Re: [Bitcoin-development] User vote in blocksize through fees
(Sorry for spam, forgot to cc the mailing list) RE: miner economics Miners who have an agenda can forego fees to achieve it and create their own txns if it is completely txn/user driven. It is better to just count miners votes and let the user votes be their backing. Although miners need to include txns that have the same vote as them, or you expect them be able to vote themselves with their own txns, with backing eventually there will be a large pool of unconfirmed txns that vote against them. Which means a juicy choice of fees for an honest or small miner to vote the other way (if there are any). If the votes are required to be near unanimous (almost 100%) rather than majority rule, there will be a small miner out there who will vote honestly and reset the vote on behalf of those users, because there is a fee incentive to do so (a pure honest miner doesn't care about fees. But they're a dying breed). If it is a majority rule type of vote, bigger miners will set the vote direction and small miners have no say no matter how they vote. From a decentralisation perspective, it is better to want the big guns to have a small voice, otherwise it will tend towards centralisation. Troll users (voting against when the direction is very clear) can still be ignored by excluding their txns unless they're paying attractive fees. (So it isn't exactly 100%, but it'll be close). Miners have some power but ultimately they will represent the users if the users votes are clearly divided. If you think 100% is hard, 95-90% could be a compromise but that requires an assumption that at least 5-10% will have their voices unheard. And that might be OK. Personally, 100% is consensus, anything less is just a democracy. RE: vote bits I think letting a vote go up and down in the same vote is a strange one. Personally I think binary votes simplify the process. Would it be better to 'announce' a vote that will contain a certain change. For example, hash of a config file that said change MAX_BLOCK_SIZE - 8mb. More things can use the same mechanism by including changes in a config (or whatever script/markup) file as needed in the future, for whichever constants you want to expose to votes. Votes can just be 0 and 1 for no/yes and omitted for neutral. My preference is 1 for yes, 0 for no neutral/ignored and omitted for no, so that it is backwards compatible and doesn't skew votes to the agreeing direction, and forces node owners and wallet developers to upgrade and participate. On Jun 13, 2015 6:04 AM, Eric Lombrozo elombr...@gmail.com wrote: Miners currently only collect an almost negligible portion of their revenue from fees. While I certainly welcome any proposals that move us in the direction of defining a smooth metaconsensus process, I think with the curent economics, miners (and especially those with significant hashing power) have more of an incentive to block txs/spam their votes than to adapt to tx sender preferences...unless people increase their tx fees significantly. But without wallets that can make decent suggestions in this regard, this feature will be almost inaccessible to most regular users. And the economics still aren't entirely clear. - Eric Lombrozo On Jun 12, 2015 12:30 PM, Jannes Faber j.fa...@elevate.nl wrote: I'm imagining in Peter's proposal it's not the transaction votes that are counted but only the votes in the blocks? So miners get to vote but they risk losing money by having to exclude counter voting transactions. But garbage transactions are no problem at all. Note that users that want to cast a vote pay for that by increased confirmation time (on average, hopefully slightly depending on the trend). On Fri, Jun 12, 2015, 20:27 Matt Whitlock b...@mattwhitlock.name wrote: On Friday, 12 June 2015, at 11:20 am, Mark Friedenbach wrote: Peter it's not clear to me that your described protocol is free of miner influence over the vote, by artificially generating transactions which they claim in their own blocks Miners could fill their blocks with garbage transactions that agree with their vote, but this wouldn't bring them any real income, as they'd be paying their own money as fees to themselves. To get real income, miners would have to vote in accordance with real users. -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development -- ___ Bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] User vote in blocksize through fees
On Friday, 12 June 2015, at 7:44 pm, Peter Todd wrote: On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 02:36:31PM -0400, Matt Whitlock wrote: On Friday, 12 June 2015, at 7:34 pm, Peter Todd wrote: On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 02:22:36PM -0400, Matt Whitlock wrote: Why should miners only be able to vote for double the limit or halve the limit? If you're going to use bits, I think you need to use two bits: 0 0 = no preference (wildcard vote) 0 1 = vote for the limit to remain the same 1 0 = vote for the limit to be halved 1 1 = vote for the limit to be doubled User transactions would follow the same usage. In particular, a user vote of 0 0 (no preference) could be included in a block casting any vote, but a block voting 0 0 (no preference) could only contain transactions voting 0 0 as well. Sounds like a good encoding to me. Taking the median of the three options, and throwing away don't care votes entirely, makes sense. I hope you mean the *plurality* of the three options after throwing away the don't cares, not the *median*. Median ensures that voting no change is meaningful. If double + no change = 66%-1, you'd expect the result to be no change, not halve With a plurality vote you'd end up with a halving that was supported by a minority. Never mind. I think I've figured out what you're getting at, and you're right. We wouldn't want halve to win on a plurality just because the remaining majority of the vote was split between double and remain-the-same. Good catch. :) -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] User vote in blocksize through fees
