Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP43 Purpose code for voting pool HD wallets
On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 10:11 AM, Justus Ranvier jus...@monetas.net wrote: Two draft information BIPs are attached. I've pinged some people privately but also pinging the list… no commentary on this proposal? -- Meet PCI DSS 3.0 Compliance Requirements with EventLog Analyzer Achieve PCI DSS 3.0 Compliant Status with Out-of-the-box PCI DSS Reports Are you Audit-Ready for PCI DSS 3.0 Compliance? Download White paper Comply to PCI DSS 3.0 Requirement 10 and 11.5 with EventLog Analyzer http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=154622311iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP43 Purpose code for voting pool HD wallets
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 09/26/2014 01:53 AM, Gregory Maxwell wrote: On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 10:11 AM, Justus Ranvier jus...@monetas.net wrote: Two draft information BIPs are attached. I've pinged some people privately but also pinging the list… no commentary on this proposal? Regarding the BIP process itself, I rather think it's broken in the case of informational BIPs. Proposals that require explicit action on the part of others do not logically belong in the same process as purely information proposals that do not require any explicit action by others are going to be carried out regardless. The only reason we proposed these as BIPs at all was to support the intent of BIP43. - -- Justus Ranvier | Monetas http://monetas.net/ mailto:jus...@monetas.net | Public key ID : C3F7BB2638450DB5 | BM-2cTepVtZ6AyJAs2Y8LpcvZB8KbdaWLwKqc -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJUJMrzAAoJEMP3uyY4RQ217DMH/1oGHayVo4smLM/OKeu1qqXC Xex4NNh6g7Jsu2ulfJ5ow3g7jHEDzTBp33THhUv6cnV7CpDvTC+Y24LDRrYwOBQo YuQ9u0NNtrcgoi+6vs8NuGO+yZyTyBYs1emOipsICsg42H8yhEHlrMyfOTJsO6r/ nAiqR+QH6isNOjQerd9Fs0nYQ6VANs8IksL41L8ch9YAvgKx7C8WxdcQrk/S2pNL JwD7Q729J34x34HPnOb5j5Rfm1gvQInYELBu0YBaCy7D05PZd5nPSYqUC3n35hUA AMvVf65jdQVBjvjlcqDPAPdBTQ3qjhQ+7EAWKJrwlrzhGXaWA3HpipRDUSyqzBg= =OhH8 -END PGP SIGNATURE- 0x38450DB5.asc Description: application/pgp-keys -- Meet PCI DSS 3.0 Compliance Requirements with EventLog Analyzer Achieve PCI DSS 3.0 Compliant Status with Out-of-the-box PCI DSS Reports Are you Audit-Ready for PCI DSS 3.0 Compliance? Download White paper Comply to PCI DSS 3.0 Requirement 10 and 11.5 with EventLog Analyzer http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=154622311iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] SPV clients and relaying double spends
Something like that would be a great help for SPV clients that can't detect double spends on their own. (still limited of course to sybil attack concerns) Aaron Voisine breadwallet.com On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 7:07 PM, Matt Whitlock b...@mattwhitlock.name wrote: What's to stop an attacker from broadcasting millions of spends of the same output(s) and overwhelming nodes with slower connections? Might it be a better strategy not to relay the actual transactions (after the first) but rather only propagate (once) some kind of double-spend alert? On Thursday, 25 September 2014, at 7:02 pm, Aaron Voisine wrote: There was some discussion of having nodes relay double-spends in order to alert the network about double spend attempts. A lot more users will be using SPV wallets in the future, and one of the techniques SPV clients use to judge how likely a transaction is to be confirmed is if it propagates across the network. I wonder if and when double-spend relaying is introduced, if nodes should also send BIP61 reject messages or something along those lines to indicate which transactions those nodes believe to be invalid, but are relaying anyway. This would be subject to sybil attacks, as is monitoring propagation, however it does still increase the cost of performing a 0 confirmation double spend attack on an SPV client above just relaying double-spends without indicating if a node believes the transaction to be valid. Aaron Voisine breadwallet.com -- Meet PCI DSS 3.0 Compliance Requirements with EventLog Analyzer Achieve PCI DSS 3.0 Compliant Status with Out-of-the-box PCI DSS Reports Are you Audit-Ready for PCI DSS 3.0 Compliance? Download White paper Comply to PCI DSS 3.0 Requirement 10 and 11.5 with EventLog Analyzer http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=154622311iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] SPV clients and relaying double spends
