Good Morning List,
understanding the strategy wrongly or purposelydriving the interaction into a
false framing doesn’t benefit Bitcoin. Mentioning or
distracts from the proposed strategy.
The strategy aims to increment the coercion cost of mining-entities relative to
the cooperation cost of mining-entities in regards of arbitrary data insertion;
it is not about banning or censoring.
Mentioning other ways or methods to insert arbitrary data should not be
understood as a threat or menace, but much more as topics which each Bitcoin
developer should have in mind to solve.
It is healthy to assume that arbitrary data insertions are nothing but innocent
or negligible. The Bitcoin system is still in the struggle of two visions:
- One controlled by every node operator and highly decentralized. (Nobody alone
controls)
or
- One controlled by a few very highly capitalized entity node operators and
highly centralized. (A committee controls).
The best tactical way to reach the latter is via prohibitive cost increment for
operating a regular Bitcoin node (aka. archival full node). That will reduce
the network decentralization making it susceptible for central entity
elimination or control acquisition; and not necessary by a national-state
government.
Chris
--- Forwarded Message ---
Von: Russell O'Connor
Datum: Am Montag, 21. August 2023 um 16:47
Betreff: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Concern about "Inscriptions"
An: martl.ch...@proton.me , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
> It's been said before, but I'll say it again:
>
> If we ban "arbitrary data", however you want to define it, then actors will
> simply respond by encoding their data within sets of public keys. Public key
> data is indistinguishable from random data, and, unless we are willing to pad
> the blockchain with proof of knowledge of secret keys, there will be no way
> to tell a priori whether a given public key is really a public key or whether
> it is encoding an inscription or some other data.
>
> When certain governments try to censor certain internet protocols, users
> respond by tunnelling their protocol through something that appears to be
> innocent HTTPS (see Tor bridge nodes). This works because, after a handshake,
> the remaining HTTPS stream, like public keys, is indistinguishable from
> random data, and can be used as a communications channel for arbitrary data.
> If we attempt to ban "arbitrary data", those users will simply respond by
> "tunneling" their data over innocent-looking public key data instead.
>
> Please correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe Counterparty has, in the past,
> encoded their data within public key data, so this concern is not
> hypothetical.
>
> On Sat, Aug 19, 2023 at 10:29 AM Chris Martl via bitcoin-dev
> wrote:
>
>> It is already more than a half year since the probably mayor Bitcoin script
>> exploit started.
>>
>> These exploits are nothing new in the Bitcoin history and mostly are due to
>> the loose flexibility of the system in regards of processing predicatives
>> (Bitcoin script). The very first mayor bug; if you wish, vulnerability, was
>> the CVE-2010-5141, which still engages us without end even after 14 years.
>>
>> Subsequent Bitcoin historical events let to build more “improvements” upon
>> this wobbly basis exposing even more ground for exploits.
>>
>> As long as this loose flexibility is not modified in a way its exposure for
>> exploits is eliminated remains nothing else than to pursue other strategies;
>> and ones which are compatible with the current status quo and furthermore,
>> with a permission-less system.
>>
>> Here a strategy proposal:
>>
>> Let’s name it: #Ordisrespector and #Ordislow.
>>
>> Why #Ordisrespector and #Ordislow are compatible with a permission-less
>> system.
>>
>> #Ordisrespector gives the option to a regular Bitcoin node operator to
>> opt-in or not to a self-defense of his/her storage property (and thus of
>> his/her integrity); by giving a signal of dissatisfaction with the current
>> affairs of aggression via insertion of arbitrary data into the witness
>> structure. This dissatisfaction signal is manifested by not taking into the
>> mempool and relaying transactions with inserted arbitrary data in the
>> witness structure.
>>
>> #Ordislow gives the option to a regular Bitcoin node operator to opt-in or
>> not to a self-defense of his/her storage property (and thus of his/her
>> integrity); by increasing the coercion cost of mining-entities relative to
>> the cooperation cost of mining-entities due to the current affairs of
>> aggression via insertion of arbitrary data into the witness structure. This
>> coercion cost increment is manifested by not propagating a found block,
>> unless a configurable or maximum delay has elapsed, which contains at least
>> a transaction with inserted arbitrary data in the witness structure.
>>
>> Chris___
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>
