Cryptography-Digest Digest #863
Cryptography-Digest Digest #863, Volume #8Fri, 8 Jan 99 02:13:02 EST
Contents:
Re: On the Generation of Pseudo-OTP ("Kevin G. Rhoads")
IEEE P1363 March Meeting Announcement (IEEE 1363)
Re: DES Hardware Implementation!! (Matthew Kwan)
Re: ScramDisk - password size - high ASCII (Brad Aisa)
Re: DES Hardware Implementation!! ("hapticz")
Call For Papers -- National Information Systems Security Conference (Program
Committee)
Re: coNP=NP Made Easier? (rosi)
Re: One-time pads not secure ? (NSA's Venona project) (Serge-Antoine Melanson)
Re: On leaving the 56-bit key length limitation (wtshaw)
Re: What is left to invent? (wtshaw)
Re: On leaving the 56-bit key length limitation ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
From: "Kevin G. Rhoads" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: On the Generation of Pseudo-OTP
Date: Thu, 07 Jan 1999 18:42:44 -0800
A transcendental constant does not have that, it is not
periodic.
Is that always true? Someone a year ago claimed that it is not
universally true.
Any number which exhibits finite repeating digit patterns (i.e.,
periodicity) when digit expanded in ANY number base
can be represented as the ratio of two integers (i.e, it is
a rational number). All transcendentals are irrational.
Therefore any number with a periodic (insert number base of one's
choice) digit expansion is NOT transcendental.
QED (with rigorous parts elided -- easiest is proof by construction,
showing how to construct a rational representation given the
repeating digit expansion. Should anyone truly be interested,
I can sketch those proof steps. [Only my bachelor's was in
theoretical math, I switched to EE/CS in grad. school])
--
Kevin G. Rhoads, Ph.D. (Linearity is a convenient fiction.)
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
--
From: IEEE 1363 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: IEEE P1363 March Meeting Announcement
Date: Thu, 07 Jan 1999 22:33:47 -0500
IEEE P1363 Working Group:
Standard Specifications for Public-Key Cryptography
MEETING NOTICE
Wednesday, March 17, 1999, 9:00am-5:00pm
Thursday, March 18, 1999, 9:00am-5:00pm
Friday, March 19, 1999, 9:00am-5:00pm
Omni Chicago Hotel
Chicago, Illinois, USA
This meeting of the P1363 working group, open to the public,
will review ballot comments on the IEEE P1363 document and
continue to assess contributions to the IEEE P1363a
addendum. Information Security Corp. is the meeting's host.
TENTATIVE AGENDA
Wednesday, March 17
1. Approval of agenda
2. Approval of minutes from previous meeting
3. Officers' reports
4. Ratification of November vote on electronic voting
procedures
5. Nomination procedures for new officers
6. Review of ballot comments
Thursday, March 18
6. Review of ballot comments (cont'd)
7. New P1363a contributions
8. Discussion of P1363a encryption and signature schemes
Friday, March 19
8. Discussion of P1363a encryption and signature schemes
(cont'd)
9. P1363a planning
10. Work assignments
11. Meeting schedule
There will be an IEEE meeting fee of $60 for the three days.
For more information, contact Burt Kaliski, the working
group's chair, at (781) 687-7057 or [EMAIL PROTECTED].
Information on the standard is available through
http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/. To join the working
group's electronic mailing list, send e-mail with the text
"subscribe stds-p1363" to [EMAIL PROTECTED].
===
MEETING LOCATION
Omni Chicago
676 Michigan Ave.
Chicago, IL 60611
(312) 944-6664, fax (312) 266-3017
The Omni Chicago Hotel is on Michigan and Huron (about 5
blocks north of the Chicago river), roughly 1/4 of the way up
Chicago's "Magnificent Mile." It is surrounded by what is
arguably the finest shopping and heaviest concentration of
restaurants in the city.
We have reserved a block of 12 rooms until 2/16 at the
rate of $169/night.
http://www.omnihotels.com/scripts/hotel_set.asp?h_id=13
--
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Matthew Kwan)
Subject: Re: DES Hardware Implementation!!
Date: 8 Jan 1999 14:48:56 +1100
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Christof Paar) writes:
Samer EL HAJJ ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
: Hello!
: I'm working on the hardware inmplementation (with VHDL into an FPGA) of
: DES decryption.
: after many searh I did not find any publication or example about this
: topic.
:
: Can anyone point me to some documentation on the subject?
: Thanks in advance!!