For the purposes of finding the median, halve same double. It will only change if a majority of non-apathetic votes are for halve or a majority of non-apathetic votes are for double. On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 11:54 AM, Matt Whitlock b...@mattwhitlock.name wrote: On Friday, 12 June 2015, at 7:44 pm, Peter Todd wrote: On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 02:36:31PM -0400, Matt Whitlock wrote: On Friday, 12 June 2015, at 7:34 pm, Peter Todd wrote: On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 02:22:36PM -0400, Matt Whitlock wrote: Why should miners only be able to vote for double the limit or halve the limit? If you're going to use bits, I think you need to use two bits: 0 0 = no preference (wildcard vote) 0 1 = vote for the limit to remain the same 1 0 = vote for the limit to be halved 1 1 = vote for the limit to be doubled User transactions would follow the same usage. In particular, a user vote of 0 0 (no preference) could be included in a block casting any vote, but a block voting 0 0 (no preference) could only contain transactions voting 0 0 as well. Sounds like a good encoding to me. Taking the median of the three options, and throwing away don't care votes entirely, makes sense. I hope you mean the *plurality* of the three options after throwing away the don't cares, not the *median*. Median ensures that voting no change is meaningful. If double + no change = 66%-1, you'd expect the result to be no change, not halve With a plurality vote you'd end up with a halving that was supported by a minority. Never mind. I think I've figured out what you're getting at, and you're right. We wouldn't want halve to win on a plurality just because the remaining majority of the vote was split between double and remain-the-same. Good catch. :) -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development -- J. Aaron Gustafson Cornell University '16 | Computer Science, Engineering | Mathematics, Arts Sciences Vice President, Kappa Delta Rho jag...@cornell.edu | Ithaca, New York -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Address Expiration to Prevent Reuse
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 I'm way late to this one, I guess, but adding some thoughts here... it seems that anything which mitigates the problem of reuse should be to the maximum extent possible, the user's option... if a person wants to have an address that lasts forever they should be able to have it... if they want to have an address that expires they should be able to have it. The reuse problem is, I think, better solved by the presentation of stealth address proposals, and would be handled by a stealth BIP (BIP 63) which has been recently re-discussed here: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1083961.0 On 03/26/2015 02:44 PM, Gregory Maxwell wrote: On Thu, Mar 26, 2015 at 9:26 PM, Tom Harding t...@thinlink.com wrote: I should have been clearer that the motivation for address expiration is to reduce the rate of increase of the massive pile of bitcoin addresses out there which have to be monitored forever for future payments. It could make a significant dent if something like this worked, and were used by default someday. Great, that can be accomplished by simply encoding an expiration into the address people are using and specifying that clients enforce it. -- - Dive into the World of Parallel Programming The Go Parallel Website, sponsored by Intel and developed in partnership with Slashdot Media, is your hub for all things parallel software development, from weekly thought leadership blogs to news, videos, case studies, tutorials and more. Take a look and join the conversation now. http://goparallel.sourceforge.net/ ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development - -- http://abis.io ~ a protocol concept to enable decentralization and expansion of a giving economy, and a new social good https://keybase.io/odinn -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJVe7cJAAoJEGxwq/inSG8C2uwH/2UfTX+6CEssv5ZhiwwqVNWk bmlODZulsJK0FIIcz2oVtMvnMR7L8DX/XtFOdiVTk/wOn7vc7X/DZ9UVKSixKCLJ IJLzBKEzFzMmNhxXv9fPsefuMsMlTkhifykl2BOp0T2gMEr5GweKSqn9XpQuo9mb LhS5vqNCRw0X3eQ5sIalSfmK3ghP5yaU+orhFjvb3QJ/JN3mxgXyl3xLx9diPVdu 2I1QoxzCyE/tlEnxZGPrCtGe3d93mPhEFGGeiP+7eW8TkJa5AGCg3QWbzniC3Nsv gjg6rCbLKtj300hH0glbPT96YO+r9l5itox+aArkCtNnR+/HlUb6zubgqebzPuc= =KZQe -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] User vote in blocksize through fees
On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 1:04 PM, Eric Lombrozo elombr...@gmail.com wrote: Miners currently only collect an almost negligible portion of their revenue from fees. Then they shouldn't care about the block size limit, since an increase in block size (and thus in the number of txs they get fees from) will only increase their revenue negligibly. -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Various block size proposals
