-Caveat Lector-
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A10543-2001Sep22.html
Borderless Network of Terror
Bin Laden Followers Reach Across Globe
By Doug Struck, Howard Schneider, Karl Vick and Peter Baker
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, September 23, 2001; Page A01
MANILA -- Abdul Hakim Murad washed his hands, and broke a basic rule of
bombmaking.
When the water mixed with chemical residue in the kitchen sink of unit 603
in the Dona Josefa Apartments here in 1995, it set off an eruption that
would reveal the inner workings of a clandestine terrorist cell allied with
Osama bin Laden.
It also revealed a plan that gave a chilling preview of the attack in New
York and Washington on Sept. 11.
Arrested and tortured by Philippine intelligence agents, Murad told the
story of "Bojinka" -- "loud bang" -- the code name bin Laden operatives had
given to an audacious plan to bomb 11 U.S. airliners simultaneously and fly
an airplane into the CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. -- all after
attempting to assassinate Pope John Paul II.
The plot in the Philippines, which was recounted to U.S. investigators at
the time, appears to be a model of the methods, aims and structure of the
network that bin Laden's followers have assembled in dozens of countries
around the world. Members of this diffuse confederation of radical
Islamists, drawing inspiration, funding and training from bin Laden's al
Qaeda group, have provided the foot soldiers -- and some commanders for his
core organization -- for attacks on U.S. citizens.
These cells, the groups that host them and any country that allows them to
operate within its borders are now the declared enemies in the U.S. war on
terrorism. An examination of operations linked to bin Laden's network in
five countries -- the Philippines, Jordan, Uzbekistan, Yemen and Egypt --
shows how difficult the fight will be.
Despite common organizational patterns and ideology, the terrorists
fighting for bin Laden's cause come from diverse locations and backgrounds.
Some have long ties to bin Laden and al Qaeda. Others have acted nearly
autonomously, undetected by authorities until the last moment before an
attack, or after one had occurred.
The Philippines plot of 1995 had many hallmarks of an operation mounted by
terrorists tied to al Qaeda, which means "the base." According to
Philippine intelligence reports obtained by The Washington Post, the
attempt to bomb the airliners was meticulously planned and well financed,
and involved preparations in countries across the globe, including the
United States.
Intelligence records indicate the precise flights that were to be targeted:
United 808, Delta 59, Northwest 6, and others. The records included
calculations to determine when to set the bomb's timer on each flight. They
also included the names of dozens of associates, and photos of some; a
record of five-star hotels; and dealings with a trading corporation in
London, a meat market owner in Malaysia and an Islamic center in Tucson,
Ariz.
The intelligence records list flying schools in San Antonio, Schenectady,
N.Y., and New Bern, N.C., where Murad trained as a commercial pilot. They
describe how money moved through an Abu Dhabi banking firm. Bar hostesses
were bribed with gifts and holiday trips to open bank accounts in which to
stash associates' funds.
The plotters also included in their plans the motives for the mission, in a
manifesto recovered by investigators: "The U.S. government gives military
aircraft to the Jewish state so the Jews can continue fighting and killing.
All of this is a result of the U.S. government's financial and military
support of the Jewish state. All people who support the U.S. government are
our target."
Bin Laden's links to the Philippines were established early in the 1990s.
In 1991, Abdurajak Janjalani, who had fought with bin Laden in Afghanistan,
returned to the Philippines and founded Abu Sayyaf -- "father of the
sword" -- which announced itself by killing two American evangelists in
1991 in a grenade blast. Officials believe Janjalani got money from an
Islamic foundation run by bin Laden's brother-in-law, Mohammad Jamal
Khalifa, who lived in the Philippines with a Filipino wife.
When Pope John Paul II announced he would visit the Philippines in 1995,
authorities worried about possible attacks by Abu Sayyaf. But the real
threat turned out to be even graver.
On Jan. 6, one week before the pope's visit, Police Station 9 in Manila
noticed a fire alarm was activated in an apartment building not far from
the pontiff's expected route. At first the cause appeared to be a simple
cooking fire. But Capt. Aida Fariscal, the night commander, went there to
see for herself. "I had a sixth sense," she said.