Please check our SAC '98 paper and Jens Kaps' MS Thesis, both of which
can be found on our web page at:
http://ece.wpi.edu/Research/crypt
Also, if you're interested in minimizing the number of gates needed to
implement the DES S-boxes, have a look at http://www.darkside.com.au/bitslice
I make no promises about the designs being faster, but they
Cryptography-Digest Digest #868
Cryptography-Digest Digest #868, Volume #8Fri, 8 Jan 99 22:13:03 EST
Contents:
Re: OCX/DLL wanted ("Morten H. Nielsen")
example with concrete numbers of blind signature (sos)
Re: Factoring ("Yves Gallot")
Re: On the Generation of Pseudo-OTP (wtshaw)
Re: RSA question ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: On the Generation of Pseudo-OTP (Paul L. Allen)
A method on finding the cheater in sharing scheme. (xlzhu)
Re: ScramDisk - password size - high ASCII (wtshaw)
Re: Triple DES with CBC (DJohn37050)
Attention: This is an encoded message? (EvanPic)
Re: On leaving the 56-bit key length limitation ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Triple DES with CBC ("Steven H. McCown")
Re: Learn Encryption Techniques with BASIC and C++ (CryptoBook)
Re: RSA-Modulus decomposition (Robert I. Eachus)
Re: On leaving the 56-bit key length limitation (wtshaw)
From: "Morten H. Nielsen" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: OCX/DLL wanted
Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1999 22:23:17 +0100
Try this link One of the BEST
http://sevillaonline.com/ActiveX/
Jonas Westberg skrev i meddelelsen 774vgh$c8v$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
Please let me know if you know of any Components that can be used in Visual
Basic applications (OCX/DLL).
- Public Key Algorithm (RSA key generation, encryption and signing)
- Secret Key Algorithm (free block- or fiestelchipher like CAST)
Thanks
Jonas Westberg
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
--
From: sos [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: example with concrete numbers of blind signature
Date: Fri, 08 Jan 1999 23:25:25 +0100
For a small treatise I am looking for an example with concrete numbers
of blind signature.
I think I understand all the formulas, but I can not achieve a
reasonable results.
All publications I found only give some hints how it works and what the
formulas are. Maybe there you can give me an internet location that can
help me.
Please mail me directly.
Soeren Schmidt
--
From: "Yves Gallot" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Crossposted-To: sci.math
Subject: Re: Factoring
Date: Sat, 9 Jan 1999 00:19:18 +0100
Thank you very much for your excellent program!
Yves
--
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (wtshaw)
Subject: Re: On the Generation of Pseudo-OTP
Date: Fri, 08 Jan 1999 16:32:11 -0600
In article [EMAIL PROTECTED], Mok-Kong Shen
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
However the context of my proposal is that one can only get
56-bit cryptos (and very likely only software). So I think that even
a not so good approximation of an OTP helps to a certain degree, for
it can be used in conjunction with a 56-bit crypto software and
enhance its strength. We have to collect all useful things and
combine them, so that those who can only get 56-bit cryptos (those
outside of the 33 countries) can still obtain adequate security
in their communications.
All it takes is a little creative chaining to even if single algorithms
are 56 bit cryptos. Consider what intermediate steps might be needed to
strip away headers that anounce what algorithm was used. The fact being
that it is not easy to determine that a 56 bit limit was surpassed or
wasn't, except that the hall-monitor might be upset that their techniques
of retreving plaintext did not work. No, a 56 bit limit does not do much
in itself, which is the point.
Look next for severe restrictions for using only very few algorithms.
--
If government can make someone answer a question as they want him to, they can make
him lie, then, punish him for not telling the truth. Such an outrage constitutes
entrapment.
--
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: RSA question
Date: Fri, 08 Jan 1999 21:56:35 GMT
The security of RSA is conjectured to be based upon the Integer Factorization
Problem (IFP), but this link has never been proved.
Recently, a paper “Breaking RSA may not be equivalent to factoring” by D.Boneh
R.Venkatesan published in Eurocrypt '98 shows some classes of the RSAP which
are not equivalent to the underlying IFP.
It _may_ be possible to break RSA without factoring...
Sam Simpson
Comms Analyst
-- http://www.hertreg.ac.uk/ss/ for ScramDisk hard-drive encryption
Delphi Crypto Components. PGP Keys available at the same site.
In article 9DB141BB95ACD978.552D4BEF2C5C8648.1961F2B1F78F3098@library-
proxy.airnews.net,
Rx Video [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hello,
I've recently read through the theory on RSA algorithm. I just wanted to
make sure if the factorization of the N (modulus) number is the keystone
of its security ?
p*q=N - I have not tried to compute all the possible values for p and q
with known N, but the approach to find those values would be to divide N
by i, with i increasing with every step (or changing i to the next prime
number), until one of p or q is found. I do not know how difficult that
task is for sufficiently long N. I would appreciate a comment on this