Thanks Bryan for collating these links in one great list. This is very helpful and thanks for sharing it. Feel free to fork https://github.com/EthanHeilman/BlockSizeDebate edit to add the list of proposals and create a pull request to Ethan. There's also a miningconsensus.slack.com group to have discussion w.r.t. fact/source checking, completeness (e.g. from IRC) etc. Tks. p. On Sat, Jun 13, 2015 at 3:13 AM, Bryan Bishop kanz...@gmail.com wrote: Here are some proposals regarding the minimum block size questions, as well as other related scalability issues. Dynamic block size limit controller (maaku) https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg07599.html https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/35c47x/a_proposal_to_expand_the_block_size/ Re: dynamic block size limit controller (gmaxwell) https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg07620.html Various other gmaxwell-relayed ideas http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/37pv74/gavin_andresen_moves_ahead_with_push_for_bigger/crp2735 Increasing the max block size using a soft-fork (Tier Nolan) https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg07927.html Elastic block cap with rollover penalties (Meni Rosenfield) https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1078521 worked example https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1078521.msg11557115#msg11557115 section 6.2.3 of https://cryptonote.org/whitepaper.pdf rollover transaction fees https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=80387.0 Variable mining effort (gmaxwell) http://sourceforge.net/p/bitcoin/mailman/message/34100485/ BIP100 Soft-fork limit of 2 MB (jgarzik) http://gtf.org/garzik/bitcoin/BIP100-blocksizechangeproposal.pdf Transaction fee targeting https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=176684.msg9416723#msg9416723 Difficulty target scaling https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/38937n/idea_make_the_difficulty_target_scale_with_block/ Annual 50% max block size increase https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/351dft/what_about_gavins_2014_proposal_of_having_block/ Various algorithmic adjustment proposals https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1865.0 https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/1owbpn/is_there_a_consensus_on_the_blocksize_limit_issue/ccwd7xh https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/35azxk/screw_the_hard_limit_lets_change_the_block_size/ https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/359y0i/quick_question_about_the_block_size_limit_issue/ http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/385xqj/what_if_block_size_limits_were_set_to_increase/ http://www.age-of-bitcoin.com/dynamic-block-size-cap-scaling/ (against) http://garzikrants.blogspot.com/2013/02/bitcoin-block-size-thoughts.html Average over last 144 blocks http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/38fmra/max_block_size_2_average_size_of_last_144_blocks/ Extension blocks (Adam Back) (why would he burn this idea for something so trivial?) https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg07937.html https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg08005.html http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/39kqzs/how_about_a_softfork_optin_blocksize_increase/ http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/39hgzc/blockstream_cofounder_president_adam_back_phd_on/cs3tgss Voting by paying to an address (note: vote censorship makes this impractical, among other reasons) http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/3863vw/a_brandnew_idea_for_resolving_the_blocksize_debate/ http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/1g0ywj/proposal_we_should_vote_on_the_blocksize_limit/ https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02325.html Vote by paying fees https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg08164.html https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02323.html Double the max block size at each block reward halving https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/359jdc/just_double_the_max_blocksize_on_every_block/ Reducing the block rate instead of increasing the maximum block size (Sergio Lerner) https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg07663.html https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/35kpgk/sergio_lerner_on_bitcoindevelopment_reducing_the/ Decrease block interval https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/2vefmp/please_eli5_besides_increasing_the_block_size_why/ https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/35hpkt/please_remind_me_once_again_why_we_cant_decrease/ Increase default soft block size limit in Bitcoin Core http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/38i6qr/why_not_increase_the_default_block_size_limit/ https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/6231 Consider the size of the utxo set when determining max block size (note that utxo depth cannot have consensus) https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=153401.20 Reduce and
[Bitcoin-development] Mining centralization pressure from non-uniform propagation speed