As she was looking around, Murad, a 26-year-old Pakistani who called
himself Saeed Ahmed, returned. He panicked, and tried to run. His shoe
caught on the roots of a potted plant, and Fariscal commandeered a taxi and
two bystanders to haul him back to the station. "He offered me a lot of
money to get him out of this mess," said Fariscal. When she and others
returned to the apartment, they found a bomb factory, stocked with beakers,
gallons of sulfuric acid and nitric acid, glycerin, large cooking kettles,
filters, funnels and fuses.
Slowly, pieces of disparate puzzles came together. Investigators found
Casio watches in the apartment that matched a timing device used to
detonate a small chemical bomb a month earlier on a Philippine Airlines
flight to Tokyo, killing a Japanese businessman. They found a stack of
passports -- Norwegian, Afghan, Saudi, Pakistani -- for the three men in
the apartment.
Murad would not talk. Handed over to intelligence agents, he taunted them.
That didn't last.
"For weeks, agents hit him with a chair and a long piece of wood, forced
water into his mouth, and crushed lighted cigarettes into his private
parts," wrote journalists Marites Vitug and Glenda Gloria in "Under the
Crescent Moon," an acclaimed book on Abu Sayyaf. "His ribs were almost
totally broken and his captors were surprised he survived."
An investigator intimately knowledgeable of the investigation confirmed the
torture, but gloated that it was Murad's fears of Jews that finally broke
him. "We impersonated the Mossad," he said, referring to the Israeli
intelligence service. "He thought we were going to take him to Israel."
Murad told all. One of his two roommates in Apt. 603 was a young Kuwaiti
chemical engineer named Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, who had helped plan the 1993
explosions at the World Trade Center, he said. They were in Manila to make
a bomb to kill the pope. One of them would hide it under a priest's robes,
and try to get close enough to kiss the pontiff as the bomb went off.
The next part of the plan was to bomb American airliners. The device on the
Philippine airliner was a dry run, he said. Murad had earned a commercial
pilot's license, and told investigators he had planned to fly a plane into
the CIA headquarters.
Murad was turned over to the Americans. Yousef, who had calmly walked away
from the Manila apartment when the firemen arrived, was found a month later
in Pakistan. A third man at the Manila apartment, Wali Khan Amin Shah, was
nabbed in Malaysia. All three were convicted by a New York court in 1997 of
involvement in the bomb plot.
But the scheme apparently lived on, officials here say. "They didn't give
up the objective," said former Gen. Renado S. De Villa, who was head of the
security effort for the pope's visit. "Murad clearly indicated it was a
large-scale operation. They were targeting the U.S. And they had a
worldwide network. It was very clear they continued to work on that plan
until someone gave the signal to go."
Watching the attacks in New York and Washington unfold on television
earlier this month, an investigator here gasped, "It's Bojinka." He said
later: "We told the Americans everything about Bojinka. Why didn't they pay
attention?"
Robert Heafner, the FBI chief in Manila at the time, who is now retired
here, said the information was heeded. "I believe everything was done that
could have been done," he said.
Abu Sayyaf still thrives in the Philippines, and could be a target in the
U.S. war on terrorism. The group has grabbed headlines with its kidnapping
schemes that have netted an estimated $25 million in ransoms. The group has
bought high-powered speedboats and armaments, and has grown to about 1,200
soldiers by paying for recruits in the poor, remote islands where it
operates. The group also holds two American missionaries, Martin and Gracia
Burnham. A third American captive, Guillermo Sobero, could have been
killed.
Observers here dismiss Abu Sayyaf as a gang of bandits with no current
links to bin Laden. "They are now just a kidnap-for-ransom group, trying to
use religion to justify their action," said Brig. Gen. Edilberto Adan,
chief spokesman for the Philippine Armed Forces.
