Re: ECC patents?
If the NSA paid anything significant for any of the curves, we would be told. You were better off not responding; you have lost your credibility on this topic. Given the NSA's history of secrecy; and the fact that it's common practice to not disclose (financial) terms (e.g., what were the terms to get RSA into early SSL?) and that either/both parties have incentive to keep it private; and the way they handled the SHA-1-Schnorr patent issues, I find it *highly significant* that the NSA announced, in a public forum, that they have a license for part of the Certicom patents. I am sure that I'm not alone. /r$ -- Rich Salz, Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Cross logins
Is it possible for two web sites to arrange for cross logins? Check out SAML, esp the browser artifact profile. /r$ -- Rich Salz Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: the limits of crypto and authentication
If you had two products ... both effectively performing the same function, one you already had deployed, which was significantly cheaper, significantly simpler, and significantly faster, which one would you choose? I was told that one of the reasons SSL took off was because Visa and/or MC told merchants they would for the time being treat SSL as card-present, in terms of fraud penalties, etc. If this is true (anyone here verify? My source is on the list if s/he wants to name themselves), then SSL/SET is an interesting example of betting on both sides. /r$ -- Rich Salz Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: the limits of crypto and authentication
I think that by eliminating the need for a merchant to learn information about your identity I have aimed higher. Given that we're talking about credit instruments, Wasn't that a goal of SET? /r$ -- Rich Salz Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Digital signatures have a big problem with meaning
I don't want to have to re-implement Apache in order to do an SSL implementation. ... Those analogies aren't apt. XML is a data format, so it's more like I don't want to have to implement ASN1/DER to do S/MIME Which is a nonsensical complaint. Makes sense to me. The other problem with XML sigs (also pointed out in the writeup) is the fact that it gives you 10 ways to do everything, of which only 1 is actually correct/secure/usable, but is indistinguishable from the other 9. I don't see it. Yes, XML DSIG makes it possible to sign parts of an XML document. And there are broken applications. Er, so what? Is the lack of certificate validation in outlook proof that S/MIME is broken? reluctant to implement something that lets users blow their feet off in a dozen different ways without even knowing it. So have your API take an XML document and output a signature that signs the exclusive canonicalization of that document, and includes the signer's certificate in the keydata. Problem solved. And that's a fair comparison, since S/MIME is just a profile of PKCS#7 applied to email, right? So use WS-Security which is a profile of XML DSIG applied to SOAP messages, for example. In other postings, you've pointed out that nobody re-generates the DER, but instead keeps it around to verify the signature. In the XML world we do it all the time; recreating and re-canonicalizing works. I guess that proves S/MIME and PGP are fundamentally broken. :) /r$ -- Rich Salz, Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Digital signatures have a big problem with meaning
Peter Gutmann wrote: Yup, see Why XML Security is Broken, http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/xmlsec.txt, for more on this. Peter's shared earlier drafts with me, and we've exchanged email about this. The only complaint that has a factual basis is this: I don't want to have to implement XML processing to do XML Digital Signatures The others are just blowing smoke, or proof by snarkiness. :) /r$ -- Rich Salz Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Digital signatures have a big problem with meaning
On the one hand a digital signature should matter more the bigger the transaction that it protects. On the other hand, the bigger the transaction the lower the probability that it is between strangers who have no other leverage for recourse. I think signatures are increasingly being used for technical reasons, not legal. That is, sign and verify just to prove that all the layers of middleware and Internet and general bugaboos didn't screw with it. People seem to be building systems that assume proper operation, and use signatures as an application-level way to check, and also as a line of defense to screen out outsiders, rather than hold insiders liable. Loosly coupled, tightly contracted. /r$ -- Rich Salz, Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Printers betray document secrets
US scientists have discovered that every desktop printer has a signature style that it invisibly leaves on all the documents it produces. I don't think this is new - I'm pretty sure it was published about 6 or 7 years back as a technique. A couple of years ago, I was told that *every* Canon laser engine generated a unique microprint signature that could be traced back to a particular device. OEMs could buy the engine with or without the signature. If so, this has been going on, surruptitiously, for years. /r$ -- Rich Salz Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
NIST on TLS
Found via the RSS feed for cryptome.org: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts.html#sp800-52 NIST is pleased to announce the first public draft of Special Publication 800-52, Guidelines on the Selection and Use of Transport Layer Security. This document is a guideline for implementing Transport Layer Security in the Federal Government to protect sensitive information. Care must be taken when selecting cryptographic mechanisms for authentication, confidentiality, and message integrity, as some choices are non-compliant with Government standards, or may pose security risks. The comment period for this document will be 30 days, ending on November 1st, 2004. Please direct all comments and questions to Matthew J. Fanto at [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- Rich Salz Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Kerberos Design
I've been trying to study Kerberos' design history in the recent past and have failed to come up with a good resource that explains why things are built the way they are. http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/dialogue.html /r$ - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: dual-use digital signature vulnerability
attempt to address this area; rather than simple i agree/disagree buttons ... they put little checkmarks at places in scrolled form you have to at least scroll thru the document and click on one or more checkmarks before doing the i agree button. a digital signature has somewhat higher integrity than simple clicking on the i agree button ... See US patent 5,995,625. The abstract: A method of unwrapping wrapped digital data that is unusable while wrapped, includes obtaining an acceptance phrase from a user; deriving a cryptographic key from the acceptance phrase; and unwrapping the package of digital data using the derived cryptographic key. The acceptance phrase is a phrase entered by a user in response to information provided to the user. The information and the acceptance phrase can be in any appropriate language. The digital data includes, alone or in combination, any of: software, a cryptographic key, an identifying certificate, an authorizing certificate, a data element or field of an identifying or authorizing certificate, a data file representing an images, data representing text, numbers, audio, and video. -- Rich Salz Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Using crypto against Phishing, Spoofing and Spamming...
