Re: [bitcoin-dev] Taproot proposal
Hi, I want to add to John Newbery's suggestion of using implicit even/odd only public keys and tweaked public keys in taproot and suggest the following: If everything is implicit then the only reason for the first byte of the control block(`c[0]`) is the tapscript leaf version. I suggest that this is moved to be the first OP_CODE of the tapscript itself (i.e. OP_0/OP_1 etc.) That way having the script *tells* you what does it mean without needing to check the control block. That way there's a separation between the tapscript+leaf version and the control block being the merkle path to the script. -- PGP: 5607C93B5F86650C ___ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Re: [bitcoin-dev] New BIP - v2 peer-to-peer message transport protocol
Thanks, I just couldn't find where is the message sequence number comes from. So if it's max 1GB and it's an incremental counter that cannot be reseted without a rekeying than it's perfectly fine :). Thanks for the answer! On Mon, Jun 17, 2019 at 12:20 PM Jonas Schnelli wrote: > Hi Elichai > > > About the nonce being 64bit. (rfc7539 changed it to 96bit, which djb > later calls xchacha) > > > > You suggest that we use the "message sequence number" as the nonce for > Chacha20, Is this number randomly generate or is this a counter? > > And could it be reseted without rekeying? > > The in BIP324 (v2 message transport protocol) proposed AEAD, > ChaCha20Poly1305@Bitcoin [1], uses a „message sequence number“. There is > no such thing as random nonce described in the BIP (hence the term > „sequence number“). The message sequence number starts with 0 and the max > traffic before a rekey must occur is 1GB. A nonce/key reuse is conceptually > impossible (of course implementations could screw up at this point). > > Using XChaCha20 with the possibility of a random nonce could be done, but > I don’t see a reason to use it in our case since the usage of a sequence > number as nonce seems perfectly save. > > [1] > https://gist.github.com/jonasschnelli/c530ea8421b8d0e80c51486325587c52#chacha20-poly1305bitcoin-cipher-suite > -- PGP: 5607C93B5F86650C ___ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Re: [bitcoin-dev] New BIP - v2 peer-to-peer message transport protocol
Hi everyone, About the nonce being 64bit. (rfc7539 changed it to 96bit, which djb later calls xchacha) You suggest that we use the "message sequence number" as the nonce for Chacha20, Is this number randomly generate or is this a counter? And could it be reseted without rekeying? If it is randomly generated then 64bit isn't secure enough. And we should either move to the chacha20 from RFC7539 which has 96bit nonce and 32bit counter or increment it manually every time. If it's simply a counter then 64bit nonce should be fine :) Thanks, Elichai. -- PGP: 5607C93B5F86650C ___ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