But the jitters of a wider war linger. Immigration authorities say four of
the Sept. 11 hijackers may have passed through the Philippines several
times since 1999. Sen. Rodolfo Biazon insists there is intelligence that 50
Abu Sayyaf were training in Afghanistan this year, though senior
intelligence chiefs discount that report.
"We've been dealing with this problem for 10 years," said De Villa, still a
top adviser to the president. "You're about to find that this is going to
be a long haul."
Amman, Jordan
By the early 1990s, Raed Hijazi had found a mission.
Born and educated in California, Hijazi had been radicalized through
college contacts he met at the Islamic Assistance Organization in
Sacramento. He concluded that the country of his birth was the enemy of
Islam. Violence was the means to confront it.
Hijazi traveled to Afghanistan, where he trained at bases run by al Qaeda.
>From there, he easily traversed continents with his U.S. passport. He
worked as a cab driver in Boston, where he allegedly knew Nabil Al-Marabh,
who was detained in Chicago last Wednesday in connection with the Sept. 11
attacks. He came to Amman, where he assembled weapons, chemicals and other
supplies from Syria, Europe and elsewhere.
Here, according to prosecutors, Hijazi helped organize what was intended as
a spectacular disruption of Jan. 1, 2000, celebrations: deadly attacks on
Western tourists and Israelis across Jordan.
Today, Hijazi is in a Jordanian prison. Of 27 accomplices arrested in the
scheme, five received death sentences, 16 are imprisonned and six were
acquitted. Hijazi is currently on trial, and during proceedings earlier
this month quietly recited from the Koran while held inside a black cage.
His lawyer maintains he was tortured in prison, and that he is innocent.
Hijazi also faces a possible death sentence.
Hijazi's alleged role in the millennium plot demonstrates the
entrepreneurial side of bin Laden's network, Jordanian officials say. In
this case as in others, they say, a loose-knit local structure was drawn
together for a precise mission at a precise time with cash, planning, and
encouragement from al Qaeda.
Groups linked to al Qaeda were first detected in Jordan nearly a decade
earlier, in a series of modest attacks. Small explosive charges were
detonated in parking lots, injuring no one. Theaters showing Western films,
deemed "pornographic," were attacked. So were liquor stores, as was the
American School on the airport road.
Membership in these groups included some of the 500 Jordanians who had
volunteered to fight in Afghanistan as part of a CIA-supported war against
an invading army from the Soviet Union. Returning after years of "jihad,"
or holy war, these "Afghan Arabs" didn't fit with Jordan's increasingly
Westernized ways. They particularly came to resent the country's peace
treaty with Israel and its ties to the United States.
"They found difficulty being part of the society," said a Jordanian
official. "They considered that this society and this government was not
good Islam, was not ruled by religion. Bars serving alcohol. Swimming
pools. Discos."
They formed groups under names such as Mohammed's Army, Challenge and
Reform, or the Group of Mohammed Maqdissi, while maintaining contact with
bin Laden and his deputies. Jordanian intelligence officials saw a common
pattern: Organizations devised localized schemes, then reported to
designated deputies either in Afghanistan or Western capitals such as
London.
Sometimes the connection to bin Laden was peripheral. Jordanian authorities
claim that money and guidance for the Challenge and Reform group came from
a London-based man, Omar Abu Omar, who they say largely operates on his
own, even though he has ties to bin Laden.
For the millennium plot, however, they went straight to the source.
Beginning in 1996, Hijazi and a man named Khadar Abu Hoshar, a veteran of
the Afghan wars, contacted one of bin Laden's chief operatives, Gaza-born
Abu Zubaida. Arrangements were made for Hijazi and others to travel to
Afghanistan in mid-1999 for final preparations.
There, Jordanians allege, both Zubaida and Khalil Deek, also an American
citizen, reviewed the plan and the targets: a Radisson hotel fully booked
for millennium celebrations, Israeli border posts, Mount Nebo, where Moses
is thought to have viewed the Holy Land, and other spots.