SET failed due to the complexity of distributing the software and setting up the credentials. I think another reason was the go-fast atmosphere of the late 90s, where no one wanted to slow down the growth of ecommerce. The path of least resistance was simply to bring across the old way of authorizing transactions by card number. I think your other reason was in fact the primary reason. And, of course, the primary enablers of the go-fast approach were, in fact, the very same credit card companies. They made a conscious business decision to treat online transactions the same as conventional transactions -- I forget the details, but it was pretty risk-free for a merchant to do online credit cards, getting low surchage rates. That, coupled with the US law that limited consumer liability to $50, made CCard-over-SSL a no-brainer over SET. From a consumer viewpoint, CC/SSL is more secure then SET ever was. Since it wasn't a CCard transacdtion, my liability under SET was unlimited (at least until Congress caught up to the technology). Looking at the risk management aspect, SET was a big loser for the customer. /r$ -- Rich Salz Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Passwords can sit on disk for years
What? No compiler is smart enough to say, The program sets these variables but they are never referenced again. I'll save time and not set them. Given the semantics of C pointers, and multiple compilation units, the answer to your question is probably not in non-research use. /r$ -- Rich Salz Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Security Architect Position at National Archives
Forwarded with permission. This may not be appropriate for the list, but it is one of the most interesting and useful crypto/security jobs I've seen in some time... The position is at Archive II in College Park, right next to the University of MD, at the junction of I-95 and the beltway. The hours are flexible so avoiding the rush hour traffic is not a big deal. The role is for a system architec/designer with strong cyber security experience. Somebody who can evaluate the security implication of various design proposal. In other words, I'm not looking just for somebody who can run a firewall or vulnerabiility check, or who can cite NIST security standard (although those skills woul dcome in handy too!). We are hiring system integrator to build a large, distributed, multi-sites electronic archives. It's possibly the most interesting project in the civilian government, IMHO. You can find out more about it at http://www.archives.gov/electronic_records_archives/about_era/scope.html The project is multi-year and is being bidded upon by large system integrators. So the candidate will get a chance to do interesting work, and watch how the big guys do it too. Attched is the annoucement. It's a position I can bring directly in, without going through the OPM process. Regards, Dyung Le [EMAIL PROTECTED] Information Technology (IT) Specialist (INFORMATION SECURITY) The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) is seeking one (1) Information Technology (IT) Specialist (Information Security) as part of the development team for NARAs Electronic Records Archives (ERA) program. The Electronic Records Archives is a challenging program with national importance, and aims to develop a comprehensive, systematic, and dynamic mechanism for preserving virtually any kind of electronic record, free from dependence on any specific hardware or software. (http://www.archives.gov/electronic_records_archives/index.html) -- Rich Salz, Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Verisign CRL single point of failure
dave kleiman wrote: Because the client has a Certificate Revocation Checking function turned on in a particular app (i.e. IE or NAV). I don't think you understood my question. Why is crl.verisign.com getting overloaded *now.* What does the expiration of one of their CA certificates have to do with it? Once you see that a cert has expired, there's no need whatsoever to go look at the CRL. The point of a CRL is to revoke certificates prior to their expiration. /r$ -- Rich Salz, Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Verisign CRL single point of failure
I'm not sure what the no longer dynamically changing means, I assume they've made it even worse by giving it a much larger expiry period, so your online check gives you the status from last year instead of last week. It means that they learned the lesson when the erroneously issued two MSFT certificates: In the future, VRSN patches will be issued as MSFT software updates. -- Rich Salz Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Ousourced Trust (was Re: Difference between TCPA-Hardware and a smart card and something else before
I asked the guy making the presentation about the similarity to Kerberos message flows and he said something to the effect of ah yes, kerberos. Not sure what the guy meant by that. But yes, SAML flows are just like Kerberos flows. And Liberty and WS-Federation look a lot like DCE cross-cell (er, Kerberos inter-realm) flows. After all, there's only not many ways to do secure online trusted third-party authentication. /r$ -- Rich Salz, Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Ousourced Trust (was Re: Difference between TCPA-Hardware and a smart card and something else before
