RE: [Pfif] [cifs-protocol] Clarify AEAD behaviour for GSSAPI with AES

2008-08-27 Thread Andrew Bartlett
On Tue, 2008-08-26 at 08:50 -0700, Hongwei Sun wrote:
 Andrew,
 
 In this case, you provided a diagram for us to add to the  document and metze 
 added some comments.  Thanks for your contribution to our documentation and 
 continued feedback.
 
 The product team reviewed the diagram and comments provided.  We believe that 
 the diagrams imply interaction between elements and without detailed notes 
 they are subject to multiple interpretation and hence confusion.We 
 believe that as a matter of providing deterministic documentation, we would 
 prefer to provide specific examples.
 
 We'll be happy to get your  feedback on creating examples and  send them for 
 your review  once they are ready.

A visual description of how the RRC interacts with the AEAD behaviour
and the subsequent placement of the trailer in the header will be
critical.

Andrew Bartlett

-- 
Andrew Bartlett
http://samba.org/~abartlet/
Authentication Developer, Samba Team   http://samba.org
Samba Developer, Red Hat Inc.


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RE: [Pfif] [cifs-protocol] Clarify AEAD behaviour for GSSAPI with AES

2008-08-26 Thread Hongwei Sun
Andrew,

In this case, you provided a diagram for us to add to the  document and metze 
added some comments.  Thanks for your contribution to our documentation and 
continued feedback.

The product team reviewed the diagram and comments provided.  We believe that 
the diagrams imply interaction between elements and without detailed notes they 
are subject to multiple interpretation and hence confusion.We believe that 
as a matter of providing deterministic documentation, we would prefer to 
provide specific examples.

We'll be happy to get your  feedback on creating examples and  send them for 
your review  once they are ready.

Thanks !


Hongwei

-Original Message-
From: Andrew Bartlett [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, August 19, 2008 8:17 PM
To: Hongwei Sun
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Stefan (metze) Metzmacher
Subject: Re: [Pfif] [cifs-protocol] Clarify AEAD behaviour for GSSAPI with AES

On Fri, 2008-08-08 at 09:17 +0200, Stefan (metze) Metzmacher wrote:
 Hongwei,

 The  encryption function in Kerberos is described in details in 5.3 
  [RFC3961] (http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3961.txt), which is referenced by 
  [MS-KILE].
  I can summarize  as follows
 
  * conf is actually a random confounder prefix  of length c ,such 
  as 16.
 
  * pad is for shortest padding to bring confounder and plaintext 
  to a length that is the multiple of message block size m, which is octet(8) 
  for AES encryption, as specified in  section 6 [RFC 3962] 
  (http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3962.txt)
 
  *  Ke is an encryption key and Ki is a checksum key.
 
  * Plain text is the input confidential data before encryption.
 
  * The GSSWrapEX()  is exactly the same as the GSSWrap except that 
  it supports ordered list of input buffers.  Input buffers for which 
  conf_req_flag == TRUE are encrypted and returned. Buffers which sign == 
  TRUE are included in the signature.
 

 It would be extremly useful if the MS-RPCE document would explain what
 the exact input buffers to GssWrapEX() are and what flags are used in
 each of the cases (with and without header signing).

 Then it would be useful to know to what exactly SSPI EncryptMessage
 call this is mapped.

 And finally how each of the of the encryption types (des-*,
 arcfour-hmac-md5, and aes-*) are supposed to process the
 EncryptMessage input.

 It would be nice if you could use a realistic example, with explicit
 values. A bit like the A.5 Test suite section of RFC1321 - The MD5
 Message-Digest Algorithm.

While we have Microsoft's bugs and features in this area worked around, this is 
the level of documentation this area needs.

Has there been any more progress on this?  (We didn't seem to get to this on 
the call today).

