RE: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Sonntag, 17. September 2006 06:01
>
> For another example of just how badly this kind of thing can
> be done, look at this code excerpt from Firefox version
> 1.5.0.7, which is the fixed version. There are two PKCS-1
> parsing functions, one which returns the hash and its prefix,
> the other of which is given the hash and asked whether it
> matches the RSA-signed value. This is from the latter one:
>
> /*
> * check the padding that was used
> */
> if (buffer[0] != 0 || buffer[1] != 1)
> goto loser;
> for (i = 2; i < modulus_len - hash_len - 1; i++) {
> if (buffer[i] == 0)
> break;
> if (buffer[i] != 0xff)
> goto loser;
> }
>
> /*
> * make sure we get the same results
> */
> if (PORT_Memcmp(buffer + modulus_len - hash_len, hash,
> hash_len) != 0)
> goto loser;
>
> PORT_Free(buffer);
> return SECSuccess;
>
> Here, buffer holds the result of the RSA exponentiation, of
> size modulus_len, and we are passed hash of size hash_len to compare.
>
> I don't think this code is used, fortunately. It will accept
> anything of the form 0, 1, 0, garbage, hash. Just goes to
> show how easy it is to get this kind of parsing wrong.
>
Unfortunately, this code _is_ used! It took me quite a while to understand
under what circumstances, but here is the result. The problem is fixed as of
version 1.5.0.8 (out now). Interestingly, the mozilla people fixed it by
themselves in the 2.0 version (and any public beta I could find), but for the
1.5 version it took my bug report...
So here is how the code is used and some hints (I am reluctant to give out the
details right now, given that there are still many vulnerable systems out
there. However, I am sure you can easily work out the details):
Whenever a SSL or TLS server send a ServerKeyExchange message, the key
contained in there is signed with a fresh nonce. This signature is checked
using RSA_CheckSign().
Faking a signature for a key with a small exponent like 3 is easy. This can be
used to break the SSL/TLS authentication.
Better upgrade asap...
Regards,
Ulrich
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Re: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
-- Travis H. wrote: > Actually, encoding lengths of other fields in a > protocol is probably the easiest way to introduce a > remotely-exploitable vulnerability (typically buffer > overflow). I'm going to have to side with the "no > redundancy means no inconsistencies possible" argument > here. Oh, and you shouldn't process > remotely-manipulable data in a language like C, unless > you're doing all variable-length buffer management > through a well-tested library, and even then you're > playing with fire. All fields that could be controlled by an adversary should have reasonable maximum values specified in the protocol definition. Consider the language field in HTTP. It normally is blank, or contains the string "English". A lot of implementations failed in ways interesting to attackers when the language field exceeded 20K, and wound up executing script contained in the language field. Why were language fields not given a reasonable maximum length, and reasonable limits on the characters permitted in the language field, and an error response defined for the case that the language field exceeded that limit, or contained improper characters? The only fields that should be permitted to have unbounded length are those that can be pipelined, where you repeated fill a fixed length buffer, and repeatedly empty it. > And fixed-length buffers are often broken too, because > many a programmer has arbitrarily decided "that's big > enough" without considering how an active adversary > would be constrained, or without considering that the > data may grow in size with the next revision of > (whatever is feeding data to us). All fixed length buffers are of course broken unless the length is part of the protocol. Since there is, in practice, always going to a maximum length, if only the length at which the computer starts to run out of memory, maximum lengths should be defined as part of the protocol "The field is bounded by the first whitespace character, or a maximum of 128 unicode characters, whichever comes first." Recall all the implementations that gave interesting results when the length count overflowed to negative. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG /qepotdogioqKl6zqKb1307bOmyXeRzSTpBPmWcw 4WtThf8IVl9id73YCBhzL8jl5yJ7wd+oc/GuW4E7o - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
