Hawks and Eagles: "Greater NATO' Flies to the Aid of 'Greater Albania' by Diana Johnstone <cont'd> Although KLA leaders were not enthusiastic about this agreement either, the United States apparently obtained their consent by promising a privileged role for the rebel gunmen as military partners of the United States. Eliminating the Alternative It is preposterous to suggest that there was no alternative to unconditional surrender of Yugoslavia to CIM and COMKFOR. It would have taken time to work them out, and bringing the intransigent KLA into the negotiations made matters vastly more difficult. But that intransigence was largely the result of their certitude that they ultimately commanded full United States and NATO support. During the time needed for a peace process, the presence of truly neutral peacemakers could have played a constructive and indispensable role. Last October 12, Richard Holbrooke got Belgrade to allow 2,000 "verifiers" to enter Kosovo to monitor compliance of the Yugoslav side only with a cease-fire the KLA had never been obliged to keep. This was already an extreme oddity: a one-sided cease-fire, in which the legal police of a country agrees not to pursue armed groups which, whether called "liberation army" or "terrorists," had been murdering citizens for well over a year and showed no inclination to stop. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was chosen to organize this Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). In Western Europe, since the demise of the 1980s peace movement, objections to the qualitative and geographical expansion of NATO have tended to take refuge in proposals to strengthen the OSCE which, unlike NATO, involves Russia and indeed all European countries except, since 1992, Yugoslavia. Early suspicions in some pro-OSCE circles, confirmed by later events, suggested that this assignment was used largely to discredit the OSCE as a viable "alternative" to NATO. Although the champions of OSCE had seen it as less U.S.-dominated, the U.S. put one of its own "dirty war" specialists, William Walker, in charge of the KVM. The "verifier" force never approached 2,000, and it was widely assumed that many of the verifiers were agents of various NATO intelligence services, in particular U.S. military or civilian intelligence. Walker's "diplomatic" experience in assisting the Contra guerrillas to mount a spoiling war against Sandinista Nicaragua was good background for cooperation with the KLA, the only "liberation" movement in the world (so far) which enthusiastically calls for NATO bombing of the territory it is out to conquer. In mid-January, Walker himself broke the fragile peace his force had been sent to solidify by endorsing the KLA version of the extremely controversial events in the village of Racak. Walker's hasty and unquestioning condemnation of a "Serbian massacre," which many believe (and on the basis of solid evidence) was a propaganda set-up, arranging battlefield dead to give the appearance of an execution, discredited the KVM as a neutral observer. Some of the resulting dissension within the OSCE has come into public view. In particular, the German vice-president of the OSCE, Christian Democratic Bundestag member Willy Wimmer, called the KVM a "fairly hopeless mission" because some people "apparently did not at all want it to succeed." Who? "For instance, those who are behind the UCK and pull the strings." Wimmer said that the international OSCE observers had unambiguously agreed that the Yugoslav side had kept to the October cease-fire agreement, while the UCK had "systematically evaded it" and engaged in provocations. Asked by Deutschlandradio Berlin whether he considered the NATO military assault a mistake, Wimmer answered: "I personally consider it a very big mistake. And I am in agreement with the OSCE parliamentary assembly, which with a majority of nearly 90% has repeatedly stated that military engagements can be undertaken only with a mandate from the United Nations Security Council. "However, the interests of the United States and Britain were diametrically opposed to us." "Greater Albania" to "Greater NATO" The war against Yugoslavia has been sold to the public as a humanitarian necessity, when in reality it is a political project. For the Albanian leaders, the purpose was always clear: Albanian rule over Kosovo, not "human rights" and certainly not "peace." Veton Surroi, publisher of the leading Kosovo Albanian newspaper Koha Ditore, financially supported by the Soros Foundation and the National Endowment for Democracy, is often mentioned as the West's dark horse to be President of "independent" ethnic Albanian Kosovo. He was a member of the Albanian delegation that signed the Rambouillet war agreement with the U.S. and the EU. He told the New York Times a week later that when he signed, he "also accepted that there would be consequences for the people of Kosovo, that