Re: JILT: New Rules for Anonymous Electronic Transactions? An Exploration of the Private Law Implications of Digital Anonymity
At 07:56 AM 01/24/2003 -0500, Bob Hettinga wrote: http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/01-2/grijpink.html There's some interesting discussion about the ability of the Dutch legal culture to provide useful tools for regulating transactions in anonymous or semi-anonymous environments - if you can't find somebody, can you speak of enforcing contracts, etc. Not surprisingly, this has been discussed extensively by the Cypherpunks and other people exploring applications for cryptographically-protected communications. Some of the standard references are Tim May's Cyphernomicon paper (on the web), Orson Scott Card's novel Ender's Game, and Vernor Vinge's story True Names. (As the JILT paper says, systems like this may be quite complex to actually implement in practice, and fiction provides a good tool for exploring the social implications without doing the difficult detail work.) I do want to comment on the concept of pseudonymity and semi-anonymity. The paper appears to be using a definition in which a Trusted Third Party provides a pseudonym service, which knows the True Name behind each pseudonym and can provide it when required for a limited number situations, such as collecting unpaid debts or prosecuting ThoughtCrime, but otherwise the pseudonym is adequate for many activities, and the user can protect his privacy and conduct various activities under different pseudonyms without them being linked to each other or to his True Name.Unfortunately, the definitions of ThoughtCrime have been radically expanded in recent years, primarily due to intellectual property concerns from the music and movie publishers and the Church of Scientology, so the usefulness of these pseudonyms has decreased, even for pure communications applications without the anonymous digital payment systems that can enable anonymous business. An alternative definition of pseudonymity, which is more common in the Cypherpunks discussions, is the use of a persistent identity, verified by digital signatures, which permits the development of reputations without the need for True Names. The types of businesses that can be supported in this environment are more limited, because there's no way to throw somebody in jail if they default, but much of European merchant law evolved without this ability. For some applications, Reputation Capital provides enough protection - a name that's used for months or years of good transactions or writing good essays or making good investment recommendations has a value that will be lost if it's abused, but for other applications, escrow services substantially increase the types and values of transactions that are possible. Escrow can be used on a per-transaction basis, or the escrow service may be part of establishing a pseudonym, providing an amount of money that can be seized in a dispute resolution process without needing the True Name of the pseudonym-holder. Pseudonymity is becoming increasingly common in practice. AOL screen names were primarily intended to allow multiple family members to share an account, but are also useful for protecting privacy, especially of children in chat rooms. There's no explicit requirement for a True Name, though most accounts use credit cards which do provide some tracing ability, but the depth of credit checking performed by AOL is did their credit card company approve paying for their service this month, rather than how big a transaction can their assets cover or where do they sleep, in case the police want to arrest them. Yahoo Mail and Hotmail systems are relatively untraceable, however. EBay accounts have an organized reputation capital system, allowing buyers and sellers to rate whether the other party has met their obligations, and to allow prospective buyers and sellers to see the ratings and estimate whether they'll be defrauded or not. Unfortunately, EBay recently bought Paypal, so the privacy of Paypal users is no longer protected by the separation between the auction system and the payment system, since Paypal uses credit cards and therefore semi-traceable identities to pay people. Julf Helsingius's original Anonymous Remailer was originally intended to provide the stronger form of pseudonymity, but unfortunately he was forced to reveal the information he had about a user (because of the intellectual property Throughtcrime problem), though in fact that identity was another disposable email address. In order to respond to a growing need for anonymity in legal transactions, the regulations for organised semi-anonymity could also be extended (e.g. under property law), so that it will be possible to break through a person's anonymity retrospectively if necessitated by court order or by the law. Organised semi-anonymity (or pseudonymity) in legal transactions is therefore a useful weapon against a number of disadvantages of acting absolutely anonymously or spontaneously semi-anonymously, while retaining the envisaged protection of privacy. It is only with the
Re: Keep it secret, stupid!