As other's have mentioned, I don't believe the small RSA exponent (e = 3) is to blame in Bleichenbacher's attack. Indeed, the mathematical problem of computing the cubic root of m modulo an rsa modulus n, for a *fixed*, arbitrary m, is still considered to be hard (no one has shown the opposite). What Bleichenbacher demonstrated is that computing the cubic root of m' || G, where G can be any value, garbage, and is sufficiently large, is easy. These are two different problems, and the vulnerability is due to the fact that these libraries allow for the variant G part. I don't see ASN.1 as being faulty either. The ASN.1 simply acts as a value that allows you to determine what hash algorithm to use. If the encrypted signature would be of the form: What-ever-padding, hash, header and implementations would directly go to the least significant bits in order to retrieve the header (which should be of fixed size), and then retrieve the hash, we wouldn't have this problem. I believe you should put the most sensitive information in the least significant bytes, which are harder to manipulate (Bleichenbacher's attack plays with the most significant bytes, the least significant bytes are basically random in his calculations, he doesn't have control over them). This reminds me of the RSA lsb hardness problem theorem http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~oded/annot/node17.html I have notes explaining it right here, section 8.4.1: http://crypto.cs.mcgill.ca/~stiglic/Papers/crypto2.ps The theorem basically says that if you can predict the least significant bit of the plaintext given the corresponding RSA ciphertext, than you can compute the whole plaintext. The theorem doesn't directly apply however (RSA signature verification uses the encryption operation, not decryption), but may be of some insight. The problem is that we (crypto community) still don't have a good way of writing specs. This is in fact a hard problem. And the problem doesn't get easier with the increasing complexity of the specs. We need simple algorithms and protocols, which allow just enough flexibility, and we need a good and precise way to write specs for these. On one side you have theoretical cryptographers / mathematicians who work in an abstract level, develop algorithms and protocols, but dont have much interest in implementing these other than possibly in a prototype form. On the other end, you have developers who excel in coding and system integration but dont necessarily understand the theoretical background in all its details. Specifications act as a bridge between these two worlds, but this bridge is not very solid today. We need to do allot more effort into building stronger bridges. --Anton - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [cryptography] Re: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
On Sep 20, 2006, at 3:10 PM, Kuehn, Ulrich wrote: -BEGIN CERTIFICATE- MIICgzCCAWugAwIBAgIBFzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBoMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEl MCMGA1UEChMcU3RhcmZpZWxkIFRlY2hub2xvZ2llcywgSW5jLjEyMDAGA1UECxMp U3RhcmZpZWxkIENsYXNzIDIgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkwHhcNMDYw ODE5MTY1MTMwWhcNMDYxMDE4MTY1MTMwWjARMQ8wDQYDVQQDEwZIYWNrZXIwgZ8w DQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAKSu6ChWttBsOpaBrYf4PzyCGNe6DuE7 rmq4CMskdz8uiAJ3wVd8jGsjdeY4YzoXSVp+9mEF6XqNgyDf8Ub3kNgPYxvJ28lg QVpd5RdGWXHo14LWBTD1mtFkCiAhVlATsVNI/tjv2tv7Jp8EsylbDHe7hslA0rns Rr2cS9bvpM03AgMBAAGjEzARMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEF BQADggEB ADLL/Up63HkFWD15INcW Xd1nZGI+gO/whm58ICyJ1Js7ON6N4NyBTwe8513CvdOlOdG/Ctmy2gxEE47HhEed ST8AUooI0ey599t84P20gGRuOYIjr7c= -END CERTIFICATE- Broken implementations can successfully verify it using the Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority: I tried to parse and verify this certificate using openssl's asn1parse command. However, I get an error: Error in encoding 7469:error:0D07207B:asn1 encoding routines:ASN1_get_object:header too long:asn1_lib.c:150: I am using openssl version 0.9.8c as of Sep 05, 2006 (Linux/Debian system). Hi Ulrich, You're using a version that has already been fixed. However the main problem seems to be that you're trying to parse a certificate in PEM format using the option -inform DER instead of -inform PEM ;) At least that's how I can reproduce your error... Cheers, Ralf smime.p7s Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature
RE: [cryptography] Re: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
> From: Ralf-Philipp Weinmann > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] [...] > Unfortunately we only found out that there has been prior art > by Yutaka Oiwa et al. *AFTER* we successfully forged a > certificate using this method (we being Andrei Pyshkin, Erik > Tews and myself). > > The certificate we forged however adheres to the padding > specifications unlike the one by Yutaka Oiwa that Simon > Josefsson forwarded to the list a couple of days ago: > > -BEGIN CERTIFICATE- > MIICgzCCAWugAwIBAgIBFzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBoMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEl > MCMGA1UEChMcU3RhcmZpZWxkIFRlY2hub2xvZ2llcywgSW5jLjEyMDAGA1UECxMp > U3RhcmZpZWxkIENsYXNzIDIgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkwHhcNMDYw > ODE5MTY1MTMwWhcNMDYxMDE4MTY1MTMwWjARMQ8wDQYDVQQDEwZIYWNrZXIwgZ8w > DQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAKSu6ChWttBsOpaBrYf4PzyCGNe6DuE7 > rmq4CMskdz8uiAJ3wVd8jGsjdeY4YzoXSVp+9mEF6XqNgyDf8Ub3kNgPYxvJ28lg > QVpd5RdGWXHo14LWBTD1mtFkCiAhVlATsVNI/tjv2tv7Jp8EsylbDHe7hslA0rns > Rr2cS9bvpM03AgMBAAGjEzARMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEF > BQADggEB > > > ADLL/Up63HkFWD15INcW > Xd1nZGI+gO/whm58ICyJ1Js7ON6N4NyBTwe8513CvdOlOdG/Ctmy2gxEE47HhEed > ST8AUooI0ey599t84P20gGRuOYIjr7c= > -END CERTIFICATE- > > Broken implementations can successfully verify it using the > Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority: > I tried to parse and verify this certificate using openssl's asn1parse command. However, I get an error: Error in encoding 7469:error:0D07207B:asn1 encoding routines:ASN1_get_object:header too long:asn1_lib.c:150: I am using openssl version 0.9.8c as of Sep 05, 2006 (Linux/Debian system). Any ideas what I am doing wrong? Cheers, Ulrich - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
