-Caveat Lector-
Well, you might be right. As an example of the resources available to you,
the following is provided from:
http://www.cadre.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/hurley.html
SADDAM HUSSEIN
AND IRAQI AIR POWER:
JUST HAVING AN AIR FORCE ISN'T ENOUGH
1st Lt Matthew M. Hurley, USAF
BAGHDAD arose early on 17 January 1991, rudely awakened by the opening
shots of an air campaign unparalleled in history for its scope, intensity,
and overwhelming success. Surprisingly, despite the ferocity of Operation
Desert Storm, effective Iraqi opposition never materialized. During the
43-day campaign, only 41 coalition aircraft were lost in combat, all to
surface-to-air missile or antiaircraft artillery fire.1 For its part, the
Iraqi air force (IQAF) offered only feeble resistance. The IQAF shot down
no coalition aircraft in air-to-air combat, conducted no successful air
strikes against coalition positions, and put only a handful of planes into
the air at any given time.
Where was the IQAF? Why didn't this air force, perhaps the largest in the
region, put up a decent fight in defense of its homeland?2 The answer may
be found in the policies of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. Since assuming
power, Saddam--driven by a deep-rooted fear of military coups--has
systematically undermined the IQAF's capability in order to maintain and
maximize his personal rule; he therefore bears the responsibility for its
failure. This article discusses the dangers Saddam perceived in a capable
air force, his notions regarding the purpose and value of air power, and
the subsequent measures he took to control the IQAF. It then shows that
those policies led to the gross deficiencies in training, motivation,
skill, and employment that lost the air war for Iraq.
Saddam's Fear
of the IQAF
Saddam regards the IQAF with an extreme caution that is rooted in modern
Iraqi history. Since Great Britain nominally granted Iraq its independence
in 1932, no Iraqi regime has been fully secure from the threat of a
military takeover, and no element of the armed forces has played as
prominent a role in Iraqi politics as has the air force. During modern
Iraq's first military coup in 1936, rebellious pilots established the
pattern for IQAF involvement by bombing the office of the prime minister.3
Similarly, the air force inaugurated the short-lived Baathist regime of
1963 with an attack against the Defense Ministry in Baghdad.4 Key IQAF
personnel or units led further attempts in 1965 and 1966, and two years
later the air force backed the Baath party's second, successful bid to
secure the reins of state.5
But the IQAF apparently grew dissatisfied with the government it helped to
install. Following Saddam's ascension to power, coup attempts sponsored or
supported by the air force continued, even at the height of the Iran-Iraq
War.6 More recent attempts, including a scheme in 1988 to shoot down the
presidential jetliner and a reported plot in 1989 to bomb Saddam's
reviewing stand during a parade, highlight a danger that seemed unlikely to
abate on its own.7
Besides corrupting the armed forces to the point that "political intrigue
became more important to the officer corps than military professionalism,"8
constant military meddling in Iraqi politics has led to a fundamental
characteristic of Saddam's rule. Frankly, he fears his own armed
forces--especially the IQAF--and is determined to preclude their
involvement in future coup attempts. This might explain why the Republican
Guard and the Baath party militia, both established primarily to
counterbalance the regular armed forces, are equipped with antiaircraft
weapons (French Rolands and Crotales), which are generally considered
superior to the Soviet-made weapons of the IQAF's Air Defense Command.9
Value of the IQAF
Though troubled by the IQAF's rebellious tendencies, Saddam also recognized
in air power a potentially powerful asset. Established in 1931 to subdue
dissident tribesmen, the IQAF had proven useful to the British and
pre-Baathist Iraqi governments in their quest to maintain central control
over troublesome regions and disaffected groups.10 Despite his misgivings
regarding the IQAF, Saddam relished the prospect of bombing wayward Iraqis
into submission. In fact, during three major campaigns--in 1968-69,
1974-75, and 1987-88--the IQAF was employed against Iraq's
independence-minded Kurdish minority, at times using chemical weapons to
suppress the Kurds.11 When necessary, Saddam has also subjected other
opposition groups to air attack, as demonstrated by an IQAF strike against
militant Iraqi Shiites in 1987.12 As a potential asset as well as a threat,
the IQAF warranted special treatment from Saddam's regime. He wanted an air
force that he could employ or emasculate, as he saw fit, to preserve his
rule--which meant that "most of the time it was effectively powerless."13
His efforts to that effect began even before he assumed the presidency in
1979.