2) certificates were fundamentally designed to address a trust issue in offline environments where a modicum of static, stale data was better than nothing How many years have you been saying this, now? :) How do those modern online environments achieve end-to-end content integrity and privacy? My guess is that they don't; their use of private value-add networks made it unnecessary. If my guess is/was correct, than as more valuable transactions (or regulated data) flow over the commodity Internet, then those things will become important. Make sense? Am I right? If so, then I believe that we need a federated identity and management infrastructure. The difference is that the third-party PKI enrollment model still doesn't make sense, and organizations will take over their own identity issues, as with SAML and Liberty. Once you do that, adding publicKey as just another attribute is no big deal. With any luck, the new year will bring the analogy SOAP::other middleware as SAML::x.509 :) /r$ -- Rich Salz, Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: IP2Location.com Releases Database to Identify IP's Geography
The IP2Location(TM) database contains more than 2.5 million records for all IP addresses. It has over 95 percent matching accuracy at the country level. Available at only US$499 per year, the database is available via download with free twelve monthly updates. And since the charge is per-server, not per-query, you could easily set up an international free service on a big piece of iron. /r$ -- Rich Salz Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: PKI root signing ceremony, etc.
*shrug* it doesn't retroactively enforce the safety net - but that's ok, most MS products don't either :) The whole point is to enhance common practice, not stay at the lowest common denominator. Key management and auditing is pretty much external to the actual software regardless of which solution you use I would have thought. You'd be wrong. :) I did just download and use XCA for a little bit. It's practically impossible to audit. Every key in the database is protected with the same password. The system ask for the password as soon as it starts up. If I leave the program running while I leave my computer, I'm screwed. The key-holder isn't asked to confirm each signing -- there's no *ceremony* -- and they never enter the password after the program starts. For any kind of root these are all very bad. XCA is pretty nice for a Level-2 or small Level-1 CA. The template management, etc., is pretty good. (Having them tied to the key database, and having the keys be unlocked while making cert requests, are both real bad ideas, however.) /r$ -- Rich Salz Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
PKI root signing ceremony, etc.
Some folks here might be interested in http://webservices.xml.com/pub/a/ws/2003/12/09/salz.html which walks through a secure, auditable root keygen and signing ceremony. The context is using OpenSSL to build a PKI so that we can write an XKMS server, building up to secure Web Services messages using XML DSIG and Encryption. But hey, ya gotta start somewhere. /r$ -- Rich Salz Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Open Source Embedded SSL - Export Questions
We've implemented a small version of SSL that we plan to release as open source by year's end. Great! We're not looking for official legal advice, just some pointers to current online resources of how to go about registering our product in the US. http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Encryption; Google for crypto export turned it up as the third item. Yes, open source is pretty easy to export. (Even for binaries, it's not like the bad old days; the regulations are pretty realistic now. For example, there's really no such thing as export strength any more.) On a different, but similar legal note, what current patent/trademark issues have people run across with the algorithms mentioned above? Well, for the ones you mentioned, RSA and 3DES are unencumberd. RC4 is a trademark owned by RSA Data Security. So don't violate their trademark. /r$ -- Rich Salz Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: XML-proof UIDs
This is what GUIDs/UUIDs were designed for, and they're used broadly. They're standardized in ISO 11578 [1], although there's a very similar public description in an expired Internet Draft [2]. Microsoft also publishes a description of how they generate their GUIDs, but I can't find it right now. That draft has been replaced by the UUID/URN draft that I mentioned. It includes all of the original text. Actually, I rewrote most of it so it reads better now. It's actually in the final comment period and should show up as an official RFC in few weeks. /r$ -- Rich Salz Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Open Source (was Simple SSL/TLS - Some Questions)
I took the initial view that closed source and trustable crypto are mutually incompatible Of course this isn't true. When is the last time you built your own ATM or credit-card POS terminal? Claims such as Download this app and you will be secure should definitely need to be proven, and if the app is built with TLS++ that would mean distributing the source code. That's not enough. Are you validating the toolchain? (See Ken Thompson's Turing Aware lecture on trusting trust). Are you going to prevent users from storing private keys in world-readable files? Think very carefully before you make *any* claims about what features your software will provide, and what is necessary to truly ensure those features. Are you planning on taking real liability here? That would be a first in the software world. I don't want to restrict the distribution of TLS++, but I also don't want crippled versions of it being used to fool the public. Do you really think that someone who wants to fool the public will be deterred by a LICENSE.txt file in an open source distribution? If anyone could help me to outline a reasonable possibility? I think that rather than spending time on deciding what to call this library that is to-be-written, and how to license this library that is to-be-written, that time should be spent on, well, writing it. :) /r$ -- Rich Salz Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: using SMS challenge/response to secure web sites