-- imon Josefsson wrote: > Again, there is no problem in ASN.1 or PKCS#1 that is > being exploited here, only an implementation flaw, > even if it is an interesting one. But why did several people independently implement the same or similar flaws? The answer is in Jack Lloyd's post: > I wrote a decoder for PKCS#1 v1.5, realized it > probably had bugs I wouldn't figure out until too > late, [...] my PSS verification code is probably > around twice the length of the PSS generation code, > due to the need to check every stupid little thing. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG kcayKvWlPFXTPP9oNsxdS/f7Cu706I0sQMBSZJUj 4578L9TLcVLPN7c++p1/Un4LFV6ugOy6Pb/SpWw2u - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [cryptography] Re: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
On Sep 16, 2006, at 11:31 PM, Eric Young wrote: This is a question I would not mind having answered; while the exponent 3 attack works when there are low bits to 'modify', there has been talk of an attack where the ASN.1 is correctly right justified (hash is the least significant bytes), but incorrect ASN. 1 encoding is used to add 'arbitrary' bytes before the hash. So in this case some of the most significant bytes are fixed, the least significant bytes are fixed, but some in the middle can be modified. Does the exponent 3 attack work in this case? My personal feel is that his would be much harder, but is such an attack infeasible? This issue about ASN.1 parameters being an evil concept goes away if the attack can only work when the least significant bytes need to be modifiable. Hi Eric, the attack indeed is not infeasible. Although if you do not want to violate the padding specifications (minimum of eight 0xFF bytes), you need moduli longer than 1024 bits. My colleague Andrei Pyshkin had the following idea: In the following, we will assume to public exponent e=3. Let s be the signature of a message m. The message can be broken down into 3 parts: m := f_1 || v || f_2 with f_1, f_2 being fixed and v variable. Note that f_2 denotes the lowermost bits of the message. Furthermore let d=bitlength(f_2). In order to calculate a signature s such that m is a perfect cube, we carry out the following steps: 1. Calculate an x such that f_2 = x^3 mod 2^d with x < 2^d. This will succeed with probability > 1/2. 2. Calculate s_0 = floor(cuberoot(m)) 3. Calculate the signature s = s_0 + x - (s_0 mod 2^d) Calculating the bounds for which moduli and fixed data structures this attack will succeed is left as an excercise to the inclined reader. Unfortunately we only found out that there has been prior art by Yutaka Oiwa et al. *AFTER* we successfully forged a certificate using this method (we being Andrei Pyshkin, Erik Tews and myself). The certificate we forged however adheres to the padding specifications unlike the one by Yutaka Oiwa that Simon Josefsson forwarded to the list a couple of days ago: -BEGIN CERTIFICATE- MIICgzCCAWugAwIBAgIBFzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADBoMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEl MCMGA1UEChMcU3RhcmZpZWxkIFRlY2hub2xvZ2llcywgSW5jLjEyMDAGA1UECxMp U3RhcmZpZWxkIENsYXNzIDIgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkwHhcNMDYw ODE5MTY1MTMwWhcNMDYxMDE4MTY1MTMwWjARMQ8wDQYDVQQDEwZIYWNrZXIwgZ8w DQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAKSu6ChWttBsOpaBrYf4PzyCGNe6DuE7 rmq4CMskdz8uiAJ3wVd8jGsjdeY4YzoXSVp+9mEF6XqNgyDf8Ub3kNgPYxvJ28lg QVpd5RdGWXHo14LWBTD1mtFkCiAhVlATsVNI/tjv2tv7Jp8EsylbDHe7hslA0rns Rr2cS9bvpM03AgMBAAGjEzARMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEF BQADggEB ADLL/Up63HkFWD15INcW Xd1nZGI+gO/whm58ICyJ1Js7ON6N4NyBTwe8513CvdOlOdG/Ctmy2gxEE47HhEed ST8AUooI0ey599t84P20gGRuOYIjr7c= -END CERTIFICATE- Broken implementations can successfully verify it using the Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority: https://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/sf-class2-root.crt Cheers, Ralf - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
I noticed the exact same code being present in the mozilla 1.7.13 source ... I
wonder what the correct consequence would be? Have us crypto people proof-read
all relevant source code? Better educate developers?
Interestingly the attacker's playground between the 0, 1, 0 and the hash gets
bigger with larger key sizes, so I wonder if attacks get easier for longer
keys...