Control of the IQAF
By 1973 Saddam, then deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council
for internal security, had become the de facto strongman of the Baathist
regime.14 His position as Iraq's chief "enforcer" permitted him both to
ensure his ultimate assumption of total power and to eliminate potentially
threatening elements within Iraq. Towards that end, he intensified a
long-running series of military purges. Ranking air force officers
frequently fell among the victims, including IQAF commander Hussein Hayawi,
who was unceremoniously dismissed in 1975.15
By the end of the decade, the purges had reached a fever pitch. Saddam's
"cleansing operation" of 1978 resulted in some 60 military executions and
the removal of dozens of other officers, among them the latest air force
commander.16 Hundreds more military officers were imprisoned, exiled, or
killed after Saddam became president in 1979, and heads continued to roll
at a brisk pace during and after the Iran-Iraq War.17 Even as war with the
US-led coalition approached, Saddam apparently feared his military
leadership more than the impending assault. In December 1990, he ordered
the dismissal of the defense minister and a dozen senior officers, while 16
others were put to death for allegedly "plotting against the regime."18
Weeding out a relatively few troublesome individuals failed to ensure the
long-term loyalty of the military as a whole, so Saddam engineered a
"Baathization" campaign to further cleanse the armed forces of unreliable
elements. The party restricted enrollment in the Iraqi Military Academy to
Baathists, instructed its military members to ignore the orders of suspect
non-Baathist officers, and decreed the death penalty for military personnel
who participated in any kind of non-Baathist political activity. Those
party members who were thought to be sufficiently reliable to remain in the
ranks were subjected to a steady barrage of Baathist indoctrination and
propaganda at every turn.19
Of course, lip service to Baathist ideals would not fully guarantee the
armed forces' loyalty to the regime. To further ensure their political
purity, Saddam co-opted, expanded, and strengthened Iraq's already
formidable network of internal security services. Organizations such as the
Military Intelligence Department and Baath Military Bureau screen officer
candidates, monitor the military and civilian activities of Iraqi
personnel, and conduct surveillance in each unit under the guise of
"ideological indoctrination."20 Overseeing all intelligence and internal
security operations is Party Intelligence, which also employs agents in the
military and directs the party militia.21
It is hardly a coincidence that Saddam's half brother, Sibawi Ibrahim, runs
Party Intelligence;22 his family has also found a home in the Iraqi
military. By the time Saddam became president, most senior military posts
were restricted to his relatives and fellow members of the Tikriti clan,23
but the process of patronage had begun much earlier. As early as 1969,
Saddam sponsored Hussein Hayawi's appointment as IQAF commander--not for
any outstanding military or administrative qualifications, but because
Hayawi hailed from Saddam's hometown of Tikrit and boasted solid Baathist
credentials.24 Regardless of the ties of family or clan, all
commanders--including Hayawi--were "continually reshuffled to prevent
anyone from establishing a power base within the armed forces."25
Effects on the IQAF
The IQAF's woes were aggravated when Saddam assumed full operational
control as commander in chief in 1979. By 1978 the IQAF's attack and
long-range bomber squadrons had already been placed under his personal
direction to preempt their use in a plot against his regime. To further
reduce the chance of an IQAF-supported coup, he severely restricted its
operational training.26 By the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War, the best
Iraqi attack pilots--those who would fly the initial strikes against
Iranian airfields--were experienced only in attacking defenseless Kurdish
villages and dropping dummy bombs on practice ranges.27 Prospective Iraqi
aces fared little better, for the IQAF had rehearsed only one-on-one
engagements above 5,000 feet.28 Iraq might have alleviated such
shortcomings in training by sending new pilots to its chief sponsor, the
Soviet Union. However, Saddam deliberately curtailed the number of pilots
sent abroad, fearing that "officers trained there might become
subversives."29
To further ensure his domination of the air force and to reduce pilot
independence and initiative, Saddam tightened the IQAF's Soviet-style
system of rigidly centralized command and control (C2). Although
centralized C2 is characteristic of many air forces, the system imposed on
the IQAF was far more restrictive--even "personalized."30 Saddam directed
the planning and execution of all Iraqi air operations in detail, a
responsibility that reflected his desire to maintain full authority over
every facet of military activity.31 During the Iran-Iraq War, this system
resulted in "rigidly preplanned missions that originated at high levels of
command and [took] too long of a period to plan," not least of them the
pathetic counterair "campaign" that opened the Iran-Iraq War.32
In such a negative political climate, military professionalism and
competence were bound to suffer. Iraqi commanders, eager to avoid
accusations of disloyalty or insolence, dutifully complied with Saddam's
every whim, all the while professing their loyalty to the "president
commander." To deflect suspicion, individual pilots also directed their
energies towards proving their devotion to Saddam, rather than making the
best of what little training and operational planning he had allowed
them.33
The motivation for these military "reforms" was neither ideological zeal
nor the national interest, but Saddam's self-interest. To most observers, a
program designed to render a military force virtually ineffective would
seem absurd. But to the Iraqi president, who was weighing the potential
threats against his personal rule, Iraq's own armed forces posed a greater
danger than did any other likely adversary and had to be dealt with
accordingly. In the process, Saddam's efforts created a climate in which
competence, capability, and professionalism were regularly sacrificed on
the altar of political conformity, thus breeding servile mediocrity and
