avoid discussion of topics not approriate on this >> list. >> >> Thank you for the suggestion of unchained execution of transfers with >> cut-through exit transaction as this made the example much stronger: >> >> The most important question for someone who trusts his coins to some >> unchained platform is probably the question of how exit is guaranteed if one >> is unhappy with what one gets. >> >> With the exit covenant exit conditions are set in stone, since validated >> on-chain. If the exit key is owned by a trusted arbiter other than the >> federation governing the unchained platform >> then one at least have the option to cut losses at some point by presenting >> the arbiter a chain of valid transactions and asking to sign the exit. >> >> Participants in the unchained platform would also be interested to regularly >> snapshot the economic effect of offchain transactions with cut-through >> transactions as such cut-through shortens the chain of transactions >> they would need to get on chain if chosing the exit without consent of the >> federation governing the transfers. >> >> So the convenant needed is: 'covenant or(_ covenant transitive, and(pkExit, >> _) covenant drop)' which gives unrestricted flexibility to the unchained >> platform with the exception that it has to maintain the exit option. >> >> >> Tamas Blummer >> >> >>> On Jun 29, 2019, at 22:25, ZmnSCPxj wrote: >>> >>> Good morning Tamas, >>> >>> While I think covenants for some kind of debt tool is mildly interesting >>> and an appropriate solution, I wonder about this particular use-case. >>> >>> It seems to me that, as either the `Transfer` signers or `Exit` signers are >>> always involved, that the `Transfer` signers can be constrained so as to >>> ensure that the rules are followed correctly, without requiring that >>> covenants be used on the Bitcoin layer. >>> After all, the outputs of each transaction signed by the `Transfer` signers >>> are part of the transaction that is being signed; surely the `Transfer` >>> signers can validate that the output matches the contract expected, without >>> requiring that fullnodes also validate this? >>> >>> In particular, it seems to me that covenants are only useful if there exist >>> some alternative that does not involve some kind of fixed `Transfer` signer >>> set, but still requires a covenant. >>> Otherwise, the `Transfer` signer set could simply impose the rules by >>> themselves. >>> >>> >>> Another thing is that, if my understanding is correct, the "sidechain" here >>> is not in fact a sidechain; the "sidechain" transaction graph is published >>> on the Bitcoin blockchain. >>> Instead, the `Transfer` signers simply validate some smart contract, most >>> likely embedded as a pay-to-contract in the `pk(Alice)`/`pk(Bob)` public >>> keys, and ensure that the smart contract is correctly executed. >>> In that case, it may be useful to consider Smart Contracts Unchained >>> instead: https://zmnscpxj.github.io/bitcoin/unchained.html >>> >>> It would be possible, under Smart Contracts Unchained, to keep the >>> `Transfer`-signed transactions offchain, until `Exit`-signing. >>> Then, when this chain of
Re: [bitcoin-dev] Generalized covenants with taproot enable riskless or risky lending, prevent credit inflation through fractional reserve
My argument does not need the comparison with ICOs. They were just an example that people pay for the utility of register even though others think the tokens they keep track of are worthless. Tamas Blummer > On Jun 30, 2019, at 22:13, Eric Voskuil wrote: > > ICO tokens can be traded (indefinitely) for other things of value, so the > comparison isn’t valid. I think we’ve both made our points clearly, so I’ll > leave it at that. > > Best, > Eric > >> On Jun 30, 2019, at 12:55, Tamas Blummer wrote: >> >> >>> On Jun 30, 2019, at 20:54, Eric Voskuil wrote: >>> >>> Could you please explain the meaning and utility of “unforgeable register” >>> as it pertains to such encumbered coins? >> >> I guess we agree that some way of keeping track of ownership is prerequisite >> for something to aquire value. >> We likely also agree that the security of that ownership register has great >> influence to the value. >> >> The question remains if a register as utility in itself gives value to the >> thing needed to use that register. >> I think it does, if people are interested in what it keeps track of, for >> whatever reason, even for reasons you find bogus. >> >> It was not intentional, but I think I just explained why Ethereum aquired >> higher market value by being register of ICO tokens. >> >> Now back to the coins encumbered with the debt covenant: >> Transactions moving them constitute a register of covered debt and you need >> them to update that register. >> Should some people find such a register useful then those coins needed to >> update this register will aquire value. >> Does not matter if you think the concept of covered debt is just as bogus as >> ICOs. >> >> Here some good news: If they aquire value then they offer a way to generate >> income for hodler by temporarily giving up control. >> >> Tamas Blummer >> >>> >>> The meaning in terms of Bitcoin is clear - the “owner” of outputs that >>> represent value (i.e. in the ability to trade them for something else) is >>> recorded publicly and, given Bitcoin security assumptions, cannot be faked. >>> What is not clear is the utility of a record of outputs that cannot be >>> traded for something else. You seem to imply that a record is valuable >>> simply because it’s a record. >>> >>> e >>> On Jun 30, 2019, at 11:35, Tamas Blummer wrote: > On Jun 30, 2019, at 19:41, Eric Voskuil wrote: > > >> On Jun 30, 2019, at 03:56, Tamas Blummer wrote: >> >> Hi Eric, >> >>> On Jun 29, 2019, at 23:21, Eric Voskuil wrote: >>> >>> What loan? Alice has paid Bob for something of no possible utility to >>> her, or anyone else. >>> >> >> Coins