[security bulletin] HPSBHF02821 SSRT100934 rev.1 - HP Integrated Lights-Out iLO3 and iLO4, Remote Disclosure of Information
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Note: the current version of the following document is available here: https://h20566.www2.hp.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/kb/ docDisplay?docId=emr_na-c03515413 SUPPORT COMMUNICATION - SECURITY BULLETIN Document ID: c03515413 Version: 1 HPSBHF02821 SSRT100934 rev.1 - HP Integrated Lights-Out iLO3 and iLO4, Remote Disclosure of Information NOTICE: The information in this Security Bulletin should be acted upon as soon as possible. Release Date: 2012-11-19 Last Updated: 2012-11-19 Potential Security Impact: Remote disclosure of information Source: Hewlett-Packard Company, HP Software Security Response Team VULNERABILITY SUMMARY A potential security vulnerability has been identified with HP Integrated Lights-Out iLO3 and iLO4. The vulnerability could be remotely exploited resulting in a disclosure of information. References: CVE-2012-3271 SUPPORTED SOFTWARE VERSIONS*: ONLY impacted versions are listed. HP Integrated Lights-Out 3 (iLO3) firmware versions 1.28 and earlier. HP Integrated Lights-Out 4 (iLO4) firmware versions 1.11 and earlier. BACKGROUND CVSS 2.0 Base Metrics === Reference Base Vector Base Score CVE-2012-3271(AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C) 9.3 === Information on CVSS is documented in HP Customer Notice: HPSN-2008-002 RESOLUTION HP has made the following Firmware updates available to resolve the vulnerabilities. The latest firmware and installation instructions are available from the HP Business Support Center: http://www.hp.com/go/bizsupport HP Integrated Lights-Out 3 (iLO3) Online ROM Flash Component for Linux and Windows v1.50 or subsequent. HP Integrated Lights-Out 4 (iLO4) Online ROM Flash Component for Linux and Windows v1.13 or subsequent. HISTORY Version:1 (rev.1) - 19 November 2012 Initial release Third Party Security Patches: Third party security patches that are to be installed on systems running HP software products should be applied in accordance with the customer's patch management policy. Support: For issues about implementing the recommendations of this Security Bulletin, contact normal HP Services support channel. For other issues about the content of this Security Bulletin, send e-mail to security-al...@hp.com. Report: To report a potential security vulnerability with any HP supported product, send Email to: security-al...@hp.com Subscribe: To initiate a subscription to receive future HP Security Bulletin alerts via Email: http://h41183.www4.hp.com/signup_alerts.php?jumpid=hpsc_secbulletins Security Bulletin List: A list of HP Security Bulletins, updated periodically, is contained in HP Security Notice HPSN-2011-001: https://h20566.www2.hp.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/kb/ docDisplay?docId=emr_na-c02964430 Security Bulletin Archive: A list of recently released Security Bulletins is available here: http://h20566.www2.hp.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/kb/secBullArchive/ Software Product Category: The Software Product Category is represented in the title by the two characters following HPSB. 3C = 3COM 3P = 3rd Party Software GN = HP General Software HF = HP Hardware and Firmware MP = MPE/iX MU = Multi-Platform Software NS = NonStop Servers OV = OpenVMS PI = Printing and Imaging PV = ProCurve ST = Storage Software TU = Tru64 UNIX UX = HP-UX Copyright 2012 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Hewlett-Packard Company shall not be liable for technical or editorial errors or omissions contained herein. The information provided is provided as is without warranty of any kind. To the extent permitted by law, neither HP or its affiliates, subcontractors or suppliers will be liable for incidental,special or consequential damages including downtime cost; lost profits;damages relating to the procurement of substitute products or services; or damages for loss of data, or software restoration. The information in this document is subject to change without notice. Hewlett-Packard Company and the names of Hewlett-Packard products referenced herein are trademarks of Hewlett-Packard Company in the United States and other countries. Other product and company names mentioned herein may be trademarks of their respective owners. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAlCqm/gACgkQ4B86/C0qfVkJfwCcDX+1OfvkJrcTUbXvjSP2znG3 esMAoJ/q9V+3JRyAhb5MfCMaV3EUAd9T =TRt9 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
