[CTRL] Iraqiana: 01-30: Opposition

[Alamaine Ratliff]

 -Caveat Lector-

From Fed of am Scientists
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/crs-iraq-op.htm

CRS Report


Iraq's Opposition Movements


Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Foreign Affairs and
National Defense Division

March 26, 1998

Summary

Many in Congress believe that the only way to blunt the term threat from
Iraq is to remove Saddam from power, but the Administration is skeptical of
new proposals to rebuild the opposition movement. The Iraqi opposition has
been generally ineffective in shaking Saddam Husayn's grip on power, in
part because differences within and between different dissident groups and
with the regional backers of these groups. The conference report on the
State Department authorization for FY1998-99, as well as the Senate version
of S.1768, a supplemental appropriation, includes U.S. funds for opposition
activities. This report will be updated to reflect legislative and other
developments.

Introduction1

During the latest crisis over access to suspected weapons production sites
in Iraq, a growing number of foreign policy experts and Members of Congress
have called for a long term U.S. effort to overthrow Iraq's President
Saddam Husayn. These critics of current policy maintain that confrontations
between Iraq and the United States and United Nations will flare
repeatedly, and Iraq will pose a constant threat to its neighbors and the
international community, as long as Saddam remains in power. Some Members,
including Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, Senator John McCain, and
others, have said the Administration should look beyond the immediate
crisis and consider steps including: recognizing a coalition of opposition
groups as the legitimate government of Iraq; releasing Iraqi frozen assets
to those groups; granting export licenses for the purchase of arms by those
groups; lifting sanctions for those portions of Iraq controlled by the
opposition; establishing an opposition Radio Free Iraq; extending no fly
zones to cover the entire country; and barring Iraq from moving armor in
all or parts of Iraq. The Administration has said it would continue to have
ties to the opposition and look for ways to support it more effectively but
that some of the above ideas are impractical. (For further information on
Iraq, see Issue Brief 92117, Iraqi Compliance With Cease-f re Agreements;
and Issue Brief 94049, Iraq-U.S. Confrontations. )

Postwar Attempts to Oust Saddam

Both the Bush and the Clinton Administrations previously pursued
unsuccessful efforts to topple Saddam Husayn. Many of the past difficulties
are relevant to the current debate on whether or how to oust the Iraqi
President. Prior to Desert Storm, which began January 17, 1991, President
Bush called on the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam. Opposition Shiite
Muslims in southern Iraq and Kurdish factions in northern Iraq, heartened
by the U.S. call (and probably anticipating U.S. support) launched all-out
rebellions against Saddam and his Sunni Muslim-dominated regime2 within
days of the end of the Gulf war (February 28, l991). The rebellion in
southern Iraq spread northward and reached the suburbs of Baghdad, but
Republican Guard forces gained the upper hand against the rebels by
mid-March 1991, and the uprising there petered out. (Saddam had largely
kept the Republican Guard out of the fighting in Desert Storm for the
purpose of preserving his hold on power after the war.) The Kurds in the
north, benefitting from a U.S.-led no fly zone established in April 1991,
were able to carve out an autonomous enclave in northern Iraq, free of
Iraqi troops and governmental presence. However, Iraq is an Arab state that
would not accept Kurdish independence or leadership, and the 4 million
Kurds in northern Iraq did not represent a major threat to Saddam's rule.

According to press reports, in May 1991, about two months after the failure
of the Shiite and Kurdish uprisings, President Bush notified Congress of an
intelligence finding justifying new U.S. efforts to topple Saddam Husayn.
Press accounts indicate that about $15 - $20 million were allocated to
efforts to cultivate ties to military and security officials around the
Iraqi leader in the hopes of fomenting a coup d'etat.3 The published
accounts suggest that some funds might have gone to opposition Shiite,
Kurdish, and other exiled opponents of Saddam, but that Bush Administration
officials reportedly focused on promoting a narrowly-based military
takeover. These officials reportedly believed that a military coup offered
the best hope of bringing to power a more favorable regime while preserving
Iraq's integrity. It was feared that Shiite and Kurdish groups, if they
succeeded in ousting Saddam, would fragment the country into warring ethnic
and tribal groups, and open Iraq to political and military influence from
neighboring Iran, Turkey, and Syria. Saudi Arabia, in particular, was said
to fear that 

[CTRL] Iraqiana: 01-30

[Alamaine Ratliff]

 -Caveat Lector-

From Int'l Herald Tribune

Paris, Saturday, January 30, 1999


U.S. Restricts Pledge to Aid Saddam's Foes



By Vernon Loeb Washington Post Service

WASHINGTON - The senior American diplomat coordinating affairs with the
Iraqi opposition told 13 opposition leaders on Friday that he would promote
the goals of the Iraq Liberation Act with Gulf states. But he stopped well
short of committing U.S. military aid to opposition forces, American
officials and opposition members said.