It was one of three known operations set for New Year's Eve, including a
plan to bomb Los Angeles International Airport that failed when a customs
official at the Canadian border discovered bomb materials in the trunk of a
car driven by an accused Algerian terrorist, Ahmed Ressam.
Jordanian officials broke up the plot through a combination of
infiltration, electronic surveillance and counterintelligence. Although
they dismantled the cell, they are unsure if remnants remain. Last week,
authorities detained Mohammed Maqdissi, convicted of organizing a terrorist
group in 1996 but pardoned in 1999, apparently seeking information about
the Sept. 11 attacks.
In the end, proving complicity in individual crimes has been easier than
undoing the network, or even demonstrating its reach. The Jordanian
military tribunal that handed down guilty verdicts on some charges in the
millennium case acquitted all of the defendants of charges that they were
associated with al Qaeda.
Tashkent, Uzbekistan
In the two years since the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) introduced
itself with bombings in this Central Asian capital, its heritage has been
traced along the bloodlines of other groups born in Afghanistan.
One of its leaders, Juma Namangani, was a disillusioned Soviet paratrooper
who embraced radical Islam on his return home to Uzbekistan, and eventually
received training in Afghanistan from Tajik opposition and Pakistani and
Saudi intelligence officials, according to a Russian military newspaper.
The other leader, Tahir Yuldash, was a young activist in the same town in
Uzbekistan who also wound up in Afghanistan, where he got to know bin
Laden.
The IMU emerged from the guerrilla movement that challenged the government
in Tajikistan during its 1992-97 civil war. Its goals are narrower and more
nationalistic than those of bin Laden's borderless al Qaeda. It aims to
topple President Islam Karimov and carve out an Islamic state in the
Ferghana Valley, a fertile region that includes Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz
territory.
Although the Bush administration has identified the IMU as part of bin
Laden's network, its links to al Qaeda are fuzzy. It enjoys a haven in
Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, and is said to receive funding from bin
Laden. With camps in Tajikistan and an ability to launch raids into
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, U.S. analysts worry that one day it could strike
near the oil fields of the nearby Caspian region.
Meanwhile, Karimov's repression of political opponents and Muslim activists
may only be fueling its growth. Men wearing beards and women wearing
scarves are often harassed and thousands of political opponents have been
jailed. Some accused of radical ties have been raped and even beaten to
death in detention, their bodies sent home with crushed skulls and no
fingernails, according to human rights groups. Karimov has also alienated
his neighbors by planting land mines along the borders with Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan.
The Uzbek guerrillas did not return to fight on their home turf this
summer. Analysts say the Taliban leadership, faring poorly against
anti-Taliban rebels, pressed its resident foreign allies into fighting in
Afghanistan.
But now the IMU's 2,000 or so fighters may be on the move. According to the
anti-Taliban group, Uzbek fighters were pulled back from the front lines
about a week ago, and Russian border guards based in Tajikistan reported
seeing concentrations of Uzbek militants on the other side of the border in
recent days.
Aden, Yemen
In the days after a suicide bomb tore open the USS Cole as it paused for
fuel in the humid Yemeni port of Aden -- killing 17 sailors and two zealots
aboard an explosive-laden skiff -- anyone with the bushy whiskers favored
by conservative Muslims was liable to be hauled in and asked hard
questions.
In the context of the Koran, a full, untrimmed beard bespoke piety. But a
different context had taken hold in Yemen during the latter half of the
1990s. Islam had become mixed with war. Militancy had bled into terrorism.
And facial hair had grown suspicious enough that operatives of al Qaeda
were instructed to shave before undertaking a mission.
The Cole attack on Oct. 12, 2000, had all the markings of al Qaeda: a
walled-off safe house where the bomb was assembled, the sophistication of
the "shaped charge" that took the technical aspect of the Cole assault up a
notch from the group's alleged previous attack on the U.S. embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998.
And when authorities tracked down a newly issued boating license, they
found a portrait of the suicide bomber, clean-shaven.
