Re: [Captive-portals] Use Case: "Carrier Grade Captive Portal"

2017-05-31 Thread Martin Thomson
On 1 June 2017 at 08:23, Livingood, Jason  wrote:
> In any case, this is very much in scope IMO – so agree with others here. With 
> the rise of IoT compromises the need for these sorts of notifications will 
> only rise and will be critical to maintaining the security & integrity of the 
> Internet.

Just trying to understand this.  Jason, can you expand on your
assertion that insertion of notices in HTTP messages (I assume
response bodies) is critical to security & integrity?

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Re: [Captive-portals] Use Case: "Carrier Grade Captive Portal"

2017-05-31 Thread Livingood, Jason
Yes, sounds like one of the primary use cases we at Comcast tried to cover 
(described in RFC 6108, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6108). It is however a 
different walled garden compared to the one you saw, Warren. That one is a 
closed WG with no Internet access, whereas the other one just channels HTTP to 
a proxy that uses ICAP to insert a notification message but all sites are 
accessible. 

In any case, this is very much in scope IMO – so agree with others here. With 
the rise of IoT compromises the need for these sorts of notifications will only 
rise and will be critical to maintaining the security & integrity of the 
Internet.

- Jason

On 5/4/17, 11:14 AM, "Captive-portals on behalf of Warren Kumari" 
 wrote:

I *think* that this is quite similar to a captive portal system run by
Comcast -- I recently upgraded my cable-modem (my old one didn't
support v6). This means that I ended up with a new MAC address on the
CM, and Comcast placed me into a walled garden until I signed in (and
they associated my new MAC with my account) -- while a different cause
(new MAC vs malware), the rest is very similar.

So, I think that these would be well within scope.
W

On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 9:37 AM, Dave Dolson  wrote:
> I consider this in scope. It is an excellent example of why captive 
portals should be handled at the IP layer (layer3) with IP protocols, and are 
not only a WiFi (layer 2) problem.
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Captive-portals [mailto:captive-portals-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf 
Of Heiko Folkerts
> Sent: Wednesday, May 3, 2017 8:43 AM
> To: captive-portals@ietf.org
> Cc: Herzig, Willi; Gunther Nitzsche
> Subject: [Captive-portals] Use Case: "Carrier Grade Captive Portal"
>
> Hi everybody,
>
> I visited the capport WG the first time in Chicago. Thank you very much 
for the presentations! Afterwards I had a very brief chat with Martin about a 
use case, I name “carrier grade captive portals”. As a result I want to present 
this use case to you on this mailing list:
>
> *Background and use case:*
> In Germany the Federal Office for Information Security informs the ISPs 
with IPs, timestamp and other information of users that are part of a botnet. 
The ISPs are informing the users about the infection. We can not inform the 
users without the help of the ISP as they are the only ones knowing who is 
behind the dynamic IP address users get normally in Germany.
> There are different ways to inform users by the ISPs: e-mail, snail mail 
or a carrier grade captive portal (aka walled garden, forced portal),
>
> The most efficient way to inform and get systems cleaned has been proven 
is the carrier grade captive portal.
> One of the  internet service providers, NetCologne, uses a, as they call 
it, Forced Portal. The current solution is legal in germany, if the ISPs terms 
of service are appropriate.
>
> *Technically it roughly works like this:*
> - When the abuse management system detects that a user is infected, the 
CPE customers router connection (PPOE connection) is disconnected and 
immediately a new PPOE connection is started.
> - With the new PPOE connection, the CPE customers router gets a new 
DNSServer, IP, gateway (policy routing) and is connected to a carrier grade 
captive portal.
> - Within the new network connection all traffic is routed through a 
HTTP/HTTPS proxy. This proxy allows the user to access selected sites like 
informational sites about infections, AV and OS vendors and will otherwise 
present an information page to the user. This information page tells the user 
about the situation, including information about the infection(s) and instructs 
him how to clean the system.
>
> *Problem (almost the same as you know it):* As with captive portals in 
local networks this worked pretty well using HTTP.
> Also on Browsers, which first tries a HTTP connection, the information 
page  is displayed. Problem occurs now with HTTPS. Especially Google Chrome 
does no longer connect first using HTTP when the user enters a domain name of a 
web page if using HSTS and HSTS preload.
> Connecting with HTTPS, the browser detects a MITM attack (which of course 
makes sense, because it is MITM) and does not display the information page.
> Instead an error page is displayed, which generates a whole lot of calls 
to the costumer support. An addional problem we encounter is that the well 
known detection strategies used by iOS/macOS, Windows and Android for captive 
portals do *never* work in our case.
> Reason is that these detection strategies will only test for captive 
portals, when the network connection of the actual device (for example using 
WiFi) is started new. In our case the customers CPE router gets a new PPPOE 
connection, but the client  does not detect that the network connection to the 
internet was dropped by