Re: Article on passwords in Wired News
also sprach Peter Gutmann [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2004.06.03.1014 +0200]: One-time passwords (TANs) was another thing I covered in the Why isn't the Internet secure yet, dammit! talk I mentioned here a few days ago. From talking to assorted (non-European) banks, I haven't been able to find any that are planning to introduce these in the foreseeable future. I've also been unable to get any credible explanation as to why not, as far as I can tell it's We're not hurting enough yet. Maybe it's just a cultural thing, certainly among European banks it seems to be a normal part of allowing customers online access to banking facilities. While these are definitely nice, I am not particularly pleased. For one, they are only what you have, and not anything else. I love the Swiss system, which is a token card and a reader, locked with a PIN. You go to the web, get a challenge, run it through the reader after inserting the card and entering the pin, then it spits out the response, which you enter, and you're in... Simple, efficient, secure. -- martin; (greetings from the heart of the sun.) \ echo mailto: !#^.*|tr * mailto:; [EMAIL PROTECTED] invalid/expired pgp subkeys? use subkeys.pgp.net as keyserver! you raise the blade, you make the change you rearrange me till i'm sane. you lock the door, and throw away the key, there's someone in my head but it's not me. -- pink floyd, 1972 signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Fwd: New PGP Universal beta: PGP and S/MIME
fyi - Forwarded message from Lucky Green [EMAIL PROTECTED] - Cpunks, I spent the last few months working at PGP on a nifty new solution to an old problem: how to get email encryption deployed more widely without requiring user education. Since ideas for solving this problem have been discussed on this mailing list for over 10 years now, some of you might wish to take a peek at the solution that we came up with. The public beta of PGP Universal 1.1 is now yours to download for free from http://www.pgp.com/products/beta1.1.html One of the many interesting features of our approach is the ability to secure all users of a mail server, without the users needing to understand what encryption is or does, no need for MUA-specific plugins, interchangeable use of PGP keys or S/MIME, and much more. And yes, you can still keep your 4096-bit RSA key on your PC only. I am using PGP Universal myself. It is really cool. Note that the download of PGP Universal is 322MB in size and requires a dedicated x86 server to install. Have fun, --Lucky Green [EMAIL PROTECTED] - End forwarded message - -- martin; (greetings from the heart of the sun.) \ echo mailto: !#^.*|tr * mailto:; [EMAIL PROTECTED] invalid/expired pgp subkeys? use subkeys.pgp.net as keyserver! der beruf ist eine schutzwehr, hinter welche man sich erlaubterweise zurückziehen kann, wenn bedenken und sorgen allgemeiner art einen anfallen. - friedrich nietzsche pgp0.pgp Description: PGP signature
A-B-a-b encryption
it came up lately in a discussion, and I couldn't put a name to it: a means to use symmetric crypto without exchanging keys: - Alice encrypts M with key A and sends it to Bob - Bob encrypts A(M) with key B and sends it to Alice - Alice decrypts B(A(M)) with key A, leaving B(M), sends it to Bob - Bob decrypts B(M) with key B leaving him with M. Are there algorithms for this already? What's the scheme called? I searched Schneier (non-extensively) but couldn't find a reference. Thanks, -- martin; (greetings from the heart of the sun.) \ echo mailto: !#^.*|tr * mailto:; [EMAIL PROTECTED] invalid/expired pgp subkeys? use subkeys.pgp.net as keyserver! time wounds all heels. -- groucho marx pgp0.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Now Is the Time to Finally Kill Spam - A Call to Action
also sprach R. A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2003.10.13.0639 +0200]: The time to stop this nonsense is now, and there's a non-governmental, low-cost, low-effort way it could happen. Here's my plan of action, it's not original to me but I want to lay it out publicly as a battle plan: Of course the plan is good, and I am all for it. But it won't be carried in less than 10 years. I am much in favour of Graham's fight back approach, which is to simply visit webpage URLs in all emails automatically. This will drown spammer websites in requests and should make spam a lot less worthy. Who has been working with this system already? Are there reference implementations? -- martin; (greetings from the heart of the sun.) \ echo mailto: !#^.*|tr * mailto:; [EMAIL PROTECTED] invalid/expired pgp subkeys? use subkeys.pgp.net as keyserver! oh what a tangled web we weave, when first we practice to deceive. -- shakespeare pgp0.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Reliance on Microsoft called risk to U.S. security