reluctance to decide even the simplest matters without explicit guidance
from above. Although this result was precisely what Saddam wanted, the Gulf
war of 1991--like the Iran-Iraq War before it--plainly demonstrated that
political reliability and combat effectiveness are not necessarily
compatible.34
That Iraq won its war with Iran--insofar as survival may be equated with
winning--would seem to refute the theory that Saddam's policies had
incapacitated the IQAF. Many analysts, in fact, cite Iraqi air power as a
major factor in finally securing Iranian consent for a cease-fire.35 Such
arguments ignore the fact that air superiority will automatically fall to
one contending air force when its opponent defaults. Following the Islamic
revolution, Iran's air force had been wracked by purges and political
devastation which even eclipsed like measures that Saddam had inflicted
upon the IQAF, and by 1986 some 5,000 Iranian officers had been executed,
imprisoned, or exiled.36 Simultaneously, Iran's arsenal of American-made
aircraft and air defense weaponry steadily dwindled because of a lack of
spare parts and replacements, and between 1979 and 1983 the number of
operable Iranian combat aircraft fell from over 400 to as low as 70. Iraq,
on the other hand, had increased its stock of combat aircraft from 332 to
500 by 1986, adding advanced fighters like the MiG-25 Foxbat and the Mirage
F1 to its inventory.37
Despite its ever-increasing qualitative and quantitative superiority, the
IQAF could sustain only a limited and inconsistent campaign against Iranian
targets for most of the war. Poor training, strict control, and Saddam's
misguided strategies conspired to deny the IQAF a decisive role until
Iraq's near-catastrophic defeat at the Fao Peninsula in 1986.38 The loss of
Fao precipitated a virtual mutiny among Saddam's generals, who demanded the
freedom to prosecute the war with a minimum of political interference.39
The professional latitude subsequently granted the IQAF, though temporary,
precipitated "quantum advances" in its effectiveness.40 For the first time
in the war, the IQAF achieved some measure of its full potential and thus
was able to weaken Iran's economic infrastructure and contribute to a
string of Iraqi battlefield victories that persuaded Teheran to accept a
cease-fire.41
Once the guns fell silent in the Gulf, however, Saddam again turned a
vengeful eye inward. To punish his military commanders for their
insolence--and for the unforgivable sin of sharing credit for "his"
victory--a new round of purges reverberated through the armed forces.42 The
political-control mechanisms were also fully restored, and IQAF training
had again dropped to negligible levels by 1990.43 Soon afterwards, as
Saddam once again dragged his nation into war--this time against a capable
and well-armed foe--the deleterious effects of his policies became readily
apparent.
The IQAF's Performance
in the Gulf War
The first of 109,876 coalition sorties struck just before 0300 Baghdad time
on 17 January 1991, less than 24 hours after the United Nations' deadline
expired.44 Television footage of antiaircraft fire over Iraq belied the
fact that, despite the intensity of the coalition air assault, opposition
was generally light. Coalition commanders initially ascribed the weak
response to "a fairly high degree of tactical surprise,"45 but the pattern
persisted and eventually encompassed the entire Iraqi military.
The IQAF perhaps best epitomized this trend. In contrast to the 2,000-plus
coalition missions flown on the first day of hostilities, the IQAF sortied
only 24 combat aircraft, nine of which never returned.46 On only four days
did more than 40 Iraqi aircraft, including support types, take to the air.
Though comparable sortie rates had arguably been adequate against Iran, the
coalition's aerial blitzkrieg overwhelmed the Iraqis. After nine days of
combat, the IQAF abandoned its attempts to intercept coalition aircraft,
acknowledging the coalition's absolute mastery of the air.47
The restrictions that Saddam placed on the IQAF were most clearly
demonstrated when Iraqi pilots did fly, particularly in air-to-air combat.
The IQAF's tactics generally seemed confused, and its pilots displayed poor
situational awareness by frequently allowing coalition fighters to close to
within a few miles before taking defensive action.48 Iraqi MiG-29 pilots in
particular "appeared not to know how to fly,"49 as demonstrated by an early
engagement in which a MiG-29 pilot shot down his wingman and then flew his
own aircraft into the ground some 30 seconds later. Iraqi MiG-29 pilots
reportedly flew with the air-intercept radar button taped down to lock onto
the first aircraft detected and continually depressed the trigger to fire
their weapons as soon as they acquired a target.50 Apparently, all Iraqi
fighter pilots practiced these techniques, for when they managed to lock
onto coalition aircraft, they launched their missiles at extreme ranges and
missed every time.51
Attempts to engage coalition aircraft, however unsuccessful, were unusual;
once in the air, Iraqi pilots generally preferred to avoid direct combat.
Rather than fight the approaching coalition warplanes, most Iraqi fighters
would try to run for cover before coming within range of enemy air-to-air
missiles.52 As Royal Air Force (RAF) Group Capt Niall Irving remarked,
"Every time [RAF Tornado F3 fighters] went in for attack, the Iraqis turned
tail and put the airplanes back on the ground again."53
The strongest testimonial to the IQAF's poor performance in air combat is
the final tally: coalition pilots scored 35 kills against Iraqi MiGs,
Sukhois, and Mirages--15 in the first three days--while losing none of
their own to Iraqi aircraft.54 Incredibly, in the air-to-ground role the
IQAF fared even worse. Its air "counteroffensive" was limited to a single,
abortive Mirage F1 raid against Saudi Arabia; a planned Tu-16 chemical
attack that never even made it off the ground; and an attempted strike
against coalition shipping.55 During the entire war, only one Iraqi
surface-attack aircraft--an Exocet-laden Mirage F1--even went so far as to
launch its weapon, which fell harmlessly into the sea.56
The IQAF's fourth-rate performance suggests that it was unable, unwilling,
or not allowed to fight. The reality is a hybrid of all three hypotheses,
and each can be traced to the same root cause: Saddam's concerns about
security and associated military policies.
