Flannery on Cayley-Purser/RSA

1999-11-11 Thread John Young

Thanks to Jean-Jacques Quisquater and Jean-François Misarsky
we offer Sarah Flannery's September 1999 paper on the Cayley-Purser 
Algorithm and her comparison of it to the security and speed of RSA:

  http://cryptome.org/flannery-cp.htm

She concludes that Cayley-Purser is as secure as RSA and some
twenty-two times faster. She describes a successful attack on C-P.

We have converted excerpts to HTML. Eighteen images of the
17-page paper by Quisquater, heavily loaded with equations, tables 
and graphs:

   http://cryptome.org/flannery-cp.zip  (TIF format; 1.2MB)








call for identification of some crypto devices

1999-11-11 Thread Chr. Schulzki-Haddouti

I am looking for help to identify following three crypto devices, which were
presumably used by NATO and Eastern Countries. You can have a look here:
http://members.aol.com/infowelt/kdevice.htm

At the moment I am preparing an article for the German computer magazine c't
(www.heise.de/ct/) on hardware crypto in the 20th century. If you know how they
were called, who used them, how they were used or at which time they were used,
please contact me. I will publish the results at the same URL.

thank you,

Christiane Schulzki-Haddouti




Re: call for identification of some crypto devices

1999-11-11 Thread Rick Smith

At 07:03 PM 11/11/99 +0100, Chr. Schulzki-Haddouti wrote:

I am looking for help to identify following three crypto devices, which were
presumably used by NATO and Eastern Countries. You can have a look here:
http://members.aol.com/infowelt/kdevice.htm

At the moment I am preparing an article for the German computer magazine c't
(www.heise.de/ct/) on hardware crypto in the 20th century. 

Wow, that *is* hardware crypto!

Those devices were practical right up until people started using automatic
devices to crack codes (i.e. WW II).

Terrific pictures. First item is a 'code wheel,' though I'd only seen them
with 2 or 3 alphabets before that one. The second item looks like a strip
cipher. The third looks like some complicated variant of a Jefferson Wheel
(pardon my USA  U.Va. bred prejudices).


Rick.
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
"Internet Cryptography" at http://www.visi.com/crypto/




WPI Crypto Seminar: A High-Speed FPGA Implementation of Serpent

1999-11-11 Thread Robert Hettinga


--- begin forwarded text


Date: Thu, 11 Nov 1999 09:21:41 -0500 (EST)
From: Christof Paar [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: WPI Crypto Seminar: ;
Subject: WPI Crypto Seminar, Monday, Nov 15
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: Christof Paar [EMAIL PROTECTED]


  WPI Cryptography Seminar

  A High-Speed FPGA Implementation of Serpent

Adam Elbirt
   WPI

Monday, November 15
 4:30 pm,  AK 218
 (refreshments at 4:15 pm)


With the expiration of the Data Encryption Standard (DES) in 1998, the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) development process is well underway.
It is hoped that the result of the AES process will be the specification
of a new non-classified encryption algorithm that will have the global
acceptance achieved by DES as well as the capability of long-term
protection of sensitive information.  The technical analysis used in
determining which of the potential AES candidates will be selected as the
Advanced Encryption Algorithm includes efficiency testing of both hardware
and software implementations of candidate algorithms.  Reprogrammable
devices such as Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are highly
attractive options for hardware implementations of encryption algorithms
as they provide cryptographic algorithm agility, physical security, and
potentially much higher performance than software solutions.

This contribution investigates the significance of an FPGA implementation
of Serpent, one of the AES candidate algorithms.  Multiple architecture
options of the Serpent algorithm will be explored with a strong focus
being placed on a high speed implementation within an FPGA, in order to
support security for current and future high bandwidth applications.  One
of the main findings is that Serpent can be implemented with encryption
rates beyond 4 Gbit/s on current commercially available FPGAs.


