-Caveat Lector- an excerpt from: Drugs, the U.S., and Khun Sa Francis W. Belanger©1989 Editions Duang Kamol Siam Square, Bangkok, Thailand ISBN 974-210-4808 146 pps. – First Edition – Out-of-print --[2]-- KHUN SA, THE HEROIN KING THE EARLY YEARS The major producer of heroin in the Far East today is Khun Sa, an enigmatic character who makes a fortune through his trade in narcotics and other contraband. There are several other 'opium: warlords' in the Golden Triangle—the Laotian leader, Kaysone Phomvihane; a Thai, Lao Su; a Burmese, Kom Jerng—but Khun Sa is the man who during an interview at his fortress in Burma a short time ago arrogantly and publicly announced his plan to step up opium production in the Golden Triangle to 1200 tons a year. Khun Sa, 54, is a likable man, growing old gracefully, and quick to smile. Like many of the people in the Burma-Thailand-Laos area, he is the product of a mixed marriage, of mixed Shan and Haw Chinese blood; he was born in 1933 (or 1934) in Loi Maw in the Mong Yai State and claims maternal descent from a local sawbwa. Though his given name is Chang Chi-fu, he adopted the pseudonym 'Khun Sa', khun meaning "Lord" and' "Sa" being his stepfather's name, his mother having remarried a' Shan prince. He had gained military experience with the KMT, then became leader of his own army of several hundred men which he transformed into a KKY unit. The, young swashbuckler settled around the towns of Tang Yang and Ving Ngun close to the Wa States, an area renown for its bountiful opium production, and was soon sending large caravans of opium into Thailand and Laos. This led to clashes with KMT troops, who until then had controlled 90 percent of exports from Burma, thus sparking an 'Opium War'. The conflict ended in a formal battle at Ban Khwan in Laos, involving Khun Sa's troops, KMT troops, and Laotian troops. Khun Sa was defeated. With his subsequent arrest by Burmese authorities, on charges of corruption and drug trafficking, at Taunggyi in 1969, Khun Sa was thought to have been eliminated from the Golden Triangle. However, his army still controlled the opium-producing districts in the Lashio region, while Khun Sa languished in a Mandalay prison where for months, at least according to his own word, he underwent torture. In 1973, one of his lieutenants, Chang Tze Chuang (sometimes referred to as Chan Shu-chin), abducted two Russian doctors working at the Taunggyi hospital and ultimately exchanged them for his imprisoned leader Telling this story, Khun Sa's usually amiable face loses its smile and turns hard. "I've never forgotten what they did to me," he said, rubbing his groin. "I promised then that I'd make them pay somehow." After five years in jail, Khun Sa reassembled his army of about 2,000 men, which the Shan State army (SSA) had dubbed the Shan United Army (SUA), hoping to improve the political image of Khun Sa's brigands. Khun Sa quickly became deeply involved in the illegal drug trade and, with his subordinate groups, soon controlled 70 percent of the heroin production to come from the Golden Triangle refineries. His influence grew with his power and had soon spread to Thai territory. A sector of the SUA settled in the Shan village of Ban Hin Taek, eight kilometers from the Burmese frontier, which they used as a drug distribution point. Khun Sa claimed to have entered the narcotics trade as the only means of financing his struggle for Shan autonomy. However, cynics believed-and continue to believe- his motives were purely avaricious. OTHER SHAN WARLORDS There are several Shan warlords, the one most closely approaching the stature of Khun Sa being Lo Hsin Han, who was born in Yunnan and emigrated to the Shan States where he became chief of staff of Jimmy Yang's army of 3,000 men. General Yang, a member of a noble Kokang family, withdrew to Thailand after fighting the Burmese government for three years. The Yang family administered Kokang like a private fief and had organized armed groups at the beginning of 1950. One of the first bandit groups was headed by Jimmy's sister, Olive Yang. Jimmy was in charge of the Kokang Force, which joined the Shan State Independence Army (SSIA) in 1964 and then broke away to cooperate with the KMT. The SSIA was formed after Shan leaders called on a guerilla expert, Saw Yan Da, from the Tai (Dai) community in Yunnan, to set up a clandestine army. He adopted the name 'Sao Noi' and recruited high school students from Mandalay and Rangoon, forming the rebel group 'Nom Suk Han' on May 21, 1958. He operated in the mountains to the west of Lashio, but this group rapidly split into a number of factions. In 1959, the SSIA was formed from the