Cheers,
Ulrich
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> For another example of just how badly this kind of thing can
> be done, look at this code excerpt from Firefox version
> 1.5.0.7, which is the fixed version. There are two PKCS-1
> parsing functions, one which returns the hash and its prefix,
> the other of which is given the hash and asked whether it
> matches the RSA-signed value. This is from the latter one:
>
> /*
> * check the padding that was used
> */
> if (buffer[0] != 0 || buffer[1] != 1)
> goto loser;
> for (i = 2; i < modulus_len - hash_len - 1; i++) {
> if (buffer[i] == 0)
> break;
> if (buffer[i] != 0xff)
> goto loser;
> }
>
> /*
> * make sure we get the same results
> */
> if (PORT_Memcmp(buffer + modulus_len - hash_len, hash,
> hash_len) != 0)
> goto loser;
>
> PORT_Free(buffer);
> return SECSuccess;
>
> Here, buffer holds the result of the RSA exponentiation, of
> size modulus_len, and we are passed hash of size hash_len to compare.
>
> I don't think this code is used, fortunately. It will accept
> anything of the form 0, 1, 0, garbage, hash. Just goes to
> show how easy it is to get this kind of parsing wrong.
>
> (Note, this is from
> mozilla/security/nss/lib/softoken/rsawrapr.c:RSA_CheckSign())
>
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Re: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
"Whyte, William" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >> > > > This is incorrect. The simple form of the attack >> > > > is exactly as described above - implementations >> > > > ignore extraneous data after the hash. This >> > > > extraneous data is _not_ part of the ASN.1 data. >> >> James A. Donald wrote: >> > > But it is only extraneous because ASN.1 *says* it is >> > > extraneous. > > No. It's not the ASN.1 that says it's extraneous, it's the > PKCS#1 standard. The problem is that the PKCS#1 standard > didn't require that the implementation check for the > correct number of ff bytes that precede the BER-encoded > hash. The attack would still be possible if the hash > wasn't preceded by the BER-encoded header. That's not true -- PKCS#1 implicitly require that check. PKCS#1 says the verification algorithm should generating a new signature and then compare them. See RFC 3447 section 8.2.2. That solves the problem. Again, there is no problem in ASN.1 or PKCS#1 that is being exploited here, only an implementation flaw, even if it is an interesting one. After reading http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2020 it occurred to me that section 4.2 of it describes a somewhat related problem, where the hash OID is modified instead. That attack require changes in specifications and implementations, to have the implementation support the new hash OID. But it suggests a potential new problem too: if implementation don't verify that the parsed hash OID length is correct. E.g., an implementation that uses memcmp (parsed-hash-oid, sha1-hash-oid, MIN (length (parsed-hash-oid), length (sha1-hash-oid))) to recognize the hash algorithm used in the ASN.1 structure, it may also be vulnerable: the parsed-hash-oid may contain "garbage", that can be used to "forge" signatures against broken implementations, similar to the two attacks discussed so far. I don't know of any implementations that do this, though. /Simon - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
For another example of just how badly this kind of thing can be done,
look at this code excerpt from Firefox version 1.5.0.7, which is the
fixed version. There are two PKCS-1 parsing functions, one which returns
the hash and its prefix, the other of which is given the hash and asked
whether it matches the RSA-signed value. This is from the latter one:
/*
* check the padding that was used
*/
if (buffer[0] != 0 || buffer[1] != 1)
goto loser;
for (i = 2; i < modulus_len - hash_len - 1; i++) {
if (buffer[i] == 0)
break;
if (buffer[i] != 0xff)
goto loser;
}
/*
* make sure we get the same results
*/
if (PORT_Memcmp(buffer + modulus_len - hash_len, hash, hash_len) != 0)
goto loser;
PORT_Free(buffer);
return SECSuccess;
Here, buffer holds the result of the RSA exponentiation, of size
modulus_len, and we are passed hash of size hash_len to compare.
I don't think this code is used, fortunately. It will accept anything
of the form 0, 1, 0, garbage, hash. Just goes to show how easy it is
to get this kind of parsing wrong.