SonicWALL CDP 5040 v6.x - Multiple Web Vulnerabilities
Title: == SonicWALL CDP 5040 v6.x - Multiple Web Vulnerabilities Date: = 2012-11-19 References: === http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=549 VL-ID: = 549 Common Vulnerability Scoring System: 3.5 Introduction: = Tapeless Enterprise-Level Data Backup and Protection, Without the Price Tag. Automatic, real-time data backup for servers, laptops and PCs. Features include file versioning, fast data recovery, and automatic offsite backup capabilities to protect businesses against disasters. SonicWALL® Continuous Data Protection (CDP) v6 is a next- generation data backup and disaster recovery solution that automatically preserves and protects business-relevant data assets against loss from file, device, and location based disasters. With support for Windows®, Linux® and Mac OS® through a single Web GUI, CDP provides granular, globally enforced policy controls over the entire backup operation. Unmatched flexibility enables IT administrators to dictate what information to backup, what to exclude and how the information should be maintained to adhere to recovery and compliance requirements. A sophisticated new fileset backup methodology combined with agent-based data de-duplication moves and stores only unique data blocks. This speeds the backup process and optimizes bandwidth usage while maintaining total information continuity and the ability to flexibly restore multiple revisions. SonicWALL Continuous Data Protection v6 offers the comprehensive data protection organizations demand and the power administrators need for vigilant data backup and disaster recovery. (Copy of the Vendor Homepage: http://sonicwall.com/emea/backup_and_recovery.html) Abstract: = Vulnerability Lab Research Team discovered multiple Vulnerabilities in SonicWalls Continuous Data Protection v6.x 5040 appliance application. Report-Timeline: 2012-05-04: Researcher Notification Coordination 2012-05-08: Vendor Notification 1 2012-08-10: Vendor Notification 2 2012-08-16: Vendor Response/Feedback 2012-11-01: Vendor Fix/Patch by Check 2012-11-19: Public Disclosure Status: Published Affected Products: == SonicWall Product: Continues Data Protection GUI v5040 6.0.x Exploitation-Technique: === Remote Severity: = Medium Details: Multiple persistent input validation vulnerabilities are detected in SonicWalls Continuous Data Protection v6.x 5040 appliance application. The vulnerability allows an remote attacker or local low privileged user account to inject/implement malicious persistent script code on application side of the appliance application. The vulnerabilities are located in the network, accounts management and system settings modules with the bound vulnerable label delAppl (name, username servername) parameters. An attackers can inject script code as name, username or servername via add function to manipulate the vulnerable module with malicious persistent web context. The persistent script code will be executed when the victim is processing to watch the vulnerable module listing (output|index). Successful exploitation of the vulnerability result in session hijacking (customer/manager/admin) or stable (persistent) module context manipulation. Exploitation requires low user inter action and a low privileged web application user account. Vulnerable Module(s): [+] Network Settings [Name] [+] BMR Accounts [Username] [+] System Settings [Server] Vulnerable Parameter(s): [+] label delAppl - Name [+] label delAppl - Username [+] label delAppl - Servername Proof of Concept: = The persistent input validation vulnerabilities can be exploited by remote attackers with local low privileged user accounts and low required user interaction. For demonstration or reproduce ... Review: Network Settings ADD [Name] - label delAppl - Name label for=delAppl_0[PERSISTENT SCRIPT CODE!]/label/span/tdtd class=tableLineContrast name=ipspanlabel for=delAppl_0 192.168.150.216/label/span/tdtd class=tableLineContrast name=netmaskspanlabel for=delAppl_0 255.255.255.0/label/span/tdtd class=tableLineContrast name=gatewayspanlabel for=delAppl_0 192.168.150.1/label/span/tdtd class=tableLineContrast nowrap=a class=swlEventEdit href=# title=Edit Entryimg class=actionIcon width=20 height=20 border=0 alt=Edit this entry src=images/edit.gif//a/tdtd input type=hidden name=itemId value=undefined/input/td/tr/tbody/table/iframe/label Review: BMR Accounts [Username] - label delAppl - Username label for=delAppl_0[PERSISTENT SCRIPT CODE!]/label/span/tdtd class=tableLineContrast spanlabel for=delAppl_0
Re: [SE-2012-01] Security vulnerabilities in Java SE (details released)
