Re: DeCSS, crypto, law, and economics
-- It is easy to imagine situations where some government intervention will improve efficiency. But who will lobby for such interventions? Of course, situations where government interventions will create monopoly profits at the expense of considerable loss of efficiency are far more common, and have lobby groups. Thus whenever some clever economist claims to have discovered a situation of the first kind, chances are it is a situation of the second kind, thinly disguised. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG ycWZHQlgKti6MMd4J3O4W7WPmUH38C4yaakLV93r 4w2zz8RnIPwcoBeYSdkQfFKWGB5DFqTtDR+iru6cQ - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: DeCSS, crypto, law, and economics
--
I wote:
> I pirate films routinely
Correction. I watch made for TV shows distributed through the
internet routinely.
Full length films are not shared to any great extent, because
their sheer size makes them such a pain.
--digsig
James A. Donald
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RE: DeCSS, crypto, law, and economics
--
On 8 Jan 2003 at 0:30, Ian Brown wrote:
> the public tends to be skeptical when an industry claims that
> expert opinion shows that what is good for the company will
> also be good for the nation, and that state aid in enforcing
> its desires will produce an economically efficient result
Situations often arise where government enforcement in
supporting the anti competitive desires of the company would
produce a more efficient result.
But when this happens, invariably the result is that the
company, being a concentrated interest, soon arranges to
receive a good deal more government enforcement of its desires
than is economically efficient.
--digsig
James A. Donald
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Re: DeCSS, crypto, law, and economics
-- On 7 Jan 2003 at 20:25, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > I don't know anyone who trades video files -- they're pretty > big and bulky. A song takes moments to download, but a movie > takes many many hours even on a high speed link. I have yet > to meet someone who pirates films -- but I know lots of > hardened criminals who watch DVDs on Linux and BSD. I'm one > of these "criminals". I pirate films routinely. These are almost invariably films that I could not obtain in any other way. The amount of time I spend watching films on my computer, and on television, is roughly comparable. Similarly most of the music I listen to on my computer, I could not readily purchase. Stuff I can readily get through commercial channels I do -- the convenience, rather than the cost, is important to me. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG G6dKu0+L5GqnwO9+mBiUuQ4bgcPQWz7zc6hp0Ku0 4lRkw8fWFbF5+wXCL7T1Xi9eLN/Z/LxSrOd5a5W1p - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: DOS attack on WPA 802.11?
-- Arnold G. Reinhold > Cryptographic standards should be judged on their merits, not > on the bureaucratic difficulties in changing them. Specs have > been amended before. Even NSA was willing to revise its > original secure hash standard. That's why we have SHA1. If I > am right and WPA needlessly introduces a significant denial > of service vulnerability, then it should be fixed. I do not think the DOS is significant, since one can do the same thing with a spark emitter. The person doing the DOS has to bring his equipment up to the target, which makes attacker vulnerable to BBRS (Baseball bat restoration of service) --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG z9usqTFDdak6fIXLvMz4FRjtDX9LwX0psRJRmfeP 4JZ85epzXMA2AbDtWU3mqFXAi8Pu30SKDhyrx2bRN - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [mnet-devel] Ditching crypto++ for pycrypto (fwd)
--
On 2 Dec 2002 at 19:19, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> I have to admit that Crypto++'s build/port problems suck, a
> lot. I still have a weird fondness for it (Stockholm
> Syndrome?).
Anything that is good, gets ported a lot. Anything that is
ported a lot gets build/port problems.
If, on the other hand, something basically sucks and is seldom
maintained, it never has any build port problems.
--digsig
James A. Donald
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Re: Fwd: [fc] list of papers accepted to FC'03
--
On 15 Nov 2002 at 10:55, IanG wrote:
>
> > List of papers accepted to FC'03
> >
>
> I see pretty much a standard list of crypto papers here,
> albeit crypto with a waving of finance salt.
Theory of what could be implemented has run well ahead of what
has in fact been implemented.
This has doubtless reduced enthusiasm for the theory.