encumbered with the described covenant represent temporary control >> of a scarce resource. >> >> Can this obtain value? That depends on the availability of final control >> and ability to deal with temporary control. > > For something to become property (and therefore have marketable value) > requires that it be both scarce and useful. Bitcoin is useful only to the > extent that it can be traded for something else that is useful. Above you > are only dealing with scarcity, ignoring utility. There is a deeper utility of Bitcoin than it can be traded for something else. That utility is to use its unforgeable register. We have only one kind of units in this register and by having covenants we would create other kinds that are while encumbered not fungible with the common ones. Units are certainly less desirable if encumbered with a debt covenant. You say no one would assign them any value. I am not that sure as they still offer the utility of using the unforgeable register, in this case a register of debt covered by reserves. You also doubt forcing debt to be covered by reserves is a good idea, I got that, but suppose we do not discuss this here. If there are people who think it is a good idea, then they would find having an unforgeable register of it useful and therefore units needed to maintain that register valuable to some extent. > >> I think you do not show the neccesary respect of the market. > > I’m not sure what is meant here by respect, or how much of it is > necessary. I am merely explaining the market. > You are not explaining an existing market but claim that market that is not yet there will follow your arguments. >> Your rant reminds me of renowed economists who still argue final control >> Bitcoin can not have value, you do the same proclaiming that temporary >> control of Bitcoin can not have value. > > It seems to me you have reversed the meaning of temporary and final. > Bitcoin is useful because of the presumption that there is no finality of > control. One presumes an ability
Re: [bitcoin-dev] Generalized covenants with taproot enable riskless or risky lending, prevent credit inflation through fractional reserve
ICO tokens can be traded (indefinitely) for other things of value, so the comparison isn’t valid. I think we’ve both made our points clearly, so I’ll leave it at that. Best, Eric > On Jun 30, 2019, at 12:55, Tamas Blummer wrote: > > >> On Jun 30, 2019, at 20:54, Eric Voskuil wrote: >> >> Could you please explain the meaning and utility of “unforgeable register” >> as it pertains to such encumbered coins? > > I guess we agree that some way of keeping track of ownership is prerequisite > for something to aquire value. > We likely also agree that the security of that ownership register has great > influence to the value. > > The question remains if a register as utility in itself gives value to the > thing needed to use that register. > I think it does, if people are interested in what it keeps track of, for > whatever reason, even for reasons you find bogus. > > It was not intentional, but I think I just explained why Ethereum aquired > higher market value by being register of ICO tokens. > > Now back to the coins encumbered with the debt covenant: > Transactions moving them constitute a register of covered debt and you need > them to update that register. > Should some people find such a register useful then those coins needed to > update this register will aquire value. > Does not matter if you think the concept of covered debt is just as bogus as > ICOs. > > Here some good news: If they aquire value then they offer a way to generate > income for hodler by temporarily giving up control. > > Tamas Blummer > >> >> The meaning in terms of Bitcoin is clear - the “owner” of outputs that >> represent value (i.e. in the ability to trade them for something else) is >> recorded publicly and, given Bitcoin security assumptions, cannot be faked. >> What is not clear is the utility of a record of outputs that cannot be >> traded for something else. You seem to imply that a record is valuable >> simply because it’s a record. >> >> e >> >>> On Jun 30, 2019, at 11:35, Tamas Blummer wrote: >>> >>> On Jun 30, 2019, at 19:41, Eric Voskuil wrote: > On Jun 30, 2019, at 03:56, Tamas Blummer wrote: > > Hi Eric, > >> On Jun 29, 2019, at 23:21, Eric Voskuil wrote: >> >> What loan? Alice has paid Bob for something of no possible utility to >> her, or anyone else. >> > > Coins encumbered with the described covenant represent temporary control > of a scarce resource. > > Can this obtain value? That depends on the availability of final control > and ability to deal with temporary control. For something to become property (and therefore have marketable value) requires that it be both scarce and useful. Bitcoin is useful only to the extent that it can be traded for something else that is useful. Above you are only dealing with scarcity, ignoring utility. >>> >>> There is a deeper utility of Bitcoin than it can be traded for something >>> else. That utility is to use its unforgeable register. >>> We have only one kind of units in this register and by having covenants we >>> would create other kinds that are while encumbered not fungible with the >>> common ones. >>> >>> Units are certainly less desirable if encumbered with a debt covenant. You >>> say no one would assign them any value. >>> >>> I am not that sure as they still offer the utility of using the unforgeable >>> register, in this case a register of debt covered by reserves. >>> You also doubt forcing debt to be covered by reserves is a good idea, I got >>> that, but suppose we do not discuss this here. >>> If there are people who think it is a good idea, then they would find >>> having an unforgeable register of it useful and therefore units needed to >>> maintain that register valuable to some extent. >>> > I think you do not show the neccesary respect