"It's funny because it's true..."
Cartoon of the day: http://www.ibiblio.org/Dave/Dr-Fun/df200605/df20060517.jpg [Hat tip to Steve Bellovin for pointing it out to me...] -- Perry E. Metzger[EMAIL PROTECTED] - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
PET 2006: Call for Participation
Call for Participation 6th Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET 2006) Robinson College, Cambridge, United Kingdom June 28 - June 30, 2006 http://petworkshop.org/2006/ Special Events: * Keynote speaker: Susan Landau, Sun Microsystems Laboratories on "The Missing Link", (Abstract at the end of the email.) * PET Award 2006 ceremony and reception at Microsoft Research, http://petworkshop.org/2006/award.html Co-located with: * The Fifth Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS 2006), 26-28 June, http://weis2006.econinfosec.org/ * IAVoSS Workshop On Trustworthy Elections (WOTE 2006) 29-30 June, http://www.win.tue.nl/~berry/wote2006/ Privacy and anonymity are increasingly important in the online world. Corporations, governments, and other organizations are realizing and exploiting their power to track users and their behavior, and restricting the ability to publish or retrieve documents. Approaches to not only protecting individuals and groups, but also companies and governments, from such profiling and censorship include decentralization, encryption, distributed trust, and automated policy disclosure. This 6th workshop addresses the design and realization of such privacy and anti-censorship services for the Internet and other communication networks by bringing together anonymity and privacy experts from around the world to discuss recent advances and new perspectives. Early registration by May 12 at: http://petworkshop.org/2006/petRegister.html Further local information on accommodation and travel is available on the PET workshop website (book accommodation early!): http://petworkshop.org/2006/petTravel.html Program Chairs: * Philippe Golle, PARC (Philippe.Golle at parc com) * George Danezis, K.U.Leuven (George.Danezis at esat kuleuven be) General Chair: * Richard Clayton, University of Cambridge (Richard.Clayton at cl cam ac uk) Research Program: (also at http://petworkshop.org/2006/program.html) Privacy and the real world * One Big File Is Not Enough: A Critical Evaluation of the Dominant Free-Space Sanitization Technique Simson Garfinkel and David Malan * Protecting Privacy with the MPEG-21 IPMP Framework Nicholas Paul Sheppard and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini * Privacy for Public Transportation Thomas S. Heydt-Benjamin, Hee-Jin Chae, Benessa Defend, and Kevin Fu * Privacy Rights Management - Taming Cellphone Cameras Mina Deng, Lothar Fritsch and Klaus Kursawe * Ignoring the Great Firewall of China Richard Clayton, Steven J. Murdoch and Robert N. M. Watson * I Know What You Did Last Summer: Self-Awareness, Imagined Communities,and Information Sharing in an Online Social Network Alessandro Acquisti and Ralph Gross Privacy policies * Enhancing Consumer Privacy in the Liberty Alliance Identity Federation and Web Services Frameworks Mansour Alsaleh and Carlisle Adams * Traceable and Automatic Compliance of Privacy Policies in Federated Digital Identity Management Anna C. Squicciarini, Abhilasha Bhargav-Spantzel, Alexei Czeskis and Elisa Bertino * Privacy Injector - Automated Privacy Enforcement through Aspects Chris Vanden Berghe and Matthias Schunter * A Systemic Approach to Automate Privacy Policy Enforcement in Enterprises Marco Casassa Mont and Robert Thyne Anonymous communications * Improving Sender Anonymity in a Structured Overlay with Imprecise Routing Giuseppe Ciaccio * Selectively Traceable Anonymity Luis von Ahn, Andrew Bortz, Nicholas Hopper and Kevin O'Neill * Valet Services: Improving Hidden Servers with a Personal Touch Lasse Øverlier and Paul Syverson * Blending different latency traffic with alpha-mixing Roger Dingledine, Andrei Serjantov and Paul Syverson Attacks: Traffic and Location analysis * Breaking the Collusion Detection Mechanism of MorphMix Parisa Tabriz and Nikita Borisov * Linking Anonymous Transactions: The Consistent View Attack Andreas Pashalidis and Bernd Meyer * Preserving User Location Privacy in Mobile Data Management Infrastructures Reynold Cheng, Yu Zhang, Elisa Bertino and Sunil Prabhakar * Location Access Effects on Trail Re-identification Bradley Malin and Edoardo Airoldi Private muti-party computation, authentication, and cryptography * Private Resource Pairing Joseph A. Calandrino and Alfred C. Weaver * On the Security of the Tor Authentication Protocol Ian Goldberg * Honest-Verifier Private Disjointness Testing without Random Oracles Susan Hohenberger and Stephen A. Weis * A Flexible Framework for Secret Handshakes Gene Tsudik and Shouhuai Xu * Optimal Key-Trees for Tree-Based Private Authentication Levente Buttyan, Tamas Holczer and Istvan Vajda * Simple and Flex
