Re: Are new passports [an] identity-theft risk?
* Dave Emery: Correct me if I am wrong, but don't most of the passive, cheap RF or magnetic field powered RFIDs transmit maybe 128 bits of payload, not thousands and thousands of bits which would be enough to include addresses, names, useful biometric data and so forth ? Those that perform actual cryptographic operations can store tens of thousands of bits. Even older tags (without proper crypto) easily reach 2**15 bits. These tags (for example, MIFARE) are usually not considered RFID tags by privacy activists, even though they can be read at some distance (but not with COTS equipment). Contactless readers are only used for user comfort (you can leave the card in your purse) and to counter vandalism, not for tracking purposes. The tags you are referring to are RFID tags used in logistics which usually provide only very, very few bits (which sometimes can't even be changed). - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Are new passports [an] identity-theft risk?
At 06:11 AM 10/24/2004, Ian Grigg wrote: The questions would then be, what frequency do these things operate on, what power is required to power them up, and what power is required to ... power them down. Any radio guys around? There's an excellent RFID reference article at http://www.acmqueue.com/modules.php?name=Contentpa=showpagepid=216 RFIDs run at a variety of frequencies, including 128 kHz, 13.56MHz, 915 MHz, 2.45GHz, which are the common ISM bands that lots of other things run in, such as cordless phones, WiFi, Microwave ovens, etc., which means that detecting readers may be tough. It doesn't take a lot of power to power them; not sure what it takes to fry them. Bill Stewart [EMAIL PROTECTED] - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Are new passports [an] identity-theft risk?
On Fri, 22 Oct 2004, Perry E. Metzger wrote: I don't know who *else* has said it, but I've said this repeatedly at conferences. With phased arrays, you should be able to read RFID tags at surprising distances, and in spite of attempts to jam such signals (such as RSA's proposed RFID privacy mechanism). One thing that I have seen confuse people writing about the new passports is that RFID may mean different technologies. So I'd like to mention that the passports will not use the simple bar-code kind of RFID tags -- they will use chip cards communicating over ISO/IEC 14443. The current technology has big problems with working at a distance (in fact, the tests done with COTS 14443 readers shows that most have problems with reading passport-like cards even when placed at the optimal distance...), but I don't know enough about antenna technology to be able to guess what can be done by a dedicated attacker... /Krister PS. Most of the MRTD (Machine Readable Travel Documents) specifications are available at http://www.icao.int/mrtd/Home/index.cfm. PPS. Most people on this list seems to be interested in the US passport, so you may be interested in that the US department of state, and department of homeland security, seems to be doing a pilot of the new passport. The RFP is available from: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/jul/us-biometric-passport-original.pdf with some consolidated Q and A at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/jul/us-biometric-passport-QandA.pdf - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Are new passports [an] identity-theft risk?
On Sat, Oct 23, 2004 at 03:23:21PM -0400, Adam Shostack wrote: The technology will mature *very* rapidly if Virginia makes their driver's licenses RFID-enabled, or if the US goes ahead with the passports. Why? Because there will be a stunning amount of money to be stolen by not identity thieves, but real thieves. Imagine sitting with a laptop, a good antenna, and some software outside a metro station in Virginia. Or an upscale restaurant in Adams-Morgan, reading off the addresses of those who will be away from home for the next 3 hours. Correct me if I am wrong, but don't most of the passive, cheap RF or magnetic field powered RFIDs transmit maybe 128 bits of payload, not thousands and thousands of bits which would be enough to include addresses, names, useful biometric data and so forth ? For many if not most applications (inventory control and tracking) a 128 bit unique serial number is enough - are the passport and drivers license (soon apparently to be the same thing here in the USA at least in respect to an internal passport required for travel on public transportation) applications of RFID actually intended to allow reading tens of kilobytes of data or just a unique serial that can be used as a key in an on line database system ? The signaling reliability problem of successfully transmitting say 10 or 100 kb of data error free (enough for reasonable info about someone and some biometric measurements) is quite different from repeating 128 bits over and over and over until the reader succeeds in making the FEC and checksums work for a couple of reads out of thousands of repetitions of the 128 bits. Detecting a weak repeated short pattern in