Re: [Bitcoin-development] CoinShuffle: decentralized CoinJoin without trusted third parties
There should not be a requirement at this level to ensure validity. That would too constrain use cases of implementations of your protocol. It is not difficult to imagine use cases where parties generate chained transactions on top of unconfimed transactions. Although malleability currently makes this difficult to do safely in general, it is not inconceivable that there are circumstances where it would nevertheless be safe or otherwise desireable. It is a good security recommendation that clients validate the inputs to a shuffle they are participating in. What this means depends on the client -- checking the UTXO set for a full node, making some getutxos queries for a SPV client. But this should remain a recommendation, not a requirement. On Mon, Aug 11, 2014 at 4:38 AM, Tim Ruffing < tim.ruff...@mmci.uni-saarland.de> wrote: > Hmm, you are right. Lightweight clients are an interesting point, we have > to > think about a policy for them. > > As you said, the worst case is that the tx will not confirm. So the only > possible attack is DoS. For clients that rely on servers it's reasonable to > trust their servers not to perform DoS. (Anyway, the servers could do worse > attacks.) > > For SPV-clients (without servers), I'm not sure at the moment. Something > like > getUTXO seems to be a possibility. I think even SPV-clients can verify the > validity of the tx that created the input that is designated for mixing. > Then > the only remaining reason why it could be invalid is that the input could > have > been spent already otherwise. But in this case, only one honest client with > full information would suffice: a signed transaction that spends the money > would convince even SPV-clients that the participant with this inputs > tries to > cheat. This transaction could even be provided by lightweight client that > got > if from a server; the transaction is signed by the cheating participant > anyway. > > Tim > > On Monday 11 August 2014 02:30:16 Chris Pacia wrote: > > Actually getUTXO would probably work here as well. It isn't authenticated > > but it should be good enough for this purpose. The worst that would > happen > > is the tx doesn't confirm. > > > > On Aug 11, 2014 2:25 AM, "Chris Pacia" wrote: > > > One issue I do see is the protocol requires participants to check the > > > inputs submitted by others are valid. Lite clients (at least of the p2p > > > variety) cannot perform this check. > > > > > > You could skip the verification part and if the inputs turn out to be > > > invalid then you'll find out when it doesn't confirm. This would > problem > > > open the protocol up to dos attacks and prevent part of the "blame" > phase > > > from working properly. > > > > > > Alternatively you can have the participants submit the merkle proof for > > > the input. This would require inputs to have at least one confirmation, > > > however. > > > -- > > ___ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > > -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] CoinShuffle: decentralized CoinJoin without trusted third parties
Putting the efficacy of coinjoin to one side: On Mon, Aug 11, 2014 at 1:38 PM, Tim Ruffing < tim.ruff...@mmci.uni-saarland.de> wrote: > Then the only remaining reason why it could be invalid is that the input > could have > been spent already otherwise. But in this case, only one honest client with > full information would suffice: a signed transaction that spends the money > would convince even SPV-clients that the participant with this inputs > tries to > cheat. Bear in mind that getutxo does not return the spending transaction - it can't because the UTXO set doesn't record this information (a spent txo is deleted). However, if you have sufficient peers and one is honest, the divergence can be detected and the operation stopped/the user alerted. If all peers are lying i.e. your internet connection is controlled by an attacker, it doesn't really make much difference because they could swallow the transaction you're trying to broadcast anyway. Ultimately if your peers think a TXO is spent and refuse to relay transactions that spend them, you can't do much about it even in the non-SPV context: you *must* be able to reach at least one peer who believes in the same world as you do. -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] CoinShuffle: decentralized CoinJoin without trusted third parties
Hmm, you are right. Lightweight clients are an interesting point, we have to think about a policy for them. As you said, the worst case is that the tx will not confirm. So the only possible attack is DoS. For clients that rely on servers it's reasonable to trust their servers not to perform DoS. (Anyway, the servers could do worse attacks.) For SPV-clients (without servers), I'm not sure at the moment. Something like getUTXO seems to be a possibility. I think even SPV-clients can verify the validity of the tx that created the input that is designated for mixing. Then the only remaining reason why it could be invalid is that the input could have been spent already otherwise. But in this case, only one honest client with full information would suffice: a signed transaction that spends the money would convince even SPV-clients that the participant with this inputs tries to cheat. This transaction could even be provided by lightweight client that got if from a server; the transaction is signed by the cheating participant anyway. Tim On Monday 11 August 2014 02:30:16 Chris Pacia wrote: > Actually getUTXO would probably work here as well. It isn't authenticated > but it should be good enough for this purpose. The worst that would happen > is the tx doesn't confirm. > > On Aug 11, 2014 2:25 AM, "Chris Pacia" wrote: > > One issue I do see is the protocol requires participants to check the > > inputs submitted by others are valid. Lite clients (at least of the p2p > > variety) cannot perform this check. > > > > You could skip the verification part and if the inputs turn out to be > > invalid then you'll find out when it doesn't confirm. This would problem > > open the protocol up to dos attacks and prevent part of the "blame" phase > > from working properly. > > > > Alternatively you can have the participants submit the merkle proof for > > the input. This would require inputs to have at least one confirmation, > > however. signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part. -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