(Note, this is from
mozilla/security/nss/lib/softoken/rsawrapr.c:RSA_CheckSign())
Hal Finney
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RE: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
> > > > This is incorrect. The simple form of the attack > > > > is exactly as described above - implementations > > > > ignore extraneous data after the hash. This > > > > extraneous data is _not_ part of the ASN.1 data. > > James A. Donald wrote: > > > But it is only extraneous because ASN.1 *says* it is > > > extraneous. No. It's not the ASN.1 that says it's extraneous, it's the PKCS#1 standard. The problem is that the PKCS#1 standard didn't require that the implementation check for the correct number of ff bytes that precede the BER-encoded hash. The attack would still be possible if the hash wasn't preceded by the BER-encoded header. William - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [cryptography] Re: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
James A. Donald wrote: -- James A. Donald wrote: >> Code is going wrong because ASN.1 can contain >> complicated malicious information to cause code to go >> wrong. If we do not have that information, or simply >> ignore it, no problem. Ben Laurie wrote: > This is incorrect. The simple form of the attack is > exactly as described above - implementations ignore > extraneous data after the hash. This extraneous data > is _not_ part of the ASN.1 data. But it is only extraneous because ASN.1 *says* it is extraneous. If you ignore the ASN.1 stuff, treat it as just arbitrary padding, you will not get this problem. You will look at the rightmost part of the data, the low order part of the data, for the hash, and lo, the hash will be wrong! This is a question I would not mind having answered; while the exponent 3 attack works when there are low bits to 'modify', there has been talk of an attack where the ASN.1 is correctly right justified (hash is the least significant bytes), but incorrect ASN.1 encoding is used to add 'arbitrary' bytes before the hash. So in this case some of the most significant bytes are fixed, the least significant bytes are fixed, but some in the middle can be modified. Does the exponent 3 attack work in this case? My personal feel is that his would be much harder, but is such an attack infeasible? This issue about ASN.1 parameters being an evil concept goes away if the attack can only work when the least significant bytes need to be modifiable. eric - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
-- James A. Donald wrote: > > > > Code is going wrong because ASN.1 can contain > > > > complicated malicious information to cause code > > > > to go wrong. If we do not have that > > > > information, or simply ignore it, no problem. Ben Laurie wrote: > > > This is incorrect. The simple form of the attack > > > is exactly as described above - implementations > > > ignore extraneous data after the hash. This > > > extraneous data is _not_ part of the ASN.1 data. James A. Donald wrote: > > But it is only extraneous because ASN.1 *says* it is > > extraneous. > > > > If you ignore the ASN.1 stuff, treat it as just > > arbitrary padding, you will not get this problem. > > You will look at the rightmost part of the data, the > > low order part of the data, for the hash, and lo, > > the hash will be wrong! Ben Laurie wrote: > If you ignore the ASN.1 stuff then you won't know what > hash to calculate. If true, irrelevant. If true, it would merely imply that they should not have used ASN.1 to represent the hash type. But in fact it is not true. I suspect a lot of implementations decide the hash type by looking for particular byte values at particular fixed locations, rather than by deciphering the data as ASN.1. To repeat my argument: A program can only correctly handle a small number of fixed data layouts, but ASN.1 can express an infinite variety of layouts, giving great scope for malicious data. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG bUm91GJmI9zp9B7QNyHcQVSy/PJPz6xQb/PIepFe 47yymkER8iV/Dv/2S5EmJ4XMufQI8aDE8j3ZF80nl - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
James A. Donald wrote: > -- > James A. Donald wrote: >>> Code is going wrong because ASN.1 can contain >>> complicated malicious information to cause code to go >>> wrong. If we do not have that information, or simply >>> ignore it, no problem. > > Ben Laurie wrote: >> This is incorrect. The simple form of the attack is >> exactly as described above - implementations ignore >> extraneous data after the hash. This extraneous data >> is _not_ part of the ASN.1 data. > > But it is only extraneous because ASN.1 *says* it is > extraneous. > > If you ignore the ASN.1 stuff, treat it as just > arbitrary padding, you will not get this problem. You > will look at the rightmost part of the data, the low > order part of the data, for the hash, and lo, the hash > will be wrong! If you ignore the ASN.1 stuff then you won't know what hash to calculate. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html http://www.links.org/ "There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
-- James A. Donald wrote: >> Code is going wrong because ASN.1 can contain >> complicated malicious information to cause code to go >> wrong. If we do not have that information, or simply >> ignore it, no problem. Ben Laurie wrote: > This is incorrect. The simple form of the attack is > exactly as described above - implementations ignore > extraneous data after the hash. This extraneous data > is _not_ part of the ASN.1 data. But it is only extraneous because ASN.1 *says* it is extraneous. If you ignore the ASN.1 stuff, treat it as just arbitrary padding, you will not get this problem. You will look at the rightmost part of the data, the low order part of the data, for the hash, and lo, the hash will be wrong! --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG UXewrm6/A/3rklAbGfwShB29YFqjqqWLa3AU+htK 4Xf+hOFyYI4Pv0jWjzDC226z/LHorwYhZlhfNvl2z - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