nationalist-oriented faction, with 90 students and 140 Shan defectors from the Burmese Army. Lo Hsin Han was captured in 1965, but the Burmese Army subsequently released him to organize a KKY militia unit. After the defeat of Khun Sa, he became one of the Shan State’s main opium suppliers until forced out of the Kokang State by the BCP and made to confront the KMT and General Lee Wan Huan. He tried to rally support from the different Shan. Lo Hsin Han was captured in 1965, but the Burmese Army subsequently released him to organize a KKY militia unit. After the defeat of Khun Sa, he became one of the Shan State's main opium suppliers until forced out of the Kokang State by the BCP and made to confr[o]nt the KMT and General Lee Wen Huan. He tried to rally support from the different Shan rebel groups, but withdrew to Thailand when one of his camps was besieged by the Burmese. General Lee Wen Huan then seized the opportunity to denounce him and he was arrested by the Thai police in the Mae Hong Son area in 1973 and handed over—once again—to the Burmese Government. Initially, Lo Hsin Han was condemned to death, but his sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment. Khun SA was freed the same year and Lo Hsin Han's fall enabled him to regain supremacy. Other groups, such as the Shan United Revolutionary Army (the SURA, commanded by Moh Heng) and the Wa National Army (WNA) have remained involved in illegal drug activities, but only to the extent of sharing the crumbs that drop from Khun Sa's table. The BCP, on the other hand, has managed to extend its influence over almost the entire Kokang, Wa, and Kengtung States and thus controls most of the high-yielding, areas. Initially, the BCP simply 'licensed' poppy cultivation and allowed the Haw traders to collect opium on Khun Sa's behalf, but later the BCP itself became more directly involved in drug production and trafficking. Khun Sa enjoys relating stories about his past and, with a great flourish, in a grandiloquent manner he rehashed to reporters the story of his capture by the Burmese in early 1969. Khun Sa's 500-man caravan, carrying about 60 tons of opium, uncut jade, and other contraband to Houei Sai Village in Laos, came under attack by reinforced units of the remnant 93rd KMT Division. The object of the attack was to rob the caravan and break the back of the newly aspiring opium king. The two factions engaged in a fierce running battle that lasted for several days, with neither side gaining the advantage. They were suddenly intercepted by Laotian soldiers under the command of General Oune Rattikone, commander of the Lao Army. Both the KMT and Khun Sa's men were attacked by General Oune's Lao infantry forces, which had the aerial support of T-28 planes. While the troops of the two rebel factions fled back into Burma, General Oune and his troops 'confiscated' the contraband. Khun Sa and the KMT lost more than 200 men in the intense fighting. "They thought they had finished me, but I slipped away with several of my commanders," Khun Sa said, smiling. "But I have friends all over," Khun Sa emphasized, smiling, "Upon my release, and with the aid of influential Thais, I was brought into Thailand to live. While there, I married a Thai, Khe Yoon." THE MOVE INTO THAILAND The records show that with his Thai wife's help, he purchase a house at Pattanawet 5, Sukhumvit Soi 71. While under the protection of the powerful Thai friends, Khun Sa made a public statement renouncing the drug trade, although he clandestinely continued to do business as usual. On March 19, 1977 Khun Sa and General Bo Mya, President of the Karen National Union, met at a large hotel in Pattaya where they discussed the political situation and drug trading. "He turned down my proposal, to allow drugs to travel through his territory under Karen control, but he did agree to allow the passage of other items, such as jade, with the condition that I pay a tax to him for permitting the transport of such items." As he spoke, his face again grew hard and he paused, looking at the mountains. While still under the protection of the powerful Thais in Bangkok, Khun Sa stepped up his activities and established a small army at Ban Hin Taek in the Mae Chan District of Chiang Rai Province. The headquarters was attacked by Thai forces in 1982 and Khun Sa's men were forced back into Burma. Having been given ample warning of what was taking place in the north, Khun Sa was able to escape from his Bangkok home and slip back into Burma before the Thai authorities could prevent it. Life was difficult for the warlord, but only for the short time that it took to regroup and reestablish his authority over several