Probably the first double-spend attempt (i.e., the second transaction to spend the same output(s) as another tx already in the mempool) would still need to be relayed. A simple double-spend alert wouldn't work because it could be forged. But after there have been two attempts to spend the same output, no further transactions spending that same output should be relayed, in order to prevent flooding the network. On Thursday, 25 September 2014, at 7:12 pm, Aaron Voisine wrote: Something like that would be a great help for SPV clients that can't detect double spends on their own. (still limited of course to sybil attack concerns) Aaron Voisine breadwallet.com On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 7:07 PM, Matt Whitlock b...@mattwhitlock.name wrote: What's to stop an attacker from broadcasting millions of spends of the same output(s) and overwhelming nodes with slower connections? Might it be a better strategy not to relay the actual transactions (after the first) but rather only propagate (once) some kind of double-spend alert? On Thursday, 25 September 2014, at 7:02 pm, Aaron Voisine wrote: There was some discussion of having nodes relay double-spends in order to alert the network about double spend attempts. A lot more users will be using SPV wallets in the future, and one of the techniques SPV clients use to judge how likely a transaction is to be confirmed is if it propagates across the network. I wonder if and when double-spend relaying is introduced, if nodes should also send BIP61 reject messages or something along those lines to indicate which transactions those nodes believe to be invalid, but are relaying anyway. This would be subject to sybil attacks, as is monitoring propagation, however it does still increase the cost of performing a 0 confirmation double spend attack on an SPV client above just relaying double-spends without indicating if a node believes the transaction to be valid. Aaron Voisine breadwallet.com -- Meet PCI DSS 3.0 Compliance Requirements with EventLog Analyzer Achieve PCI DSS 3.0 Compliant Status with Out-of-the-box PCI DSS Reports Are you Audit-Ready for PCI DSS 3.0 Compliance? Download White paper Comply to PCI DSS 3.0 Requirement 10 and 11.5 with EventLog Analyzer http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=154622311iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] SPV clients and relaying double spends
What's to stop an attacker from broadcasting millions of spends of the same output(s) and overwhelming nodes with slower connections? Might it be a better strategy not to relay the actual transactions (after the first) but rather only propagate (once) some kind of double-spend alert? On Thursday, 25 September 2014, at 7:02 pm, Aaron Voisine wrote: There was some discussion of having nodes relay double-spends in order to alert the network about double spend attempts. A lot more users will be using SPV wallets in the future, and one of the techniques SPV clients use to judge how likely a transaction is to be confirmed is if it propagates across the network. I wonder if and when double-spend relaying is introduced, if nodes should also send BIP61 reject messages or something along those lines to indicate which transactions those nodes believe to be invalid, but are relaying anyway. This would be subject to sybil attacks, as is monitoring propagation, however it does still increase the cost of performing a 0 confirmation double spend attack on an SPV client above just relaying double-spends without indicating if a node believes the transaction to be valid. Aaron Voisine breadwallet.com -- Meet PCI DSS 3.0 Compliance Requirements with EventLog Analyzer Achieve PCI DSS 3.0 Compliant Status with Out-of-the-box PCI DSS Reports Are you Audit-Ready for PCI DSS 3.0 Compliance? Download White paper Comply to PCI DSS 3.0 Requirement 10 and 11.5 with EventLog Analyzer http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=154622311iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP43 Purpose code for voting pool HD wallets
I'm in favor of BIP43. Adding a Purpose node can be used as an identifier for what kind of tree is in the wallet file we're reading. I can envision a few different, common tree structures. Perhaps using a non-hardened first-layer derivation (we have clients who want this). Similarly, my proposal for a No-collision mode for multisig BIP32 trees http://sourceforge.net/p/bitcoin/mailman/message/32860512/ is another variant that might get some traction but not everyone will use it. These things could be supported by simply changing the BIP43 Purpose index and wallet software could be designed to recognize and react to the Purpose node for any number of different tree structures, and ignore any trees that it doesn't recognize (or maybe be able to view the balance across all the leaves of the tree but not expand it) We have clients with special use-cases (complex multi-layer trees) that are unlikely to be recycled across users. In such cases we might just use a random Purpose that is recognized by their system, and know that other software won't mess with it. Though it would be better if that field was encoded in the root seed, instead. Nonetheless, putting that extra layer between the root and the important tree nodes provides flexibility to BIP32 as a whole. -Alan On 09/25/2014 09:53 PM, Gregory Maxwell wrote: On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 10:11 AM, Justus Ranvier jus...