> > If so, I fear we are learning the wrong lesson, which > > while valid in other contexts is not pertinent here. > > TLS must be flexible enough to accommodate new > > algorithms, this means that the data structures being > > exchanged are malleable, and that implementations must > > validate strict adherence to a specifically defined > > form for the agreed algorithm, but the ability to > > express other forms cannot be designed out. > > There is no need, ever, for the RSA signature to encrypt > anything other than a hash, nor will their ever be such > a need. In this case the use of ASN.1 serves absolutely > no purpose whatsoever, other than to create complexity, > bugs, and opportunities for attack. It is sheer > pointless stupidity, complexity for the sake of > complexity, an indication that the standards process is > broken. I think this is a bit unfair. PKCS#1 signatures were originally designed to include a hash identifier to address a specific concern, arising from the fact that RSA signers can freely choose the hash algorithm to use. Say that Alice uses SHA-1 to generate her signature on m, and SHA-1(m) = h. Then the concern is that Bob can find a broken hash function BASH such that BASH(m') = h. If he can do that and format a message that claims to be signed with RSA and BASH, then he can present Alice's signature as a valid signature on m'. There are a number of different protections against this. For example, Alice's cert could identify her key as only to be used with SHA-1 (this is effectively what happens with DSA public keys). However, the convention has been to mark an RSA key in an X.509 cert as rsaEncryption and not specify in the AlgorithmIdentifier that it's only to be used with a certain hash function (or signature scheme). So PKCS#1 incorporated the hash identifier, which prevents a signature generated with one hash algorithm from being used with a different hash algorithm. (Since then, Burt Kaliski's done some research on the use of hash "firewalls" of this type: see http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2020. His conclusion is that by and large they aren't necessary, but that isn't relevant to the discussion here). At the time, ASN.1 was in widespread use, so it was an obvious decision (rather than pointless stupidity) to use it to encode the hash function identifier. In practice, the ASN.1 doesn't introduce complexity because most implementations (certainly ones I've worked on) simply treated it as a memcmp rather than wheeling out the heavy ASN.1 machinery. The real problem isn't ASN.1; the problem is that an encoding method was used for the rest of the signature that didn't specify the length of the signature block and it didn't occur to anyone to check it. Cheers, William - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
James A. Donald wrote: > -- > Greg Rose wrote: >> At 19:02 +1000 2006/09/14, James A. Donald wrote: >>> Suppose the padding was simply >>> >>> 010101010101010 ... 1010101010101 hash >>> >>> with all leading zeros in the hash omitted, and four >>> zero bits showing where the actual hash begins. >>> >>> Then the error would never have been possible. > > James A. Donald: >> I beg to differ. A programmer who didn't understand >> the significance of crypto primitives would (as many >> did) just search for the end of the padding to locate >> the beginning of the hash, and check that the next set >> of bytes were identical to the hash, then return >> "true". So > > The hash is known size, and occurs in known position. > He does not search the padding for location, but > examines it for correct format. > >> >> 01010101 ... 1010101010101 hash crappetycrap >> >> would still be considered valid. There's a lot of code >> out there that ignored the fact that after the FFs was >> specific ASN.1 stuff, and just treated it as a defined >> part of the padding. > > And that code is correct, and does not have the problem > that we discuss. Paying attention to ASN.1 stuff is > what is causing this problem. No, it is incorrect and does have the problem we discuss. The fact that it ignores the crap that's after the hash makes it vulnerable. > Code is going wrong because ASN.1 can contain > complicated malicious information to cause code to go > wrong. If we do not have that information, or simply > ignore it, no problem. This is incorrect. The simple form of the attack is exactly as described above - implementations ignore extraneous data after the hash. This extraneous data is _not_ part of the ASN.1 data. The more complex form of the attack does actually use the ASN.1, in the form of the parameters field. However, I'm not sure why you'd single out ASN.1 as the cause of this problem: once the designers of the protocol decided you needed parameters, the door was opened to the attack. Implementations can incorrectly ignore the extraneous parameters no matter how you encode them. Not that I'm a fan of ASN.1, but if we're going to blame it for problems, we should do so only when it is actually to blame. The fault in this case is a combination of overly flexible protocol design and implementation flaws. Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html http://www.links.org/ "There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
James Donald writes: > There is no need, ever, for the RSA signature to encrypt > anything other than a hash, nor will their ever be such > a need. In this case the use of ASN.1 serves absolutely > no purpose whatsoever, other than to create complexity, > bugs, and opportunities for attack. It is sheer > pointless stupidity, complexity for the sake of > complexity, an indication that the standards process is > broken. Actually there is something besides the hash there: an identifier for which hash algorithm is used. The ASN.1 OID was, I suppose, a handy and already-existant mechanism for universal algorithm identification numbers. Putting the hash identifier into the RSA signed data prevents hash substitution attacks. Otherwise the hash identifier has to be passed unsigned, and an attacker could substitute a weak hash algorithm and find a second preimage that matches your signed hash. Maybe that is not part of a threat model you are interested in but at least some signers don't want their hash algorithms to be changed. BTW I want to mention a correction to Peter Gutmann's post: as I understand it, GnuPG was not vulnerable to this attack. Neither was PGP. The OpenPGP standard passes the hash number outside the RSA signed data in addition to using PKCS-1 padding. This simplifies the parsing as it allows hard-coding the ASN-1 prefix as an opaque bit string, then doing a simple comparison between the prefix+hash and what it should be. Hal Finney - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
