-Caveat Lector-
Spacelift Washington: National Security Space Needs May Drive
Bush Space Policy - A Special White Paper Background Report
Frank Sietzen, Jr.
Sunday, January 28, 2001
Everybody interested in U.S. space policy these days is
salivating over the prospect that new president George W. Bush
will institute some form of a National Space Council. Such a
council -or some centralized management structure for overarching
space goals- was strongly proposed by some who advised the Bush
campaign on space matters last summer. These concepts and
comments were widely interpreted as focused on U.S. civil space
needs.
But with NASA clearly on the back burner on the administration's
current menu of political choices and reforms (given the Goldin
'temporary extension' stance), it would at least appear that
civil space might not be the sector of space that is given strong
early attention by the Bush team. In fact, it might be National
Security Space needs that are addressed first. That this might be
more than just idle speculation is based on two facts.
First, one of the strongest players in the new Bush team is
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. And the second is that
Rumsfeld was the head of a recent commission report that
recommended a whole new reorganization of how space is
managed-with emphasis on defense space needs. For those
interested in gleaning a clue as to the thinking of Bush's team
on space issues, it might be wise to look at the detailed fine
print of the commission's full report. For the Rumsfeld report
did not call for a space council at all. Instead it called for
reinstitution of a Senior Interagency Group (SIG) for space akin
to that employed during the Reagan administration. And some of
the tasks proposed for the SIG-Space group might be well worth
examining for their possible impact on civil space (*editor's
note: this column reported in error the commission supporting a
space council in the days prior to the release of the report.
What we saw was a preliminary version of a proposal made to the
commission last summer. We were regrettably wrong in our
reporting-and hereby admit it).
The structure of 'SIG-Space' II
Rumsfeld's report blasted the Clinton administration's management
of military space issues. "The current interagency process is
inadequate to address the number, range, and complexity of
today's space issues", the report says. It recommends the
president establish what is termed a "standing interagency
coordination process" to focus on policy formulation and
coordination of space activities pertinent to national security
"and to assure that representation in domestic, and international
fora effectively reflects U.S. national security and other space
interests".
The report goes on to recommend that a Senior Interagency Group
for space be established "within the National Security Council
structure". While the central thrust of the SIG Space group would
be national security, the report suggests that its scope could be
expanded "to include officials from other departments and
agencies as issues warrant". What would SIG Space's mandate be?
According to the report: * Leverage the collective investments in
the commercial, civil, defense, and intelligence sectors to
advance U.S. capabilities in each.
* Advance initiatives in domestic and international fora that
preserve and enhance U.S. use of and access to space.
According to the report, the group's agenda should include:
a.. Space control
b.. Military missions in space
c.. Space Transportation
d.. Space utilities
e.. Earth remote sensing
f.. A deliberate, coherent approach to the implementation of
space policy. Staff support should come, the report suggests,
through the National Security Council, "with experience across
the four space sectors (civil, commercial, military, and
classified)".
Of course, this does not preclude establishment of a space
council, nor does it assure that civil space policy will be
either diminished or overlooked in the new administration. What
it does suggest, however, is that National Security Space needs
are more thought through and more clearly defined than those of
the civil space arena at this early stage. Why? Well, in part,
because there is a strong military space advocate in place in the
administration-Rumsfeld.
At the same time, civil space is being 'addressed' only by
keeping Daniel S. Goldin in place as NASA administrator
indefinitely. During the Clinton administration, Goldin was the
major player in space policy. Clinton Defense Secretary William
Cohen abolished the centralized defense space office in the
Pentagon- the DUSD-Space- in what was euphemistically termed a
"cost-saving" move in 1997. Goldin emerged as the single figure
most identified with Clinton space goals, such as they were.
With Rumsfeld bringing a cogent military space policy- and
possibly a program to go with it- to the new administration's
highest ranks, it will take a strong NASA administrator to defend
civil space needs-and NASA budget needs as well. At this early
stage, it looks like if there is more dollars to be allocated to
space programs, those programs may well be aligned to space
segments of missile defense than new human spaceflight missions.
And, of course, such a strong emphasis on military space-long
neglected under the previous administration by any reasonable
review of its programs and priorities in space-is certainly not
necessarily a negative.
The U.S. is not alone in this renewed appreciation of military
space. Last week, Russian President Putin established a new
military space force which Moscow announced would have the
responsibility of not only designing and launching military
satellites and launch vehicles but commercial craft as well.
China has also embarked upon a development program for microspace
sized parasitic satellites that could act as a-sat weapons. The
PRC has also accelerated its own space reconnaissance program as
well.
A review of recent-and some not-so-recent history
The eight Clinton years marked a growing and somewhat
accelerating evolution of the importance of military uses of
space while at the same time a decline in actual number of
military space programs. Three new starts marked the period: the
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV), Space-Based Infrared
Satellite (SBIRS), and Discoverer II space radar prototype. Of
the three, EELV became a commercial program, SBIRS high and low
were delayed until 2002 and 2004 respectively, and Discoverer II
was killed by a skeptical Congress. While these programs moved
through the system, three Defense Secretaries (Aspin, Perry, and
Cohen) as well as the CINC-Space at U.S. Space Command and the
Air Force Secretary addressed military space policies. The
CINC-Space was always an Air Force bluesuiter and former
pilot-after all, CINC-Space was also CINC-Air Force Space Command
and CINC-Norad, too, a process that the Rumsfeld report attempts
to change by separating the 'hats'.