The tragic part is that there are alternatives. There are several lock designs that turn out to resist this threat, including master rings and bicentric locks. While these designs aren't perfect, they I think it is worth pointing out that, while master ring systems (and master-keyed systems with false steps added) resist the attack Matt describes, they often make the task of picking the lock (on a case by case basis) easier. Actually, master ring systems make it considerably harder to pick a lock. Sometimes a pin will set at the master shear line and sometimes it will set at the change shear line, but unless all pin stacks catch at the same one, the lock won't operate. (This phenomenon is also why it is difficult to pick a SFIC core with conventional torque tools). Adding false cuts does increase picking vulnerability, of course. Personally, I think it's a shame that master ring designs have all but disappeared. They're still listed as an option in the Corbin-Russwin catalog for a few commercial cylinders, and are also used in some prison locks as I understand it. -matt That needs to be considered when designing a physical security plan. One may wish to key locks of particular importance separately from the master ring system if entry by picking is a concern. (There are some master-key systems, like the one made by Corbin, that require pin rotation at the proper time to unlock the secondary sheer line. And, as Matt mentioned, bicentric cylinders avoid this problem completely. Cost may be a major concern with these solutions, though.) - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [IP] Master Key Copying Revealed (Matt Blaze of ATT Labs)
My message was not a reply to Matt's paper. It was a reply to a message that said, approximately, If I wanted to SECURE A BUILDING the first thing I would do is worry about the LOCK and replace it with an electric lock... It did NOT say If I wanted to SECURE A LOCK My reply was to point out that the suggested strategy for securing a building would almost always be the wrong strategy. I agree that locks and methods of defeating them are intersting. Thanks, Donald == Donald E. Eastlake 3rd [EMAIL PROTECTED] 155 Beaver Street +1-508-634-2066(h) +1-508-851-8280(w) Milford, MA 01757 USA [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Mon, 27 Jan 2003, Faust wrote: Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 13:57:30 + From: Faust [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Donald Eastlake 3rd [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: Pete Chown [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [IP] Master Key Copying Revealed (Matt Blaze of ATT Labs) You are coming at this from a software/computer mindset that just isn't applicable to this sort of physical world security. Matt's paper was about _locks_. In case you have forgotten, the title was Cryptology and Physical Security: Rights Amplification in Master-Keyed Mechanical Locks. To weakly criticize his paper because it did not talk about the cost of fabrication or physical tolerances misses the point entirely. There _are_ situations where information leakage is of concern. I can imagine other applications of Matt's methods to other forms of physical security. In any case, it is intrinsically interesting In practice, social engineering is far easier to use to access secure premises. Bribe a guard, go to bed with a person with access etc.. However, that is not the proper domain of a study of rights amplification. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
EU Privacy Authorities Seek Changes in Microsoft 'Passport'
http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB1043436716535021744,00.html The New York Times January 27, 2003 EU Privacy Authorities Seek Changes in Microsoft 'Passport' By BRANDON MITCHENER Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL BRUSSELS -- European privacy authorities this week will outline changes it wants Microsoft Corp. to make to its Passport online authentication system to settle a yearlong investigation of its privacy policies, according to people familiar with the situation. The recommendations, some of which Microsoft is said to have advanced itself in the course of discussions with European authorities, would also target Microsoft's rivals in the so-called Liberty Alliance, which includes Sun Microsystems Inc. and several other multinational companies. The proposed changes would go beyond those to which Microsoft consented last year following a complaint by a nonprofit group to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission that the company was making improper use of people's data. Passport allows users who have registered with the service to enter data such as an e-mail address and a password just once and use that digital passport to enter other Web sites without re-entering the same data or creating a new password. Microsoft has insisted that Passport complies with European data-protection rules, but European privacy authorities last year said the system raised legal issues, including the value and quality of the consent given by users and the security risks associated with the transfer of their data to Passport's partners. European data-protection commissioners are expected to discuss the recommendations Wednesday. A spokesman for the chairman of the working group declined to comment on its deliberations, as did a spokeswoman for Microsoft. People familiar with the privacy authorities' thinking say the changes they plan to request give users more information about the system and more control over how their data are used. Microsoft has accepted to make major changes, said one person familiar with the group's thinking. The group is scheduled to meet the day before Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates addresses a conference on Microsoft's Internet strategy in Brussels. The EU privacy probe is unrelated to an antitrust investigation by the European Commission, which has accused Microsoft of abusing its dominant position in the market for operating systems for desktop computers to muscle its way into related product markets. -- - R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED] The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/ 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA ... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [IP] Master Key Copying Revealed (Matt Blaze of ATT Labs)