noise is much easier than reading thousands of bits with few or no errors (few enough to be corrected by a reasonable rate FEC). Whilst unique serial numbers read at a distance could be used in a variety of rather sinister ways, they aren't equivalent to dumping the names, addresses, weight, height, birth date, social security number and biometric signatures of someone in the clear. And obviously are much less useful to an unsophisticated thief without access to the database mapping the serial number to useful information. And further it seems reasonable to suppose that if larger blocks of useful data get dumped, it would be encrypted under carefully controlled keys at least for passport and similar applications. Granted that very sophisticated attackers might obtain some of these keys, but the average thief presumably would not have access to them. It does occur to me that RFID equipped passports or internal passports/driver licenses (your papers please) COULD be equipped with some kind of press to read switch the would require active finger pressure on the card to activate the RFID transmitter - this would leave them disabled and incapable of transmitting the ID when sitting in someone's wallet or purse. Aside from very sinister covert reading applications I cannot think of any reason why a RFID equipped identity card would need to be readable without the active cooperation and awareness of the person carrying the card, thus such a safeing mechanism would not be a real burden except to those with sinister covert agendas. And needless to say, copper screen or foil lined wallets would become very popular... -- Dave Emery N1PRE, [EMAIL PROTECTED] DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass 02493 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Are new passports [an] identity-theft risk?
On Sun, Oct 24, 2004 at 12:58:56AM -0400, Dave Emery wrote: | On Sat, Oct 23, 2004 at 03:23:21PM -0400, Adam Shostack wrote: | | The technology will mature *very* rapidly if Virginia makes their | driver's licenses RFID-enabled, or if the US goes ahead with the | passports. Why? Because there will be a stunning amount of money to | be stolen by not identity thieves, but real thieves. Imagine sitting | with a laptop, a good antenna, and some software outside a metro | station in Virginia. Or an upscale restaurant in Adams-Morgan, | reading off the addresses of those who will be away from home for the | next 3 hours. | | Correct me if I am wrong, but don't most of the passive, cheap | RF or magnetic field powered RFIDs transmit maybe 128 bits of payload, | not thousands and thousands of bits which would be enough to include | addresses, names, useful biometric data and so forth ? Unclear. Presuming you're right, that 128 bit number will become your ID, just like your SSN is now. If you broadcast it at the right time, you'll be Alice. | And further it seems reasonable to suppose that if larger blocks | of useful data get dumped, it would be encrypted under carefully | controlled keys at least for passport and similar applications. | Granted that very sophisticated attackers might obtain some of these | keys, but the average thief presumably would not have access to them. You're reasonable, they're the United States Government, and they have responsed to questions about how to protect the keys that would be used to read it. (which, after all, would need to be in at least thousands of readers, just in the US, never mind in the other 190 odd countries which will want to verify passports..) ACLU's Technology and Liberty Program describes what they were told in a briefing by Frank Moss, USA Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Passport Services and director of the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs: passport issued in San Diego from January 2005 to August 2005. But you can't use the public key to then create a signature on a fraudulent document. And the public key is not used to access the data on the document -- that is wide open -- it is used only to verify the authenticity of the passport. (From http://hasbrouck.org/blog/archives/000434.html) | It does occur to me that RFID equipped passports or internal | passports/driver licenses (your papers please) COULD be equipped with | some kind of press to read switch the would require active finger | pressure on the card to activate the RFID transmitter - this would | leave them disabled and incapable of transmitting the ID when sitting in | someone's wallet or purse. Aside from very sinister covert reading | applications I cannot think of any reason why a RFID equipped identity | card would need to be readable without the active cooperation and | awareness of the person carrying the card, thus such a safeing mechanism | would not be a real burden except to those with sinister covert agendas. And who is going to pay for this press to read addition? Maybe, rather than designing with RFID, they could use a smart-card chip which requires contact? seems easier, no? Adam - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Are new passports [an] identity-theft risk?
