Starting with version 3.5 of Squid, was introduced a new feature named
"*SslBump
Peek and Splice*".
With this functionality, Squid is able to intercept HTTPS traffic
transparently (with exceptions, of course).
This manner, Squid, with spike, is able to logging HTTPS traffic and apply
directives like dstdomain on HTTPS traffic without need of a auto-signed CA.
This resource of Squid is the same functionality available on apliances
like Sonicwall, Fortigate, Checkpoint, and etc.
A example of config:
http_port 80 intercept
https_port 443 intercept
ssl-bump cert=/etc/squid3/ssl/ca/intermediate/certs/wilcard.pem
key=/etc/squid3/ssl/ca/intermediate/private/wildcard.key
generate-host-certificates=off version=4
options=NO_SSLv2,NO_SSLv3,SINGLE_DH_USE
cache_log /var/log/squid3/cache.log
access_log daemon:/var/log/squid3/access.log squid
netdb_filename stdio:/var/log/squid3/netdb.state
sslcrtd_program /usr/libexec/ssl_crtd -s /var/log/squid3/ssl_db -M 4MB
sslcrtd_children 1 startup=1 idle=1
cache_effective_user proxy
cache_effective_group proxy
pinger_enable off
dns_v4_first on
acl HTTPS dstdomain "/etc/squid3/https"
acl BLOCK url_regex "(torrent)|sex(y|o)"
cache deny all
ssl_bump bump HTTPS
ssl_bump splice all
http_access deny BLOCK
http_access allow all
PS: the use of "ssl-bump" is only to satisfy de Squid parser.
Best clarifications: https://wiki.squid-cache.org/Features/SslPeekAndSplice
Att,
2018-03-05 11:34 GMT-03:00 Bill Gee :
>
> On Monday, March 5, 2018 7:23:53 AM CST Leon Fauster wrote:
> > Am 05.03.2018 um 13:04 schrieb Nicolas Kovacs :
> > > Le 28/02/2018 à 22:23, Nicolas Kovacs a écrit :
> > >> So far, I've only been able to filter HTTP.
> > >>
> > >> Do any of you do transparent HTTPS filtering ? Any suggestions,
> > >> advice, caveats, do's and don'ts ?
> > >
> > > After a week of trial and error, transparent HTTPS filtering works
> > > perfectly. I wrote a detailed blog article about it.
> > >
> > > https://blog.microlinux.fr/squid-https-centos/
> >
> > I wonder if this works with all https enabled sites? Chrome has
> > capabilities hardcoded to check google certificates. Certificate
> > Transparency, HTTP Public Key Pinning, CAA DNS are also supporting
> > the end node to identify MITM. I hope that such setup will be unpractical
> > in the near future.
> >
> > About your legal requirements; Weighing is what courts daily do. So,
> > such requirements are not asking you to destroy the integrity and
> > confidentiality >95% of users activity. Blocking Routing, DNS, IPs,
> > Ports are the way to go.
> >
> > --
> > LF
>
> Although not really related to CentOS, I do have some thoughts on this. I
> used to work in the IT department of a public library. One of the big
> considerations at a library is patron privacy. We went to great lengths to
> NOT record what web sites were visited by our patrons. We also deny
> requests
> from anyone to find out what books a patron has checked out.
>
> The library is required by law to provide web filtering, mainly because we
> have public-use computers which are used by children. For http this is
> easy.
> Https is, as this discussion reveals, a different animal.
>
> We started to set up a filter which would run directly on our router
> (Juniper
> SRX-series) using EWF software. It quickly became apparent that any kind
> of
> https filtering requires a MITM attack. We were basically decrypting the
> patron's web traffic on our router, then encrypting it again with a
> different
> cert.
>
> When we realized what it would take, we had a HUGE internal discussion
> about
> how to proceed. Yeah, the lawyers were all over it! In the end we
> decided to
> not attempt to filter https traffic except by whatever was not encrypted.
> Basically that means web site names.
>
> Our test case was the Playboy web site. They are available on https, but
> they
> do not automatically redirect http to https. If you open playboy [dot] com
> with no protocol specified, it goes over http. Our existing filter blocked
> that. However, if you open https[colon]// playboy [dot] com, it goes
> straight
> in. The traffic never goes over http, so the filter on the router never
> processes it.
>
> Security by obscurity ... It was the best we could do without violating
> our
> own policies on patron privacy.
>
> --
> Bill Gee
>
>
>
>
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