Hello All, We have updated our project details page and added selected Proof of Concept codes to it that have been developed as part of our Java SE security research. They are available for download from SE-2012-01 project details page. Those willing to better understand Reflection API based abuses and our technical report should find them helpful. Also, we would like to clarify the following: - CVE numbers used by Oracle and IBM may not necessarily correspond to our bug numbering scheme. The four CVE numbers used by IBM seem to reflect all 17 issues we reported to the company. It looks IBM counted the number of different insecure Reflection API calls, not the number of different locations these APIs were actually used at. - IBM phrasing referring to 17 reported issues as potential security vulnerabilities in Security Manager can be now verified by running our Proof of Concept codes under vulnerable versions of IBM Java. As of the primary conclusions coming from our research, we would like to emphasize the following: - generic techniques used to bypass Java in 2012 were discovered 7 years ago, but they have never been published before, - the problems are around Java stack inspection security model and Reflection API, - Java bugs are not only about web browsers - they can be exploited on servers too (i.e. buggy RMI protocol, XML Beans deserialization), - Java 7 looks less secure than Java 6 - certain Java 7 features seem to have less security by design, - The existence of multiple security issues in new Reflection API from Java 7 indicates that it didn’t go through a security review, - Other vendors such as IBM had no idea about security implications of Reflection API (really simple cases of Reflection API flaws), - The existence of not-yet-patched (proved to be easy to patch in 30 min. time) Issue #50 tells a lot about the quality of Oracle’s vulnerability evaluation / patch testing processes (a bug in a code addressed not so long ago), - It looks software vendors do not have an easy life with Oracle. Quotes from our Inbox: They are no help (even when alleged security vulnerabilities are being exploited by malware kits/etc.) We'd like to be able to protect our customers…You're the only guys that can help on this (Oracle certainly won't) There's a lot of politics. Hint: 'Oracle unbreakable Linux' I know others have pushed Oracle, nothing has or will happened - Certain design / implementation choices can affect security of a technology for years and lead to dozens of bugs (50+ security fixes related to Reflection API in Java SE so far), - Vendors not following their own Secure Coding Guidelines / not learning from past mistakes do not give a bright prospect for the future. Thank you. -- Best Regards, Adam Gowdiak - Security Explorations http://www.security-explorations.com We bring security research to the new level -
OSSIM 4.0.2 open-source SIEM solution does not verify .deb signatures
It seems that OSSIM does not check the signature when running apt updates via network. This would allow MITM attackers to install arbitrary code when updating OSSIM. The issue seems to be already known for some time although there is no confirmation from the company AlienVault behind it. So it might be, that only the non-commercial version is affected. See http://forums.alienvault.com/discussion/512/looking-for-confirmation-of-security-issue-mitm-might-execute-arbitrary-code-on-ossim-during-update
Re: CVE-2012-4366: Insecure default WPA2 passphrase in multiple Belkin wireless routers
Hi! On 19/11/12 17:28, nauty.m...@gmail.com wrote: Jakob whart difference would it make to use a OCLhashcat with rainbow tables for simply cracking the key? The problem with rainbow tables for WPA2-PSK is that a rainbow table can only be created for one specific network name (ESSID). The default wireless network configured by Belkin has a network name such as Belkin.34cb. Having this additional three or four hex digits means that one had to create 4096 or 65,536 different rainbow tables with each of them containing a large percentage of the 2^32 possible keys. While this may in theory be feasible, creating the rainbow tables would require a significant amount of computation power and storage. Why would the hacker make such a hard attempt to crack the key. Can't this be stripped down to simple brute force Given the fact that the key can be calculated solely based on the publicly visible mac address (BSSID) of the wireless network (with some minor variations between the different router models), doing the actual brute force is not required to crack the key. Regards Jakob Lell