--digsig
James A. Donald
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Re: New Protection for 802.11
-- Reading the Wifi report, http://www.weca.net/OpenSection/pdf/Wi- Fi_Protected_Access_Overview.pdf it seems their customers stampeded them and demanded that the security hole be fixed, fixed a damned lot sooner than they intended to fix it. I am struck the contrast between the seemingly strong demand for wifi security, compared to the almost complete absence of demand for email security. Why is it so? --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG IWe4JFeDeor04Pxb96ZsQ7xX+JAwxSs8HQfoAeG5 4rQX6tgLhAvAwLjF+SXlRswSmphBhw4cOXLe9Y4r5 - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: unforgeable optical tokens?
-- Perry E. Metzger wrote: > > http://www.nature.com/nsu/020916/020916-15.html > > > > An idea from some folks at MIT apparently where a physical > > token consisting of a bunch of spheres embedded in epoxy is > > used as an access device by shining a laser through it. On 21 Sep 2002 at 0:04, David Wagner wrote: > Yeah. I think it's neat! > > This is not a replacement for cryptography. It's not > biometric authentication. It's no good for > challenge-response authentication across a network. It's not > a secure credit card. > > What is it, then? It's a physical object that's hard to > duplicate. I'd describe their work by analogy to marbles. > Marbles are more-or-less unique. Each piece of wood or parchment is also similarly unique. The knights templar used this for cheques. The parchments in your checkbook would have another half kept in the the temple, so when a cheque was presented to the temple for payment, they would compare the bits of parchment for a match. The uniqueness of wood was, and probably still is, used for signatures in Hong Kong. You would mark the paper with a wooden stamp, using a fingerprint like inking that showed the grain of the wood. This created a mark that was difficult to duplicate. Unfortunately, I do not yet see any applications for these tokens that are as useful as the chequebooks of the knights templar, or the stamps of Hong Kong, though perhaps some sharp person will soon invent one. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG 1zOSLvsmHrZmIaMMOQWUokjt+1GnFCdu2KnEXTYf 4+Z4n1kFr3OElCX6pFomVfIwLoJinCHtNtns9yqjD - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: TCPA not virtualizable during ownership change
-- On 15 Aug 2002 at 15:26, AARG! Anonymous wrote: > Basically I agree with Adam's analysis. At this point I > think he understands the spec equally as well as I do. He > has a good point about the Privacy CA key being another > security weakness that could break the whole system. It > would be good to consider how exactly that problem could be > eliminated using more sophisticated crypto. Lucky claims to have pointed this out two years ago, proposed more sophisticated crypto, and received a hostile reception. Which leads me to suspect that the capability of the powerful to break the system is a designed in feature. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG JjoH8U8qZ1eOdT/yGjfV7Xz9andBZPeYWaOLC+NP 2/OJG2MZSnAqcyuvUsNZTsQAcffGGST6LJ7e9vFbK - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: MS recruits for Palladium microkernel and/or DRM platform
-- On 14 Aug 2002 at 9:31, Seth Johns > Some voices within the company (and we currently believe > these voices to be right and sensible) hold the view that > Palladium has to be about users' security if it's to stand > any chance of winning hearts and minds, and that associating > it with protecting the music business' IP will be the kiss of > death. So they'll probably not be best pleased by the > Microsoft job ad that seeks a group program manager > "interested in being part of Microsoft's effort to build the > Digital Rights Management (DRM) and trusted platforms of the > future (Palladium)." I am entertained, but unsurprised, that those who would sell us "trust" technology start out by lying to us. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG yskEcGKmAuiCv/g0O+62LwywX9uJukk5ZLrVsrC6 2ZU13khZebdH4MNBSUqlk9RvmNnSMpBBwGK/aor7q - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: TCPA and Open Source
--
On 13 Aug 2002 at 0:05, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> The point is that while this is a form of signed code, it's not
> something which gives the TPM control over what OS can boot.
> Instead, the VCs are used to report to third party challengers
> (on remote systems) what the system configuration of this system
> is "supposed" to be, along with what it actually is.
It does however, enable the state to control what OS one can boot
if one wishes to access the internet.
It does not seem to me that the TPM is likely to give hollywood
what it wants, unless it is backed by such state enforcement.