IPICS summer course in Computer Security
Call for Participation Intensive Program on Information and Communication Security IPICS 2006 Summer Course 17-28 July 2006, K.U. Leuven, Belgium https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/ipics2006/?i=S Special Focus: Privacy Technology (26-28 July) IPICS is a two week long summer school intended for final year undergraduate students, master students and starting PhD candidates, as well as those in the private sector, that wish to learn about the foundations of computer and communication security. IPICS takes the format of a two week course, taught by internationally renowned researchers and experts. The special theme this year is "Privacy Technology", with 3 days especially devoted to it. The special privacy course will cover: * Introduction, by the father of Privacy Technologies, David Chaum * Identity management and privacy Marit Hansen (ICPP, Schleswig-Holstein, Germany) * Anonymous credential systems and e-cash Jan Camenisch (IBM Zürich, Switserland) * Election schemes Peter Ryan (Newcastle University, U.K.) * Privacy policies, languages and applications Simone Ficher-Hübner (Karlstadt University, Sweden) * Location privacy and mobile devices Kai Rannenberg (Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany) * Anonymous communications Dogan Kesdogan (Technical University of Aachen, Germany) * Privacy public policy, law and economics Jos Dumortier (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven - ICRI, Belgium) Other topics will include: * Introduction to security and course overview (Bart Preneel, KU Leuven), * Computer crime and abuse (Nathan Clarke, Plymouth), * Business continuity planning (Gerald Quirchmayr, Vienna), * Cryptology (Bart Preneel, KU Leuven), * Authorization and access control (Günther Pernul, Regensburg), * PKI and PMI (Javier Lopez, Malaga), * Biometry (Pim Tuyls, KU Leuven), * Network Security (Sokrates Katsikas, Greece), * Cybercrime Investigation (Ahmed Patel), * RFID Security (Karl Posch, T.U.Graz), * Electronic commerce (Keith Martin, Royal Holloway), * Smart cards (Helena Handschuh, Spansion, France), * Trusted computing (Klaus Kursawe, Philips Eindhoven), * Secure hardware (Lejla Batina, Nele Mentens, KU Leuven), * eID cards (Danny De Cock, KU Leuven), * Security of C and C++ programs (Yves Younan, KU Leuven) (Full program at: https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/ipics2006/course_program.shtml?i=S) Registration: Registration is FREE for students. Academics are charged (150 euros) and industry participants are charged 500 euros for L-SEC members or 650 euros for non-members. We ask those interested to register as soon as possible, and before July 7th at: (Academics:) https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/ipics2006/application.shtml?i=S (Industry:) http://l-sec.emsecure.net/optiext/optiextension.dll?ID=gQeugRexMggM A limited supply of accommodation is available through KU Leuven, that you need to book well in advance through the registration process. More details on alternative hotels and local arrangements can be found at: https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/ipics2006/practical_info.shtml?i=S Contacts and further information: Web: https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/ipics2006/index.shtml?i=S Email: George Danezis (George.Danezis esat kuleuven be) Claudia Diaz (Claudia.Diaz esat kuleuven be) Prof. Bart Preneel (Bart.Preneel esat kuleuven be) Disclaimer: http://www.kuleuven.be/cwis/email_disclaimer.htm - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: the meaning of linearity, was Re: picking a hash function to be encrypted
