Re: Keysigning @ CFP2003
On Mon, 24 Mar 2003, Ian Grigg wrote: > I must be out of touch - since when did > PGP key signing require a photo id? It does not. It is improper for a key-signing organizer to dictate signing policy to individuals. When I wrote the Efficient Group Key Signing Method paper[1], I specifically omitted identity verification steps, since it is no one's business but the holder of the key (and those who trust that key as an introducer) what information the holder requires before signing. Incidentally, the GnuPG FAQ perpetuates this fallacy, so Doug is probably not to blame for this mistake. There are better ways of determining identity, and one of the benefits of PGP is that we aren't locked in to a strict, rigid model of how trust is to be assigned. Convincing people that [easily forged] government IDs are sufficient to verify identity is a dangerous practice. A better thing to do is to announce in the key-signing notice that individuals may want to bring government ID in the case that someone attending will require it to satisfy his signing policy -- rather than dictating signing policy to your participants. --Len. [1] http://sion.quickie.net/keysigning.txt - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Keysigning @ CFP2003
On Tue, Mar 25, 2003 at 12:36:20AM -0500, Ian Grigg wrote: | So, do we have two completely disjoint communities | here? One group that avoids "photo id" and another | that requires it? Or is one group or the other so | small that nobody really noticed? Yes. One group thinks that a bad trust chain is worse than no trust chains. This group tends to think that fake ID is easy, and that ID based signatures reduce trust in the web. Adam -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Keysigning @ CFP2003
> Has anyone ever weighted a PGP key's certification value as a > function of how many keys it's know to have certified? The PGP keyserver folks perform a regular public keyring analysis: http://keyserver.kjsl.com/~jharris/ka/2003-03-23/ http://dtype.org/keyanalyze/ Cheers, Stefan. --- Dipl.-Inform. Stefan Kelm Security Consultant Secorvo Security Consulting GmbH Albert-Nestler-Strasse 9, D-76131 Karlsruhe Tel. +49 721 6105-461, Fax +49 721 6105-455 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED], http://www.secorvo.de --- PGP Fingerprint 87AE E858 CCBC C3A2 E633 D139 B0D9 212B - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Keysigning @ CFP2003
On Tue, 2003-03-25 at 07:52, Janusz A. Urbanowicz wrote: > > I must be out of touch - since when did > > PGP key signing require a photo id? > > It is an usual requirement for a keysigning party to bring a photo ID to > validate if theirs key ids are the same as their names (and to get class 3 > key signatures) I usually reserve class three signatures to people that I know very well. Casual photo ID and fingerprint verification usually produces a ersion 2 signature from me. Furthermore GPG also allows for the insertion of a signature policy URL in a signature. The policy URL is a description of what process you went through to verify an identity... -- + Douglas Calvert [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://anize.org/dfc/ + | Key Id 0xC9541FB2 http://anize.org/dfc-keys.asc | | [X] User wants to receive encrypted mail | +| 0817 30D4 82B6 BB8D 5E66 06F6 B796 073D C954 1FB2 |+ signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part
Re: Keysigning @ CFP2003
On Tue, 25 Mar 2003, Matt Crawford wrote: >Has anyone ever weighted a PGP key's certification value as a >function of how many keys it's know to have certified? An interesting idea: At one extreme you could view the whole universe as having a finite amount of trust and every certification is a transfer of some trust from one person to another. But then companies like verisign, after the first thousand or so certs, would have nothing left to sell. At the other, you could view verisign as providing a fairly reliable indication, not necessarily of who X is, but certainly of the fact that somebody was willing to spend thousands of dollars to claim to be X and the financial records are on file if you absolutely need to figure out who that was, so they "create" trust in a way that most keysigners don't. Neither model is perfect, but the latter one seems to have more appeal to people in protecting financial transactions and the former to people who are more concerned about personal privacy. Bear - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Keysigning @ CFP2003
> > I must be out of touch - since when did > > PGP key signing require a photo id? > > It's rather efficient if you want to sign a large number of keys of > people you mostly do not know personally. Assuming, of course, that the ID is of a sort for which you have an "is-a-forgery" oracle. Has anyone ever weighted a PGP key's certification value as a function of how many keys it's know to have certified? - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Keysigning @ CFP2003