The diplomat, Frank Ricciardone, a senior Foreign Service officer recently
named to fill a new post working with opposition forces to bring about a
new regime in Baghdad, also told the leaders at a meeting in London that he
would soon be joined by a planning staff that includes a retired U.S.
general.

But key opposition leaders expressed disappointment after the session at
Mr. Ricciardone's reticence toward military aid and at remarks critical of
the opposition made Thursday before the Senate Armed Services Committee in
Washington by the chief of the U.S. Central Command and leader of all U.S.
forces in the Gulf.

Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the Iraqi National Congress, a coalition group
based in London, said Mr. Ricciardone's stance seemed to reflect a bias by
U.S. policy makers for continued covert attempts to instigate a coup inside
the Iraqi military.

But Mr. Chalabi reserved his harshest criticism for General Anthony Zinni
of the Marine Corps, the commander of U.S. forces in the Gulf, who, he
said, ''may be a good general, but he's not an expert on the Iraqi
opposition and he's not an expert on Iraqi society.''

''The fact that he said there are 91 opposition groups shows his lack of
knowledge about Iraq,'' said Mr. Chalabi, who was represented at Friday's
meeting with Mr. Ricciardone by a former general in the Iraqi Army, Tawfik
Il Yassiri.

''There are a lot of opposition groups who have fought Saddam - as we did
in 1995 - and lived to tell about it,'' Mr. Chalabi said. ''And we thank
Congress for its support.''

General Zinni expressed deep reservations about the Iraq Liberation Act
before the Armed Services Committee and said arming the Iraqi opposition
under the act could backfire and create a ''rogue state'' in Iraq even more
destabilizing than the current regime of President Saddam Hussein.

Echoing concerns over arming the opposition voiced this week by key U.S.
allies in the Gulf, General Zinni told the Senate Armed Services Committee
that none of 91 Iraqi opposition groups had ''the viability to overthrow
Saddam at this point.''

Arming them, he warned, ''could be very dangerous.''

''I've seen the effect of regime changes that didn't quite come about the
way we would have liked,'' General Zinni said. ''And the last thing we need
is another rogue state. The last thing we need is a disintegrated,
fragmented Iraq because the effects on the region would be far greater, in
my mind, than a contained Saddam.''

A State Department spokesman, James Foley, later said that he endorsed
General Zinni's conclusion that opposition groups were not an immediate
threat to the Iraqi regime and should not receive U.S. arms in the short
term.

But Mr. Foley continued to embrace the Iraq Liberation Act and said the
administration's Iraq policy ''reached a turning point'' after Congress
passed the measure in September.

The act makes toppling Mr. Saddam's regime an explicit goal of U.S. foreign
policy and authorizes $97 million in military support to the Iraqi
opposition. But it leaves any decision to arm the opposition to the
administration. ''No decisions have been made yet in that regard,'' Mr.
Foley said.

As the administration shifts from containing Mr. Saddam to a more active
strategy of trying to topple his regime, it designated seven opposition
groups last week as eligible for military assistance and named Mr.
Ricciardone to coordinate U.S. activities with opposition groups.

But those efforts have spurred opposition. The Iranian-backed Supreme
Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the most potent armed force within
the opposition, announced last week that it wanted no part of the U.S.
plan.

Two armed Kurdish militias occupying parts of northern Iraq, the only other
major opposition groups with armed soldiers, quickly followed suit, despite
extensive efforts by State Department officials last fall to unify the
groups and enlist their support in opposing the Iraqi regime.

Fearing heavily armed Kurdish forces on its border, the Turkish government,
a key U.S. ally in the region, expressed reservations this week about the
Iraq Liberation Act.

Turkish concerns were echoed by Saudi officials meeting in Riyadh with
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. The Saudis said the kingdom ''does
not believe and does not support any foreign side to interfere in changing
the ruling