also sprach Ian Grigg [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2003.09.25.2253 +0200]: I wouldn't put all of the blame on Microsoft, Schneier said, the problem is the monoculture. On the face of it, this is being too kind and not striking at the core of Microsoft's insecure OS. For example, viruses are almost totally a Microsoft game, simply because most other systems aren't that vulnerable. Yes and no. First, I think that viruses will surface were e.g. Linux to take top position, albeit they may have to employ totally new paradigms to subvert the more advanced security architecture of UNIX. But I believe Schneier is right for the following reason: Microsoft is a monopolist who, despite enjoying bad press for the past four years, is managing to keep its sales going up each quarter. If you are in business, what do you care for? The steep sales curve, or the quality of your product? As long as Microsoft has the monopoly on the desktop, as long as new computers come with Windows per default, and as long as people stop complaining and actually take action against the crap that Redmond ships by switching to other systems in bulk, Microsoft has no reason to invest any money in a code rework. So, in the market for server platform OSs, is there any view as to which are more secure, and whether that insecurity can be traced to the OS? The defacement archive[1] has some statistics. But don't let yourself be fooled as one should not forget that while Windows usually comes with one web-, one mail-, one DNS server, there are like 27 and up in each category for UNIX. So theoretically, when comparing those categories, you need to include a factor of 27. 1. http://defaced.alldas.org/ -- martin; (greetings from the heart of the sun.) \ echo mailto: !#^.*|tr * mailto:; [EMAIL PROTECTED] invalid/expired pgp subkeys? use subkeys.pgp.net as keyserver! women love us for our defects. if we have enough of them, they will forgive us everything, even our gigantic intellects. -- oscar wilde pgp0.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Voltage - Identity Based Encryption.
also sprach C. Wegrzyn [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2003.07.08.2324 +0200]: This is the same approach used in the Authentica system but it is deployed in an enterprise environment. Sure, but this doesn't make it any more secure. I only know very little about Authentica, but it also doesn't strike my fancy. Private keys are private, period. There got to be other ways to make PK cryptography easier. -- martin; (greetings from the heart of the sun.) \ echo mailto: !#^.*|tr * mailto:; [EMAIL PROTECTED] invalid PGP subkeys? use subkeys.pgp.net as keyserver! die menschen drängen sich zum lichte, nicht um besser zu sehen, sondern um besser zu glänzen. - friedrich nietzsche pgp0.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: pubkeys for p and g
also sprach Arnold G. Reinhold [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2003.06.29.0424 +0200]: I am not sure I understand. How does this relate to my question? Where does the other factor come from? I got the impression, and maybe I misunderstood, that you were viewing a product of two primes aA, where a was the private part= and A was the public part. That is not how RSA works. The produce aA is the public key. Either factor can be the private part. Oh, I get it. No, that was my bad. aA and bB are simply the private/Public keypairs for A and B. Yeah, yeah, I know. Algebra is always haunting me... -- martin; (greetings from the heart of the sun.) \ echo mailto: !#^.*|tr * mailto:; [EMAIL PROTECTED] invalid PGP subkeys? use subkeys.pgp.net as keyserver! our destiny exercises its influence over us even when, as yet, we have not learned its nature; it is our future that lays down the law of our today. - friedrich nietzsche pgp0.pgp Description: PGP signature
DH: pubkeys for p and g
The Check Point Firewall-1 Docs insist, that the public keys be used for p and g for the Oakley key exchange. I ask you: is this possible? - which of the two pubkeys will be p, which g? - are they both always primes? - are they both always suitable generators mod p? It just seems to me that Check Point isn't entirely sure themselves here. I'd appreciate a short cleanup... To my knowledge, g and p are globally defined, either in DH Groups (which are nothing but pre-defined g's and p's, right?), or otherwise set constant. Am I wrong about this? Thanks. -- martin; (greetings from the heart of the sun.) \ echo mailto: !#^.*|tr * mailto:; [EMAIL PROTECTED] invalid PGP subkeys? use subkeys.pgp.net as keyserver! one should never do anything that one cannot talk about after dinner. -- oscar wilde pgp0.pgp Description: PGP signature
