[cia-drugs] Your Mileage May Vary
google consumer reviews: "Make sure though, that the specific model they're talking about is available in your area. Sometimes the same brand name in different countries means a HUGE difference in fuel economy. Lou LaPointe tells a personal story demonstrating this point: "I spoke with a guy in Costa Rica, Central America. He was driving a Hummer diesel that gave 60+ MPG and was told the engine lasted practically forever. When he tried to buy one like it and send it to the States, he was told the car could not be sold or exported to the U.S. as it was strictly for Central or South America. The same vehicle in the U.S. delivers 9-12 MPG, I believe."
[cia-drugs] Either ur4 h20 privatization or against US
McCain is mad-dog neocon zany Warco shill, not any kind of kinder gentler independent. He's mind-dependent. His Iraq for 100 years statement is a lay-down gesture toward PNAC. http://upsidedownworld.org/main/content/view/1139/68/ Next story, water privatization by bigcorp enlists police under anti-terror law, with US training: http://upsidedownworld.org/main/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1133&pop=1&page=0&Itemid=68 Source: CISPES Despite solidarity victory, activists still face up to 4 years in prisonsuchitoto_08.jpg Para más información en español, haga `click' aqui El Salvador's Attorney General last Friday requested that charges of "acts of terrorism" be dropped against 13 peaceful protesters arrested at a demonstration against water privatization last July in the town of Suchitoto . After more than 6 months of investigation into the events of July 2, 2007, the Salvadoran government was unable to substantiate its original terrorism accusations, which carried a potential sentence of up to 60 years in prison. The charges fell under the jurisdiction of El Salvador 's 2006 "Special Law Against Acts of Terrorism," which was championed by the U.S. Embassy in Sal Salvador. Human rights experts in El Salvador and on the international level uniformly concluded that the Suchitoto protest was lawful and denounced the terrorism charges. Months of domestic and international pressure for the charges to be dropped, including dozens of letters from U.S. Congressional Representatives and two national "weeks of action" carried out by U.S. solidarity organizations, culminated in the February 8 announcement, which was made before a special anti-terrorism tribunal in San Salvador . In response to grassroots pressure organized by CISPES and allied solidarity organizations, more than 40 members of Congress signed a letter to Salvadoran President Antonio Saca last July questioning the application of the anti-terrorism law in the case of the non-violent Suchitoto protestors. A handful of Congressmen sent personal letters to the Salvadoran government again last week, reiterating their concern for the state of human rights in El Salvador and urging President Saca to respect basic civil liberties, including freedom of political expression. The Salvadoran government will now seek to convict the 13 "political prisoners" of public disorder and aggravated damages as a result of their participation in last July's protest. These reduced charges could carry prison sentences of up to 4 years. Family members of the `Suchitoto 13' are calling for all charges be dropped, and have undertaken a 3-day march from Suchitoto to San Salvador to draw continued attention to the case. The family members and their social movement allies argue that those arrested at Suchitoto have been targeted not because they committed crimes, but in response to their opposition to the governing, right-wing ARENA party's plan to decentralize the national public water administration. Those who demonstrated in Suchitoto last summer view this plan as a first step toward the eventual privatization of the El Salvador 's water system. Amnesty International concurred with this analysis in a statement released July 18, 2007, stating that it feared the arrests had been made "to prevent future protest." As the ARENA government continues to pursue charges against the protestors arrested at Suchitoto, a number potentially politically-motivated killings remain unresolved, including last month's assassination of Wilber Funes, the mayor of Allegria who was a member of the FMLN opposition party. Meanwhile, El Salvador 's National Civilian Police (PNC) continues to receive training at the U.S. State Department's International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA), despite international condemnation of its repressive actions against the Suchitoto prisoners, among other recent cases. Stay tuned to the CISPES e-mail list and website in the coming weeks for more ways to help defend democracy and counter U.S.-backed repression in El Salvador. For a detailed analysis of the latest developments in the legal case against the Suchitoto 13 (put together by U.S.-El Salvador Sister Cities) click here.