IQAF Unable to Fight
Saddam's emphasis on political rather than military qualifications had
promoted a standard of mediocrity within the Iraqi officer corps, whose
effectiveness was degraded by the "incompetence and lack of determination
bred by politicization" that inevitably resulted.57 Still worse were the
training restrictions Saddam had imposed to minimize the chances of an air
attack against his regime. The IQAF's training from August 1990 to January
1991 was "insufficient to maintain an acceptable level of operational
efficiency,"58 and any flying activity that did take place appeared
"aimless."59 For example, IQAF squadrons shunned joint exercises with other
air or ground units and never practiced in large formations to prepare a
coordinated air defense or concentrated attacks against coalition
formations.60
Perhaps the greatest obstacle hindering the IQAF's performance, however,
was the operational control that Saddam wielded over the armed forces. His
absolute authority at every level of military command ensured that his
orders, however ill conceived, were carried out. The IQAF was made to
suffer for his mistakes, for Saddam "had no idea what airpower is,"
remarked Gen Charles Horner, commander of the coalition air forces during
the Gulf war. "He used his own air force so poorly."61
The rigid C2 system that Saddam had forced upon the IQAF--a system that was
crippled with relative ease in the opening hours of the war--proved to be a
serious liability as well.62 Iraqi pilots, suddenly without the direction
they had been taught to depend on entirely, were forced to rely on their
own meager skills and initiative--which proved grossly inadequate.63 When
employed properly, centralized C2 can be a valuable asset, giving the
commander "positive control and a clear overview of the air battle."64
Saddam's personalized system, however, put the Iraqi armed forces in an
extremely vulnerable position, because "if any prop was knocked out, the
entire strategy could collapse, and it did."65
IQAF Unwilling to Fight
Saddam's Baathization campaign was partially successful in one respect:
given the military's political priorities and the type of applicants they
attract, many Iraqi officers have apparently come to view the armed forces
primarily as a vehicle for advancement within the Baath party. As a result,
Iraq's air force is sorely lacking in professionalism and esprit de
corps.66 Obviously, a combat death--however glorious--would end a young
Baathist pilot's career plans; the more appealing option was to withdraw
from the field and later claim a few aerial victories.67
Saddam's efforts to subjugate the IQAF had also further alienated Iraqi
officers who were already opposed or neutral to the Baath regime. The
parade of air force-initiated/executed coup attempts that have plagued
Saddam's rule is one indication of the chronic dissatisfaction within the
IQAF, a dissatisfaction that intensified as Saddam plunged Iraq into
another military crisis. During Desert Storm, disgruntled Iraqi pilots
refused to sacrifice their lives to support Saddam's ambitions and
ill-formulated strategies, despite any notions of patriotism they might
have entertained. One Iraqi defector, summarizing the view of many of his
countrymen in the armed forces, complained that Iraqis were being forced to
fight "not for the good of the country, and not to defend our own homes,
but because of the whim of just one man named Saddam."68 Consequently, many
Iraqi pilots "refused to fight for a regime they did not respect against an
enemy they did,"69 and rumors of a wartime IQAF plot to overthrow Saddam
began filtering out of Baghdad.70
When the IQAF was forced to fight, the heavy losses that resulted from
Saddam's policies further drained its pilots' combative spirit. Combat
against the coalition air forces, whose incessant training could not have
gone unnoticed, would be a daunting prospect for even a capable air force.