if the Serbian side did not agree to the pact, it would have to be imposed by force," "even at risk to the civilian population." He said "These kinds of political arrangements require war, both as the driving force and as the action that seals them." Surroi also recognized the political interest of NATO: "The inhabitants of southeastern Europe will have to face the fact that NATO has created a security umbrella over them." In reality, the whole thrust of U.S. policy has been toward a violent conflict in Yugoslavia that would shatter Serbia, the last bastion of old-fashioned independence in the Balkans, and bring NATO in as occupier and arbiter. The United States did not want to bring Yugoslavia into NATO, but NATO into Yugoslavia. To most people, it seems incredible that the apparently blundering Clinton administration could have hatched and carried out such a Machiavellian plot. And no doubt it didn't. The monstrous policy seems, from what one can discern, to have grown more or less by chance out of a strange encounter between two very different interest groups: Balkan revanchist lobbies, both Croatian and Albanian, on the one hand, and a circle of strategic policy planners looking for the means to transform NATO from a West European defense alliance focused on containing the Soviet Union into the military arm of U.S. global hegemony, able to act anywhere in the world without regard to national sovereignty, the United Nations or international law. The Albanian Lobby First came the lobbies. Already in the 1980s, when Albanians were actually running Kosovo, and the mainstream press was reporting that Albanians were harassing Serbs in order to establish "an ethnically clean Albanian republic" before merging with Albania to form "a greater Albania," the Albanian lobby in the United States was working to reverse the image. The center of this lobby was New York Republican Congressman Joseph DioGuardi, of Italian-Albanian background. On June 18, 1986, Representative DioGuardi and Senator Bob Dole introduced Concurrent Resolution 150, "Expressing Concern over the Condition of Ethnic Albanians Living in Yugoslavia." This was an early significant victory for the Albanian lobby. Of course, neither Dole nor, probably, any other congressman had the slightest idea of conditions in Kosovo, if they could tell where it was, but it's a rare politician who isn't ready to "express concern" over the condition of an ethnic minority that has an active lobby operating in Washington. This sort of resolution can then be used as documentary proof of whatever it alleges. The reward was not long in coming. In May 1987, Dole and DioGuardi attended an Albanian-American fund-raiser in New York City that raised $1.2 million for Dole's campaign and $50,000 for DioGuardi's. Even so, DioGuardi lost his seat, whereupon he formed the Albanian-American Civic League to pursue lobbying for the Albanian cause. Cuba has long been the most striking illustration of how a relatively small ethnic lobby --that of the counter-revolutionary Cuban exiles in Florida-- could have a long-term negative influence on U.S. foreign policy. The Balkans provide a second, even more surprising, example. Ethnic lobbies offer mediocre politicians two precious assets. The most obvious is money in the form of campaign contributions. The other is the semblance of an idealistic cause: Championing some obscure "oppressed people" seeking American support for its "righteous cause" can provide a glow of international vision to mediocre provincial politicians with not a glimmer of understanding of the outside world. The ethnic lobbies are not partisan. Republicans and Democrats are eligible to support their causes. For the 1996 elections, the Democrats "established nine steering committees to concentrate on Albanians, Arabs, Croatians, Greeks, Irish, Hungarians, Italians, Lithuanians and Poles.... An energetic 31-year-old Albanian American, Ilir Zherka, was put in charge of the drive, which was called Ethnic Outreach," The European reported. Once upon a time ethnic lobbies were concerned with the social welfare and advancement of their constituents. To some extent, that may still be the case, but since America became top superpower, the focus has shifted to bringing that power in on the side of exile groups with an agenda. The Clinton administration, Zherka told The European, "has concentrated on trying to solve age-old problems in Ireland, Bosnia, and the Middle East. In addition, Clinton has worked on expanding NATO, and the Poles, Hungarian, and Baltic citizens appreciate his efforts. He has also supported Ukrainian independence." Here is where the agendas of exile groups and the post-Cold War problem of finding a new "mission" for NATO have dovetailed dangerously. With the collapse of the communist "enemy," a small number of very special interests have rushed in to fill the foreign policy void. "Minority