Re: [cia-drugs] Kosovo II: The "Next" Color Revolution (Nagorno-Karabakh)
Yes, Armenia will be involved in some fashion. There are four quarters still in old Jerusalem. Which are Jewish, Christian, Muslim, and few can guess that the other is Armenian or know why. Because Armenia is a country that 'jumped over Turkey' when in trouble. Armenia (and that old old banking) was Phoenicia (from Wikipedia)"enterprising maritime trading culture that spread across the Mediterranean between the period of 1200 BC to 900 BC". They 'moved bank' when in trouble. As for Kosovo.. Again we never read history, another geographic strangeness. Serbia not a location but an altitude. You can be Serbian in any location in old Yugo if high enough. And they have NEVER LOST. Don't even try. Even Alexander the Great was next door in Macedonia and conquered world but when suggested that he go just a bit north "Hell no, Am I a fool?" Serbia always wins in long run and all that time between three families (Romanovs, Hapsburgs, Osmilis) NEVER LOST. AFRICOM told to go to hell embarasing the hell out of Bush. This is all leading to he biggest US military defeat ever. Michael > latest update from vera: www.putinfreakshow.blogspot.com > > http://hyelog.blogspot.com/2006/07/tinderbox-caucasus-sparks-flying-along.html > TINDERBOX CAUCASUS - Sparks Flying along the Pipeline > July 3, 2006 > DER SPIEGEL > By Walter Mayr > > http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-62167636.html > > UKRAINE: UKRAINE, AZERBAIJAN DISCUSS NAGORNO-KARABAKH, PIPELINE > PROJECT.(Brief Article) > From: IPR Strategic Business Information Database | Date: 5/17/2000 > > http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a37ae038857aa.htm > > Will pipeline development bring about another Armenian-Azerbaijani war > over Nagorno-Karabakh? > > Foreign Affairs Opinion (Published) > Source: oilandgas.com > Published: 26-06-99 > Posted on 08/08/1999 15:24:08 PDT by mit > Will pipeline development bring about another Armenian-Azerbaijani war > over Nagorno-Karabakh? > > By Manos Karagiannis > > > > >
[cia-drugs] Kosovo II: The "Next" Color Revolution (Nagorno-Karabakh)
latest update from vera: www.putinfreakshow.blogspot.com http://hyelog.blogspot.com/2006/07/tinderbox-caucasus-sparks-flying-along.html TINDERBOX CAUCASUS - Sparks Flying along the Pipeline July 3, 2006 DER SPIEGEL By Walter Mayr http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-62167636.html UKRAINE: UKRAINE, AZERBAIJAN DISCUSS NAGORNO-KARABAKH, PIPELINE PROJECT.(Brief Article) From: IPR Strategic Business Information Database | Date: 5/17/2000 http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a37ae038857aa.htm Will pipeline development bring about another Armenian-Azerbaijani war over Nagorno-Karabakh? Foreign Affairs Opinion (Published) Source: oilandgas.com Published: 26-06-99 Posted on 08/08/1999 15:24:08 PDT by mit Will pipeline development bring about another Armenian-Azerbaijani war over Nagorno-Karabakh? By Manos Karagiannis
[cia-drugs] Ethnic Conflict and Pipeline Politics in THE CAUCASUS.