Hello all, I've created a simulator for Bitcoin mining which goes a bit further than the one Gavin used for his blog post a while ago. The main difference is support for links with different latency and bandwidth, because of the clustered configuration described below. In addition, it supports different block sizes, takes fees into account, does difficulty adjustments, and takes processing and mining delays into account. It also simulates longer periods of time, and averages the result of many simulations running in parallel until the variance on the result is low enough. The code is here: https://github.com/sipa/bitcoin-net-simul The configuration used in the code right now simulates two groups of miners (one 80%=25%+25%+30%, one 20%=5%+5%+5%+5%), which are well-connected internally, but are only connected to each other through a slow 2 Mbit/s link. Here are some results. This shows how the group of smaller miners loses around 8% of their relative income (if they create larger blocks, their loss percentage goes up slightly further): Configuration: * Miner group 0: 80.00% hashrate, blocksize 2000.00 * Miner group 1: 20.00% hashrate, blocksize 100.00 * Expected average block size: 1620.00 * Average fee per block: 0.25 * Fee per byte: 0.000154 Result: * Miner group 0: 81.648985% income (factor 1.020612 with hashrate) * Miner group 1: 18.351015% income (factor 0.917551 with hashrate) When fees become more important however, and half of a block's income is due to fees, the effect becomes even stronger (a 15% loss), and the optimal way to compete for small miners is to create larger blocks as well (smaller blocks for them result in even less income): Configuration: * Miner group 0: 80.00% hashrate, blocksize 2000.00 * Miner group 1: 20.00% hashrate, blocksize 2000.00 * Expected average block size: 2000.00 * Average fee per block: 25.00 * Fee per byte: 0.012500 Result: * Miner group 0: 83.063545% income (factor 1.038294 with hashrate) * Miner group 1: 16.936455% income (factor 0.846823 with hashrate) The simulator is not perfect. It doesn't take into account that multiple blocks/relays can compete for the same bandwidth, or that nodes cannot process multiple blocks at once. The numbers used may be unrealistic, and I don't mean this as a prediction for real-world events. However, it does very clearly show the effects of larger blocks on centralization pressure of the system. Note that this also does not make any assumption of destructive behavior on the network - just simple profit maximalization. Lastly, the code may be buggy; I only did some small sanity tests with simple networks. -- Pieter -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Mining centralization pressure from non-uniform propagation speed
Nice work, Pieter. You're right that my simulation assumed bandwidth for 'block' messages isn't the bottleneck. But doesn't Matt's fast relay network (and the work I believe we're both planning on doing in the near future to further optimize block propagation) make both of our simulations irrelevant in the long-run? Or, even simpler, why couldn't the little miners just run their block-assembling-and-announcing code on the other high-bandwidth-side of the bandwidth bottleneck? -- -- Gavin Andresen -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Mining centralization pressure from non-uniform propagation speed
On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 06:51:02PM +0200, Pieter Wuille wrote: The configuration used in the code right now simulates two groups of miners (one 80%=25%+25%+30%, one 20%=5%+5%+5%+5%), which are well-connected internally, but are only connected to each other through a slow 2 Mbit/s link. Here are some results. This shows how the group of smaller miners loses around 8% of their relative income (if they create larger blocks, their loss percentage goes up slightly further): To be clear, when you say 8% of their income, you mean revenue, not profit? Actual profit margins of something like 5%-10% are likely, so that's an enormous hit that could make their mining operation completely non-viable. -- 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org 127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778 signature.asc Description: Digital signature -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Mining centralization pressure from non-uniform propagation speed
are only connected to each other through a slow 2 Mbit/s link. That's very slow indeed. For comparison, plain old 3G connections routinely cruise around 7-8 Mbit/sec. So this simulation is assuming a speed dramatically worse than a mobile phone can get! -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] User vote in blocksize through fees
On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 02:22:36PM -0400, Matt Whitlock wrote: Why should miners only be able to vote for double the limit or halve the limit? If you're going to use bits, I think you need to use two bits: 0 0 = no preference (wildcard vote) 0 1 = vote for the limit to remain the same 1 0 = vote for the limit to be halved 1 1 = vote for the limit to be doubled User transactions would follow the same usage. In particular, a user vote of 0 0 (no preference) could be included in a block casting any vote, but a block voting 0 0 (no preference) could only contain transactions voting 0 0 as well. Sounds like a good encoding to me. Taking the median of the three options, and throwing away don't care votes entirely, makes sense. Incidentally, I love this idea, as it addresses a concern I immediately had with Jeff's proposal, which is that it hands control exclusively to the miners. And your proposal here fixes that shortcoming in a economically powerful way: miners lose out on fees if they don't represent the wishes of the users. Thanks! I personally expect disaster to ensue with this kind of proposal, but I'm less concerned if the disaster is something users explicitly allowed to happen in a consensual way. -- 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org 127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778 signature.asc Description: Digital signature -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] User vote in blocksize through fees