> -Original Message- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > The thing I've always wondered about stream ciphers is why we only > talk about linear ones. A stream cipher is fundamentally constructed > of two things: A stream of bits (alleged to be unpredictable) as > long as the plaintext; and a combining function that takes one > plaintext bit and one stream bit and produces a ciphertext bit. > The combining function has to conserve information. If you only > combine single bits, there are only two possible functions: XOR > and the complement of XOR. But consider RC4: It actually generates > a byte at a time. We just choose to use that byte as a vector of > 8 bits. For plaintexts that are multiples of 8 bits long - just > about everything these days - there are many possible combining > functions. Most aren't even close to linear. > I am not sure this will add to the security of the whole thing. My reasoning behind that is: The combining function needs to be invertible (we want to recover the plaintext, don't we?), so we have an 8-bit block cipher with an 8-bit key (supplied by the key stream generator). Given known plaintext and corresponding ciphertext, there should not be too many keys that map the plaintext to the ciphertext. I don't have the probability at hand how many such 'collisions' you would expect from 256 random permutations, but intuitively I would not expect too many. However, I could be wrong here and would like to be corrected in this case. Regards, Ulrich - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: NSA knows who you've called.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: > You and I are in agreement, but how do we get > the seemingly (to us) plain truth across to > others? I've been trying for a good while now, > reaching a point where I'd almost wish for a > crisis of some sort as persuasiveness is not > working. > > We are probably well off-topic for this list. First they came for the terrorists, and I said nothing because I wasn't a terrorist. Then they came for my phone calls, and I said nothing because I had nothing to hide. Then they came for the cryptographers, and I said nothing because I coulldn't even spel the word. Now I can't hide anything. -- --my blog is athttp://blog.russnelson.com | Microsoft as wall, Crynwr sells support for free software | PGPok | OSI are the sappers. 521 Pleasant Valley Rd. | +1 315-323-1241 | Walls fall stone by stone Potsdam, NY 13676-3213 | Sheepdog | - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcidx14.htm#4492 4492 I Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Blake-Wilson S., Bolyard N., Gupta V., Hawk C., Moeller B., 2006/05/16 (35pp) (.txt=72231) (Refs 2246, 3268, 3279, 3280, 4346, 4366) (was draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt) - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
anyone have "New Hash Functions and their Use in Authentication and Set Equality"
I've googled for "New Hash Functions and their Use in Authentication and Set Equality" and found several citations but no electronic copies. I don't have access to a library that might have it, does anyone here have one? Thanks. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: picking a hash function to be encrypted
"Travis H." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > On 5/14/06, Victor Duchovni <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Security is fragile. Deviating from well understood primitives may be >> good research, but is not good engineering. Especially fragile are: > > Point taken. This is not for a production system, it's a research thing. > >> TLS (available via OpenSSL) provides integrity and authentication, any >> reason to re-invent the wheel? It took multiple iterations of design >> improvements to get TLS right, even though it was designed by experts. > > IIUC, protocol design _should_ be easy, you just perform some > finite-state analysis and verify that, assuming your primitives are > ideal, no protocol-level operations break it. The 7th Usenix Security > Symposium has a paper where the authors built up SSL 3.0 to find out > what attack each datum was meant to prevent. They used mur-phi, which > has been used for VLSI verification (i.e. large numbers of states). > AT&T published some code to do it too (called SPIN). It's effective > if the set of attacks you're protecting against is finite and > enumerable (for protocol design, I think it should be; reflection, > replay, reorder, suppress, inject, etc.). I wouldn't consider > fielding a protocol design without sanity-checking it using such a > tool. Was there an attack against TLS which got past FSA, or did the > experts not know about FSA? There have been a number of attacks on TLS since Mitchell et al's paper was published in 1998. The most well known are the attacks on CBC mode described in http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt. -Ekr - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