smaller local drug producers. "I continued to strengthen my positions and built several scattered fortresses and bastions. Steadily, the size of the rank and file increased, until it was 6,000 strong. These soldiers, under the leadership of my trusted aides, were divided into numerous smaller units and scattered throughout the Shan State near the Thai border. Refineries were set up and I began the shipment of various grades of heroin." Khun Sa also ordered a few units to infiltrate back into Thailand and establish refineries there also in order to utilize the superior transportation and communications. The Shan rebels then proceeded to drive several other small, armed rebel groups—including the A-bi hilltribe and the troops of the Chinese Kuomintang Force—away from Doi Lang. Khun Sa's men also established bases on several nearby hilltops on the Burmese side of the border. Thai police and government officials, as well as Burmese soldiers who were looking for fast and easy money, were bribed and brought into the fold. Business prospered, and tons of heroin were soon being shipped by many means of transportation—mule trains, air planes, ships, boats, couriers-along a myriad of routes through the Far East to reach destinations in Hong Kong, Australia, Europe and America. RUNNING AFOUL OF THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY The American Drug Enforcement Agency stationed at Chiang Mai began increasing the amount of evidence of drug production it provided to the Thai government, disclosures which eventually led to the capture of both factories and couriers. Incensed, Khun Sa ordered a hit squad to kill informants suspected of helping the police. "I want," he said, "to have the monkeys watch while the chicken's throat is being slit." (This is a Thai expression meaning "to intimidate someone by making him witness harm done to another.") He also wanted the agency itself hit, and so he initiated terrorist missions against American officials in northern Thailand. Following Khun Sa's directives, two CIA agents were killed, a move that proved to be a big mistake. Families of U.S. officials were evacuated from the northern provinces to Bangkok for their protection, and the war against Khun Sa was stepped up dramatically. In 1982 over 2,000 Rangers, border policemen, and a special airborne unit from Thailand's Third Army Region, sealed off the roads to Khun Sa's stronghold on Doi Lang Mountain, which straddles the Thai-Burma border, and attacked. Seven heliocopter gunships provided air support and two 105mm artillery pieces were airlifted to a base close to Doi Lang for additional ground support. It was the first time artillery had ever been used against Khun Sa's guerrillas. Once again, having had ample warning because of the government's overcautious preparations and perhaps being tipped off, the guerrillas pulled back across the border. The Thai troops followed them into Burma, meeting only slight resistance from Wa rebels. Khun Sa's men passed through Wa held territory and ordered the Wa rebels to fight a delaying action. On the Burmese side of the border, 2,000 Burmese troops joined in the attack. Another 800 troops were poised to attack a Shan rebel base at Ban Pong Hai, immediately across the border from Mae Chan District in Chiang Rai. The Burmese forces ultimately engaged rebels of the Karen, Shan, Pa-o, Kayah, Kachin, Muser, and Arakan ethnic minorities along eight battle fronts in Burma facing the Thai provinces of Chiang Rai, Mae Hong Son, and Chiang Mai. Another 1,000 Burmese troops and porters had advanced to within 20 kilometers of the KNU's Manerpror headquarters and were preparing to strike. All the rebel forces succeeded in breaking contact, however, and withdrew safely. But Khun Sa had been hurt. The drug kingpin hastily dumped narcotics from his stock onto the market, gathering money to replace whatever equipment and weapons that had been lost. The payment for his drugs was made in ammunition and rifles, as well as in cash and bank drafts. The elimination of the SUA on Thai soil also forced Khun Sa to set up new bastions, and he has since extended his influence to the border areas adjacent to Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai, and Mae Hong Son. In a few weeks, things were back to normal for Khun Sa. When interrupted to ask why he had ordered the killings of Westerners, he replied, "Because they turned on me," he shouted. "At one time, they were my partners—them, the DEA and the CIA, both." After uniting and absorbing the forces of several hilltribes in the area, Khun Sa requested another meeting with Bo Mya, the leader of Burma's Karen National Union's (KNU) 