authentication and ESP
As far as I can tell, IPsec's ESP has the functionality of authentication and integrity built in: RFC 2406: 2.7 Authentication Data The Authentication Data is a variable-length field containing an Integrity Check Value (ICV) computed over the ESP packet minus the Authentication Data. The length of the field is specified by the authentication function selected. The Authentication Data field is optional, and is included only if the authentication service has been selected for the SA in question. The authentication algorithm specification MUST specify the length of the ICV and the comparison rules and processing steps for validation. To my knowledge, IPsec implementations use AH for signing though. Why do we need AH, or why is it preferred? Thanks for your clarification! -- martin; (greetings from the heart of the sun.) \ echo mailto: !#^.*|tr * mailto:; [EMAIL PROTECTED] invalid PGP subkeys? use subkeys.pgp.net as keyserver! XP is NT with eXtra Problems. pgp0.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: The meat with multiple PGP subkeys
also sprach David Shaw [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2003.06.18.0240 +0200]: The problem is that the PKS keyserver was not written to handle keys with multiple subkeys. [snip] Thanks for the explanation. I didn't know about subkeys.pgp.net yet. Moreover, I second the belief that the keyservers must be fixed as they are really harming the PGP infrastructure. I support Jason's work: http://keyserver.kjsl.com/~jharris/keyserver.html and am already talking the wwwkeys.ch.pgp.net people into upgrading. Maybe everybody can pick a keyserver of their choice and sit on the admin's face until s/he gets it... ? Let's riot! Can someone tell me why the heck SKS is written in Ocaml? What an annoyance is that? No offence to the Ocaml people here... -- martin; (greetings from the heart of the sun.) \ echo mailto: !#^.*|tr * mailto:; [EMAIL PROTECTED] keyserver problems? http://keyserver.kjsl.com/~jharris/keyserver.html get my key here: http://madduck.net/me/gpg/publickey there is more stupidity than hydrogen in the universe, and it has a longer shelf life. -- frank zappa pgp0.pgp Description: PGP signature
Wildcard Certs
I just ran across http://certs.centurywebdesign.co.uk/premiumssl-wildcard.html but there are many more sites like that: Secure multiple websites with a single PremiumSSL Certificate. For organisations hosting a single domain name but with different subdomains (e.g. secure.centurywebdesign.co.uk, www.centurywebdesign.co.uk, signup.centurywebdesign.co.uk), the wildcard Certificate is a cost effective and efficient means of securing all subdomains without the need to manage multiple certificates. All the features, compatibility and warranty of PremiumSSL included. This strikes me as notoriously bad, although it is in accordance with the RFC. I still don't want to accept the usefulness and inherent security, so I'd like to get some expert opinions on this. Are wildcard certficates good? secure? useful? Would you employ them? If not, how would you solve the problem they are trying to address (if you don't have your own CA)? Thanks! -- martin; (greetings from the heart of the sun.) \ echo mailto: !#^.*|tr * mailto:; [EMAIL PROTECTED] keyserver problems? http://keyserver.kjsl.com/~jharris/keyserver.html get my key here: http://madduck.net/me/gpg/publickey a scientist once wrote that all truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, then violently opposed and eventually, accepted as self-evident. -- schopenhauer pgp0.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Wildcard Certs
also sprach Stefan Kelm [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2003.06.16.1652 +0200]: Now, suppose I buy a certificate for *.i-am-bad.com (assuming that I'm the owner of that domain). I could then set up an SSL server with a hostname of something like www.security-products.microsoft.com.order.registration.checkout.user- support.i-am-bad.com hoping that the browser will only display the more familiar looking parts of the URL to the user who in turn will happily accept the certificate. I could also just buy a certificate with that name. While it is an interesting point, I do not see how wildcard certificates make this possible, or enhance it. -- martin; (greetings from the heart of the sun.) \ echo mailto: !#^.*|tr * mailto:; [EMAIL PROTECTED] keyserver problems? http://keyserver.kjsl.com/~jharris/keyserver.html get my key here: http://madduck.net/me/gpg/publickey before he died, rabbi zusya said: in the world to come they will not ask me, 'why were you not moses?' they will ask me, 'why were you not zusya?' pgp0.pgp Description: PGP signature