For an Iraqi pilot, whose skills had never been allowed to mature, the
natural reaction was to turn and run. It is tempting to attribute such
behavior to the fear supposedly generated by the coalition's vaunted
technology, but the IQAF itself possessed some very capable aircraft, such
as the MiG-29 and Mirage F1. Indeed, those aircraft were the ones most
involved in the fighting during the first few days, but they were also the
ones most often shot down.71 According to the Soviet newspaper Izvestiya,
the mounting losses had "a very dispirited [sic] effect on the
psychological state of the flight personnel of Baghdad's aviation."72 Great
Britain's commander in the Middle East, Lt Gen Sir Peter de la Billiere,
summed up the situation more succinctly. The IQAF, he said, was simply "too
frightened to fight."73
IQAF Not Allowed to Fight
Saddam had imposed severe political restrictions on the IQAF to minimize
the threat it might pose to his regime, but it is important to remember
that he also considered the IQAF a valuable asset. Therefore, as losses
mounted early in the war and it became apparent that Iraq's air force could
not mount a sufficient defense, Saddam attempted to preserve some measure
of air power as a precaution against future threats. His rationale is not
so difficult to understand, for popular and sectarian revolts in the Middle
East have often occurred in the wake of military defeat.74
Initially, Saddam sought to protect his aircraft in hardened aircraft
shelters, but in late January coalition pilots began striking those
shelters one by one, eventually destroying an estimated 141 Iraqi
aircraft.75 Saddam then sought alternate sanctuaries for his planes,
including residential areas, remote roadways, important archeological
sites, and previously bombed shelters. Those aircraft, dispersed singly and
in pairs without logistical or maintenance support, remained grounded for
the rest of the war.76 Although of no further consequence in the fighting,
aircraft so disposed did improve Saddam's chances of retaining a loyal
in-country force in the event of a coalition victory. 77
Even more telling, and much more perplexing, was the exodus of some 148
Iraqi aircraft to Iran.78 A number of interpretations have been offered to
explain this odd development, but it appears that the first aircraft were
in fact flown by defecting Iraqi pilots. This possibility might explain why
some of them ran out of fuel and crashed--indicating poor-to-nonexistent
planning and a "last ditch" mentality--and why Saddam initially demanded
the return of these aircraft.79 Shortly thereafter, however, Saddam himself
began ordering Iraqi aircraft out of the war zone to preserve "the flower
of the air force," including Iraq's entire fleet of Su-24 strike aircraft
and an assortment of Mirage F1s and MiG-29s.80 The length and scale of the
operation, which continued for some 15 days and in some cases included
entire squadrons, support this explanation, as do reports that Iraqi
fighters escorted tanker and transport aircraft to the border.81 Captured
Iraqi sailors claimed that they too had received orders "from the very top"
to seek sanctuary in Iranian waters,82 and people who have studied the
Iran-Iraq War may recall that in 1980 Saddam dispersed Iraqi aircraft to
friendly regional states to protect them from Iranian air attacks.83
Whatever the reason, the exodus ultimately stemmed from Saddam's
self-serving policies. Whether the pilots in question were Iraqis who
despaired of their inability to fight and wanted to avoid almost certain
death in the air, defectors who were simply unwilling to fight, or loyal
officers following their president's orders, the root cause remains the
same: Saddam's personal security policies drove the air force to Iran, just
as they had crippled the IQAF over Iraq and Kuwait.
Lessons Learned and
Relearned
Air power advocates hail Desert Storm's success as the vindication of
long-held beliefs first expressed by the likes of Gen William ("Billy")
Mitchell and Giulio Douhet in the 1920s. Coalition air supremacy certainly
facilitated the rapid success of the ground campaign, prompting Gen Merrill
A. McPeak, Air Force chief of staff, to proclaim that "this is the first
time in history that a field army has been defeated by airpower."84
Perhaps so, but air power is a relative quantity. Coalition forces
benefited as much from their enemy's inability and reluctance to fight as
from their own skill, preparation, and technical prowess. In fact, by the
end of the war, more IQAF aircraft had been intentionally rendered hors de
combat by the Iraqi high command than had been destroyed by the
coalition.85 Had the IQAF been a competent, capable, and motivated force,
it might have wrought considerable havoc on coalition forces, but Saddam's
political shackles relegated any such scenario to the realm of fantasy.
By neutralizing his own air force, Saddam committed a blunder of a
magnitude rarely seen in military history; hence, Iraq's case may prove to
be unique. The US and coalition air forces must therefore look to the Gulf
war as a reminder that each threat is different, governed by considerations
that fall outside bean counting and the stereotypes we tend to formulate.
Only in this way can we avoid the mistake of planning for the last war, an
all-too-common temptation for victorious forces. A future enemy may not
make the same mistakes, and the methods employed so successfully against
Iraq under such favorable conditions may not work as well against a less
shortsighted foe.
For Saddam Hussein and the IQAF, two lessons of the Gulf war should stand
out above all others. First, war is the province of professional soldiers.
The Vietnam War, Saddam believed, taught that Americans would never again
tolerate a prolonged or costly conflict. He ignored a lesson that American
commanders had learned all too well: the chief executive's office is a poor
place from which to plan and direct a battle. Thus, while President George
Bush vowed that American forces would never again be committed to battle
"with one hand tied behind their back,"86 President Saddam sent his forces
into the fray virtually bound, gagged, deaf, dumb, and blind.
Second, just having an air force isn't enough. On paper, the IQAF looked
formidable indeed--both in terms of personnel and modern equipment. That
qualitative and quantitative advantage might have been sufficient to
prevent an Iranian victory in the 1980s, but against the coalition air
forces the IQAF could offer little more than token resistance. A painfully
obvious lesson of twentieth-century warfare, proven time and again, is that
modern weapons are a waste of resources without operators who are willing
and able to use them. Saddam serenely defied the lessons of history, and
Iraq paid the price for his ignorance. Therefore, if the Gulf war was truly
won in the air, the outcome was decided long before the first shot was
fired, for Saddam Hussein did more damage to the Iraqi air force than did
2,000 coalition sorties a day.