15,000 men at that time in its fortieth year of armed struggle against the government in Rangoon. Their intent was to join forces and to allow Khun Sa to transport narcotics through KNU territory in exchange for arms and ammunition. When questioned about the meeting later, Bo Mya denied the allegations and claimed that he had met Khun Sa solely to urge him to stop narcotics production and to try and entice him into the struggle against the Burmese government. The KNU has a reputation for being an opponent of narcotics, instead financing their struggle against the Burmese government by taxing cross-border trade, and by exporting raw materials—mainly minerals and timber—from their 1,000 meter stretch of land along Thailand's western border. Although the KNU leadership is unwilling to disclose the details, it now appears that Bo Mya was approached in the middle of last year and offered financial assistance from abroad in exchange for an opium eradication program. Khun Sa agreed to the total eradication of opium in his territory within six to eight years—if the necessary financial assistance were to be obtained. An old idea had been replanted in Kung Sa's mind. Once before, in 1977, Khun Sa had approached U S Congressman Lester Wolff asking for money in return for his withdrawal from the opium business. "He made no headway then, U.S. embassy official confirms, "because the United States didn't then," a and still does not, engage in talks with a 'rebel' who is engaged in fighting a government that Washington recognizes as legitimate." 'But why not try again?' Khun Sa asked himself. And he did in January 1988, through an emissary, Phra Chamroon Parnchand, the abbot of Wat Tham Krabork, who is heavily involved in the fight against drug addiction in Thailand. Phra Chamroon urged. the United States to lead "damaged parties" (he didn't specify who, but it is understood he meant other groups much like Khun Sa's) in negotiations with the Shan State dealer, Khun Sa, whose activities along the Thai-Burmese border were said to have supplied 60 to 90 percent of the heroin reaching the U.S. and Europe. Phra Chamroon gave an inkling of his plan to former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during a brief meeting in Bangkok in November, indicating that concerned U.S. officials should come to Thailand for further discussions. According to Phra Chamroon, Khun Sa proposed to put an end to the outflow of drugs for the price of U.S. 'economic assistance' to the tune of US$95 million a year for six years. To most observers, requesting US$570 million over a period of six years is a tall order. But for Phra Chamroon, it is not. He argued that the United States already spends much more than that in its war against drug addiction and prevention. Phra Chamroon does not reject the notion that he is being used as a tool by Khun Sa, but the abbot is convinced that he is working for world-wide benefit, and stresses that there should be a common concern about reducing the availability of drugs. "Khun Sa is serious about his proposal because of the pressures of need," Abbot Chamroon emphasized. Some 3,500 men in the Shan United Army are addicted to drugs, with the rest of the population under his control awaiting certain death if Khun Sa does not wipe the slate clean. Worldwide pressure on Khun Sa and the infighting among the rebel groups are both threats. SANCTUARY IN LAOS His feet now on firmer ground in Burma, Khun Sa turned his eyes to Laos in 1982, seeking another ally in the person of Kaysone Phomvihane. The Lao government, under the leadership of Kaysone Phomvihane, has been a major narcotics peddler since at least 1977, with Kaysone and his regime having poured huge amounts of heroin, morphine, opium, and marijuana on the world markets. Except for a handful of Thai intelligence and anti-narcotics officials, the only members of the international diplomatic community ever to publicly criticize the Laotian government has been the United Nations. Disclosures by both the Thai and foreign press have occasionally forced Laos to change its methods of operation, but they have never forced it to close down. Khun Sa's request for help from the Lao government met with success, although many of the details of the Khun Sa-Kaysone alliance are unknown, and Khun Sa refuses to elaborate. But clearly the small, tight Communist politburo in Vientiane is in collusion with the notorious Khun Sa. The Burmese-Chinese drug warlord receives both support and protection from Vientiane, and has moved most of his factories into Laos. In one of its first administrative announcements in 1976, the new People’s Republic legalized the growing of