"Steven M. Bellovin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >As for the "not compatible with a well-socialized human" -- well, maybe -- I >don't think normal people describe themselves as "paranoid by profession" Might I refer the reader to http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/. I've even received mail from address-harvesting bots that begin "Dear Paranoid, ...". Peter. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
-- Victor Duchovni wrote: > If so, I fear we are learning the wrong lesson, which > while valid in other contexts is not pertinent here. > TLS must be flexible enough to accommodate new > algorithms, this means that the data structures being > exchanged are malleable, and that implementations must > validate strict adherence to a specifically defined > form for the agreed algorithm, but the ability to > express other forms cannot be designed out. There is no need, ever, for the RSA signature to encrypt anything other than a hash, nor will their ever be such a need. In this case the use of ASN.1 serves absolutely no purpose whatsoever, other than to create complexity, bugs, and opportunities for attack. It is sheer pointless stupidity, complexity for the sake of complexity, an indication that the standards process is broken. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG mKNEZf/r5lZqyGpNhzkQ0zdt2uAdaxkSyyyxAW3W 4BWO8prrBiE/VfMik8xpeS4TgD+5KsqGSGeRw2Dxr - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
>From http://www.w3.org/2001/tag/doc/leastPower.html : When designing computer systems, one is often faced with a choice between using a more or less powerful language for publishing information, for expressing constraints, or for solving some problem. This finding explores tradeoffs relating the choice of language to reusability of information. The "Rule of Least Power" suggests choosing the least powerful language suitable for a given purpose -- STSM, Senior Security Architect SOA Appliances Application Integration Middleware - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
On Thu, 14 Sep 2006 17:21:28 -0400, Victor Duchovni <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > If so, I fear we are learning the wrong lesson, which while valid in > other contexts is not pertinent here. TLS must be flexible enough to > accommodate new algorithms, this means that the data structures being > exchanged are malleable, and that implementations must validate strict > adherence to a specifically defined form for the agreed algorithm, > but the ability to express other forms cannot be designed out. > > This, in my view, has little to do with ASN.1, XML, or other encoding > frameworks. Thorough input validation is not yet routinely and > consistently practiced by most software developers. Software is almost > invariably written to parse formats observed in practice correctly, and is > then promptly declared to "work". The skepticism necessary to continually > question the implicit assumption that the input is well-formed is perhaps > not compatible with being a well-socialized human. The attackers who ask > the right questions to break systems and the few developers who write > truly defensive code are definitely well off the middle of the bell-curve. > > It is not just PKCS#1 or X.509v3 that presents opportunities for crafting > "interesting" messages. MIME, HTTP, HTML, XML, ... all exhibit similar > pitfalls. Loosely speaking, this looks like a variant of Goedel's theorem, > if the protocol is expressive enough it can express problematic assertions. > > We can fine-tune some protocols to remove stupid needless complexity, but > enough complexity will remain to make the required implementation disciple > beyond the reach of most software developers (at least as trained today, > but it is not likely possible to design a training program that will > a preponderance all strong defensive programmers). A software testing expert once asked me why even good test groups didn't find more of the software holes. I told her it was because the spec said things like "must accept input up to 4096 bytes" rather than "must accept input up to 4096 bytes and must detect and reject longer input strings". I think we're seeing the same thing here -- the spec didn't say "must reject", so people who coded to the spec fell victim. As for the "not compatible with a well-socialized human" -- well, maybe -- I don't think normal people describe themselves as "paranoid by profession" --Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
Victor Duchovni <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >This, in my view, has little to do with ASN.1, XML, or other encoding >frameworks. Thorough input validation is not yet routinely and consistently >practiced by most software developers. Software is almost invariably written >to parse formats observed in practice correctly, and is then promptly >declared to "work". It's not just this, sometimes the acceptance of not-quite-correct data is necessary, because if you don't do it, your implementation breaks. To take one well-known example, Microsoft have consistently encoded the version info in their SSL/TLS handshake wrong, which in theory allows rollback attacks. So as a developer you have the following options: 1. Reject the encoding and be incompatible with 95(?)% of *all* deployed SSL clients (that's *several hundred million* users). 2. Turn a blind eye and interoperate with said several hundred million users, at the expense of being vulnerable to rollback attacks. I'm not aware of a single implementation that takes option 1, simply because it would be pure marketplace suicide to do so. The same goes for pretty much every other security protocol I know of. SSH is the most explicit since clients and servers exchange ASCII strings before they do anything else, all SSH implementations have a built-in database of known bugs that they adjust their behaviour for when they detect a certain client or server. Obviously no-one will implement this bug-compatibility for a security hole, but it's not impossible that some of this extended flexibility may at some point lead to a problem. For other protocols, it works in reverse, you recognise the peer implemention by the bugs, not the other way round. Beyond straight implementation bugs though are standards that require insecure or ambiguous behaviour, either by accident (which eventually gets fixed), or because of design-by-committee politics, about which enough has probably been said in the past (cough*IPsec*cough :-). Peter. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