Notes
1. Norman Friedman, Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait (Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 1991), 353-56. The figure of 41 counts only
fixed-wing losses, including aircraft shot down, aircraft that crashed on
return due to battle damage, and aircraft that successfully returned to
base despite battle damage but could not be repaired. Aircraft lost during
the war are as follows:
USAF (14): 1 AC-130H, 5 A-10s, 1 EF-111A, 1 F-4G, 2 F-15Es, 4 F-16s
US Navy (8): 5 A-6Es, 1 F-14A, 2 F/A-18Cs
US Marine Corps (7): 4 AV-8Bs, 3 OV-10Bs
Royal Air Force (6): 6 Tornado GR Mk 1s
Royal Saudi Air Force (3): 2 F-5Es, 1 Panavia Tornado IDS
Kuwaiti Air Force (1): 1 A-4KU
France (1): 1 Jaguar A
Italy (1): 1 Panavia Tornado IDS
Different sources vary regarding the number of coalition aircraft lost
during the war. Of those I have seen, this figure represents the "worst
case."
2. According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, in the
summer of 1990 the IQAF boasted some 40,000 personnel and 689 combat
aircraft. These included 16 bombers (eight Tu-22s, four Tu-16s, four
Chinese H-6Ds), 360 fighter/ground-attack aircraft (30 Chinese J-6s, 90
MiG-23s, 64 Mirage F1-EQ5s, 30 Su-7s, 70 Su-20s, 16 Su-24s, 60 Su-25s), 275
air-to-air fighters (40 Chinese J-7s, 150 MiG-21s, 25 MiG-25s, 30 Mirage
F1-EQs, 30 MiG-29s), 12 reconnaissance aircraft (five MiG-21s, seven
MiG-25s), two airborne early warning aircraft (Il-76 "Adnans"), and a
number of combat-capable trainers. Iraqi foreign minister Ahmad Hussein
Khuddayer al-Sammarai later admitted that Iraq actually had 24 Su-24 Fencer
strike aircraft. The International Institute of Strategic Studies, The
Military Balance, 1990-91 (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1990),
106; and James Bruce, "Iraq Lists `148 Aircraft in Iran'," Jane's Defence
Weekly, 27 April 1991, 684.
3. The Committee against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq
(CARDRI), Saddam's Iraq: Revolution or Reaction?, 2d ed. (London: Zed
Books, Ltd., 1989), 206.
4. Ronald E. Bergquist, The Role of Air Power in the Iran-Iraq War (Maxwell
AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1988), 22.
5. The Baathist coup of 1968 actually occurred in two stages. On 17 July
the Baath party and military seized power in a joint takeover. The
Baathists, dissatisfied with the power-sharing arrangements that followed,
seized full control two weeks later. Edgar O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt:
1961-1970 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1973), 140; CARDRI, 212; and Phebe
Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985),
210.
6. Edgar O'Ballance, The Gulf War (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers,
1988), 43.
7. Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography
(New York: Free Press, 1991), 207; Louise Lief, "Even Three Sets of Spies
Aren't Enough," US News & World Report, 4 February 1991, 39; and Efraim
Karsh, "Regional Implications of the Iran-Iraq War," in The Middle East
Military Balance 1988-1989, ed. Shlomo Gazit and Zeev Eytan (Boulder,
Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), 105.
8. Bergquist, 21.
9. Samir al-Khalil, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 31; Karsh and Rautsi, 190; Lief, 39; and
Friedman, 25.
10. Bergquist, 19.
11. O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt, 151, 155-56; al-Khalil, 23; CARDRI,
197; and Karsh and Rautsi, 169.
12. Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1988), 102.
13. Friedman, 23.
14. Karsh and Rautsi, 60
15. al-Khalil, 294.
16. Karsh and Rautsi, 88.
17. Ibid., 118, 185.
18. "Command Purged," Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 January 1991, 10.
19. Chubin and Tripp, 19; al-Khalil, 26-27; Karsh and Rautsi, 88; and
CARDRI, 216-17.
20. CARDRI, 216-17; Lief, 39; and Chubin and Tripp, 19, 115.
21. Andrew Rathmell, "Iraqi Intelligence and Security Services,"
International Defense Review, May 1991, 393-94.
22. Lief, 39; and Karsh and Rautsi, 180-81. Before Sibawi--another of
Saddam's half brothers--Barzan al-Tikriti directed Party Intelligence.
23. CARDRI, 216, 222; and Karsh and Rautsi, 190.
24. Marr, 213.
25. CARDRI, 222.
26. Anthony H. Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: The First Round,"
Armed Forces Journal International, April 1982, 38, 42; and Jasjit Singh,
"Military Dimension," in Iran-Iraq War (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House,
1985), 95.
27. Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War,
vol. 2, The Iran-Iraq War (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), 83.
28. Cordesman, "Lessons," 38.
29. Cordesman and Wagner, 44.
30. Yezid Sayigh, "Why Iraq Could Not Win," Middle East International, 8
March 1991, 6.
31. Karsh and Rautsi, 155; al-Khalil, 276; and Friedman, 247.
32. Cordesman and Wagner, 458.
33. Christine Moss Helms, "The Iraqi Dilemma: Political Objectives versus
Military Strategy," American-Arab Affairs, Summer 1983, 79.
