Pardon the top-post, I'm on a retarded mobile client at the moment...
I wish the following were true. However a current nsa.gov url with a recent
timestamp explicitly lists FIPS 180-4 hashes (SHA-n) as covered by the
notification requirement.
I phrased my initial query to the list explicitly in the form of what is the
FIPS 180 notification requirement, not is there one, on purpose. See the
ridiculous requirements I (tangentially) cited.
All cryptography has been treated as politically sensitive by the USG, even
when it no longer makes sense for a given algorithm, for decades. In the
current political climate in the US, does anyone want to be a test case for
admittedly outdated regulatory compliance because of unrelated personal views
or actions?
I sure don't. After last nights research session, I'm going to stick with
sending in email notification for open source FIPS 180 code. This isn't the
country it described in social studies and civics class anymore, at all,
however once it may have lived up to that mythology.
Cheers,
David Mercer
David Mercer
Portland, OR
-Original Message-
From: Ray Dillinger b...@sonic.net
Sender: cryptography-bounces+radix42=gmail@metzdowd.com
Date: Tue, 03 Sep 2013 12:29:38
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Subject: [Cryptography] Three kinds of hash: Two are still under ITAR.
On 09/03/2013 09:54 AM, radi...@gmail.com wrote:
--Alexander Kilmov wrote:
--David Mercer wrote:
2) Is anyone aware of ITAR changes for SHA hashes in recent years
that require more than the requisite notification email to NSA for
download URL and authorship information? Figuring this one out last
time around took ltttss of reading.
I used to believe that hashing (unlike encryption) was not considered
arms.
If I recall the most recent revision, the above requirement is true
for keyed hashes whether they are signatures with public-key crypto
or secret hashes with private-key crypto) but not for fingerprint
or unkeyed hashes like FIPS or SHA-XXX.
The distinction among the three types:
Signature hashes: Alice produces a signature hash using her
private key. Because her public key is common knowledge, everybody
can tell that Alice (or at least someone with her private key)
really did sign it.
Secret hashes: MIB or some similar group share knowledge of a
secret key. A, a member of the group, produces a secret hash
using that key, and when they check, every member from Bea to Zed
knows know that some member of the organization (or at least
someone who has the secret key) did sign it. But even if the
message and hash are public or in an insecure channel like email,
nobody who doesn't have the key can prove a thing about the
signer. Or at least, not from the signature itself. Server logs
and security video surveillence of public terminals etc, are
an entirely different thing. A would be worried about those
if she had an official identity for someone to find.
Fingerprint hashes: Anybody can apply a fingerprint hash to
something, and it proves nothing about who signed it because
the hash is completely public knowledge and has no particular
key. Anyone who applies a fingerprint hash to something will get
exactly the same hash code for the same thing. The point of a
fingerprint hash is that it is a fixed-length probably-unique
identifier that can be checked in constant time. If the
fingerprint of two documents are not equal, the documents are
guaranteed to be dissimilar. If the documents are dissimilar,
the signatures are *almost* guaranteed to be dissimilar. This
is very useful for looking up documents in a hash table or
tree, for example, using the fingerprint hash as a key.
Usually when cryptographers use the word hash they are
talking about a fingerprint hash.
Bear
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