This stunningly picturesque, deeply Muslim nation of 18 million has
nurtured a unique preoccupation with Islamic militants for nearly a
generation. After the war in Afghanistan, Yemen absorbed not only its own
veterans but also hundreds of foreign "Afghan Arabs" who streamed into a
country that then required no entry visa.
In peace, however, the roving bands of righteous, heavily armed foreigners
proved worrisome. Hundreds were asked -- then forced -- to leave.
"We can say that we deported almost all the non-Yemenis," said Abubakar Al
Qirbi, Yemen's foreign minister. "There might be a few who remain. They are
people who tried to integrate in traditional religious schools. Our
security knows who they are. They are under surveillance."
As for the Yemeni veterans, the great majority settled back into normal
life. Some, however, clung to the gun, setting up camps in the remote
sections of a country that government officials are quick to acknowledge
they control in name only.
Best known was the Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan, also called the Islamic Army
of Aden. The group praised bin Laden, whose father was born in Yemen, and
used a camp reportedly established by him in the southern village of
Mudiyah. But the army was more clearly tied to Sheik Abu Hamza, a handless,
one-eyed Afghan war veteran living in London's Finsbury Park.
For all that, analysts here say the group was not taken seriously until
December 1998, when it kidnapped 16 Western tourists, four of whom were
killed after government forces attacked. The Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan has
not been heard from since.
The plot against the Cole was more deft, and years in the making. A U.S.
official said the idea of ambushing a U.S. warship in port appears to date
back to May 1998, when the USS Mount Vernon paid an official visit to Aden,
staying two or three days.
Over the next 2 1/2 years, a team was assembled and put into action. "These
were 'sleeper agents,' " said one Yemeni official. "They try to live a
simple life in the area where they are."
Yemeni and U.S. officials described the operation in three phases: In the
first, a senior al Qaeda official assessed the feasibility of the mission
and made initial preparations. In the second, a technical specialist
arrived to provide "the infrastructure," in this case, a boat, trailer, car
and bomb.
"And the third phase was the action," the Yemeni official said. "They work
simple. They work very, very simple."
In Aden, the main hitch would be the bomb. The previous January, a boat
laden with TNT proved so heavy it sank as it made for the USS The
Sullivans, also on a routine fueling stop. When the Cole steamed in 10
months later, it was the first-ever arrival in Aden of an
Arleigh-Burke-class destroyer, the platform from which cruise missiles were
launched at bin Laden's Afghan camps in retaliation for the embassy
bombings.
In the aftermath, the legions of bewhiskered potential suspects were
winnowed to the six whom Yemeni authorities say they are prepared to take
to trial. Jamal al Badawi, an Afghan war veteran whom Yemeni officials say
is Egyptian, was described as the chief local organizer.
But the apparent mastermind was not to be found.
Mohammed Omar Al Harazi, a Saudi man of Yemeni descent who is also known as
Abdul Rehman Hussain Mohammed Al Safani, departed Yemen a few days before
the Cole attack, officials said. He also left Nairobi before the East
Africa bombings he helped plan, according to a U.S. official.
As an al Qaeda official linked to both the East Africa and Cole bombings,
Safani presumably was the person meeting with Al-Midhar, the suspected
hijacker of the plane that struck the Pentagon, when a surveillance camera
captured his image in Malaysia earlier this year. Al-Midhar was later added
to an Immigration and Naturalization "stop list," but by then had already
entered the United States.
Cairo, Egypt
When al Qaeda was founded in Afghanistan in the late 1980s, Ayman Zawahiri
was at the creation. The bespectacled Cairo physician would eventually help
supply bin Laden's organization with its globalist ideology. Other
Egyptians would supply the bodies, from field commanders such as former
policeman Mohammed Atef to one of the suspected participants in the Sept.
11 attacks, Mohamed Atta.
In the beginning, Zawahiri and Atef formed a trio with the Saudi-born bin
Laden, the labor neatly divided. Bin Laden brought financial resources,
Atef provided a compelling ability to organize field operations, and to
smuggle people and supplies around the region, and Zawahiri expanded the
theological and philosophical base of their mission.