34. Chubin and Tripp, 116.
35. See, for example, Efraim Karsh, "Military Lessons of the Iran-Iraq
War," Orbis, Spring 1989, 209-23; and Aharon Levran and Zeev Eytan,
"Strategic Air Attacks in the Iran-Iraq War: The Gulf Campaign," in The
Middle East Military Balance, 1987-1988, ed. Shlomo Gazit (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1988).
36. David Segal, "The Air War in the Persian Gulf," Air University Review,
March-April 1986, 53.
37. Cordesman and Wagner, 162, 466.
38. For specific examples, see Cordesman and Wagner, 70, 81, 481;
Cordesman, "Lessons," 47; Karsh and Rautsi, 155, 170-71; al-Khalil, 276;
Bergquist, 69; and Chubin and Tripp, 61.
39. Karsh and Rautsi, 192.
40. Frederick W. Axelgard, "Iraq and the War with Iran," Current History,
February 1987, 90.
41. David Segal, "The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis," Foreign Affairs,
Summer 1988, 957; Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War and Western
Security, 1984-87: Strategic Implications and Policy Options (New York:
Jane's Publishing, Inc., 1987), 114; Levran and Eytan, 238-40; and Karsh,
"Military Lessons," 217.
42. Karsh and Rautsi, 185; and Lief, 39.
43. Bill Sweetman and Anthony Robinson, "The Mechanics of Interdiction and
Airfield Attack," International Defense Review, May 1991, 472; "Desert
Storm: The First Phase," World Airpower Journal, Spring 1991, 33; and Karsh
and Rautsi, 193.
44. Thomas B. Allen, F. Clinton Berry, and Norman Polmar, CNN: War in the
Gulf (Atlanta: Turner Publishing, Inc., 1991), 142; and Barbara Starr et
al., "Success from the Air," Jane's Defence Weekly, 6 April 1991, 531.
45. John D. Morrocco, "Allies Attack Iraqi Targets; Scuds Strike Israeli
Cities," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 21 January 1991, 20.
46. Steve Morse, ed., Gulf Air War Debrief (London: Aerospace Publishing,
1991), 64, 226.
47. Starr et al., 531.
48. Murray Hammick, "Aerial Views: USAF Air-to-Air Combat," International
Defense Review, May 1991, 744; and Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, "Allied Air
Supremacy Keeps Air-to-Air Engagements Limited," Aviation Week & Space
Technology, 18 February 1991, 46.
49. Hammick, 744.
50. "Iraqi MiG-29 Shot Down Partner Aircraft, Then Crashed in Early Desert
Storm Mission," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 18 February 1991, 63; and
Friedman, 357.
51. Hammick, 744.
52. Ibid.
53. "United Kingdom Takes Key Role in Attacks against Iraqi Targets,"
Aviation Week & Space Technology, 18 February 1991, 48.
54. Morse, 226.
55. Friedman, 191, 357; and Morse, 53, 80. According to Friedman, the two
Mirage F1s that were shot down on 24 January--reportedly carrying Exocet
missiles to strike coalition shipping--were in fact on a reconnaissance
mission.
56. John Roberts, "Gulf War: The Air Strategy," Air Forces International,
no. 3 (1991): 23.
57. James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay, From Shield to Storm (New York:
William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1991), 75.
58. Sweetman and Robinson, 472.
59. David A. Fulghum, "US Deploys U-2, TR-1 Spy Aircraft over Gulf in
Intelligence Missions," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3 September 1990,
31.
60. David A. Fulghum, "Analysis Indicates Iraqi Air Force Weak on
Innovation, CAS Role," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 17 September 1990,
113. This pattern is consistent with the IQAF's performance in the
Iran-Iraq War before 1986. In its initial raids against Teheran, for
example, the IQAF employed only three aircraft per attack, while ground and
air operations appeared to be planned in "virtual isolation from each
other." Nick Cook, "Iran-Iraq: The Air War," International Defense Review,
November 1984, 1605; and Bergquist, 47.
61. Richard Mackenzie, "A Conversation with Chuck Horner," Air Force
Magazine, June 1991, 60.
62. John D. Morrocco, "Allies Shift Air Attacks to Break Ground Units,"
Aviation Week & Space Technology, 28 January 1991, 20-21; idem, "War Will
Reshape Doctrine, but Lessons Are Limited," Aviation Week & Space
Technology, 22 April 1991, 43; and Starr et al., 530.
63. Starr et al., 530.
64. Ibid.
65. Sayigh, 6.
66. Charles Q. Cutshaw, "Lessons from the Gulf--A Time for Caution," Jane's
Intelligence Review, July 1991, 318; and Dunnigan and Bay, 75.
67. By 11 February, in fact, Baghdad claimed to have shot down 371
coalition aircraft and missiles. "The Losses of Both Sides Multiply,"
Izvestiya, 12 February 1991, 5, in "JPRS [Joint Publication Research
Service] Report: Soviet Press Coverage of the Gulf War," Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS), JPRS-UMA-91-008, 18 March 1991, 10.
