[CTRL] Blueprints For Colombian War
http://ww2.antiwar.com/cockburn/pf/p-c080201.html August 2, 2000 Blueprints For Colombian War As we all know, the war in Colombia isn't about drugs. It's about the annihilation of popular uprisings by the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the ELN (National Liberation Army), guerilla groups or Indian peasants fending off the ravages of oil companies, cattle barons and mining firms. A good old-fashioned counterinsurgency war, designed to clear the way for American corporations to set up shop in Colombia, with cocaine as the scare tactic. Two recent Defense Department-commissioned reports outline in chilling terms the same strategy of ongoing military intervention under the cover of the drug war. Both urge the Bush administration to drop the pretext of counter-narcotics and get on with the business of wiping out the insurgents. Last year the US Air Force commissioned the RAND Corporation to prepare a review of the situation in Colombia. In early June the Santa Monica-based RAND think tank (progenitor of many a blood-sodden scenario in the Vietnam era) submitted its 130-page report, called "The Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability." The other report is a paper written by Gabriel Marcella, titled "Plan Colombia: the Strategic and Operational Imperatives." Marcella is a former chief adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the US Southern Command who now teaches on national security matters at the US Army War College. Together, the two reports reach the same conclusion: the US needs to step up its military involvement in Colombia and quit forfeiting options by limiting its operations to counter-narcotics raids. Along the way, both reports make a number of astonishing admissions about the paramilitaries and their links to the drug trade, about human rights abuses by the US-trained Colombian military and about the irrationality of crop fumigation. RAND argues that the drug war approach is on the brink of not only failing, but of prompting a wider conflict that might require the insertion of US troops. "If the Pastrana administration falters, either in its counter-narcotics or counterinsurgency approach, the US would be confronted with an unpalatable choice. It could escalate its commitment to include perhaps an operational role for US forces in Colombia, or scale it down, which would involve some significant costs, including a serious loss of credibility and degradation of the US's ability to muster regional support for its counter-narcotics and political objectives." The RAND study draws heavily from a December 2000 report by the World Bank, titled Violence in Colombia: Building Sustainable Peace and Social Capital, which concluded that the quid pro quo for Colombia getting any future large infusions of international financial aid will depend on their successful suppression of the FARC and other rebel groups. Another World Bank memo describes the FARC's fundraising strategy as a "loot-seeking" assault on "primary commodities": cattle ranches on the eastern plains, commercial agriculture in Urabá, oil in Magaldena, gold mines in Antioquia and the coca fields of Putumayo. RAND cites a former CIA analyst as saying that the FARC has invested its "taxes" on these industries into "a strategic financial reserve," which will enable them to "sustain an escalation of the conflict." While the FARC peasant army has doubled over the past decade, it still only numbers about 7,000 fighters – 2,000 fewer than the paramilitary death squads. Both RAND and the World Bank point to the horrifying level of "social intolerance killings," which for men aged 14-44 reached a level of 394 deaths per 100,000 last year. In all, Colombia endures 30,000 annual murders, double the number for the entire United States in 1998. Slightly more than 23,000 murders have been linked to "illegal armed organizations" since 1988. The implication is that the FARC is responsible for these killings and one has to dig deep into the RAND analysis to discover otherwise. In fact, according to statistics compiled by the Colombian government, about 3,500 people were killed by the guerrillas and 19,652 by paramilitaries and "private justice" groups. The leader of the AUC (United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia), the central command for the 19 paramilitary "fronts," is a sadistic scoundrel named Carlos Castaño, who supervises a killing program right off the pages of the CIA's Phoenix Program's operations manual. The RAND report details how Castaño's AUC routinely executes "suspected guerrilla sympathizers" in order "to instill fear and compel support among the local population." When that strategy fails to deliver, the AUC simply launches an all-out attack on the villages and slaughters the inhabitants. RAND dispassionately notes that the AUC justifies these atrocities, in language that even Bob Kerrey might admire, as
[CTRL] Blueprints For Colombian War
