long-term GPG signing key
I'd like to make a long-term key for signing communication keys using GPG and I'm wondering what the current recommendation is for such. I remember a problem with Elgamal signing keys and I'm under the impression that the 1024 bit strength provided by p in the DSA is not sufficiently strong when compared to my encryption keys, which are typically at least 4096-bit D/H, which I typically use for a year. The whole reason I'm using a signing key is that I have numerous older keys which have now expired and so the signatures on them are worthless. I don't attend many keysigning parties so it's hard to make the system work without collecting signatures over a long period on some very high strength key. Also, I'd like to use the signing key as a kind of identity, not tied to any particular email address, and only used to sign communication keys, which *are* tied to a email address and have shorter expiration times. Does anyone have any suggestions on how to do this, or suggestions to the effect that I should be doing something else? -- "If I could remember the names of these particles, I would have been a botanist" -- Enrico Fermi -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9DE 23B9 ED98 C93E 38E9 204A 94C2 641B - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: phone records for sale.
You can get records of most kinds from various private investigators and data brokers for a fee. I first found out about this in the mid-90s, but I'm sure they existed before that. Where the data collection is illegal, the reputable firms assure you that they are not doing anything illegal, which is correct; they farm it out to contractors with more cunning than scruples, and they don't ask questions. Records of all kinds are available, including subscriber information for a specific mobile or pager number, or land lines marked as unlisted. Mitnick managed to pretext as a law enforcement agent and attempted to get an informant's drivers license record faxed to him, according to "The Fugitive Game". Apparently informants are specifically marked in the records, which alerted a DMV clerk that something was amiss. A book I recently read reports that DEA agents have given up informant names and other info to murderous cartels for as little as $50 a pop, so to speak. A well-intentioned law might stop wholesale retail operations, but I have doubts it would stop the suitably motivated. I'd rather not have to try to restrict the activities of some other party who has my information, I'd rather prevent information from leaking to other parties in the first place. The case of utilities delivered to one's residence is particularly problematic as far as privacy goes. -- "If I could remember the names of these particles, I would have been a botanist" -- Enrico Fermi -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9DE 23B9 ED98 C93E 38E9 204A 94C2 641B - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: long-term GPG signing key
Travis H. wrote: I'd like to make a long-term key for signing communication keys using GPG and I'm wondering what the current recommendation is for such. I remember a problem with Elgamal signing keys and I'm under the impression that the 1024 bit strength provided by p in the DSA is not sufficiently strong when compared to my encryption keys, which are typically at least 4096-bit D/H, which I typically use for a year. 1. Signing keys face a different set of non-crypto threats than to encryption keys. In practice, the attack envelope is much smaller, less likely. Unless you have particular circumstances, it's not as important to have massive strength in signing keys as it is in encryption keys. 2. DSA has a problem, it relies on a 160 bit hash, which is for most purposes the SHA-1 hash. Upgrading the crypto to cope with current hash circumstances is not worthwhile; we currently are waiting on NIST to lead review in hashes so as to craft a new generation. Only after that is it possible to start on a new "DSA". So any replacement / fix for DSA is years away, IMO. The OpenPGP group has wrestled with this and more or less decided to defer it. 3. The RSA patent expired, which means that RSA no longer has everyone over a barrel. For various reasons, many projects are drifting back to RSA for signing and for encryption. Does anyone have any suggestions on how to do this, or suggestions to the effect that I should be doing something else? If you want something stronger, then I'd suggest you just use a big RSA key for signing. iang - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
SIGINT and the prisoner "rendition" scandal
Without going into the details of the purported CIA "rendition" of
prisoners to other countries ("it's not torture; we're just outsourcing
interrogration to places with less legal overhead"), there may be a
SIGINT connection. The following text appeared in an AP wire story
today about a purported Egyptian government document:
But Dick Marty, a Swiss senator leading the probe on behalf of the
Council of Europe, said it was still not clear that the
document -- a fax reportedly sent by satellite transmission from
Egypt's Foreign Ministry to its embassy in London -- was
genuine.
...
Marty also said he wondered how Swiss intelligence intercepted a
fax allegedly sent from Egypt to London.
-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
