-Caveat Lector- <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/"> </A> -Cui Bono?- an excerpt from: The Politicos 1865-1986 Matthew Josephson©1938 Harcourt, Brace and Compnay New York 760 pps. – First Edition – Out-of-print ----- William C Whitney (S&B 1863) -- the young Mr. Elihu Root as counsel to the Whisky Trust, prosecuted under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. The Whisky Trust (American Cattlefeed and Distilling Company), famous at the moment for having attempted to have an independent distillery in Chicago blown up by dynamite, was under prosecution in several States at the same time, like the Standard Oil Company. But the case had been won before Federal Judge Jenkins in Massachusetts, on the afterward familiar ground that "manufacturing is not commerce"; Judge Jenkins had promptly been appointed to the United States Supreme Court by President Harrison. But among Mr. Olney's satisfied employers who had seen him "riddle" the Anti-Trust Act in court we find once more the ubiquitous Mr. Whitney, who, with the stealthy Mr. Ryan, held much stock then in the Whisky Trust. Like the protective tariff, the Trust law was to be administered by a "friend,"—indeed by "the hired man of the Whisky Trust." [14] -- Om K ----- The other cabinet members were unknowns, in part mediocre political selections) in part personal friends, such as Wilson Bissell, the Postmaster General, a native of Buffalo; but their selection too was not without significance. A familiar figure from the old regime was Daniel Lamont, earlier private secretary to Cleveland at Albany and at the White House, and now named Secretary of War. Lamont had been an aide and protege of the late New York boss, Daniel Manning, and was a master of Organization craft and lore. To Cleveland he had been an indispensable and trusted servant. During the Republican interregnum, Whitney had found the bald-headed, closemouthed little man with the walrus mustaches most useful as a confidential aide in his stock-market forays. Whitney, with his increasingly sinister Wall Street reputation, could no longer be invited into the Cabinet any more than Henry Villard. But Lamont, considerably enriched, more secretive and silent than ever, was Whitney's alter ego in the Cabinet, the custodian of presidential secrets and the "Assistant President," as political observers called him. "Lamont in some respects filled the place of William C. Whitney in Cleveland's first Administration, " and was also "the means of communication . . . between Cleveland and the big business men of the country." [6] Thus the restless hand of the uncanny Whitney still hung over the Administration for years-even more potent than if he had been present at its councils-though he held himself in the shadows now, sometimes fearing even to show himself in Washington.* [* "Because of articles about me [in the press] intended for the annoyance of Cleveland it would be thought wrongly of at this time." (Lamont Papers, letter of June 1, 1895.)] The many illuminating letters and dispatches from Whitney to Lamont, arriving almost daily at certain seasons, show what close watch Whitney kept over the affairs of the National Government, testify to his constant requests for jobs and places to be turned over to friends of the Standard Oil family, and record his demands for special government favors to friendly banks, as well as his detailed advice and virtual orders in matters of taxation, tariff schedules, and financial policy. "If I want a thing I will ask for it," Whitney writes Lamont breezily at the very beginning of the new term.[7] And the mousy Lamont carries out all requests promptly, or goes noiselessly to the President's office to transmit Mr. Whitney's views as to which banking syndicate should be awarded the profitable financing of a government-bond issue, or which tariff duties should be "specific" and which "ad valorem."[8] A message comes, and Lamont sends off a War Department memorandum requesting the assignment of post-office deposits to a certain New York bank of which "Mr. Whitney is one of the largest owners." [9] One spirited communication reads: In making plans I hope August Belmont & Co., will have the opportunity of being made the financial agents of the different departments. Brown Bros. were made so when we were in before but they did little or nothing this time and I think Belmont entitled to consideration. He took the chairmanship of the bankers' committee and gave $10,000 himself.[10] Lamont is Secretary of War; but military duties do not occupy enough of his time. He glides from the Post Office to the White House, to the corridors of the Senate, back to the Treasury Department, where, at periods, he seems to supersede Carlisle. The advance knowledge he possesses concerning financial actions contemplated by the Administration, concerning duties on sugar or steel, upon which impassioned and notorious speculation in Wall Street largely centered in the 1890s—all this is of supreme value, giving tactical advantage to the market leader with millions at his command. Whitney, in return, gives Lamont "points" or advance "tips" upon speculative stocks: "I don't want to advise, but Col. [0. H. Payne?] and I have both bought [Metropolitan] Traction around 110."[11] Certainly in a time of peace Lamont was one of the busiest Secretaries of War the Government had ever boasted. As the unsleeping liaison officer for the magnificent Whitney and his associates, Lamont of course enjoyed an influence at the cabinet table far surpassing his official rank. Still curiouser was the personality and the choice of Richard Olney of Boston as Attorney General, a strategic executive post in an Administration which was in duty bound to prosecute the industrial Trusts and monopolistic railroads. Olney's selection, after certain other personages had declined the embarrassing invitation, was due to "a strong New York backing," according to an intimate of Cleveland's.[12] Some unseen hand and eye which shaped the character of the new Administration as a "rock of conservatism" had certainly fished up this hard-crusted Yankee corporation lawyer from State Street, who had spent his life chiefly in the service of New England financiers and railroad captains. Without public glory as yet, Olney's capacities were fully appreciated by men like John M. Forbes and Charles E. Perkins, the builders of the rich Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad, whom he served as corporation counsel. Olney was a bank director as well as a director of two other large railroads, the Santa Fe, and the Boston & Maine, at the time of his appointment.