At the same time, it would appear that two Deputy Defense
Secretaries, John Deutch and John Hamre were strongly and mildly
anti-space, respectively. Deutch led a redirection of space-based
early warning that would lead to SBIRS, a substantially scaled
back version of a much larger program (FEWS) proposed earlier.
Documents made available in 1993 and 1994 reveal a Deutch tone
that was strongly skeptical of military space programs. Hamre
came to his office from the Pentagon's Comptroller in a shake-up
following, among other things, the abolishment of DUSD-Space.
The major space 'event' of Hamre's tenure as Deputy Defense chief
was helping to administer Clinton's 1996 line item veto of
several defense projects. Three were at the heart of the Air
Force's space agenda: military spaceplane, KE-A-sat (kinetic
energy anti-satellite), and Clementine II microsatellite
research. Hamre said at the time that the three projects were
killed because they were put on the thrash heap by the Air Force
leadership, a fact only partially accurate.
Air Force Secretary Sheila Widnall during the first Clinton term,
and concurrent with the Aspin/Perry period at the DoD helm,
pushed to begin an Air Force evolution from an "Air force to an
air-and-space force, to a space-and-air force". The idea wasn't
thought to be too serious a policy path at the time by some
critics because of a lack of either timetable or budget for such
a massive change. In hindsight however the proposal might well
have played a role in the current thinking about a space corps
within the Air Force, and an ultimate, separate space corps in
the decades ahead.
U.S. and Air Force Space Commands moved during these years to
embrace space control and begin a doctrinal shift towards defense
of space assets that, if the truth be spoken, lies at the center
of the thrust of the Rumsfeld report. With growing reliance on
commercial space assets and other space systems for normal
commerce and projection of military force, the vulnerability of
these assets has increasingly worried military space planners. A
series of space war games conducted by the Army Space Command as
well as the Air Force have revealed how truly exposed the U.S.
force structure was to such potential attacks and disruption.
When added to missile defense, space was increasingly seen during
the period as a critical area for U.S. national security,
culminating in the congressionally-mandated Rumsfeld study. When
taken in the larger context of these changes in attitudes, its
recommendations came as no surprise to military space analysts
and observers. But how to implement these ideas? That's another
story entirely.
And how to fund the space programs that would surely be required
for space control and defense of space assets that are
recommended by these reviews, studies, and war games? Which of
the services are prepared to give up airplanes, tanks, ships or
submarines to pay for new spacecraft, space fighters, or space
systems? Most likely, very few. Which leaves us with a policy
roadblock: no current way to implement what a growing list of
supporters believe is the crucial need of the U.S. in space: some
practical way to in essence patrol low earth orbit and defend
commercial spacecraft from denial of service or other attack. And
it is this fact that may well serve to threaten any hopes for
increased civil space budgets, unless the Bush team grows all of
space spending, unlikely at this early point.
The prospect of this renewed competition for space R&D only
heightens the need for a cogent rationale for civil space goals,
for offloading as many operational elements of NASA to
privatization as prudent, and a laying out of a true vision for
human spaceflight as soon as possible. If, ultimately NASA's
budget will not be increased, then realignment of its spending
may well be the subject that the U.S. space policy community will
need to forge a consensus. The time to start building that
consensus is at hand.
Rumsfeld the key?
Rumsfeld brings his strong views on defense-related space issues
to the Pentagon formed over years of previous service. But his
views on the role and importance of the civil space program might
also be worth reviewing in the days and months ahead. In the
spring of 1963 congressional critics of Project Apollo made what
would turn out to be their last major attempt to either kill or
redirect the moon landing. In an attachment to a report by the
House Committee on Science and Astronautics (H.R. 7500, House
Report 591), six dissenting Republicans proposed that military
space needs-not the lunar landing goal- be at the center of the
U.S. space program. While they said they supported Apollo
"because there exists no other comparable program to develop
space technologies at this time", they categorized the Apollo
mission as mainly one of "largely prestige" without lasting
significance to the U.S. space program. Wrote one of the
dissenters: "This country should direct itself toward (military
development of) inner space* (*defined as 500 miles up and lower)
and not place our top priority in the direction of the Moon." The
name of that dissenter 38 years ago? A Congressman from Illinois
named Donald H. Rumsfeld.
SPACELIFT WASHINGTON © 2001 by Aerospace FYI Inc. All rights
reserved. Reproduction allowed with permission. The information
contained herein are the authors own and are not affiliated with
any other society, organization, or institution. Publication does
not constitute endorsement of either editorial content or
sponsoring web site. Have information about space transportation?
Email the editor at [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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Kadosh, Kadosh, Kadosh, YHVH, TZEVAOT
FROM THE DESK OF:
*Michael Spitzer* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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