DIRECTIONS:

The WPI Cryptoseminar is being held in the Atwater Kent building on the
WPI campus. The Atwater Kent building is at the intersection of the
extension of West Street (labeled "Private Way) and Salisbury Street.
Directions to the campus can be found at
   http://www.wpi.edu/About/Visitors/directions.html


ATTENDANCE:

The seminar is open to everyone and free of charge. Simply send me a brief
email if you plan to attend.


TALKS IN THE FALL '99 SEMESTER:

10/4  Berk Sunar, SITI
   Comparison of Elliptic Curve Implementations

10/18 Jim Goodman, MIT
   Energy Scalable Reconfigurable Cryptographic
   Hardware for Portable Applications

10/28 Brendon Chetwynd, WPI/Raytheon
   Towards an Universal Block Cipher Module

11/15 Adam Elbirt, WPI
   A High-Speed FPGA Implementation of Serpent

12/6  Richard Stanley, GTE Labs
   Using Cryptography to Combat Wireless Fraud -- A Case Study


See
   http://www.ece.WPI.EDU/Research/crypt/seminar/index.html
for talk abstracts.


MAILING LIST:

If you want to be added to the mailing list and receive talk
announcements together with abstracts, please send me a short mail.
Likewise, if you want to be removed from the list, just send me a
short mail.

Regards,

Christof Paar


! WORKSHOP ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC HARDWARE AND EMBEDDED SYSTEMS (CHES 2000)!
!   WPI, August 17  18, 2000!
!  http://www.ece.wpi.edu/Research/crypt/ches!

***
  Christof Paar,  Assistant Professor
   Cryptography and Information Security (CRIS) Group
   ECE Dept., WPI, 100 Institute Rd., Worcester, MA 01609, USA
fon: (508) 831 5061email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
fax: (508) 831 5491www:   http://ee.wpi.edu/People/faculty/cxp.html
***







For help on using this list (especially unsubscribing), send a message to
"[EMAIL PROTECTED]" with one line of text: "help".

--- end forwarded text


-
Robert A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'



Re: Flannery on Cayley-Purser/RSA

1999-11-11 Thread Wei Dai

On Thu, Nov 11, 1999 at 12:21:44PM -0500, John Young wrote:
 Thanks to Jean-Jacques Quisquater and Jean-François Misarsky
 we offer Sarah Flannery's September 1999 paper on the Cayley-Purser 
 Algorithm and her comparison of it to the security and speed of RSA:

The equations in the scanned paper are not very readable. Would it be
possible to get the paper rescanned in grayscale or at a different contrast
setting? 

Question for people who can figure out the equations: The conclusion says
"the CP algorithm is as secure as the RSA Algorithm" but then the
postscript goes on to say "Thus the system as originally set out is
'broken'". Assuming RSA has not been broken, these two statements seem
contradictory. Is CP completely broken, or is there some variant of it that
is still unbroken?



Re: Flannery on Cayley-Purser/RSA

1999-11-11 Thread bram

On Thu, 11 Nov 1999, Jim Gillogly wrote:

 Wei Dai writes:
  Is CP completely broken, or is there some variant of it that
  is still unbroken?
 
 It's completely broken. 

So what on earth was that claim of mathematically showing it was as strong
as RSA about? If breaking it doesn't result in a break of RSA, it must
have been of the typical voodoo hand-waving flavor.

 That's not to denigrate Flannery's work: she started from the
 assumption that the algorithm she'd been handed to work on was
 O.K. and did some good work optimizing its implementation.

That doesn't make the algorithm any more useful.

-Bram




online debit ... nacha thing short excerpt from tomorrow's american banker

1999-11-11 Thread Lynn . Wheeler




a private key to use in generating digital signatures with participating
nternet merchants. The bank would attach a corresponding public key to the
person's checking account and store it in a data base. When buying from an
Internet site, the cardholder would use his ATM card number. Instead of
entering a PIN, he would use the encryption key to digitally sign an
electronic authorization form. The form, in turn, would be sent to the

misc. related AADS information at:

http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/