On Sat, Oct 23, 2004 at 03:23:21PM -0400, Adam Shostack wrote: 5 years? I don't think we have that long. The technology will mature *very* rapidly if Virginia makes their driver's licenses RFID-enabled, or if the US goes ahead with the passports. Why? Because there will be a stunning amount of money to be stolen by not identity thieves, but real thieves. Imagine sitting with a laptop, a good antenna, and some software outside a metro station in Virginia. Or an upscale restaurant in Adams-Morgan, reading off the addresses of those who will be away from home for the next 3 hours. Is the problem discriminating the RFID response, or supplying power so it can respond at all? How much power does the reader need to emit to activate the RFID? What sort of equipment is needed to deliver the power directionally? -- /\ ASCII RIBBON NOTICE: If received in error, \ / CAMPAIGN Victor Duchovni please destroy and notify X AGAINST IT Security, sender. Sender does not waive / \ HTML MAILMorgan Stanley confidentiality or privilege, and use is prohibited. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: Are new passports [an] identity-theft risk?
R.A. Hettinga wrote: http://worldnetdaily.com/news/printer-friendly.asp?ARTICLE_ID=41030 An engineer and RFID expert with Intel claims there is little danger of unauthorized people reading the new passports. Roy Want told the newssite: It is actually quite hard to read RFID at a distance, saying a person's keys, bag and body interfere with the radio waves. Who was it that pointed out that radio waves don't interfere, rather, receivers can't discriminate? Absolutely. I'd add that while it's *currently* hard to read at a distance, passports typically have a lifetime of 10 years and I'd be very surprised if the technology wasn't significantly better five years out. William - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Are new passports [an] identity-theft risk?
On Fri, Oct 22, 2004 at 11:01:16AM -0400, Whyte, William wrote: | | R.A. Hettinga wrote: | | http://worldnetdaily.com/news/printer-friendly.asp?ARTICLE_ID=41030 | |An engineer and RFID expert with Intel claims there is | little danger of | unauthorized people reading the new passports. Roy Want | told the newssite: | It is actually quite hard to read RFID at a distance, | saying a person's | keys, bag and body interfere with the radio waves. | | Who was it that pointed out that radio waves don't | interfere, rather, receivers can't discriminate? | | Absolutely. I'd add that while it's *currently* hard to | read at a distance, passports typically have a lifetime | of 10 years and I'd be very surprised if the technology | wasn't significantly better five years out. 5 years? I don't think we have that long. The technology will mature *very* rapidly if Virginia makes their driver's licenses RFID-enabled, or if the US goes ahead with the passports. Why? Because there will be a stunning amount of money to be stolen by not identity thieves, but real thieves. Imagine sitting with a laptop, a good antenna, and some software outside a metro station in Virginia. Or an upscale restaurant in Adams-Morgan, reading off the addresses of those who will be away from home for the next 3 hours. Adam - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Are new passports [an] identity-theft risk?
R.A. Hettinga wrote: http://worldnetdaily.com/news/printer-friendly.asp?ARTICLE_ID=41030 An engineer and RFID expert with Intel claims there is little danger of unauthorized people reading the new passports. Roy Want told the newssite: It is actually quite hard to read RFID at a distance, saying a person's keys, bag and body interfere with the radio waves. Who was it that pointed out that radio waves don't interfere, rather, receivers can't discriminate? iang - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Are new passports [an] identity-theft risk?
Ian Grigg [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: R.A. Hettinga wrote: http://worldnetdaily.com/news/printer-friendly.asp?ARTICLE_ID=41030 An engineer and RFID expert with Intel claims there is little danger of unauthorized people reading the new passports. Roy Want told the newssite: It is actually quite hard to read RFID at a distance, saying a person's keys, bag and body interfere with the radio waves. Who was it that pointed out that radio waves don't interfere, rather, receivers can't discriminate? I don't know who *else* has said it, but I've said this repeatedly at conferences. With phased arrays, you should be able to read RFID tags at surprising distances, and in spite of attempts to jam such signals (such as RSA's proposed RFID privacy mechanism). This isn't terribly surprising but for the fact that most people don't think in terms of the fact that you can spatially discriminate radio sources. Perry - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