-- Greg Rose wrote: > At 19:02 +1000 2006/09/14, James A. Donald wrote: >> Suppose the padding was simply >> >> 010101010101010 ... 1010101010101 hash >> >> with all leading zeros in the hash omitted, and four >> zero bits showing where the actual hash begins. >> >> Then the error would never have been possible. James A. Donald: > I beg to differ. A programmer who didn't understand > the significance of crypto primitives would (as many > did) just search for the end of the padding to locate > the beginning of the hash, and check that the next set > of bytes were identical to the hash, then return > "true". So The hash is known size, and occurs in known position. He does not search the padding for location, but examines it for correct format. > > 01010101 ... 1010101010101 hash crappetycrap > > would still be considered valid. There's a lot of code > out there that ignored the fact that after the FFs was > specific ASN.1 stuff, and just treated it as a defined > part of the padding. And that code is correct, and does not have the problem that we discuss. Paying attention to ASN.1 stuff is what is causing this problem. Code is going wrong because ASN.1 can contain complicated malicious information to cause code to go wrong. If we do not have that information, or simply ignore it, no problem. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG 8Jickn3nr3AE+2RW3jUC7DaHw6yD1gLpSTISH0F6 4Bjf3VmASP+HQ4q0CYdRKgWFZxd/QnFOiartuob5Q - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
On Thu, Sep 14, 2006 at 11:25:11AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > "James A. Donald" writes: > -+--- > | > | > | ASN.1 provided additional redundant information, making > | possible unexpected data layouts that should not > | normally happen. It had too much expressive power, too > | much flexibility. It could express cases that one does > | not expect to deal with, could flex in more ways than > | one's software is likely to be written for. > | > | > > Sir, There is a lesson here as important as > Fred Brook's "Adding people to a late project > makes it later" and I urge you to put this in > some form of "print" at your earliest capability. > No, not urge but rather beg. If so, I fear we are learning the wrong lesson, which while valid in other contexts is not pertinent here. TLS must be flexible enough to accommodate new algorithms, this means that the data structures being exchanged are malleable, and that implementations must validate strict adherence to a specifically defined form for the agreed algorithm, but the ability to express other forms cannot be designed out. This, in my view, has little to do with ASN.1, XML, or other encoding frameworks. Thorough input validation is not yet routinely and consistently practiced by most software developers. Software is almost invariably written to parse formats observed in practice correctly, and is then promptly declared to "work". The skepticism necessary to continually question the implicit assumption that the input is well-formed is perhaps not compatible with being a well-socialized human. The attackers who ask the right questions to break systems and the few developers who write truly defensive code are definitely well off the middle of the bell-curve. It is not just PKCS#1 or X.509v3 that presents opportunities for crafting "interesting" messages. MIME, HTTP, HTML, XML, ... all exhibit similar pitfalls. Loosely speaking, this looks like a variant of Goedel's theorem, if the protocol is expressive enough it can express problematic assertions. We can fine-tune some protocols to remove stupid needless complexity, but enough complexity will remain to make the required implementation disciple beyond the reach of most software developers (at least as trained today, but it is not likely possible to design a training program that will a preponderance all strong defensive programmers). -- /"\ ASCII RIBBON NOTICE: If received in error, \ / CAMPAIGN Victor Duchovni please destroy and notify X AGAINST IT Security, sender. Sender does not waive / \ HTML MAILMorgan Stanley confidentiality or privilege, and use is prohibited. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
At 19:02 +1000 2006/09/14, James A. Donald wrote: Suppose the padding was simply 010101010101010 ... 1010101010101 hash with all leading zeros in the hash omitted, and four zero bits showing where the actual hash begins. Then the error would never have been possible. I beg to differ. A programmer who didn't understand the significance of crypto primitives would (as many did) just search for the end of the padding to locate the beginning of the hash, and check that the next set of bytes were identical to the hash, then return "true". So 01010101 ... 1010101010101 hash crappetycrap would still be considered valid. There's a lot of code out there that ignored the fact that after the FFs was specific ASN.1 stuff, and just treated it as a defined part of the padding. Greg. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Why the exponent 3 error happened:
"James A. Donald" writes: -+--- | | | ASN.1 provided additional redundant information, making | possible unexpected data layouts that should not | normally happen. It had too much expressive power, too | much flexibility. It could express cases that one does | not expect to deal with, could flex in more ways than | one's software is likely to be written for. | | Sir, There is a lesson here as important as Fred Brook's "Adding people to a late project makes it later" and I urge you to put this in some form of "print" at your earliest capability. No, not urge but rather beg. --dan P.S., If needing further examples, take a shot at the fattest, sittingest duck -- the PERL credo: "There's more than one way to do it." - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