n.runs-SA-2012.004 - SPLUNK Unauthenticated remote DoS
n.runs AG http://www.nruns.com/ security(at)nruns.com n.runs-SA-2012.004 19-Nov-2012 Vendors:Splunk Inc., http://www.splunk.com Product:Splunk 4.0 - 4.3.4 Vulnerability: Unauthenticated remote denial of service against splunkd Tracking IDs: SPL-55521 Vendor communication: 2012/09/03 Reported the issue via Splunk's website 2012/09/04 Splunk responds and assigns tracking ID, plans fix for 4.3.5 2012/10/25 Splunk informs us that 5.0 will be available on November 1st and 4.3.5 on November 15th. Proposes to defer announcement of the vulnerability to ensure that people aren't forced to move to a new major release in order to mitigate. n.runs agrees. Overview: When a splunktcp-input (for use in Splunk-to-Splunk communication) is configured, an attacker can send an initial packet with a malformed '__s2s_capabilities' field. This leads to a crash of the splunkd daemon making the splunktcp-input unavailable. If the Splunk web-interface is running on the same host, it will be unavailable, too as it needs to communicate with splunkd. Description: An example packet looks like this (__s2s_capabilities is just 'A' here): --splunk-cooked-mode-v3--\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0 \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0 \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0 \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0 \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0 \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0 \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0 \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0 \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0 \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0 \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0 \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0 \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0 \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0 \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0 \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0 \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0 \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0 \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0 \0\0\0\0.\0\0\0\SOH\0\0\0\DC3__s2s_capabilities\0\0\0 \0\STXA\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\ENQ_raw\0 When this packet is sent multiple times, splunkd eventually crashes with a crash log similar to this one: [build 128297] 2012-08-30 13:34:01 Access violation, cannot read at address [0x6A62] Exception address: [0x6FC4500A] Crashing thread: TcpInputProcessor ContextFlags: [0x0001007F] Dr0: [0x] Dr1: [0x] Dr2: [0x] Dr3: [0x] Dr6: [0x] Dr7: [0x] SegGs: [0x] SegFs: [0x003B] SegEs: [0x0023] SegDs: [0x0023] Edi: [0x099F0020] Esi: [0x6A62] Ebx: [0x08BD5680] Edx: [0x0001] Ecx: [0x01734000] Eax: [0x05CD6A63] Ebp: [0x03B0F9C4] Eip: [0x6FC4500A] memcpy + 90/880 SegCs: [0x001B] EFlags: [0x00010212] Esp: [0x03B0F9BC] SegSs: [0x0023] OS: Windows Arch: i386 Backtrace: Frame 0 @[0x03B0F9C4]: [0x6FC80475] memcpy_s + 72/123 Frame 1 @[0x03B0F9E0]: [0x67DA1201] std::char_traitschar::_Copy_s + 21/29 Frame 2 @[0x03B0F9F8]: [0x67DA394D] std::basic_stringchar,std::char_traitschar, std::allocatorchar::assign + 126/146 Frame 3 @[0x03B0FA1C]: [0x67DA5E45] std::basic_stringchar,std::char_traitschar, std::allocatorchar ::operator= + 13/16 Frame 4 @[0x05CD287C]: [0x6A62] ? Frame 5 @[0x0064656B]: (Frame below stack) Crash dump written to: C:\Program Files\Splunk\var\log\splunk\C__Program Files_Splunk_bin_splunkd_exe_crash-2012-08-30-13-34-01.dmp XXX /6.1 Service Pack 1 Threads running: 36 argv: [Splunkd -p 8089] terminating... Further analysis showed that the crash is indeed triggered by an incorrect source address in a fastcopy_I call. It is unclear where this address comes from, though and why the crash only happens after a certain amount of packets. Impact: Denial of service of splunkd (and possibly the Splunk web-interface, depending on configuration) until splunkd is restarted. Fixes: This issue has been fixed in Splunk 4.3.5 and 5.0. Credits: Alexander Klink, n.runs AG (discovery) Moritz Jodeit, n.runs AG (further analysis) References: This advisory and upcoming advisories: http://www.nruns.com/security_advisory.php About n.runs: n.runs AG is a vendor-independent consulting company specializing in the areas of: IT Infrastructure, IT Security and IT Business Consulting. Copyright Notice: Unaltered electronic reproduction of this advisory is