On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 02:26:20PM -0400, Matt Whitlock wrote: On Friday, 12 June 2015, at 11:20 am, Mark Friedenbach wrote: Peter it's not clear to me that your described protocol is free of miner influence over the vote, by artificially generating transactions which they claim in their own blocks Miners could fill their blocks with garbage transactions that agree with their vote, but this wouldn't bring them any real income, as they'd be paying their own money as fees to themselves. To get real income, miners would have to vote in accordance with real users. Exactly. I very explicitly am proposing that we consider giving users a mechanism to pay for votes to give them a way to directly influence the outcome. -- 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org 127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778 signature.asc Description: Digital signature -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] User vote in blocksize through fees
This is a misguided idea, to say the least. If such a mechanism of of user input would be possible, one would use it for transaction verification in the first place. In proof-of-stake outcomes are determined by vote by stake (that vote has very different characteristics than vote by compute power). There is no such thing as making it possible to determine what users want. That's what the proof-of-work mechanism does in the first place, only that it is now unfortunately skewed/corrupted/(whatever you want to call it). Before centralization the concept of miners didn't exist in Bitcoin and miners were roughly identical to users. Peer-to-Peer implies only one class of users. A big problem with such a vote (in PoW and PoS): miners get paid for their work and have incentives to raise fees. Those who pay fees would have no say in whether those fees are fair or not. Transaction verification has to be roughly profitable, but there is no fixed formula for determining profitability. On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 8:26 PM, Matt Whitlock b...@mattwhitlock.name wrote: On Friday, 12 June 2015, at 11:20 am, Mark Friedenbach wrote: Peter it's not clear to me that your described protocol is free of miner influence over the vote, by artificially generating transactions which they claim in their own blocks Miners could fill their blocks with garbage transactions that agree with their vote, but this wouldn't bring them any real income, as they'd be paying their own money as fees to themselves. To get real income, miners would have to vote in accordance with real users. -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 8:34 PM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote: On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 02:22:36PM -0400, Matt Whitlock wrote: Why should miners only be able to vote for double the limit or halve the limit? If you're going to use bits, I think you need to use two bits: 0 0 = no preference (wildcard vote) 0 1 = vote for the limit to remain the same 1 0 = vote for the limit to be halved 1 1 = vote for the limit to be doubled User transactions would follow the same usage. In particular, a user vote of 0 0 (no preference) could be included in a block casting any vote, but a block voting 0 0 (no preference) could only contain transactions voting 0 0 as well. Sounds like a good encoding to me. Taking the median of the three options, and throwing away don't care votes entirely, makes sense. Incidentally, I love this idea, as it addresses a concern I immediately had with Jeff's proposal, which is that it hands control exclusively to the miners. And your proposal here fixes that shortcoming in a economically powerful way: miners lose out on fees if they don't represent the wishes of the users. Thanks! I personally expect disaster to ensue with this kind of proposal, but I'm less concerned if the disaster is something users explicitly allowed to happen in a consensual way. -- 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org 127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778 -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 8:36 PM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote: On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 02:26:20PM -0400, Matt Whitlock wrote: On Friday, 12 June 2015, at 11:20 am, Mark Friedenbach wrote: Peter it's not clear to me that your described protocol is free of miner influence over the vote, by artificially generating transactions which they claim in their own blocks Miners could fill their blocks with garbage transactions that agree with their vote, but this wouldn't bring them any real income, as they'd be paying their own money as fees to themselves. To get real income, miners would have to vote in accordance with real users. Exactly. I very explicitly am proposing that we consider giving users a mechanism to pay for votes to give them a way to directly influence the outcome. -- 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org 127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778 -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 8:36 PM, Matt Whitlock b...@mattwhitlock.name wrote: On Friday, 12 June 2015, at 7:34 pm, Peter Todd wrote: On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 02:22:36PM -0400, Matt Whitlock wrote: Why should miners only be able to
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Mining centralization pressure from non-uniform propagation speed
