Paying for drinks with wave br of the hand
http://worldnetdaily.com/news/printer-friendly.asp?ARTICLE_ID=38038 WorldNetDaily Wednesday, April 14, 2004 YOUR PAPERS, PLEASE ... Paying for drinks with wave of the hand Club-goers in Spain get implanted chips for ID, payment purposes Posted: April 14, 2004 5:00 p.m. Eastern By Sherrie Gossett Being recognized has never been easier for VIP patrons of the Baja Beach Club in Barcelona, Spain. Like a scene out of a science-fiction movie, all it takes is a syringe-injected microchip implant for the beautiful men and women of the nightclub scene to breeze past a reader that recognizes their identity, credit balance and even automatically opens doors to exclusive areas of the club for them. They can buy drinks and food with a wave of their hand and don't need to worry about losing a credit card or wallet. By simply passing by our reader, the Baja Beach Club will know who you are and what your credit balance is, Conrad K. Chase explains. Chase is director of the Baja Beach Club in Barcelona. From the moment of their implantation they will also have free entry and access to the VIP area, he said. In the popular club, which boasts a dance floor that can accommodate 3,000, streamlined services and convenience matter to Chase's VIP customers. Baja Beach Clubs International is the first firm to employ the VeriPay System, developed by Applied Digital's VeriChip Corporation and announced at an international conference in Paris last year. The company touts this application of the chip implant as an advance over credit cards and smart cards, which, absent biometrics and appropriate safeguard technologies, are subject to theft resulting in identity fraud. Palm Beach-based Applied Digital Solutions (NASDAQ:ADSXD) unveiled the original VeriChip immediately after the 9-11 tragedy. Similar to pet identification chips, the VeriChip is a syringe-injectable radio frequency identification microchip that can be read from a few feet away by either a hand-held scanner or by the implantee walking through a portal scanner. Information can be wirelessly written to the chip, which contains a unique 10-digit identification number. Media seized on the novelty factor of the chip implant, driving it to worldwide headlines in 2001. Last year, Art Kranzley, senior vice president at MasterCard, speculated on possible future electronic payment media: We're certainly looking at designs like key fobs. It could be in a pen or a pair of earrings. Ultimately, it could be embedded in anything ñ someday, maybe even under the skin. Chase calls the chip implant the wave of the future. The nightclub director has been implanted along with stars from the Spanish version of the TV show Big Brother. I know many people who want to be implanted, he said. Actually, almost everybody has piercings, tattoos or silicone. Will the implant only be of use at the Baja? The objective of this technology is to bring an ID system to a global level that will destroy the need to carry ID documents and credit cards, Chase said. During a recent American radio interview, Chase said the CEO of VeriChip, Dr. Keith Bolton, had told him that the company's goal was to market the VeriChip as a global implantable identification system. With only 900 people implanted worldwide, though, the global mandate isn't exactly around the corner, and current applications are extremely limited. Chase added, The VeriChip that we implant at Baja will not only be for the Baja, but is also useful for whatever other enterprise that makes use of this technology. He also alluded to plans for FN Herstal, which manufactures Browning and Smith and Wesson firearms, to develop an implant-firearm system that would make a firearm functional only to the individual implanted with its corresponding microchip. A scanner in the gun would be designed to recognize the owner. Chase's mention of the FN Herstal-Verichip partnership came a full week before it's formal announcement by Applied Digital yesterday. Chase believes all gun owners should be required to have a microchip implanted in their hand to be able to own a gun. While yesterday's Associated Press story on the prototype is primarily from the angle of police usage, WND reported two years ago that from the he outset of the company's acquisition of its Digital Angel implant patent ñ said to be GPS trackable ñ Applied touted the implant as a potential universal method of gun control. Chase also claimed that the VeriChip company had told him that the Italian government was preparing to implant government workers. We are the only company today offering human implantable ID technology, said Scott R. Silverman, chairman and chief executive officer of Applied Digital Solutions. We believe the market opportunity for this technology is substantial, and high-profile successes such as in Spain will serve as catalysts for broader adoption. Since 1999, the Applied Digital Solutions has boasted that it also has a