Furthermore, since the TPM gets first whack at boot up, a simple
code download to the TPM could change the meaning of the
signature, so that the machine will not boot unless running a
state authorized operating system.
It could well happen that TPM machines become required to go on
the internet, and then later only certain operating systems are
permitted on the internet, and then later the required operating
system upgrades the TPM software so that only authorized operating
systems boot at all.
--digsig
James A. Donald
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Re: trade-offs of secure programming with Palladium (Re: Palladium:technical limits and implications)
--
On 12 Aug 2002 at 16:32, Tim Dierks wrote:
> I'm sure that the whole system is secure in theory, but I
> believe that it cannot be securely implemented in practice and
> that the implied constraints on use & usability will be
> unpalatable to consumers and vendors.
Or to say the same thing more pithily, if it really is going to be
voluntary, it really is not going to give hollywood what they
want. If really gives hollywood what they want, it is really
going to have to be forced down people's throats.
--digsig
James A. Donald
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Re: TCPA/Palladium -- likely future implications
--
On 9 Aug 2002 at 17:15, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> to understand it you need a true picture of TCPA rather than the
> false one which so many cypherpunks have been promoting.
As TCPA is currently vaporware, projections of what it will be,
and how it will be used are judgments, and are not capable of
being true or false, though they can be plausible or implausible.
Even with the best will in the world, and I do not think the
people behind this have the best will in the world, there is an
inherent conflict between tamper resistance and general purpose
programmability. To prevent me from getting at the bits as they
are sent to my sound card or my video card, the entire computer,
not just the dongle, has to be somewhat tamper resistant, which is
going to make the entire computer somewhat less general purpose
and programmable, thus less useful.
The people behind TCPA might want to do something more evil than
you say they want to do, if they want to do what you say they want
to do they might be prevented by law enforcement which wants
something considerably more far reaching and evil, and if they
want to do it, and law enforcement refrains from reaching out and
taking hold of their work, they still may be unable to do it for
technical reasons.
--digsig
James A. Donald
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RE: Challenge to David Wagner on TCPA
-- On 2 Aug 2002 at 14:36, Trei, Peter wrote: > OK, It's 2004, I'm an IT Admin, > and I've converted my corporation over to TCPA/Palladium machines. My > Head of Marketing has his TCPA/Palladium desktop's hard drive > jam-packed with corporate confidential documents he's been actively > working on - sales projections, product plans, pricing schemes. > They're all sealed files. > > His machine crashes - the MB burns out. > He wants to recover the data. > > HoM: I want to recover my data. > Me: OK: We'll pull the HD, and get the data off it. > HoM: Good - mount it as a secondary HD in my new system. > Me: That isn't going to work now we have TCPA and Palladium. > HoM: Well, what do you have to do? > Me: Oh, it's simple. We encrypt the data under Intel's TPME key, > and send it off to Intel. Since Intel has all the keys, they can > unseal all your data to plaintext, copy it, and then re-seal it for > your new system. It only costs $1/Mb. > HoM: Let me get this straight - the only way to recover this data is > to let > Intel have a copy, AND pay them for it? > Me: Um... Yes. I think MS might be involved as well, if your were > using > Word. > HoM: You are *so* dead. Obviously it is insane to use keys that you do not yourself control to keep secrets. That, however, is not the purpose of TCPA/Palladium as envisaged by Microsoft. The intent is that Peter can sell Paul software or content that will only run on ONE computer for ONE time period.. When the motherboard emits blue smoke, or the time runs out, whichever happens first, Paul has to buy new software. If prices are lowered accordingly, this might be acceptable. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG 4Mqj1ia6DD0EYpdLMEd7al35eTYefnvhcFesBlMz 25n9obdfhvRVxEkY4YtWw7BuFxrOKgTtfI1Dp8uAA - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: Challenge to David Wagner on TCPA
--
On 2 Aug 2002 at 10:43, Trei, Peter wrote:
> Since the position argued involves nothing which would invoke
> the malign interest of government powers or corporate legal
> departments, it's not that. I can only think of two reasons why
> our corrospondent may have decided to go undercover...