groups have leverage because their support can mean the difference between a candidate winning or losing an entire state," according to William Kimberling of the Federal Election Commission. "Smaller ethnic groups can be more effective than big ones because they are more compact. One of the problems of American politics is that the two biggest groups, Blacks and Hispanics, are the least organized and don't vote." The lesson he drew is that "if you vote together, candidates will pay attention." The leading role of the Albanian lobby in the Clinton campaign's "Ethnic Outreach" program is striking, as is the absence of any Serbian lobby. One can assume that this is not because there are no Americans of Serbian origin in the United States, but because Serbian-Americans have not, in recent decades, been united by an activist revanchist agenda. Serbs identified totally with the victorious Allied side in both world wars; many considered themselves Yugoslavs first and foremost, and if they opposed Tito, the changes they hoped to see in Yugoslavia were political and democratic, not a reshaping of the Balkans with help from the U.S. Superpower. In contrast, right-wing Croatian exile groups in particular nursed dreams of restoring the fascist Ustashe "Independent Croatian State," which had existed only during World War II thanks to the occupation and dismantling of Yugoslavia by Germany and Italy. In 1993, it was reported that "Croatia has built up the most effective lobbying and public relations network on Capitol Hill since the days when the Israeli and Greek lobbies were at their peak." Croatian lobbying efforts, congressional investigators were quoted as saying, "could well exceed $50 million." Culturally, there is little in common between Croats and Albanians. But extreme Croatian and Albanian exiles nursing the hope of restoring the Greater Croatia and the Greater Albania that had existed only thanks to the Axis Powers during World War II shared something very important: a common enemy. That common enemy was multi-national Yugoslavia, which deprived them of their ethnically defined independent states. Politically, it was more effective to define that enemy as the Serbs, the people who had played the leading historic role in creating multi-cultural Yugoslavia. Denouncing the Serbs as communist oppressors was the formula for winning support from American politicians. Serbian-Americans were without a well-funded revanchist agenda, and politically divided: no clout. A key role in the joining of the anti-Serb forces was reportedly played by a young aide of Senator Dole, Mira Radievolic Baratta. Within the "small circle of those who monitor U.S. policy toward the Balkans," The Weekly Standard reported in 1995, "her influence and her expertise are widely recognized." Richard Perle, an informal Dole adviser who worked on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims at the Dayton peace talks, says that "other than Richard Holbrooke, Baratta has been the most influential individual in shaping U.S. policy." Baratta began working for Dole in June 1989 and in May 1995 received the "Award for Excellence in Politics" from the National Federation of Croatian Americans. In a bastion of ignorance, Baratta easily became the congressional expert on the Balkans. Baratta has "as good an understanding of the Balkans as anyone on Capitol Hill," The Weekly Standard reported admiringly, adding that "she is probably the only congressional staffer monitoring ex-Yugoslavia who speaks and reads both Croatian and Serbian," a statement which itself indicates the prevailing ignorance, since Croatian and Serbian are the same language. Baratta clearly understood the importance of concentrating on the villain --the Serbs-- as a better way to influence policy than to try to sell Congress on the Croats. She also advocated the Albanian cause and was publicly credited with getting the Senate to adopt a resolution calling for lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims. Even after leaving politics, Dole continues his support of the Albanian cause. "In articles and TV appearances, Dole has glorified the KLA and vilified the Serbs," Investor's Business Daily reported. Matthew Rees predicted that Baratta would succeed in "climbing the foreign-policy establishmen's greasy pole. Dole advisers such as Perle, Wolfowitz, and Jeane Kirkpatrick are among Baratta's biggest boosters." By a not so strange coincidence, Baratta's fans include the most hawkish veterans of the Reagan administration. "Many former Reagan officials --U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Perle, and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger-- have publicly endorsed sending NATO ground troops to Kosovo." Caspar Weinberger, whose name is synonymous with the big California-based transnational infrastructure-construction company, Bechtel, is described as "the most hawkish on