Re: Elcomsoft trying to patent faster GPU-based password cracker

2007-10-25 Thread Jon Callas

On Oct 24, 2007, at 1:21 PM, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:


I hope they don't get the patent.  The idea of using a GPU for
cryptographic calculations isn't new; see, for example, Remotely  
Keyed

Cryptographics: Secure Remote Display Access Using (Mostly) Untrusted
Hardware (http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/~angelos/Papers/2005/ 
rkey_icics.pdf)

Debra L. Cook, Ricardo Baratto, and Angelos D. Keromytis. In
Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Information and
Communications Security (ICICS), pp. 363 - 375. December 2005,  
Beijing,

China. An older version is available as Columbia University Computer
Science Department Technical Report CUCS-050-04
(http://mice.cs.columbia.edu/getTechreport.php? 
techreportID=110format=pdf),

December 2004.


I agree completely. If the PTO does their job, they won't get it.  
This is like claiming that once we know that making daiquiris in a  
blender is possible, it's patentable to improve that by making pina  
coladas. If you're skilled in the art, you know that this is pretty  
obvious. Crypto extended to cryptanalysis is less of a stretch than  
strawberries extended to coconut and pineapple.


Unfortunately, the PTO hands out patents for things like using a  
laser pointer as a cat toy.


Jon

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fyi: Report on Workshop on Next Steps for XML Signature and XML Encryption

2007-10-25 Thread ' =JeffH '
of possible interest to some...

Scott Cantor and I represented the perspective of xmldsig is 
broken/mess/complex from some non-trivial number of implementors' perspective, 
we spec'd 'just sign the blob' in a SAML binding spec recently because of 
this, perhaps if xmldsig is rev'd these sorts of concerns/approaches should be 
taken into account, to promote interoperability, and didn't get ignored, 
interestingly enough. Also, a few other participants explicitly mentioned the 
streaming use case, which is a key concern in Peter Gutmann's xmldsig 
critique: http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/xmlsec.txt.

As the report described below indicates, there's an effort emerging to charter 
a W3C working group to rev the xmldsig spec, which might be of interest to 
various folk.


=JeffH


 Original Message 
Subject: Report on Workshop on Next Steps for XML Signature and XML 
Encryption
Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2007 19:40:41 +0200
From: Thomas Roessler [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]


On 25 and 26 September 2007, W3C held a Workshop on Next Steps for
XML Signature and XML Encryption [1] in Mountain View, CA, USA,
hosted by VeriSign. The group has published its summary report [2].

The Workshop report indicates strong interest in additional work on
XML security and interest in a Working Group. Attendees identified
the areas of highest interest:

   - Create a basic profile of XML Signature
   - Review and possibly update the referencing
 model using xml:id and other mechanisms
   - Update cryptographic algorithms
   - Revisit XML canonicalization
   - Update the transform model.

Areas of ongoing and medium interest that were identified are scalable
profiling, implementation guidance, key management issues, XKMS, XML 1.1, EXI,
and interaction with other security organizations.

The Workshop report will serve as input for the deliverable of the XML
Security Specification Maintenance Working Group to propose a draft charter
for possible follow-up work.


To enable discussion among Workshop attendees, Working Group
participants, and the broader community, this mailing list,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (public archive [3]), has been created.

Participation in the mailing list is open to all interested parties.

Current list subscribers include the members of the XML Security
Specifications Maintenance Working Group, and workshop participants.
If you want to be removed from the list, please let me know.

[1] http://www.w3.org/2007/xmlsec/ws/cfp
[2] http://www.w3.org/2007/xmlsec/ws/report
[3] http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-xmlsec-discuss/2007Oct/

-- 
Thomas Roessler, W3C  [EMAIL PROTECTED]


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RE: Elcomsoft trying to patent faster GPU-based password cracker

2007-10-25 Thread Trei, Peter
I was the person who originated the DES Challenges at RSA, and also
helped set up and run them.

I knew that there was a stealth effort underway at SGI, but didn't 
know any of the details. 

A good deal of cool stuff came out of the contests.

Other prior art against this patent would include using the DSP
chip in the Amiga graphics set for non-graphics purposes, which
was often done back in the 80s.

Peter Trei

-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Ian Farquhar 
(ifarquha)
Sent: Wednesday, October 24, 2007 7:35 PM
To: 'Cryptography'
Subject: RE: Elcomsoft trying to patent faster GPU-based password cracker

ROTFL.

When SGI's stealth DES Challenge project was underway in 1997, it's main 
client ran on the host's (MIPS) CPU(s), implemented with a variant of Eli 
Biham's bit-slice DES implementation.  The 64-bit 195MHz R1 could do 2.5M 
keys/sec.  I was peripherally involved in the project.

One of the things I was looking into was offloading the client into the VICE 
ASIC on the O2.  The VICE ASIC was a compression offload engine, and combined 
with the MACE ASIC (which had the 3D rendering pipeline), provided graphics 
support on the O2.  At the time, SGI put a workstation on everyone's desk in 
the company, so there were thousands of O2's around the company.

The VICE itself had two CPU's in it, the MSP which was a R4000-derived core 
with a 128bit vector unit, and the BSP which was a custom little RISC core 
designed for efficiently slicing non-word-aligned multimedia bit streams.  
Biham's algorithm would have run beautifully on the VICE.

I'd just gotten the devkit when the project came to an end with DESCHALL's 
successful keyfind.

So I'm feeling a little bit of déjà vu about Elcomsoft's patent here.  
Offloading keyfinding algorithms to a programmable graphics accelerator.  Wow, 
sounds *very* familiar.  But alas, probably not sufficient for a prior art 
claim.  Gotta also wonder if the mailing list traffic would still exist in SGI 
too.

Mind you, if the patent system wasn't totally broken, this application would 
fail the obviousness test anyway.  The GPU's mentioned below are basically just 
optimized little co-processors anyway.  How much innovation is there in 
offloading crypto to a coprocessor? 

Ian.

-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, 25 October 2007 3:25 AM
To: Cryptography
Subject: Elcomsoft trying to patent faster GPU-based password cracker

From:

   http://www.elcomsoft.com/EDPR/gpu_en.pdf

  Moscow, Russia - October 22, 2007 - ElcomSoft Co. Ltd. has
  discovered and filed for a US patent...Using the brute force
  technique of recovering passwords, it was possible, though
  time-consuming, to recover passwords from popular
  applications. For example...Windows Vista uses NTLM hashing
  by default, so using a modern dual-core PC you could test up to
  10,000,000 passwords per second, and perform a complete
  analysis in about two months. With ElcomSoft's new technology,
  the process would take only three to five days..Today's [GPU]
  chips can process fixed-point calculations. And with as much as
  1.5 Gb of onboard video memory and up to 128 processing
  units, these powerful GPU chips are much more effective than
  CPUs in performing many of these calculations...Preliminary
  tests using Elcomsoft Distributed Password Recovery product
  to recover Windows NTLM logon passwords show that the
  recovery speed has increased by a factor of twenty, simply by
  hooking up with a $150 video card's onboard GPU.

-Michael Heyman

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