If there is a benefit in producing larger more-fee blocks if they propagate slowly, then there is also a benefit in including high-fee transactions that are unlikely to propagate quickly through optimized relay protocols (for example: very recent transactions, or out-of-band receoved ones). This effect is likely an order of magnitude less important still, but the effect is likely the same. On Jun 12, 2015 8:31 PM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote: On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 01:21:46PM -0400, Gavin Andresen wrote: Nice work, Pieter. You're right that my simulation assumed bandwidth for 'block' messages isn't the bottleneck. But doesn't Matt's fast relay network (and the work I believe we're both planning on doing in the near future to further optimize block propagation) make both of our simulations irrelevant in the long-run? Then simulate first the relay network assuming 100% of txs use it, and secondly, assuming 100%-x use it. For instance, is it in miners' advantage in some cases to sabotage the relay network? The analyse say yes, so lets simulate that. Equally even the relay network isn't instant. -- 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org 127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778 -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] User vote in blocksize through fees
Peter it's not clear to me that your described protocol is free of miner influence over the vote, by artificially generating transactions which they claim in their own blocks, or conforming incentives among voters by opting to be with the (slight) majority in order to minimize fees. Wouldn't it in fact be simpler to use the dynamic block size adjustment algorithm presented to the list a few weeks back, where the miner opts for a larger block by sacrificing fees? In that way the users vote for larger blocks by including sufficient fees to offset subsidy, but as it is an economic incentives miners gain nothing by inflating the fees in their own blocks. On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 11:11 AM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote: Jeff Garzik recently proposed that the upper blocksize limit be removed entirely, with a soft limit being enforced via miner vote, recorded by hashing power. This mechanism within the protocol for users to have any influence over the miner vote. We can add that back by providing a way for transactions themselves to set a flag determining whether or not they can be included in a block casting a specific vote. We can simplify Garzik's vote to say that one of the nVersion bits either votes for the blocksize to be increased, or decreased, by some fixed ratio (e.g 2x or 1/2x) the next interval. Then we can use a nVersion bit in transactions themselves, also voting for an increase or decrease. Transactions may only be included in blocks with an indentical vote, thus providing miners with a monetary incentive via fees to vote according to user wishes. Of course, to cast a don't care vote we can either define an additional bit, or sign the transaction with both versions. Equally we can even have different versions with different fees, broadcast via a mechanism such as replace-by-fee. See also John Dillon's proposal for proof-of-stake blocksize voting: https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02323.html -- 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org 127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778 -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Mining centralization pressure from non-uniform propagation speed
I'm merely proving the existence of the effect. On Jun 12, 2015 8:24 PM, Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net wrote: are only connected to each other through a slow 2 Mbit/s link. That's very slow indeed. For comparison, plain old 3G connections routinely cruise around 7-8 Mbit/sec. So this simulation is assuming a speed dramatically worse than a mobile phone can get! -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] User vote in blocksize through fees
On Friday, 12 June 2015, at 11:20 am, Mark Friedenbach wrote: Peter it's not clear to me that your described protocol is free of miner influence over the vote, by artificially generating transactions which they claim in their own blocks Miners could fill their blocks with garbage transactions that agree with their vote, but this wouldn't bring them any real income, as they'd be paying their own money as fees to themselves. To get real income, miners would have to vote in accordance with real users. -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Mining centralization pressure from non-uniform propagation speed
Sure, and you did indeed say that. -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Mining centralization pressure from non-uniform propagation speed
On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 01:21:46PM -0400, Gavin Andresen wrote: Nice work, Pieter. You're right that my simulation assumed bandwidth for 'block' messages isn't the bottleneck. But doesn't Matt's fast relay network (and the work I believe we're both planning on doing in the near future to further optimize block propagation) make both of our simulations irrelevant in the long-run? Then simulate first the relay network assuming 100% of txs use it, and secondly, assuming 100%-x use it. For instance, is it in miners' advantage in some cases to sabotage the relay network? The analyse say yes, so lets simulate that. Equally even the relay network isn't instant. -- 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org 127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778 signature.asc Description: Digital signature -- ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