I can think of two innocuous reasons, though the real reason is
probably something else altogether:
1. Defending copyright enforcement is extremely unpopular because
it seemingly puts you on the side of the hollywood cabal, but in
fact TCPA/Paladium, if it works as described, and if it is not
integrated with legal enforcement, does not over reach in the
fashion that most recent intellectual property legislation, and
most recent policy decisions by the patent office over reach.
2.. Legal departments are full of people who are, among their
many other grievious faults, technologically illiterate.
Therefore when an insider is talking about something, they cannot
tell when he is leaking inside information or not, and tend to
have kittens, because they have to trust him (being unable to tell
if he is leaking information covered by NDA), and are
constitutionally incapable of trusting anyone.
--digsig
James A. Donald
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TCPA
-- In an anarchist society, or in a world where government had given up on copyright and intellectual property, TCPA/Palladium would be a great thing, a really good substitute for law, much more effectual, much cheaper, and much less dangerous than law. In a world where we have anticircumvention laws and ever growing patent and copyright silliness, it seems a dangerously powerful addition to law. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG 6FaJusAR8fMsVvaFm9l3vbuyiQwio/YrBFLpyT6c 2Db/Fk0MeNi3mjdoDTo2IGzHeelYts0/xqiEjUFmA - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: Challenge to David Wagner on TCPA
--
On 2 Aug 2002 at 3:31, Sampo Syreeni wrote:
> More generally, as long as we have computers which allow data to
> be addressed as code and vice versa, the ability to control use
> of data will necessarily entail ability to control use of code.
> So, either we will get systems where circumventing copyright
> controls is trivial or ones where you cannot compile your own
> code. All the rest is just meaningless syntax.
The announced purpose of TCPA/Palladium is to introduce some
intermediate cases. For example you could compile your own code,
and then encrypt it so that it can only run on a specific target
computer.
As somone who sells code, I would think this would be a great
idea, were it not for the excesses we have been seeing from the IP
lobbyists.
--digsig
James A. Donald
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Re: Challenge to David Wagner on TCPA
-- On 31 Jul 2002 at 23:45, AARG! Anonymous wrote: > So TCPA and Palladium "could" restrict which software you could > run. They aren't designed to do so, but the design could be > changed and restrictions added. Their design, and the institutions and software to be designed around them, is disturbingly similar to what would be needed to restrict what software we could run. TCPA institutions and infrastructure are much the same as SSSCA institutions and infrastructure. According to Microsoft, the end user can turn the palladium hardware off, and the computer will still boot. As long as that is true, it is an end user option and no one can object. But this is not what the content providers want. They want that if you disable the Fritz chip, the computer does not boot. What they want is that it shall be illegal to sell a computer capable of booting if the Fritz chip is disabled. If I have to give superroot powers to Joe in order to run Joe's software or play Joe's content, fair enough. But the hardware and institutions to implement this are disturbingly similar to the hardware and institutions needed to implement the rule that I have to give superroot powers to Joe in order to play Peter's software or content.. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG FQhKMpDHys7gyFWenHCK9p7+Xfh1DwpaqGKcztxk 20jFdJDiigV/b1fmHBudici59omqc/Ze0zXBVvQLk - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Challenge to David Wagner on TCPA
--
On 29 Jul 2002 at 15:35, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> both Palladium and TCPA deny that they are designed to restrict
> what applications you run. The TPM FAQ at
> http://www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/TPM_QA_071802.pdf reads
>
They deny that intent, but physically they have that capability.
--digsig
James A. Donald
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ElmZA5NX6jAmhPu1EDT8Zl7D+IeQTSI/z1oo4lSn
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RE: building a true RNG
--
On 30 Jul 2002 at 17:02, Amir Herzberg wrote:
> I found that when trying to explain and define hash functions
> and their properties, I didn't find a satisfactory definition
> for the `randomness` properties.
Randomness is of course indefinable. A random oracle is however
definable.
If SHA-1 is indistinguishable from a random oracle without prior
knowledge of the input, then we would like to prove that for an
attacker to make use of the loss of entropy that results from the
fact that it is not a random oracle, the attacker would be need to
be able to distinguish SHA-1 from a random oracle without prior
knowledge of the input.
--digsig
James A. Donald
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