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-62590563.html Ethnic Conflict and Pipeline Politics in THE CAUCASUS. From: USA Today (Magazine) | Date: 5/1/2000 | Author: BLACK, JAN KNIPPERS THE YOUNG language instructor took on an expression of hurt bewilderment when the topic of conversation turned to Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan, the former Soviet republic on the Caspian Sea. Ancient hatreds? "Nothing of the sort. Armenians have always lived among us and been our friends. But why," she asked, "are they doing this to us?," referring to the fighting that has been ongoing since the Soviet Union broke up in late 1991. Among Azeris, one encounters little real anger directed against Armenians, but a pervasive and individually internalized sense of injury. Foreign visitors to Azerbaijan are routinely urged to visit Azeri refugees in the United Nations High Commissioners Office for Refugees camps around the country and, in the capital, Baku, a once popular resort on the Caspian Sea, to visit the tombs of the martyrs of the struggle for Nagorno-Karabakh. Throughout the Caucasus, between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea, governments and peoples were casting a wary eye on Kosovo at the end of the 20th century. As in the Balkans, ethnic friction was more often the result than the cause of the conflicts which wracked the region earlier in the decade and are now suppressed, but not resolved. It is not surprising that the Azeris, having the greater number of refugees and having lost territory to their adversary, would support in principle external intervention to enforce a return of territory and resettlement of refugees. Nor is it surprising that the Armenians, having the upper hand with respect to occupation of territory, would oppose such intervention. However, Azeri support for NATO's initiative in Kosovo and Armenian opposition are also manifestations of a geopolitical game and of economic interests more encompassing than any ethnic conflict in the region. Nevertheless, national accommodation and ethnic reconciliation must be at the core of any long-term resolution and, for good or ill, the lessons to be learned from Kosovo will have a great impact on this region. As if to reconfirm that security strategists live in a world of their own making, some appear to be upping the ante in a power game at the blind crossing where old U.S. and Russian spheres of influence intersect with new Muslim militancy along a now oil-slickened Silk Road. Alexander Rondeli, a political scientist advising Georgia's Foreign Ministry, fears that lines drawn in shifting sands are being hardened in ways that most of the players can ill afford. The lineup pits the U.S., its long-term ally Turkey, and its newer allies Georgia and Azerbaijan against Russia, Iran, and Armenia. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan as well are tilting away from Russian markets and toward Western oil industry investors. The game is further complicated by the 1996 security agreement between Israel and Turkey, which arouses Israeli interest in Azeri oil and puts distance between Israeli and Armenian lobbies on Capitol Hill. It is hard to see how the interests of any of these countries are served by a hardening of the lines of division, but Georgia, which is pivotal to any regional solution, is rendered particularly vulnerable by it. Companions on a hike in the foothills of the Caucasus Range in 1999 said to us that such an excursion would have been too risky a couple of years earlier. Secessionist movements and ethnic strife along the northern border had blurred into general anarchy and banditry that had only recently abated. Georgian Pres. Eduard Shevardnadze had survived coup and assassination attempts in 1998 and still traveled with extraordinary security precautions. The South Ossetians, in Georgia's northeast highlands, had declared their independence. Adjaria, the autonomous province in the south on the Black Sea, was under the control of a tyrant who answered to no one. When the northwestern province of Abkhazia pulled away, it took with it some of Georgia's main ports and most popular resorts. The Abkhazians pushed out approximately 250,000 ethnic Georgians. Most of them headed toward the capital, where housing was scarce and paying jobs a novelty. Many Georgians assume that Russia encouraged and supported the Abkhazian rebellion. Yet, when Georgian troops were unable to put it down, Shevardnadze felt compelled to accept Russian troops as peacekeepers in the area. Issues of security and power balance, as of economic recovery or economic advantage, have increasingly come to be bundled with pipeline politics. By some estimates, the shores of the Caspian Sea contain more oil and gas reserves than Iraq and Iran combined, but foreign investors and Western governments have been in a quandary about how to get the precious products out to markets. A cynic might be forgiven for expectin
[cia-drugs] Competition for Pipeline Route Heats Up By David Nissman
http://209.85.129.104/search?q=cache:YSL53whlshUJ:ourworld.compuserve.com/HOMEPAGES/USAZERB/7.htm+nagorno+karabakh+pipeline&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=ro
CASPIAN CROSSROADS MAGAZINE
Don't Get Lost! Get Caspian Crossroads!
Competition for Pipeline Route Heats Up By David Nissman
David Nissman is President of the Turkic Information Center (USA) and an expert
on Central Asian issues
The route of the oil pipeline that is to carry the Caspian's oil riches to the
West has become a matter for heated debate between Russia and Turkey. Until the
question is resolved, Azerbaijan and the oil consortium will be unable to cash
in on its investments in money effort.