On Mon, 27 Jan 2003, Faust wrote: Bribe a guard, go to bed with a person with access etc.. However, that is not the proper domain of a study of rights amplification. I'm actually not sure of that. I think that an organized case-by-case study of social engineering breaches would be valuable reading material for security consultants, HR staff, employers, designers, and psychologists. It's not actually the study of cryptography, but it's a topic near and dear to the heart of those who need security, just as Matt's paper on locks. Bear - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: EU Privacy Authorities Seek Changes in Microsoft 'Passport'
The widespread acceptance of something as obviously a bad idea as passport really bothers me. I could see a password manager program to automate the process of password invalidation where you discovered a compromise; but the idea of putting everything you do online on the same password or credential is just... stupid beyond belief. Why are single-sign-on systems even legal to sell without warnings? Why don't Msoft and the other members of the Liberty alliance have to put a big warning label on them that says USE OF THIS PRODUCT WILL DEGRADE YOUR SECURITY? Because that's what we're looking at here; drastically reduced security for very marginally enhanced convenience. But what really gets me about this is that it's totally obvious that that's what we're looking at, and people are buying this system anyway. That's hard to swallow, because even consumers ought not to be that stupid. But it's even worse than that, because people who ought to know better (and people who *DO* know better, their own ethics and customers' best interests be damned) are even *DEVELOPING* for this system. It just doesn't make any damn sense. Bear - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: EU Privacy Authorities Seek Changes in Microsoft 'Passport'
but the idea of putting everything you do online on the same password or credential is just... stupid beyond belief. Liberty is architected to be federated, unlike Passport. /r$ - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: FYI: Palladium now NGSCB
On Mon, 27 Jan 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: From: http://news.zdnet.co.uk/story/0,,t269-s2129337,00.html Microsoft has dropped the code name of its controversial security technology, Palladium, in favor of this buzzword- bloated tongue twister: next-generation secure computing base. Similar from http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/4/29039.html -Michael Heyman I think that if we cooperate we can stop this absurd Orwellian grab of a perfectly generic phrase. Palladium is the proper name. Microsoft should not be allowed to claim next-generation secure computing base as a trademark nor as a term meaning Palladium. Not as a trademark because the phrase is deceptive and generic and not as a term because the term is deceptive and generic. There is no advantage to us in propagating this crude lie. I ask that those on this list continue to refer to Palladium by its right name Palladium. If we continue to use Palladium to mean Microsoft's program, Palladium remains a useful term of art. It is precise and accurate, whereas next-generation secure computing base is misleading, vague, and inaccurate. oo--JS. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Verizon must comply with RIAA's DMCA subpoena
[Moderator's note: I think this is slipping from relevance... --Perry] Faust wrote: Here's a little story: this week I learned that one of our valuable security doctoral candidates doesn't vote, and doesn't want to learn about or discuss politics and the political implications of what she does. Sounds very sensible to me. Leave the voting to those who care. Good thing that you never post complaining about security policy and governments, then Funny, that seems a constant theme on this list! For most of the years I've been involved, the very idea of public, unclassified, non-govermental activity in cryptography and security was actively opposed by our respective governments. That changed through direct activism by many of those on this list. Democracy is not a spectator sport. To be involved in security is to be concerned with policy. Ignorance of policy automatically disqualifies somebody to be a security analyst, since they have no basis for analysis. Security requires more than mere bit twiddling. One of my peeves about Australia is that voting is compulsory here. Quite apart from enforced voting being an infringement of my civil right, the What civil right would that be? Does Australia have some sort of enumerated right to benefit from the work of others without contributing? problem is that most people do not even know who is standing for election from their electorate, far less care what their policies are. And you personally worked to educate them -- how? As a result the great unwashed turn up and tick boxes at random. And you personally worked to educate them -- how? One rightwing politician used this recently to register 30 fake minor parties ( Gay and Lesbian Party, Marihuana party, Save the Forests Party etc ) and then directed the preferences of these parties to himself. This enabled him to get elected to Parliment. Sounds like an excellent hack of the system! Although, with petition signatures from 5% of the electorate for each party to gain a place on the ballot, 30 parties would indicate that he had 150% of the voters sign petitions Either there was an error in the petition validation process, or the party qualifications are unreasonably low (5% to 15% is typical), or you're exaggerating a wee bit (Here, you have to show a minimum of support to gain a place on the ballot. Indeed, incumbent officials have to go out and gather thousands of signatures to be placed on the ballot, even when their party has already qualified for the election. Heck, many places don't require a politician to be a member of any party, as long as they separately qualify to a slightly higher standard.) -- William Allen Simpson Key fingerprint = 17 40 5E 67 15 6F 31 26 DD 0D B9 9B 6A 15 2C 32 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Shamir factoring machine uninteresting?
I worte - implemented?), and 3-4 orders is not that big of a magnitude. I take that back. When considering cost, 3-4 orders of magnitude is important. --Anton - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