[13] All his life had literally been passed in board rooms, trading, negotiating, counseling. Olney was admired by the great Eastern capitalists, and his selection for a cabinet office was made with a view to gaining their support for the Cleveland Administration. But more lately he had acted together with the young Mr. Elihu Root as counsel to the Whisky Trust, prosecuted under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. The Whisky Trust (American Cattlefeed and Distilling Company), famous at the moment for having attempted to have an independent distillery in Chicago blown up by dynamite, was under prosecution in several States at the same time, like the Standard Oil Company. But the case had been won before Federal judge Jenkins in Massachusetts, on the afterward familiar ground that "manufacturing is not commerce"; Judge Jenkins had promptly been appointed to the United States Supreme Court by President Harrison. But among Mr. Olney's satisfied employers who had seen him "riddle" the Anti-Trust Act in court we find once more the ubiquitous Mr. Whitney, who, with the stealthy Mr. Ryan, held much stock then in the Whisky Trust. Like the protective tariff, the Trust law was to be administered by a "friend,"—indeed by "the hired man of the Whisky Trust." [14] Olney's authorized biographer has described the man as both ob-stinate and cruel, of a pugnacious disposition, with a glaring bulldog physiognomy and eyes like coals. In short, a hard-thinking, accomplishing, ruthless being like one of those modern war-tanks which proceeds across the roughest ground, heedless of opposition, deaf alike to messages from friends and cries from the foe, able to crush every person and every obstacle that gets between it and its chosen objective.[15] A close student of his profession, he had previously shown distaste for public office, and took almost no pleasure in human company save that of his family, over whom he tyrannized. We must note also that four years earlier, in 1888, he had played a most active part in breaking a strike by the employees of the "Burlington" Railroad, to whose fortunes he seemed more attached than to any other thing. Before accepting Cleveland's offer Olney had written at once to Perkins, president of the Burlington, asking if in his opinion it would be "to the true interest of the C.B.&Q." that he, Olney, should become the United States Attorney General.[16] The reply may have assured Olney that since he loved railroads, which were then under such heavy attack, and disbelieved in the legal force of the Anti-Trust Act, his acceptance of the post would be in the true interest not only of the Burlington but of all railroads and industrial corporations. If Lamont was the fox of this hard-pressed, embattled Administration, then Oln ey, with his bold and aggressive temperament, was its lion. Yet he brought intellectual traits superior to the others which made him eventually the formidable, the dominating figure of the President's circle. Especially he showed a certain brilliance of logic which enabled him to define the self-interest of the capitalist class with a precision and clarity that few others have equaled. He would fight without giving quarter when the way was clear, but he could bide his time too. Some weeks before Olney took office, the railroad captain Perkins, who feared government attempts to regulate railroads, sought the prospective Attorney General's aid in persuading the new Administration to abolish the Interstate Commerce Commission altogether. Olney in his reply considered various aspects of the recent reform law and expressed with utmost candor a "business and railroad point of view" and a philosophy of government relations with business which has seldom been so wisely and honestly put. He advised: My impression would be that looking at the matter from a railroad point of view exclusively it would not be a wise thing to undertake. . . . The attempt would not be likely to succeed; if it did not succeed, and were made on the ground of the inefficiency and uselessness of the Commission, the result would very probably be giving it the power it now lacks. The Commission, as its functions have now been limited by the courts, is, or can be made) of great use to the railroads. It satisfies the popular clamor for a government supervision of railroads, at the same time that that supervision is almost entirely nominal. Further, the older such a commission gets to be, the more inclined it will be found to take the business and railroad view of things. It thus becomes a sort of barrier between the railroad corporations and the people and a sort of protection against hasty and crude legislation hostile to railroad interests. . . . The part of wisdom is not to destroy the Commission, but to utilize it.[17] * During the tense opening weeks of the new Administration, Olney began to press his clear business and "railroad view of things" upon the Government. According to this the gold standard must be defended at all costs. He maintained close contact between the Cleveland Cabinet and the "bankers, merchants and others in Boston, " as he related. To Perkins, Forbes, and Henry Lee Higginson he sent information about where to "spend some money" in accomplishing the repeal of the Silver Purchase Act, furnishing them with a list of "doubtful Senators, who ought to be persuaded to see the thing in the right light." [18] pps. 522-526 CHAPTER XV 5 Cf. Noyes, American Finance, pp. 183-85- 6 Dunn, From Harrison to Harding, Vol. I, p. 106. 7 Lamont Papers, letter of Apr. 4, 18 93 -18 8 Ibid., Whitney to Lamont, Jan- 3, 1896. 9 Ibid., War Department Memo. 10 Ibid., undated 5 probably early in 1893 11 Ibid., undated; probably 1894. 12 Parker, Cleveland, p. 178. 13 Poor's Manual of Railroads for 1894; Board of Directors of Chicago, Bur-lington & Quincy, as of Mar, 4, 1894; directors elected for Boston & Maine, Dec. 11, 1893. 14 New York World, Jan. 23, 1895; Dec. 24, 1895, editorial. 15 James, Olney, p. 12. 16 Olney Papers, Letterbook, Feb. 16, 1 8 9 3 -18 17 Ibid., Dec. 28, 1892. Italics mine. 18 Ibid., letter to Carlisle, July 5, 1893. ----- Aloha, He'Ping, Om, Shalom, Salaam. Em Hotep, Peace Be, All My Relations. Omnia Bona Bonis, Adieu, Adios, Aloha. Amen. Roads End <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/">www.ctrl.org</A> DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. 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