68. B. Ivanov, "The Persian Gulf: Negotiations Proceed as Explosions
Rumble," Izvestiya, 16 February 1991, 4, in "JPRS Report: Soviet Press
Coverage of the Gulf War," FBIS, JPRS-UMA-91-008, 18 March 1991, 19.
69. Roberts, 21.
70. News of the plot coincided with reports from the Soviet news agency
Interfax that the commanders of the IQAF and air defense forces had been
executed "for failing to perform their duties with sufficient zeal and
determination." The alleged executions have never been verified, but at
approximately that time Gen Mezahim Saib replaced Lt Gen Hamid Shaaben al
Khazraji as commander of the IQAF. A connection between the two events is
possible but difficult to confirm. Tom Masland, "Seeking Haven in Iran,"
Newsweek, 11 February 1991, 32; and Morse, 8.
71. Of the 15 Iraqi aircraft lost in combat from 17 to 19 January 1991, six
were Mirage F1s and five were MiG-29s. The remainder included two
Chinese-built F-7s (MiG-21s) and two MiG-25s. Morse, 226.
72. D. Veliky and B. Ivanov, "Persian Gulf: Allied Supremacy in the Air and
at Sea," Izvestiya, 4 February 1991, 1, 4, in "JPRS Report: Soviet Press
Coverage of the Gulf War," FBIS, JPRS-UMA-91-008, 18 March 1991, 6.
73. John Boatman et al., "Bombing Campaign to Continue," Jane's Defence
Weekly, 2 February 1991, 135.
74. Following Iran's invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan in 1983, for example,
Iraqi Kurds revolted against Baghdad in a rebellion that was not suppressed
until 1988. Karsh and Rautsi, 168.
75. The IQAF had some 594 hardened aircraft shelters, 395 of which were hit
by coalition aircraft during the war. "A Friend in Need," The Economist, 2
February 1991, 19; Dunnigan and Bay, 148; and Allen, Berry, and Polmar,
126.
76. Helen Dewar et al., "Ground War Not Imminent, Bush Says; Allies to Rely
on Air Power `For a While'," Washington Post, 12 February 1991, A13; and
Friedman, 161, 164.
77. John Boatman et al., "Saddam `May Be Sitting It Out'," Jane's Defence
Weekly, 2 February 1991, 138.
78. According to an official Iraqi statement, those aircraft included 115
combat aircraft, among them 44 Su-20/22 Fitters, 24 Mirage F1s, 24 Su-24
Fencers, nine MiG-23 Floggers, seven Su-25 Frogfoots, and four MiG-29
Fulcrums. Bruce, 684.
79. Gen Michael Dugan, USAF, Retired, "The Air War," US News & World
Report, 11 February 1991, 30; and "A Friend in Need," 19.
80. David Hoffman and R. Jeffrey Smith, "Iraq Sheltering More Than 80 Jets
at Sites in Iran, US Officials Say," Washington Post, 29 January 1991, A13;
and Bruce, 684.
81. Morse, 84-120 passim; and "A Friend in Need," 19.
82. Veliky and Ivanov, 6; and "Evasions `Ordered'," Jane's Defence Weekly,
9 February 1991, 168.
83. Those sanctuaries included Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, North
Yemen, and the United Arab Emirates. Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The
Ceaseless Quest for Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1985), 366; O'Ballance, The Gulf War, 32; and Cordesman, "Lessons," 47.
84. "Airpower: Desert Shield/Desert Storm," US Air Force Internal
Information Directorate Backgrounder, 1991, 7.
85. Iraq began the war with about 689 combat aircraft. Confirmed Iraqi
fixed-wing losses include 35 aircraft shot down by coalition fighters, 81
destroyed in the open on the ground, and 12 captured intact in southern
Iraq. An estimated 141 were also destroyed in hardened aircraft shelters,
for a total of 269. One hundred and fifteen IQAF aircraft flew to Iran, and
Saddam grounded the rest. In fact, coalition airborne warning and control
system (AWACS) aircraft detected not a single IQAF sortie after 12
February. "Desert Storm: Gulf Victory," World Airpower Journal, Summer
1991, 20-21, 27; and Allen, Berry, and Polmar, 126.
86. W. H. Parks, "Rules of Engagement: No More Vietnams," US Naval
Institute Proceedings, March 1991, 27.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contributor
1st Lt Matthew M. Hurley (USAFA; MA, University of Washington) is an
intelligence applications officer with the 436th Airlift Wing (Air Mobility
Command) at Dover AFB, Delaware. Lieutenant Hurley was the Ira C. Eaker
Award winner for the Winter 1989 issue of the Airpower Journal.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the
author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air
University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S.
Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air
University.
~~~~~~~~~~~~
A<>E<>R
The only real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new landscapes
but in having new eyes. -Marcel Proust
----------
: From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
: To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
: Subject: Re: [CTRL] Wag the Dog (Again)? (fwd.)
: Date: Wednesday, December 16, 1998 3:16 PM
:
: -Caveat Lector-
:
: I am stationed at Maxwell AFB and have heard time and time again that
: Saddam got a lot of his training at our schools here.
: M.A.
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spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRL
gives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers;
be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credeence to Holocaust denial and
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