Now a company called NetPay.TV - I have no idea about them, really - have started a service that sends out a 6 digit pin over the SMS messaging features of the GSM network for the user to type in to the website [4]. Authentify (http://www.authentify.com), does the same kind of thing. They put a number on a web page, and then they call you and you key in the number. They were founded in 1999; not sure if they're still active. /r$ -- Rich Salz, Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Monoculture
I imagine the Plumbers Electricians Union must have used similar arguments to enclose the business to themselves, and keep out unlicensed newcomers. No longer acceptable indeed. Too much competition boys? The world might be better off if you couldn't call something secure unless it came from a certificated security programmer. Just like you don't want your house wired by a Master Electrician, who has been proven to have experience and knowledge of the wiring code -- i.e., both theory and practice. Yes, it sometimes sucks to be a newcomer and treated with derision unless you can prove that you understand the current body of knowledge. We should all try to be nicer. But surely you can understand a cryptographer's frustration when a VPN -- what does that P stand for? -- shows flaws that are equivalent to a syntax error in a Java class. Perhaps it would help to think of it as defending the field. When crap and snake-oil get out, even well-meaning crap and snake-oil, the whole profession ends up stinking. /r$ PS: As for wanting to avoid the client-server distinction in SSL/TLS, just require certs on both sides and do mutual authentication. The bytestream above is already bidirectional. -- Rich Salz Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: fyi: bear/enforcer open-source TCPA project
You propose to put a key into a physical device and give it to the public, and expect that they will never recover the key from it? Seems unwise. You think the public can crack FIPS devices? This is mass-market, not govt-level attackers. Second, if the key's in hardware you *know* it's been stolen. You don't know that for software. /r$ -- Rich Salz Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: OpenSSL *source* to get FIPS 140-2 Level 1 certification
On Fri, Sep 05, 2003 at 04:05:07PM -0400, Rich Salz wrote: It is the first *source code* certification. The ability to do this runs counter to my understanding of FIPS 140-2. Sure, that's why it's *the first.* They have never done this before, and it is very different to how they (or their Ft Meade experts) have done things before. I suppose one could argue that they're doing this for Level 1 to increase the industry demand for Level 2, but I'm not that paranoid. I think they finally get it. Also, while I don't know anything beyond what's in the public email, but based on the initial refeference platform I'll jump to some conclusions about who's involved, and they're folks with a great deal of credibility, experience, and influence in export and govt crypto issues. Anyhow, if you are interested in details, read the articles (3 at last check) in the thread from the original URL I posted. You did read before posting, right? :) /r$ -- Rich Salz Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
OpenSSL *source* to get FIPS 140-2 Level 1 certification
This is termendously exciting. For the first time ever, NIST will be certifying a FIPS 140 implementation based on the source code. As long as the pedigree of the source is tracked, and checked at run-time, then applications can claim FIPS certification. For details: http://groups.google.com/groups?dq=hl=enlr=ie=UTF-8threadm=bj9mos%242tbt%241%40FreeBSD.csie.NCTU.edu.twprev=/groups%3Fgroup%3Dmailing.openssl.users /r$ -- Rich Salz, Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Session Fixation Vulnerability in Web Based Apps
The framework, however, generally provides insecure cookies. No I'm confused. First you said it doesn't make things like the session-ID available, and I posted a URL to show otherwise. Now you're saying it's available but insecure? /r$ -- Rich Salz Chief Security Architect DataPower Technology http://www.datapower.com XS40 XML Security Gateway http://www.datapower.com/products/xs40.html XML Security Overview http://www.datapower.com/xmldev/xmlsecurity.html - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Nullsoft's WASTE communication system
It's utterly baffling to me why people like this choose to design their own thing rather than just using SSL. Totally agree. At this point in time, if it's a TCP based protocol and it isn't built on SSL/TLS, it should pretty much be treated as snake oil, I'd say. Perhaps some kind of evangelism is needed. /r$ - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