@monetas.net wrote: Two draft information BIPs are attached. I've pinged some people privately but also pinging the list… no commentary on this proposal? -- Meet PCI DSS 3.0 Compliance Requirements with EventLog Analyzer Achieve PCI DSS 3.0 Compliant Status with Out-of-the-box PCI DSS Reports Are you Audit-Ready for PCI DSS 3.0 Compliance? Download White paper Comply to PCI DSS 3.0 Requirement 10 and 11.5 with EventLog Analyzer http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=154622311iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development -- Meet PCI DSS 3.0 Compliance Requirements with EventLog Analyzer Achieve PCI DSS 3.0 Compliant Status with Out-of-the-box PCI DSS Reports Are you Audit-Ready for PCI DSS 3.0 Compliance? Download White paper Comply to PCI DSS 3.0 Requirement 10 and 11.5 with EventLog Analyzer http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=154622311iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP43 Purpose code for voting pool HD wallets
On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 8:53 PM, Gregory Maxwell gmaxw...@gmail.com wrote: I've pinged some people privately but also pinging the list… no commentary on this proposal? One possible reason is that non-subscribed users aren't able to access the file through sourceforge. The attachment through their web interface is giving back HTTP 500. see http://sourceforge.net/p/bitcoin/mailman/attachment/53F38542.2000704%40monetas.net/1/ - Bryan http://heybryan.org/ 1 512 203 0507 -- Meet PCI DSS 3.0 Compliance Requirements with EventLog Analyzer Achieve PCI DSS 3.0 Compliant Status with Out-of-the-box PCI DSS Reports Are you Audit-Ready for PCI DSS 3.0 Compliance? Download White paper Comply to PCI DSS 3.0 Requirement 10 and 11.5 with EventLog Analyzer http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=154622311iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] SPV clients and relaying double spends
Of course you wouldn't want nodes to propagate alerts without independently verifying them, otherwise anyone could just issue alerts for every new transaction. Aaron Voisine breadwallet.com On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 7:16 PM, Matt Whitlock b...@mattwhitlock.name wrote: Probably the first double-spend attempt (i.e., the second transaction to spend the same output(s) as another tx already in the mempool) would still need to be relayed. A simple double-spend alert wouldn't work because it could be forged. But after there have been two attempts to spend the same output, no further transactions spending that same output should be relayed, in order to prevent flooding the network. On Thursday, 25 September 2014, at 7:12 pm, Aaron Voisine wrote: Something like that would be a great help for SPV clients that can't detect double spends on their own. (still limited of course to sybil attack concerns) Aaron Voisine breadwallet.com On Thu, Sep 25, 2014 at 7:07 PM, Matt Whitlock b...@mattwhitlock.name wrote: What's to stop an attacker from broadcasting millions of spends of the same output(s) and overwhelming nodes with slower connections? Might it be a better strategy not to relay the actual transactions (after the first) but rather only propagate (once) some kind of double-spend alert? On Thursday, 25 September 2014, at 7:02 pm, Aaron Voisine wrote: There was some discussion of having nodes relay double-spends in order to alert the network about double spend attempts. A lot more users will be using SPV wallets in the future, and one of the techniques SPV clients use to judge how likely a transaction is to be confirmed is if it propagates across the network. I wonder if and when double-spend relaying is introduced, if nodes should also send BIP61 reject messages or something along those lines to indicate which transactions those nodes believe to be invalid, but are relaying anyway. This would be subject to sybil attacks, as is monitoring propagation, however it does still increase the cost of performing a 0 confirmation double spend attack on an SPV client above just relaying double-spends without indicating if a node believes the transaction to be valid. Aaron Voisine breadwallet.com -- Meet PCI DSS 3.0 Compliance Requirements with EventLog Analyzer Achieve PCI DSS 3.0 Compliant Status with Out-of-the-box PCI DSS Reports Are you Audit-Ready for PCI DSS 3.0 Compliance? Download White paper Comply to PCI DSS 3.0 Requirement 10 and 11.5 with EventLog Analyzer http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=154622311iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development