Symantec VIP Access Desktop Arbitrary DLL Execution

2016-12-08 Thread apparitionsec
[+] Credits: John Page aka hyp3rlinx

[+] Website: hyp3rlinx.altervista.org

[+] Source:  
http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/SYMANTEC-VIP-ACCESS-ARBITRARY-DLL-EXECUTION.txt

[+] ISR: ApparitionSec



Vendor:

www.symantec.com



Product:
===
Symantec VIP Access
Desktop versions prior to 2.2.2


Vulnerability Type:
===
Arbitrary DLL Execution



CVE Reference:
==
CVE-2016-6593



Vulnerability Details:
=

VIP Access Desktop UI Manager invokes DLLs from the current working folder 
during startup. A malicious local user can create
specifically modified DLLs to replace the normal product DLLs required during 
startup.

Then, by redirecting the startup path of the VIP Access Desktop UI Manager the 
user can cause the VIP Access Desktop
UI Manager to invoke the substituted DLL instead of the required product DLL. 
Any specifically modified code execution
could be performed with logged-on user privileges, which is normally user-level 
access in currently supported operating systems.
Ultimately, this problem is caused by a failure to properly validate required 
product DLLs during start-up.

This could result in a local user being able to manipulate VIP Access Desktop 
to load and execute an arbitrary DLL of the user’s
choice with user-level privileges.

Reference:
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/securityupdates/detail.jsp?fid=security_advisory=security_advisory==20161208_00



Disclosure Timeline:
==
Vendor Notification:  February 4, 2016
December 8, 2016  : Public Disclosure




Exploitation Technique:
===
Local




[+] Disclaimer
The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no 
warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise.
Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided 
that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and
that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in 
vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit
is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the 
information contained herein and accepts no responsibility
for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author 
prohibits any malicious use of security related information
or exploits by the author or elsewhere.

hyp3rlinx


AST-2016-009:

2016-12-08 Thread Asterisk Security Team
 Asterisk Project Security Advisory - ASTERISK-2016-009

 ProductAsterisk  
 Summary
Nature of Advisory  Authentication Bypass 
  SusceptibilityRemote unauthenticated sessions   
 Severity   Minor 
  Exploits KnownNo
   Reported On  October 3, 2016   
   Reported By  Walter Doekes 
Posted On   
 Last Updated OnDecember 8, 2016  
 Advisory Contact   Mmichelson AT digium DOT com  
 CVE Name   

Description  The chan_sip channel driver has a liberal definition for 
 whitespace when attempting to strip the content between a
 SIP header name and a colon character. Rather than   
 following RFC 3261 and stripping only spaces and horizontal  
 tabs, Asterisk treats any non-printable ASCII character as   
 if it were whitespace. This means that headers such as   
  
 Contact\x01: 
  
 will be seen as a valid Contact header.  
  
 This mostly does not pose a problem until Asterisk is
 placed in tandem with an authenticating SIP proxy. In such   
 a case, a crafty combination of valid and invalid To 
 headers can cause a proxy to allow an INVITE request into
 Asterisk without authentication since it believes the
 request is an in-dialog request. However, because of the 
 bug described above, the request will look like an   
 out-of-dialog request to Asterisk. Asterisk will then
 process the request as a new call. The result is that
 Asterisk can process calls from unvetted sources without 
 any authentication.  
  
 If you do not use a proxy for authentication, then this  
 issue does not affect you.   
  
 If your proxy is dialog-aware (meaning that the proxy keeps  
 track of what dialogs are currently valid), then this issue  
 does not affect you. 
  
 If you use chan_pjsip instead of chan_sip, then this issue   
 does not affect you. 

Resolution  chan_sip has been patched to only treat spaces and
horizontal tabs as whitespace following a header name. This   
allows for Asterisk and authenticating proxies to view
requests the same way 

   Affected Versions   
 Product   Release  
   Series   
  Asterisk Open Source  11.xAll Releases  
  Asterisk Open Source  13.xAll Releases  
  Asterisk Open Source  14.xAll Releases  
   Certified Asterisk   13.8All Releases  

  Corrected In
  Product  Release
Asterisk Open Source   11.25.1, 13.13.1, 14.2.1   
 Certified Asterisk11.6-cert16, 13.8-cert4

Patches
 SVN URL  Revision

   Links 

Asterisk Project Security Advisories are posted at
http://www.asterisk.org/security  
  
This document may be superseded by later versions; if so, the latest  
version will be posted at 

AST-2016-008: Crash on SDP offer or answer from endpoint using Opus

2016-12-08 Thread Asterisk Security Team
   Asterisk Project Security Advisory - AST-2016-008

 ProductAsterisk  
 SummaryCrash on SDP offer or answer from endpoint using  
Opus  
Nature of Advisory  Remote Crash  
  SusceptibilityRemote unauthenticated sessions   
 Severity   Critical  
  Exploits KnownNo
   Reported On  November 11, 2016 
   Reported By  jorgen
Posted On   
 Last Updated OnNovember 15, 2016 
 Advisory Contact   jcolp AT digium DOT com   
 CVE Name   

Description  If an SDP offer or answer is received with the Opus codec
 and with the format parameters separated using a space the   
 code responsible for parsing will recursively call itself
 until it crashes. This occurs as the code does not properly  
 handle spaces separating the parameters. This does NOT   
 require the endpoint to have Opus configured in Asterisk.
 This also does not require the endpoint to be
 authenticated. If guest is enabled for chan_sip or   
 anonymous in chan_pjsip an SDP offer or answer is still  
 processed and the crash occurs.  