Russia is extolling the virtues of a route that will pass over the North
Caucasus (including Chechnya) to the Black Sea port of Novorossisk. Turkey
favors a route that will pass through Iran and Turkey to a Mediterranean
outlet.
Both routes have definite advantages and definite shortcomings. A Russian
Lukoil official praised the virtues of the Russian route by stressing the
disadvantages of the Turkish option: in November, just before the outbreak of
the Russian-Chechen war, Vasilenko said that "blueprints for extending the
pipeline through Turkey pass over 'Kurdistan'. Neither Russia nor Turkey can do
anything about the Kurds". [ AZADLYG - November 8, 1994] He emphasized this
point at the end of January by pointing out that not only did the projected
pipeline pass through Turkish Kurdistan, but also Iranian Kurdistan. [AZADLYG -
January 28, 1995] The alternative, a Russian route, would pass either through
or around Chechnya, a matter which Vasilenko dismisses.
The critical issue is whether Russia can control the Kurds. The Kurds have been
under the protection of Russia since the early nineteenth century. This
protection is still in place. Recently, for example, the CIS Kurdish Council
was formed in Moscow; the Kurdish Council is an outgrowth of several other
Moscow based Kurdish organizations that began to appear during the Gorbachev
period. Yuri Nabiyev, a member of the Council, defined the functions of the
Council as uniting the Kurds living in the CIS and creating "favorable
conditions for the Kurdish National Liberation struggle". ["Interview with CIS
Kurdish Council member Yuri Nabiyev," Daily News Report from Armenia, November
10, 1994]
Moscow's involvement with Kurdish affairs has intensified since the end of the
1980s: a commission on problems of the Kurdish population was established by
the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1990. One of its immediate concerns was the arrival
of some 2 thousand Kurds among some 30 thousand refugees of other nationalities
in Krasnodar by the end of 1990. The number of Kurds in the Krasnodar area had
swollen to five thousand by 1992. Most of these Kurds were fleeing the
Armenian-Azerbaijan war, but many were from Central Asia. Also involved with
the question this influx of Kurds posed was the Center for Kurdish Culture
which had been established in Moscow in 1989. Its goal was not only to serve
the Kurdish interest in the then USSR but also to liaise with Kurdish
organizations abroad.
At the June 1990 Moscow conference of representatives of the Kurdish population
which was hosted by the Center for Kurdish Culture a second organization was
formed, the Kurdish Unity Front. The ultimate objective of the Center and the
Unity Front was the "establishment of the national-cultural autonomy of the
Kurdish people". {Bugay, Broyev and Broyev, Sovetskie Kurdy (Moscow, 1993), p.
121]
In Krasnodar in 1992, the PKK (the militant arm of the Kurdish movement),
together with the Moscow based Kurdish organizations hosted a Kurdish meeting
in Krasnodar, which was attended by 102 elected military commander of the
Lachin Kurdish Republic. Aslan was formerly with the Kurdish broadcasting
section of Radio Yerevan. While reports on this event were sparse, and those
which did surface could have been easily dismissed as Turkish propaganda,
confirmation of its occurrence gradually became available: in 1992 Alikhane
Mame, deputy president of the Kurdish Liberation Movement (another Moscow based
group), tied the Kurdish fate to an ultimate Armenian victory in the Karabagh
conflict. Furthermore, he stated the Kurdish options to be: declaration of the
Lachin region to be a Kurdish republic recognized by the Republic of
Nagorno-Karabakh; recognition of an autonomous Kurdish territory within the
RNK; or the establishment of a federated state between Lachin and the RNK.
[GAMK (Paris) November 22, 1992]
The Kurds, however, have not fared well in the Karabakh conflict. An appeal by
the Kurdish Cultural Center in Baku (no relation to the Moscow organization)
noted that over 20 thousand Muslim Kurds have been driven out of Armenia an