[Publicity-list]: DIMACS Workshop on Mobile and Wireless Security
* DIMACS Workshop on Mobile and Wireless Security June 15 - 17 , 2004 DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ Organizers: Bill Arbaugh, University of Maryland, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Presented under the auspices of the Special Focus on Communication Security and Information Privacy. The rapid growth of both voice and data wireless communications has resulted in several serious security problems in both the voice and data spaces. Unfortunately, many of the early security mistakes made with wireless voice communications were repeated with data communications, i.e. the use of flawed authentication and confidentiality algorithms. For example, the standards committee for 802.11 left many of the difficult security issues such as key management and a robust authentication mechanism as open problems. This has led many organizations to use either a permanent fixed cryptographic variable or no encryption with their wireless networks. Since wireless networks provide an adversary a network access point that is beyond the physical security controls of the organization, security can be a problem. Similarly, attacks against WEP, the link-layer security protocol for 802.11 networks can exploit design failures to successfully attack such networks. This workshop will focus on addressing the many outstanding issues that remain in wireless cellular and WLAN networking such as (but not limited to): Management and monitoring; ad-hoc trust establishment; secure roaming between overlay networks; availability and denial of service mitigation; and network and link layer security protocols. We will seek to extend work on ad hoc networking from a non-adversarial setting, assuming a trusted environment, to a more realistic setting in which an adversary may attempt to disrupt communication. We will investigate a variety of approaches to securing ad hoc networks, in particular ways to take advantage of their inherent redundancy (multiple routes between nodes), replication, and new cryptographic schemes such as threshold cryptography. ** Participation: Participants interested in presenting talks may contact the organizer. ** Registration: Pre-registration deadline: June 8, 2004 Please see website for registration information. * Information on participation, registration, accomodations, and travel can be found at: http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/MobileWireless/ **PLEASE BE SURE TO PRE-REGISTER EARLY** - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Cryptography Expert Paul Kocher Warns: Future DVDs Prime Target for Piracy, Pay TV Foreshadows Challenges
At 10:40 AM 4/20/2004, R. A. Hettinga wrote: While it's unfortunate that security on the current DVD format is broken and can't be reprogrammed, HD is what really matters. Once studios release high-definition content, there will be little or no distinction between studio-quality and consumer-quality, said Kocher. This means that HD is probably Hollywood's one and only chance to get security right. The major problem facing Hollywood in protecting their HD content is that it runs smack up against an installed base of millions of HDTVs with only ACV (analog component video), including mine. These consumers were promised by the FCC that they would not be left to twist in the wind when newer set-top-box to TV connections evolved and it does not appear technically practical to retrofit these sets to accommodate encrypted DVI or Firewire inputs. The FCC has already stated they do not support broadcast flags for pay content and unless they back-peddle on this Hollywood appears to have only three other options: restrict the availability of HD content to cable broadcasters, prevent the sale of devices that can capture HD quality content from ACV, or insist that the resolution of ACV signals be degraded when copy restricted content is being broadcast. The first will bring great howls from existing HDTV owners with only ACV. The second is probably impractical since illegal devices (little more than 3-channel A-D converters on a PCI card) are sure to be produced and only a small number in the hands of skilled movie releasing groups are required to widely disseminate their content via the Internet. The third option is also sure to bring major complaints from existing set owners. steve - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Cryptography Expert Paul Kocher Warns: Future DVDs Prime Target for Piracy, Pay TV Foreshadows Challenges