of the market. I’m not sure what is meant here by respect, or how much of it is necessary. I am merely explaining the market. >>> >>> You are not explaining an existing market but claim that market that is not >>> yet there will follow your arguments. >>> > Your rant reminds me of renowed economists who still argue final control > Bitcoin can not have value, you do the same proclaiming that temporary > control of Bitcoin can not have value. It seems to me you have reversed the meaning of temporary and final. Bitcoin is useful because of the presumption that there is no finality of control. One presumes an ability to trade control of it for something else. This is temporary control. Final control would be the case in which, at some point, it can no longer be traded, making it worthless at that point. If this is known to be the case it implies that it it worthless at all prior points as well. These are distinct scenarios. The fact that temporary (in my
Re: [bitcoin-dev] Generalized covenants with taproot enable riskless or risky lending, prevent credit inflation through fractional reserve
> On Jun 30, 2019, at 20:54, Eric Voskuil wrote: > > Could you please explain the meaning and utility of “unforgeable register” as > it pertains to such encumbered coins? I guess we agree that some way of keeping track of ownership is prerequisite for something to aquire value. We likely also agree that the security of that ownership register has great influence to the value. The question remains if a register as utility in itself gives value to the thing needed to use that register. I think it does, if people are interested in what it keeps track of, for whatever reason, even for reasons you find bogus. It was not intentional, but I think I just explained why Ethereum aquired higher market value by being register of ICO tokens. Now back to the coins encumbered with the debt covenant: Transactions moving them constitute a register of covered debt and you need them to update that register. Should some people find such a register useful then those coins needed to update this register will aquire value. Does not matter if you think the concept of covered debt is just as bogus as ICOs. Here some good news: If they aquire value then they offer a way to generate income for hodler by temporarily giving up control. Tamas Blummer > > The meaning in terms of Bitcoin is clear - the “owner” of outputs that > represent value (i.e. in the ability to trade them for something else) is > recorded publicly and, given Bitcoin security assumptions, cannot be faked. > What is not clear is the utility of a record of outputs that cannot be traded > for something else. You seem to imply that a record is valuable simply > because it’s a record. > > e > >> On Jun 30, 2019, at 11:35, Tamas Blummer wrote: >> >> >>> On Jun 30, 2019, at 19:41, Eric Voskuil wrote: >>> >>> On Jun 30, 2019, at 03:56, Tamas Blummer wrote: Hi Eric, > On Jun 29, 2019, at 23:21, Eric Voskuil wrote: > > What loan? Alice has paid Bob for something of no possible utility to > her, or anyone else. > Coins encumbered with the described covenant represent temporary control of a scarce resource. Can this obtain value? That depends on the availability of final control and ability to deal with temporary control. >>> >>> For something to become property (and therefore have marketable value) >>> requires that it be both scarce and useful. Bitcoin is useful only to the >>> extent that it can be traded for something else that is useful. Above you >>> are only dealing with scarcity, ignoring utility. >> >> There is a deeper utility of Bitcoin than it can be traded for something >> else. That utility is to use its unforgeable register. >> We have only one kind of units in this register and by having covenants we >> would create other kinds that are while encumbered not fungible with the >> common ones. >> >> Units are certainly less desirable if encumbered with a debt covenant. You >> say no one would assign them any value. >> >> I am not that sure as they still offer the utility of using the unforgeable >> register, in this case a register of debt covered by reserves. >> You also doubt forcing debt to be covered by reserves is a good idea, I got >> that, but suppose we do not discuss this here. >> If there are people who think it is a good idea, then they would find having >> an unforgeable register of it useful and therefore units needed to maintain >> that register valuable to some extent. >> >>> I think you do not show the neccesary respect of the market. >>> >>> I’m not sure what is meant here by respect, or how much of it is necessary. >>> I am merely explaining the market. >>> >> >> You are not explaining an existing market but claim that market that is not >> yet there will follow your arguments. >> Your rant reminds me of renowed economists who still argue final control Bitcoin can not have value, you do the same proclaiming that temporary control of Bitcoin can not have value. >>> >>> It seems to me you have reversed the meaning of temporary and final. >>> Bitcoin is useful because of the presumption that there is no finality of >>> control. One presumes an ability to trade control of it for something else. >>> This is temporary control. Final control would be the case in which, at >>> some point, it can no longer be traded, making it worthless at that point. >>> If this is known to be the case it implies that it it worthless at all >>> prior points as well. >>> >>> These are distinct scenarios. The fact that temporary (in my usage) control >>> implies the possibility of value does not imply that finality of control >>> does as well. The fact that (renowned or otherwise) people have made errors >>> does not imply that I am making an error. These are both non-sequiturs. >>> I say, that temporary control does not have value until means dealing with it are offered, and that is I work