the Balkans." Bechtel, incidentally, has already been selected to build Croatia's new coastal highway. The ravaged Balkans should supply plenty of infrastructure construction opportunities -- not least the future oil pipeline to bring Caspian Sea oil from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, in line with the Clinton administration's great concern to divert the oil away from Russia or Iran." The Eagles and the Hawks "Albania," in the Albanian language "the land of the eagles," is by far the poorest, least developed country in Europe. After the fall of its uniquely repressive communist regime, Albanians came into world view trying desperately to flee their poor country toward Italy. During Enver Hoxha's dictatorship, that exit had been closed tight from within. The easiest exit route for Albanians in that period had been across the mountains of northern Albania into Kosovo, where local authorities --often ethnic Albanian kinfolk-- let them settle. Compared to Albania, Kosovo was the land of milk and honey, even if it was the poorest part of Yugoslavia. With a Yugoslav passport, travel was easy. From Kosovo, enterprising Albanians went out to make their fortunes in Germany or Switzerland. Thanks in part to their very tight clan structure, Kosovo Albanians have notoriously taken control of the heroin smuggling routes through the Balkans from Turkey to Switzerland and Germany. After the fall of communism, rich Kosovo Albanians have tended to treat Albania itself as a colony for exploitation and a base for various illegal operations. Considering the potential dominance by Kosovo Albanians in a "Greater Albania," the prospect does not delight all people in Albania itself, in particular in the south, where the Tosk dialect is spoken, in contrast to northern Albania and Kosovo where the Gheg dialect prevails. If, as has been widely reported, the KLA is the armed branch of the ethnic Albanian mafia, it would not be the first time that the CIA has ended up working hand in hand with drug dealers. The alliance of the Hawks and the Eagles solidified around the dangerous project of "Greater Albania," sold by lobbies and public relations campaigns to American politicians and public opinion as a "human rights" rather than a nationalist cause. This project filled a foreign policy vacuum. Veterans of the Cold War policy elite were groping around for new "threats" and a new mission for NATO and the U.S. military-industrial complex. As for the American left, or what remained of it after the end of the Cold War, it largely stopped thinking seriously about international problems of war and peace. The "single issue" approach made paradoxical connections invisible. Reduced to sentimental humanitarianism, the liberal left has become easily manipulated by public relations campaigns framed in terms of human rights and victims. A contemporary version of the old "white man's burden" or "mission civilisatrice" has emerged to be exploited by the designers of NATO's new global mission. Thus by championing a supposedly "oppressed people," NATO could prove in the Balkans its ability to act as a "humanitarian" police force anywhere in the world. Bombing Iraq and Serbia simultaneously, it could prove its "two wars at once" capacity (and clean out its stockpile of aging Cruise missiles). If it worked, NATO would have a formula that could be put into operation in other trouble spots, notably what Zbigniew Brzezinski calls the "Eurasian Balkans," a vast area of mixed ethnic composition interestingly located around the Caspian Sea and all those oil reserves. The idea is to find an "oppressed minority," promise support to its fiercest warriors --preferably drug dealers who can afford to buy their own weapons-- and when all hell breaks loose, one moves in to "avoid humanitarian catastrophe." Yugoslavia is a test case. Supposing U.S. mastery of airspace and television time, this mixed propaganda-missile mechanism should meet the needs of those who perceive that eternal U.S. economic supremacy needs a military arm. "The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist -- McDonald's cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the designer of the F-15," is how Thomas L. Friedman summed it up. This is the imperative behind the rush to assert NATO's "right to intervene" all over the world. Thus, observed columnist Jim Hoagland, "the Kosovo war is about the global future, not the European past." The American people not being considered mature enough for such Realpolitik, it has been necessary to feed them children's fairy tales about the Big Bad Milosevic eating babies for breakfast, with Slick Willy and Slick Tony reincarnating FDR and Churchill to stop "the new Hitler." The future of the Albanians and the Serbs is only one of the stakes in the Kosovo war of 1999. Another is the capacity of the American people to tell reality from fiction. <footnotes omitted>