At 10:40 AM -0700 4/20/04, R. A. Hettinga wrote: While it's unfortunate that security on the current DVD format is broken and can't be reprogrammed, HD is what really matters. Once studios release high-definition content, there will be little or no distinction between studio-quality and consumer-quality, said Kocher. This means that HD is probably Hollywood's one and only chance to get security right. According to Kocher, Hollywood is following a path common to other industries facing similar problems. Typically, first-generation security systems fail irrecoverably, but later generations are designed to recover from failures, Kocher said. As an example, he cites K-band (big dish) satellite TV systems, which suffered from devastating piracy because security flaws could not be corrected. Having learned this lesson, modern pay TV systems place critical security components in smart cards or security modules that can be replaced. While this approach is not optimal because hardware upgrades are expensive, it has enabled the industry to keep piracy at survivable levels. Continuously changing the protection on permanent storage media is a much more difficult problem than changing broadcast protection. With broadcast, you give current subscribers the new smart card, change what's broadcast, and away you go. With permanent storage media, once the protection is broken, the content is still available to pirate. Only new releases can be protected with new protection schemes. These technical considerations would seem to lead to a marketing strategy of short product cycles driven by big advertising campaigns, to reap as much profit as possible while piracy is still difficult. This approach is not new to the movie industry. In recent years, the number of theaters opening a big movie release has increased greatly, and the time it runs in theaters has become shorter. It is ironic to compare the marketing strategy of reaping most of the profit quickly, with the public policy stance that long copyright terms are necessary to provide incentive for production. Cheers - Bill - Bill Frantz| There's nothing so clear as a | Periwinkle (408)356-8506 | vague idea you haven't written | 16345 Englewood Ave www.pwpconsult.com | down yet. -- Dean Tribble | Los Gatos, CA 95032 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Bank Transfer via Quantum Cryptography Based on Entangled Photons
Sigh... The old hype-meter pegs so much the needle's bent... Cheers, RAH http://www.quantenkryptographie.at/rathaus_press.html Quantum Cryptography live World Premiere: Bank Transfer via Quantum Cryptography Based on Entangled Photons Press conference and demonstration of the ground-breaking experiment: 21 April 2004, 11:30, Vienna City Hall ñ Steinsaal A collaboration of: group of Professor Anton Zeilinger, Vienna University; ARC Seibersdorf research GmbH; City of Vienna; Wien Kanal Abwassertechnologien GmbH and Bank Austria ñ Creditanstalt Downloads: Einladung (pdf-file, german) Invitation (pdf-file, english) Presse-Information (pdf-file, german) Press release (pdf-file, english) Where to get Pictures of the Event :: Fotoinformation (pdf-file) Poster 1 (pdf-file, german) Poster 2 (pdf-file, german) Poster 3 (pdf-file, german) Poster 4 (pdf-file, german) Poster 5 (pdf-file, german) For further Information please contact: Julia Petschinka ARC Seibersdorf research; Information Technologies e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Phone: +43-(0)50550-4161 Fax: +43-(0)50550-4150 Mobile: +43-(0)664-8251064 or: Andrea Aglibut Institut fuer Experimentalphysik, University of Vienna e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Phone: +43-(1)4277-51166 Fax: +43-(1)4277-9512 Mobile: +43-(0)664-60277-51166 -- - R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED] The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/ 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA ... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Bank transfer via quantum crypto
On /. today: An anonymous reader writes with today's announcement that the Austrian project for Quantum Cryptography[1] made the world's first Bank Transfer via Quantum Cryptography Based on Entangled Photons; see also Einstein-Podolski-Rosen Paradoxon[2]. (For more background, see the recent Slashdot post Quantum Cryptography Leaving the Lab.[3]) [1] http://www.quantenkryptographie.at/ [2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EPR_paradox [3] http://science.slashdot.org/science/04/04/12/1336238.shtml?tid=134 I have to agree with Perry on this one: I simply can't see a compelling reason for the push currently being given to ridiculously overpriced implementations of what started off as a lab toy, and what offers - in all seriousness - almost no practical benefits over the proper use of conventional techniques. Besides, any of the ultrasecret applications that *might* (I remain very skeptical) call for such a level of confidentiality - things like military communication or diplomatic message exchange between a country and its ambassadors - are all too likely to be out of the range currently offered by these QC setups (last I read, if I'm not mistaken, it was about 50 km or ~30 miles). Fine, the range might improve - but I doubt that the amount of money and hassle required to set these up will. Cheers, Ivan - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