Andrew Bartlett

--
Andrew Bartlett
http://samba.org/~abartlet/
Authentication Developer, Samba Team   http://samba.org
Samba Developer, Red Hat Inc.
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Re: [Pfif] [cifs-protocol] Clarify AEAD behaviour for GSSAPI with AES

2008-08-08 Thread Stefan (metze) Metzmacher
Hongwei,

The  encryption function in Kerberos is described in details in 5.3 
 [RFC3961] (http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3961.txt), which is referenced by 
 [MS-KILE].
 I can summarize  as follows
 
 * conf is actually a random confounder prefix  of length c ,such as 
 16.
 
 * pad is for shortest padding to bring confounder and plaintext to 
 a length that is the multiple of message block size m, which is octet(8) for 
 AES encryption, as specified in  section 6 [RFC 3962] 
 (http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3962.txt)
 
 *  Ke is an encryption key and Ki is a checksum key.
 
 * Plain text is the input confidential data before encryption.
 
 * The GSSWrapEX()  is exactly the same as the GSSWrap except that it 
 supports ordered list of input buffers.  Input buffers for which 
 conf_req_flag == TRUE are encrypted and returned. Buffers which sign == TRUE 
 are included in the signature.


It would be extremly useful if the MS-RPCE document would explain what
the exact input buffers to GssWrapEX() are and what flags are used in
each of the cases (with and without header signing).

Then it would be useful to know to what exactly SSPI EncryptMessage call
this is mapped.

And finally how each of the of the encryption types (des-*,
arcfour-hmac-md5, and aes-*) are supposed to
process the EncryptMessage input.

It would be nice if you could use a realistic example, with explicit
values. A bit like the A.5 Test suite section of RFC1321 - The MD5
Message-Digest Algorithm.

metze

 * We use the Kerberos standard's encryption and signatures.It is 
 very important to  concatenate  the correct buffers to make it  work.
 
 
 
Please let me know if further clarification is needed and I will be happy 
 to assist you.
 
 Thanks
 
 --
 Hongwei  Sun - Support Escalation Engineer
 DSC Protocol  Team, Microsoft
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Tel:  469-7757027 x 57027
 ---
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -Original Message-
 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Andrew Bartlett
 Sent: Monday, July 28, 2008 12:53 AM
 To: Interoperability Documentation Help
 Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Subject: [cifs-protocol] Clarify AEAD behaviour for GSSAPI with AES
 
 
 
 I've been spending most of today staring at MS-KILE 3.4.5.4.1 and Heimdal's 
 implementation of GSSAPI CFX.
 
 
 
 What has me stumped is exactly what this means:
 
 
 
 If the session key encryption type is AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 or
 
 AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96, as specified in [RFC3961], the base line is
 
 [RFC4121] and the encrypted data per [RFC3961] (which [RFC4121] is based on) 
 is:
 
C1 | H1[1..h]
 
Where
 
(C1, newIV) = E(Ke, conf | plaintext | pad, oldstate.ivec)
 
H1 = HMAC(Ki, conf | plaintext+encrypted-data | pad) where the
 
 plaintext+encrypted-data is all the input data buffers supplied to
 
 GSS_WrapEx() concatenated in the order provided in the ordered list, 
 input_message.


It would be extremly useful if the MS-RPCE document would explain what
the exact input buffers are and
 I see that C1 is the output of the encryption function E, and presume that Ke 
 is the encryption key, but what is 'conf', and is 'plaintext'
 
 the confidential data in plaintext, or the data over which only a signature 
 is computed (presumably the confidential data in plaintex, but then what is 
 conf)?
 
 
 
 I presume again that Ki is the signing key.
 
 
 
 Likewise, a description of how the pad fits into the HMAC function here would 
 be very helpful.
 
 
 
 In short, because this is a deviation from the GSSAPI spec (as the spec does 
 not allow data to be signed, but not sealed), I really need much more detail, 
 and all the inputs and outputs clearly labelled, particularly as this seems 
 to require a major rework of Heimdal to implement :-(
 
 
 
 Thanks,
 
 
 
 Andrew Bartlett
 
 --
 
 Andrew Bartlett
 
 http://samba.org/~abartlet/
 
 Authentication Developer, Samba Team   http://samba.org
 
 Samba Developer, Red Hat Inc.
 
 
 
 
 
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