poppies. Exactly when and how Kaysone and his cohorts became drug dealers is murky and—barring a major defection or an overnight rebellion against the communists which might expose incriminating documents—will remain so. The Kaysone-Khun Sa alliance is at first glance curious, not incongruious. It mixes a Vietnamese-trained, Marxist-Leninist leader with an outlaw warlord sporting a $25,000, dead-or-alive reward on his head. As in most strange marriages, however, there are advantages for both partners. For Khun Sa, whose main business is selling heroin, the alliance offers another source of raw materials and a sanctuary in which to make the drug. After establishing himself in his new surroundings, his first priority was to move several factories already in operation from Vientiane to the province of Sayaboury. These refining operations now abut Khun Sa's territory in Thailand, separated only by a mere trickle of a stream that a few miles downstream turns into the mile-wide Mekong River. The move of the operation, ironically, provided Laos with even more opportunity to move in on another growth industry—marijuana smuggling. The cover story for the world is that it is merely a centuries-old tradition in Laos to use marijuana as a cooking spice. In 1985, Mo Hein, chairman of the TRA, and Khun Saeng, who is Khun Sa's uncle, held discussions which led to another alliance. They formed a new party, the United Shan State Patriotic Council (USSPC), in September 1987. The Mo Hein political philosophy has declared itself to be in opposition to the Burmese government, the Burmese Communist Party, and narcotics trafficking. These goals have been proclaimed as the official USSPC ideology. Mo Hein's role in the USSPC appears to be little more than a figurehead, and naming the TRA leader as president of the alliance was clearly a sop to his well-known ego. Real power-control of the council's finances—was retained by the dominant partner, Khun Sa, who immediately proclaimed that his current right-hand man, Chang Hsuchern, would succeed him if he should be assassinated. Khun Sa also stated that in 1987 some Russian officials had approached him with an offer of military material and men, but he turned them down because he disliked Communism. Khun Sa claims to have over eight million people under his domination in six 'provinces' of the Shan State, the southern extremities of which border the Thai provinces of Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, and Mae Hong Som. He declined to state the strength of his Shan United Army, but it is estimated to be anywhere between 6,000 and 8,000 men. The Shan State itself is not a major grower of opium but rather buys the raw material from others in the Golden Triangle, and then processes it into heroin. According to field sources, Khun Sa's supply comes mainly from Burmese Communists, who tend poppy fields east of the- Salween River close to the southern Chinese province of Yunnan. KHUN SA, THAILAND AND THE U.S. Khun Sa readily confirmed that retired U.S. Marine Corps Lt-Col. James "Bo" Gritz had made several trips into the Shan State seeking assistance from him while searching for Americans missing in action during the Vietnam War. Khun Sa stated that he thought Gritz would be able to relay his offer to high officials in the United States. But Gritz had no success when he told the House Foreign Affairs Panel, under oath, that the Thai Government had built a road that would boost the flow of narcotics from the kingpin's Shan territories. The maverick MIA-searcher emphasized to the panel's International Narcotics Control Task Force that Khun Sa's Shan United Army would no longer have to rely on mule and pony caravans to get the drugs out. The road, capable of accommodating 10-ton trucks, was ironically built by the Thai Government with manpower, time, and materials financed by U.S. taxpayers' money allocated to drug suppression funds. Despite hundreds of millions of dollars of U.S. taxpayers' money spent on the drug suppression program in Southeast Asia, Gritz testified, Thailand and Burma had done little to eradicate the flow. Thai officials countered that Gritz's allegations were groundless and insisted that the government was determined to stamp out the drug trade. In his testimony, which was based on disclosures by Khun Sa, the former Green Beret accused several United States officials of involvement in the opium trade, linking them to a covert CIA operation in the region. Among the officials he named were CIA operatives Jerry Daniels and Theodore Shackley, who were responsible for covert operations in Asia; Richard Armitage, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security, who