[ Charset UTF-8 unsupported, converting... ] > On Saturday 22 March 2003 17:12, Douglas F. Calvert wrote: > > > > I will be organizing a keysigning session for CFP2003. Please submit > > your keys to [EMAIL PROTECTED] and I will print out sheets with key > > information in order to speed up the process. Bring a photo ID and a > > copy of your key information so that you can verify what is on the > > printout. A list of submitted keys and a keyring will be available on: > > I must be out of touch - since when did > PGP key signing require a photo id? It is an usual requirement for a keysigning party to bring a photo ID to validate if theirs key ids are the same as their names (and to get class 3 key signatures) http://www.cryptnet.net/fdp/crypto/gpg-party.html#ss1.1 Alex - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Keysigning @ CFP2003
On Tuesday, Mar 25, 2003, at 00:36 US/Eastern, Ian Grigg wrote: On Tuesday 25 March 2003 00:22, Jeroen van Gelderen wrote: On Monday, Mar 24, 2003, at 22:32 US/Eastern, bear wrote: On Mon, 24 Mar 2003, Jeroen C. van Gelderen wrote: It's rather efficient if you want to sign a large number of keys of people you mostly do not know personally. Right, but remember that knowing people personally was supposed to be part of the point of vouching for their identity to others. Not that I heard of. I always understood that I should be 'convinced' of the identity and willing to state that to others. Well, that's a surprise to me! My understanding of the PGPid signature was that the semantics were loose, deliberately undefined. And, within that limitation, it came down to "I met this guy, he called himself Micky Mouse." I don't think that is a contradiction. This is just your personal requirements for being 'convinced'. I've only been to one key signing event, and no identity was flashed around that I recall. So, do we have two completely disjoint communities here? One group that avoids "photo id" and another that requires it? Or is one group or the other so small that nobody really noticed? Nah. I think the photo-id case just makes large key-signing parties easier (or possible). I suspect that for a large group of people (excluding you(?)) the following statement holds: "When I see a new person for 30 seconds she cannot 'convince' me of her identity. If a passport is flashed in my face in those 30 seconds I actually am quite certain of it." So there you have it: the difference between being able to sign in 30 seconds, or not. A practical -if not optimal- way to grow the WoT. This does *not* mean photo-id is a pre-condition for signing someone's key. It does *not* mean you should sign a key if you are shown a photo-id. It just *might* make it possible to sign a key where otherwise no certification would be possible. Yes. But PGP doesn't mandate either interpretation. That is what you use your trust knobs for: you decide on a per-user basis how trustworthy an identity certification from that user is. The redundancy of a well-connected WoT then helps you a bit in eliminating simple errors. Um. So, there are people out there that I am convinced are who they say they are. They happen to be nyms, but I know that, and they are consistent nyms. Can I sign their key with the highest level? Why not? It is *your* definition of 'convinced'. Other people will use their trust knobs to translate your judgement to their reliance on said judgement. Cheers, Jeroen -- Jeroen C. van Gelderen - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Western Corporations That Supplied Iraq's Weapons Program: http://www.thememoryhole.org/corp/iraq-suppliers.htm - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Keysigning @ CFP2003
On Tuesday 25 March 2003 00:22, Jeroen van Gelderen wrote: > On Monday, Mar 24, 2003, at 22:32 US/Eastern, bear wrote: > > On Mon, 24 Mar 2003, Jeroen C. van Gelderen wrote: > > > >> It's rather efficient if you want to sign a large number of keys of > >> people you mostly do not know personally. > > > > Right, but remember that knowing people personally was supposed > > to be part of the point of vouching for their identity to others. > > Not that I heard of. I always understood that I should be 'convinced' > of the identity and willing to state that to others. Well, that's a surprise to me! My understanding of the PGPid signature was that the semantics were loose, deliberately undefined. And, within that limitation, it came down to "I met this guy, he called himself Micky Mouse." I've only been to one key signing event, and no identity was flashed around that I recall. So, do we have two completely disjoint communities here? One group that avoids "photo id" and another that requires it? Or is one group or the other so small that nobody really noticed? I'm curious, is all! > Yes. But PGP doesn't mandate either interpretation. That is what you > use your trust knobs for: you decide on a per-user basis how > trustworthy an identity certification from that user is. The redundancy > of a well-connected WoT then helps you a bit in eliminating simple > errors. Um. So, there are people out there that I am convinced are who they say they are. They happen to be nyms, but I know that, and they are consistent nyms. Can I sign their key with the highest level? -- iang - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Keysigning @ CFP2003