When the Afghan war ended, the men realized they had the makings of
something sustainable. Following Zawahiri's ideas, they turned their eyes
back toward Egypt, and across the globe to the United States.
The grandson of a sheik and a trained surgeon, Zawahiri was steeped from
childhood in the modern Islamic politics that has coursed through Egypt
since the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1920s.
But in the 1970s he moved beyond the staid and nationalist political
activism of the brotherhood to forge a broader theory of holy war. He saw
it as a way to attack not only rulers perceived to be unjust, such as those
in Egypt, but as justification to fight beyond national borders, anywhere
that tyranny existed.
These principles of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the companion Islamic
Group organization drew the disaffected such as Atef, brothers Mohammed and
Khaled Islambouli, and others into a movement that penetrated not only the
destitute slums of Cairo, but the ranks of the country's armed forces.
Though President Anwar Sadat had given Islamists political space, his
decision to sign a peace treaty with Israel in 1979 put him squarely among
the enemies. Two years later, Zawahiri and Islamic Group leaders such as
Rifai Ahmed Taha used connections in the armed forces to arrange Sadat's
assassination during a military parade.
Ataf and others fled the country, moving easily through Sudan, Somalia and
ultimately to Afghanistan. Some, like Khaled Islambouli, were tried and
executed. Zawahiri and Taha served prison terms for gun and other
violations. Many would meet under bin Laden's hospitality later in
Afghanistan.
It is believed now that Atef was the al Qaeda member who identified the
first American "target of opportunity": a peacekeeping mission to Somalia.
To al Qaeda, the mission was another U.S. incursion into an Islamic
country, like the U.S. troops who remained in Saudi Arabia after the
Persian Gulf War. Al Qaeda members claimed to have helped organize the
attack that killed 18 U.S. soldiers in Somalia in 1992.
While allegedly supporting the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1998
embassy bombings in East Africa, Zawahiri and Taha also began focusing on
their native Egypt, and President Hosni Mubarak's increasingly close ties
to the United States.
Fundamentalism had spread quickly under Mubarak. Radical preachers set up
storefront mosques in rural villages and urban slums. Islamist
professionals took control of prominent labor syndicates such as law and
engineering, Atta's trade. Islamic investment groups offered high returns
and ample charity through shaky pyramid schemes.
When the military expertise of returning Afghan fighters was linked with
the increasingly popular radical sermons of Abdel Rahman -- later convicted
as an organizer of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing -- and a flow of
money and weapons from Zawahiri, Atef and others, the result was almost
civil war.
Taha's Islamic Group had a popular base so wide that the entire Cairo
neighborhood of Imbaba declared itself an independent Islamic state.
Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad went for higher-profile targets outside
the country, nearly assassinating Mubarak in Ethiopia in 1995, and bombing
Egypt's embassy in Pakistan.
Countered by an increasingly effective Egyptian police force -- more than
600 suspected terrorists and planners were executed or killed between 1992
and 1997 -- there has not been an acknowledged terrorist attack since the
November 1997 murder of 58 foreign tourists in Luxor, a massacre that
turned the population squarely against the militants.
Soon after the Luxor killings, leaders of the Islamic Group called a
cease-fire, arguing that violence had failed to advance them toward the
goal of making Egypt an Islamic state.
But in Afghanistan, Zawahiri wanted none of it. After more than a decade at
bin Laden's side, he formally merged Egyptian Islamic Jihad with his al
Qaeda to form a combined World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and
Crusaders. The name reflected the distance Zawahiri had traveled since the
1970s.
The group that once had formed around Sadat's murder was no longer
satisfied with opposing the "iniquitous princes" in charge of the Arab
world.
Now, they believed, they were after the power behind the throne.
Struck reported from Manila, Schneider from Amman and Cairo, Vick from Aden
and Baker from Tashkent. Staff writer Bill Branigin contributed to this
report.
================================================================
Kadosh, Kadosh, Kadosh, YHVH, TZEVAOT
FROM THE DESK OF:
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The Best Way To Destroy Enemies Is To Change Them To Friends
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