-Caveat Lector- Left Coast by Alexander Cockburn http://www.antiwar.com/cockburn/cockburn-col.html Antiwar.com Alexander Cockburn August 2, 2000 Blueprints For Colombian War As we all know, the war in Colombia isn't about drugs. It's about the annihilation of popular uprisings by the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the ELN (National Liberation Army), guerilla groups or Indian peasants fending off the ravages of oil companies, cattle barons and mining firms. A good old-fashioned counterinsurgency war, designed to clear the way for American corporations to set up shop in Colombia, with cocaine as the scare tactic. Two recent Defense Department-commissioned reports outline in chilling terms the same strategy of ongoing military intervention under the cover of the drug war. Both urge the Bush administration to drop the pretext of counter-narcotics and get on with the business of wiping out the insurgents. Last year the US Air Force commissioned the RAND Corporation to prepare a review of the situation in Colombia. In early June the Santa Monica-based RAND think tank (progenitor of many a blood-sodden scenario in the Vietnam era) submitted its 130-page report, called The Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability. The other report is a paper written by Gabriel Marcella, titled Plan Colombia: the Strategic and Operational Imperatives. Marcella is a former chief adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the US Southern Command who now teaches on national security matters at the US Army War College. Together, the two reports reach the same conclusion: the US needs to step up its military involvement in Colombia and quit forfeiting options by limiting its operations to counter-narcotics raids. Along the way, both reports make a number of astonishing admissions about the paramilitaries and their links to the drug trade, about human rights abuses by the US-trained Colombian military and about the irrationality of crop fumigation. RAND argues that the drug war approach is on the brink of not only failing, but of prompting a wider conflict that might require the insertion of US troops. If the Pastrana administration falters, either in its counter-narcotics or counterinsurgency approach, the US would be confronted with an unpalatable choice. It could escalate its commitment to include perhaps an operational role for US forces in Colombia, or scale it down, which would involve some significant costs, including a serious loss of credibility and degradation of the US's ability to muster regional support for its counter-narcotics and political objectives. The RAND study draws heavily from a December 2000 report by the World Bank, titled Violence in Colombia: Building Sustainable Peace and Social Capital, which concluded that the quid pro quo for Colombia getting any future large infusions of international financial aid will depend on their successful suppression of the FARC and other rebel groups. Another World Bank memo describes the FARC's fundraising strategy as a loot-seeking assault on primary commodities: cattle ranches on the eastern plains, commercial agriculture in Urab?, oil in Magaldena, gold mines in Antioquia and the coca fields of Putumayo. RAND cites a former CIA analyst as saying that the FARC has invested its taxes on these industries into a strategic financial reserve, which will enable them to sustain an escalation of the conflict. While the FARC peasant army has doubled over the past decade, it still only numbers about 7,000 fighters ? 2,000 fewer than the paramilitary death squads. Both RAND and the World Bank point to the horrifying level of social intolerance killings, which for men aged 14-44 reached a level of 394 deaths per 100,000 last year. In all, Colombia endures 30,000 annual murders, double the number for the entire United States in 1998. Slightly more than 23,000 murders have been linked to illegal armed organizations since 1988. The implication is that the FARC is responsible for these killings and one has to dig deep into the RAND analysis to discover otherwise. In fact, according to statistics compiled by the Colombian government, about 3,500 people were killed by the guerrillas and 19,652 by paramilitaries and private justice groups. The leader of the AUC (United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia), the central command for the 19 paramilitary fronts, is a sadistic scoundrel named Carlos Casta?o, who supervises a killing program right off the pages of the CIA's Phoenix Program's operations manual. The RAND report details how Casta?o's AUC routinely executes suspected guerrilla sympathizers in order to instill fear and compel support among the local population. When that strategy fails to deliver, the AUC simply launches an all-out attack on the villages and slaughters the inhabitants. RAND dispassionately notes that the AUC justifies these atrocities, in language that even Bob Kerrey might admire, as a