Resolution  The code has been updated to properly handle spaces   
separating parameters in the fmtp line. Upgrade to a  
released version with the fix incorporated or apply patch.

   Affected Versions 
  ProductRelease  
 Series   
   Asterisk Open Source   13.x13.12.0 and higher  
   Asterisk Open Source   14.xAll Versions

  Corrected In   
Product  Release  
 Asterisk Open Source13.13.1, 14.2.1  

Patches  
SVN URL  Revision 
   http://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/security/AST-2016-008-13.diff   Asterisk 
 13   
   http://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/security/AST-2016-008-14.diff   Asterisk 
 14   

Links  https://issues.asterisk.org/jira/browse/ASTERISK-26579 

Asterisk Project Security Advisories are posted at
http://www.asterisk.org/security  
  
This document may be superseded by later versions; if so, the latest  
version will be posted at 
http://downloads.digium.com/pub/security/AST-2016-008.pdf and 
http://downloads.digium.com/pub/security/AST-2016-008.html

Revision History
  Date   Editor  Revisions Made   
November 15, 2016  Joshua Colp  Initial draft of Advisory 

   Asterisk Project Security Advisory - AST-2016-008
   Copyright © 2016 Digium, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  Permission is hereby granted to distribute and publish this advisory in its
   original, unaltered form.



CVE-2013-1306: MSIE 9 MSHTML CDisp­Node::Insert­Sibling­Node use-after-free details

2016-12-08 Thread Berend-Jan Wever
Since November I have been releasing details on all vulnerabilities I
found that I have not released before. This is the twenty-eighth entry
in the series. This information is available in more detail on my blog
at http://blog.skylined.nl/20161208001.html. There you can find a repro
that triggered this issue in addition to the information below.

Today's release is again not very interesting, because it also was one
of the first bugs I found and reported back in 2012, before I had
developed the tools and skills to properly analyze MSIE bugs. This
report is therefore very scarce in information. I did get some more
details from EIP about the root cause, which I've included.

If you find this information useful, and would like to help me make time
to continue releasing this kind of information, you can make a donation
in bitcoin to 183yyxa9s1s1f7JBp­PHPmz­Q346y91Rx5DX.

Follow me on http://twitter.com/berendjanwever for daily browser bugs.

MSIE 9 MSHTML CDispNode::InsertSiblingNode use-after-free
=
(MS13-037, CVE-2013-1306)

Synopsis

A specially crafted web-page can trigger a memory corruption
vulnerability in Microsoft Internet Explorer 9. I did not investigate
this vulnerability thoroughly, so I cannot speculate on the potential
impact or exploitability.

Known affected software and attack vectors
--
* Microsoft Internet Explorer 9
  An attacker would need to get a target user to open a specially
  crafted web-page. JavaScript does not appear to be required for an
  attacker to triggering the vulnerable code path.

Details
---
This bug was found back when I had very little knowledge and tools to do
analysis on use-after-free bugs, so I have no details to share. The EIP
provided me with some details of their analysis, which I'll paraphrase
here: It is a use-after-free vulnerability where the span object in the
frame.html file is reused after being freed. It appears to be impossible
to reallocate the freed memory before it is reused. Part of the freed
memory is overwritten when it is freed because a WORD `FreeEntryOffset`
value is stored at offset 0. This value is then used as part of a
pointer to a vftable in order to call a method. This pointer now consist
of the upper 16-bits of the old vftable and the lower 16-bits contain
the `FreeEntryOffset` value. Exploitation is near impossible without a
way to have more control over this pointer in the freed memory block.
ZDI also did a more thorough analysis and [provide very similar details
in their advisory at
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-13-082/

Time-line
-
* 27 September 2012: This vulnerability was found through fuzzing.
* 3 October 2012: This vulnerability was submitted to EIP.
* 11 October 2012: This vulnerability was rejected by EIP.
* 2 November 2012: This vulnerability was submitted to ZDI.
* 19 November 2012: This vulnerability was acquired by ZDI.
* 22 January 2013: This vulnerability was disclosed to Microsoft by ZDI.
* 29 May 2013: Microsoft addresses this vulnerability in MS13-037.
* 8 December 2016: Details of this vulnerability are released.

Cheers,

SkyLined


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