worked in the Defense Attache's office in Saigon between 1973-75; and Daniel Arnold, a former CIA station chief for Thailand and Laos. Gritz stated that Khun Sa's ledgers showed that the U.S. intelligence community became an active participant in drug smuggling—to the extent of buying, selling, and transporting the contraband—in order to fund covert operations When the Thai Government came under criticism from the United States in 1987 for lacking enthusiasm in its war against Khun Sa, certain Thai elements which profit enormously from the opium trade approached the kingpin and proposed that a "show" be staged to appease Washington. Khun Sa agreed to let Thai officials visit the border for a Fort Benning-style "map minute" for press purposes so the Thais could claim they were doing their part in fighting him. In return, the Thai officials had to build the road for Khun Sa. To do this, they used gigantic earth rippers and moving equipment that had been left in Thailand by the Americans at the end of the Vietnam War, bulldozers which can hack roads through the densest jungle. The road was carved over mountains and through a forest rich in teak. Teak had become very valuable in Thailand due to its scarcity, and the thousands of logs stacked up waiting to be marketed meant a huge bonus for the officials. Throughout his testimony, Lt-Col. Gritz presented himself as the carrier of a message and an offer from Khun Sa to the United States. According to Gritz, Khun Sa was not comfortable with the present conditions of the drug trade into which his people had been forced for their survival. The Shans needed to grow opium to fund their defense against the constant warfare being waged against them. If the fighting could be stopped, the Shan people could return to more normal methods of economic development. Khun Sa proposed that if the United States gave the Shans support, both morally and through treaty obligations (by which he means, basically, money), he would guarantee the eradication of opium production in the Golden Triangle. The Support, Khun Sa argued, did not have to be military, but could be political and educational. No one on the committee took the proposal seriously, though perhaps they should have since Gritz's statements were—and are—not far off the mark Instead, Gritz was subsequently investigated for a passport violation. A congressional source said that Gritz had lacked credibility on the MIA issue, and that his interpretation regarding the narcotics situation was no more credible. At least one committee staffer, however, declared Gritz's allegations were very serious and said that the task force should investigate the road issue. It is interesting to note that despite the Thai Government's denial that such a road ever existed—a story that the Americans seemingly believed—a small item hidden in the back pages of an October 1988 edition of the Bangkok Post, stated that the Thai government was going to blow up several kilometers of a seldom used highway near theThai-Burma a border. The article stated that the road had been built a couple of years before, but that it was not used, so actually served no purpose. Three -days later, another small item appeared saying that Khun Sa had warned the Thais that if they were to proceed with the destruction of the highway, he would bomb government buildings and assassinate officials in Mae Hong Son. The Thais did delay blowing up the road for several weeks, although they ultimately did demolish five kilometers later. DRUG MOVEMENTS Thailand is positioned geographically so that it contains ideal routes for the transport of heroin from its mountains origins to jump-off points for the international markets. Some elements of the Thai government work hard to intercept and destroy any drugs being transported through the country, but the flood is overwhelming. Over the past several years, narcotics produced in the Golden Triangle have been transported from northern Thailand to Bangkok where they are expedited on their way around the world. In Thailand the major drug kingpins behind the trafficking are mainly Chinese Haws and Taechews who have been naturalized while living in Bangkok. About one hundred of these affluent immigrants are believed to be financial backers for the illicit trade. Opium, morphine, and heroin leave Thailand by mule train, air, car, and railroad. Bangkok International Airport provides the major avenue for air transport to Europe, America, Australia, and other pans of Asia. Land routes used for transportation to Malaysia pass through Songkhla, Narathiwat, and Yala Provinces, while shipment by sea starts at the port of Klong Toey