-Caveat Lector-

WHY I LOVE BIOMETRICS

<http://www.infosecuritymag.com/articles/january01/columns_logoff.shtml>

It is "liveness," not secrecy, that counts.

BY DOROTHY E. DENNING
Information Security Magazine
January 2001

I'm a big fan of biometrics. I'm tired of trying to remember umpteen
zillion account names and passwords in order to use the computers in my
office, browse my favorite Web sites and update the Web sites I manage. I
long for the day when computers will automatically recognize me and handle
the identification and authentication function with little effort on my part.

I make lots of security-related presentations, and when I tell all of this
to an audience, someone inevitably asks, "What happens if someone snatches
the biometric print used to validate you? Couldn't they just replay your
biometric and pretend to be you? And wouldn't that make your biometric
useless?"

My response is, "No." A good biometrics system should not depend on
secrecy. To understand why, think about how biometrics work in the physical
world. Your friends and colleagues authenticate you by recognizing your
face, voice, eyes, hands and so on. None of this is secret. Anyone who
interacts with you sees these characteristics. Even your fingerprints can
be lifted from surfaces.

What makes biometrics successful is not secrecy, but rather the ability to
determine "liveness." I can easily distinguish the living, flesh-and-blood
you from a statue or photograph of you, or even someone wearing a costume
and mask that looks like you. If I don't know you well, I might be fooled
by a lookalike, but in the non-Mission Impossible real world, the system
generally works. If I don't know you at all, I might ask for a photo ID.
But I would use such a photo only because I lack knowledge of your
appearance. I authenticate you by comparing your live face against the
photo, not by comparing one photo against another. For further proof, I may
watch you sign your name and compare the live signature against the one on
your ID card.

The same principle applies in the digital world. Your biometric prints need
not be kept secret, but the validation process must check for liveness of
the readings. Many biometric products work this way. For instance, the
Sensar iris-recognition system from Iridian Technologies
(www.iridiantech.com) looks for the "hippus movement"-the constant shifting
and pulse that takes place in the eye. The liveness test ensures that the
reading is fresh, so an adversary can't replay a previously recorded reading.
This is the beauty of biometrics. Other forms of user
authentication-including passwords, tokens and encryption-all depend on
protecting a secret or device from theft. Once that secret or device is
compromised, the system fails until a new one is established. Moreover,
these methods typically require users to hold a different secret with each
and every device or service they use, thereby burdening the user. Imagine
if every time you greeted a friend or colleague, you had to use a new
secret handshake!

Testing liveness is reasonably straightforward if the biometrics reader
senses appropriate characteristics and is tightly coupled with the
validation process and database of biometric prints. If the reader is
remote from the validation process and database, encryption can be used to
provide a secure path connecting the components. The encryption system,
obviously, should protect against replays. Encryption can also be used to
pass credentials from one system to another. For example, once my smart
card validates my fingerprint, it may use a private signature key on the
card to authenticate me to services that use my public key for
authentication. Of course, the encryption system itself requires secret
keys, but in this context, the secrets may be less prone to compromise
because they don't have to be known by humans.

Biometrics can be applied not only with human users, but also with
locations. For example, technology from CyberLocator (www.cyberlocator.com)
authenticates geodetic location by capturing a location signature from GPS
signals in a way that ensures liveness. No secrets are required. One could
imagine using biometrics to authenticate places or anything else with
distinguishing characteristics that exhibit a form of liveness.

In addition to liveness, a biometrics system also depends on uniqueness.
Otherwise, it may be subject to false accepts or rejects. Some forms of
biometrics are better than others in this regard-iris recognition being one
of the best.

Questions about privacy abuse aside, biometrics is likely to be the way of
the future. I can't wait to get rid of my gazillion passwords.

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