On Monday, Mar 24, 2003, at 22:32 US/Eastern, bear wrote: On Mon, 24 Mar 2003, Jeroen C. van Gelderen wrote: It's rather efficient if you want to sign a large number of keys of people you mostly do not know personally. Right, but remember that knowing people personally was supposed to be part of the point of vouching for their identity to others. Not that I heard of. I always understood that I should be 'convinced' of the identity and willing to state that to others. Knowing someone personally is very nice and gives you rather a lot of assurance that their identity is being used consistently and that others know the person by the same identity. (It is for precisely that reason that I have signed a few keys for people who use an alias.) Sometimes however you have the choice between a 'weaker' form of certification and no certification at all. I prefer the former because it increases the chances of the WoT being useful. Key signing parties' reliance on passports are a case in point. In general passports are a reasonable indication of identity. "I know this guy. We spent a couple years working on X together." is different in kind from "I met this guy once in my life, and he had a driver license that said his name was mike." Yes. But PGP doesn't mandate either interpretation. That is what you use your trust knobs for: you decide on a per-user basis how trustworthy an identity certification from that user is. The redundancy of a well-connected WoT then helps you a bit in eliminating simple errors. Cheers, Jeroen -- Jeroen C. van Gelderen - [EMAIL PROTECTED] The python has, and I fib no fibs, 318 pairs of ribs. In stating this I place reliance On a séance with one who died for science. This figure is sworn to and attested; He counted them while being digested. -- Ogden Nash - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Keysigning @ CFP2003
On Mon, 24 Mar 2003, Jeroen C. van Gelderen wrote: >It's rather efficient if you want to sign a large number of keys of >people you mostly do not know personally. > Right, but remember that knowing people personally was supposed to be part of the point of vouching for their identity to others. "I know this guy. We spent a couple years working on X together." is different in kind from "I met this guy once in my life, and he had a driver license that said his name was mike." Bear - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Keysigning @ CFP2003
On Monday, Mar 24, 2003, at 11:00 US/Eastern, Ian Grigg wrote: On Saturday 22 March 2003 17:12, Douglas F. Calvert wrote: I will be organizing a keysigning session for CFP2003. Please submit your keys to [EMAIL PROTECTED] and I will print out sheets with key information in order to speed up the process. Bring a photo ID and a copy of your key information so that you can verify what is on the printout. A list of submitted keys and a keyring will be available on: I must be out of touch - since when did PGP key signing require a photo id? It's rather efficient if you want to sign a large number of keys of people you mostly do not know personally. -J -- Jeroen C. van Gelderen - [EMAIL PROTECTED] War prosperity is like the prosperity that an earthquake or a plague brings. The earthquake means good business for construction workers, and cholera improves the business of physicians, pharmacists, and undertakers; but no one has for that reason yet sought to celebrate earthquakes and cholera as stimulators of the productive forces in the general interest. -- Ludwig von Mises - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Keysigning @ CFP2003
On Saturday 22 March 2003 17:12, Douglas F. Calvert wrote: > I will be organizing a keysigning session for CFP2003. Please submit > your keys to [EMAIL PROTECTED] and I will print out sheets with key > information in order to speed up the process. Bring a photo ID and a > copy of your key information so that you can verify what is on the > printout. A list of submitted keys and a keyring will be available on: I must be out of touch - since when did PGP key signing require a photo id? -- iang - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