nettime diebold law firm aware of lgal risks
--- begin forwarded text Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2004 21:38:47 -0100 From: nettime's_roving_reporter [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: nettime diebold law firm aware of lgal risks Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Reply-To: nettime's_roving_reporter [EMAIL PROTECTED] [ via [EMAIL PROTECTED]] http://www.oaklandtribune.com/Stories/0,1413,82~1865~2095811,00.html Diebold knew of legal risks Attorneys warned firm that use of uncertified vote-counting software violated state law By Ian Hoffman, STAFF WRITER Attorneys for Diebold Election Systems Inc. warned in late November that its use of uncertified vote-counting software in Alameda County violated California election law and broke its $12.7 million contract with Alameda County. Soon after, a review of internal legal memos obtained by the Oakland Tribune shows Diebold's attorneys at the Los Angeles office of Jones Day realized the McKinney, Texas-based firm also faced a threat of criminal charges and exile from California elections. Yet despite warnings from the state's chief elections officer, Diebold continued fielding poorly tested, faulty software and hardware in at least two of California's largest urban counties during the Super Tuesday primary, when e-voting temporarily broke down and voters were turned away at the polls. Other documentation obtained by the Tribune shows that the latest approved versions of Diebold's vote-counting software in this state cast doubt on the firm's claims elsewhere that it has fixed multiple security vulnerabilities unearthed in the last year. In California those issues can be addressed, said Diebold spokesman David Bear. They were addressed in Maryland, and they could be changed in California. California elections officials said they are perplexed that Diebold apparently hasn't changed practices since a December audit revealed uncertified software running in every county that it serves. Diebold may suffer from gross incompetence, gross negligence. I don't know whether there's any malevolence involved, said a senior California elections official who spoke on condition of anonymity. I don't know why they've acted the way they've acted and the way they're continuing to act. Notwithstanding their rhetoric, they have not learned any lessons in terms of dealing with this secretary (of state). The memos show that for months, Diebold attorneys at Jones Day have been exploring ways to keep the nation's second-largest electronic voting provider from losing an eighth of the national market. Jones Day partner Daniel D. McMillan declined to comment on the content of the documents except to confirm they were internal papers from his office. He warned against drawing conclusions from the firm's memos. Diebold's legal team appears to have been exploring whether California Secretary of State Kevin Shelley has the power to investigate the company's practices. The memos reflect an argument that the regulations by which California approves voting equipment for elections may never have been properly codified and are unenforceable. Diebold's Bear said his company is cooperating with Shelley's office. I've been working with the SOS and we're hopeful we can move forward and the advantages of electronic voting can be continued to be offered to the citizens of California, he said. We will continue to work with state and local elections officials to address any and all elections issues. The law firm's memos reflect a corporate defense firm on a $500,000-a-month campaign to protect Diebold. It is a critical moment for Diebold, for electronic voting in California and for at least some of the 19 counties statewide that purchased Diebold voting systems for more than $50 million. On Wednesday, state elections officials begin debating their advice to Shelley on whether to disallow some or all Diebold voting systems, or all touchscreen voting machines, from the November elections. What Shelley decides will be a test of state authority over makers of the computers that will determine the electoral votes in California and other states. His decision also could send some of California's largest counties -- Alameda and San Diego -- scrambling for other ways to count votes six months from now. Voting experts say the industry's factories and printing plants probably can handle the extra demand for replacement voting machines and paper ballots, given at least three months' notice. But Shelley's decision also could unleash a barrage of lawsuits that could mire orders of equipment and ballots in legal wrangling over who will pay for them. At the center of those battles will be Jones Day. The firm's internal memoranda show its attorneys considered the idea of calling a new bit of uncertified voting software