in Bangkok. More drugs are sent north by packtrain into the southern Chinese province of Yunnan. From there, the drugs move over China's relatively good road, air, and rail networks to the ports of Canton and Hong Kong, some 2,000 kilometers away. It is generally believed that Beijing's official policy is to crack down on narcotics smuggling, but sources in Thailand, who asked for anonymity, said there is substantial evidence that officials at various levels in Yunnan allow the movement of drugs from Burma. Bribing local authorities is very easy in the Far East, and the exploitation for drug trafficking is widespread. Hence, authorities throughout Asia seize only a miniscule percentage of the flow. Heroin is stashed in hollow places specially built in automobiles to escape the eyes of authorities, making it hard to detect the drugs unless the officials have been tipped off in advance. Drugs have been hidden in furniture, orchids, canned foods, bales of raw rubber, and fresh fish; they have been packed in condoms and swallowed or hidden in body orifices; they have been worn in pouches under clothing and girdles. Drugs have been hidden in vases, clocks, boxes of chocolate, and candy—you name it and it has been tried. Buyers trust the quality of heroin according to its brand name. Brand names also determine profitability. Most of the brand names being traded today come from Khun Sa's factories, most of which are now in Laos, opposite Thailand's Chiangsaen District The following are some of the more famous—or infamous—brands that have been seized by the Thai police: Super 100% (No. 1): This is Khun Sa's brand, certifying that the product is manufactured at Ta Khee Lek in Laos. The lettering and artwork on the packaging of this brand is all red. The two upper comers bear a circle with a deer's head, while the two bottom comers each bear a circle with a tiger's head. The word "super" is written within the enlarged "1", above "100%". Crouching Lion: The flaming red package shows a crouching lion within a circle. This brand also comes from Ta Khee Lek in Laos and is produced by Mooser tribes under the control of Khun Sa. A pair of rabbits with mountains in the background: This signifies the origin of the product as from the Shan State, also another brand of Khun Sa's. "Guaranteed 100%" is written in English across the top, and "Yong Yee Product" is written at the bottom. A pair of green rabbits face each other in the center, with mountains in the background. A pair of lions with a globe: A couple of red lions am holding a blue globe. Written at the top is "Good Luck to You", while the bottom carries Chinese characters. This brand is produced in Burma by Khun Sa. Other brands which are not Khun Sa's, include, but are not limited to: Super No. 1, 100%; Red lion holding globe; Two lions holding a Roman-style helmet; Dragon; Lucky Strike (both the name and trade mark stolen from the American cigarette); Lion; Flying Horse; Cards; Chinese Alphabets; and, Panda. Panda is the original brand introduced and made notorious by two of the region's pioneer drug traders, Lo Chin Han and Lo Chin Ming. When Lao Su (whose aliases include Su Wan Ho and Wanko Sae Wan), a former subordinate of these early drug kingpins, set up his own manufacturing facilities, he used the Panda brand for his products. The brand remains famous among drug users, and it sells as briskly as it did in earlier days. Whether Khun Sa's statement that he will increase production to 1200 tons this year is true or not, more and more drugs are appearing on the scene around the world. 1,280 kilos of heroin were seized at Bangkok's Klong Toey Port in February 1988. The largest seizures on record have taken place in Hong Kong, Spain, Australia, Los Angeles, Miami, and New York. Several Thai policemen, soldiers, and politicians have also been apprehended with drugs. Maybe Gritz's story of Khun Sa's offer is true. After meeting Khun Sa, I could believe it. But whatever the case, the fact remains that vast amounts have materialized around the world. Khun Sa is a shrewd and conniving person—a survivor-and is not averse to manipulating anyone whom he feels can help him. Maybe, just maybe, the man with the highest price tag on his head in the history of Thailand has kept his word. Maybe he has doubled the production of heroin in the Shan States. pps. 96-114 ----- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, All My Relations. Omnia Bona Bonis, Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion and informational exchange list. Proselyzting propagandic screeds are not allowed. Substance—not soapboxing! 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