RE: Schneier (and RSA) on Bernstein factoring machine

2002-04-17 Thread R. A. Hettinga

At 3:54 PM -0400 on 4/16/02, Trei, Peter wrote:


 Well, Lucky's not a business, and he's certainly not a military
 institution (despite his fondness for ordinance). What does that
 leave? Most of us who know him got a little chuckle out of this.

 For RSA's 'official' position on this issue, take a look at:

 http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/technotes/bernstein.html

 If there's a call for it, I'll post the whole text so you can read
 it without visiting our site (it's not too long).

One should also note, that, last time I looked at least, that Mr. Briceno
ended up at RSA as part of the XCert buyout.

Cheers,
RAH
Whose old 1028 bit RSA key will probably go away soon as part of an
apparent impedance mismatch between MacPGP and MacGPG anyway...

-- 
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... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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RE: Schneier (and RSA) on Bernstein factoring machine

2002-04-17 Thread Trei, Peter

 R. A. Hettinga[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
 
 At 3:54 PM -0400 on 4/16/02, Trei, Peter wrote:
 
  Well, Lucky's not a business, and he's certainly not a military
  institution (despite his fondness for ordnance). What does that
  leave? Most of us who know him got a little chuckle out of this.
 
 One should also note, that, last time I looked at least, that Mr. Briceno
 ended up at RSA as part of the XCert buyout.
 Cheers,
 RAH
 
The last time you looked was too long ago, I'm afraid. Lucky is no
longer with RSA.

Peter


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RE: Schneier (and RSA) on Bernstein factoring machine

2002-04-16 Thread Trei, Peter

 Anonymous[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
 
 Bruce Schneier writes in the April 15, 2002, CRYPTO-GRAM,
 http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-0204.html:
 
  But there's no reason to panic, or to dump existing systems.  I don't
 think 
  Bernstein's announcement has changed anything.  Businesses today could 
  reasonably be content with their 1024-bit keys, and military
 institutions 
  and those paranoid enough to fear from them should have upgraded years
 ago.
 
  To me, the big news in Lucky Green's announcement is not that he
 believes 
  that Bernstein's research is sufficiently worrisome as to warrant
 revoking 
  his 1024-bit keys; it's that, in 2002, he still has 1024-bit keys to
 revoke.
 
 Does anyone else notice the contradiction in these two paragraphs?
 First Bruce says that businesses can reasonably be content with 1024 bit
 keys, then he appears shocked that Lucky Green still has a 1024 bit key?
 Why is it so awful for Lucky to still have a key of this size, if 1024
 bit keys are good enough to be reasonably content about?
 
Anonymous is missing the joke here. Bruce suggests that ordinary
non-paranoid users (here represented as 'businesses') should feel 
reasonably content with 1024 bit keys, but 'military institutions 
and those paranoid enough to fear them should have upgraded 
years ago'.

So, we have three categories of users: 

1. businesses (ie, 'ordinary users)
2. Military institutions.
3. The paranoid (whether justified or not).

Well, Lucky's not a business, and he's certainly not a military
institution (despite his fondness for ordinance). What does that 
leave? Most of us who know him got a little chuckle out of this.

For RSA's 'official' position on this issue, take a look at:

http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/technotes/bernstein.html

If there's a call for it, I'll post the whole text so you can read
it without visiting our site (it's not too long).

Peter Trei
RSA Security


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