Re: Amex supports CARNIVORE enabled Anonymity System

2000-09-18 Thread George

A Yahoo wrote:
%What a load of shit.   If you check that URL the next
%thing you see the following release:
%
%http://www.privada.net/news/releases/2717.html
%#
%#Privada's Technology Protects Users' Privacy, Only
%#Monitors Those Who Abuse It
%#[snip]
%
%Obviously AMEX  Privada don't have a clue as to the
%history of privacy and privacy tools...
%
%What about civil john doe complaints?
%What about Church of $cientology and Penet.fi?
%What about the entire key escrow debate?
%What about the entire clipper debate?
%
%If anyone really things that 'identity escrow' enabled
%privacy products are what the market is looking for,
%they are seriously clueless.
%
%This is obviously snake oil.

No, the emphasis is on what consumers in general want.
And it delivers.

Those wishing to push the edge of free speech aren't
going to be satisfied, but the new services meet the
needs of regular consumers/people accessing the Internet.

That market dwarfs what ZKS/Anonymizer will ever get.

Even the Anonymizer shut down its free version due to abuse.

And Yahoo has cooperated with civil subpeonas regarding
stock touting / company disparagement.

Yet you use it. It's free and does what you need.
AmEx is offering their services for free for cardholders.

ZKS isn't exactly mixmaster WWW surfing, at some point
there will be traceability, given the necessary court order.

Albeit ZKS seems to be the best at what it does.

Too bad the cardholders aren't setting up for you to choose
your privacy provider, like cable is being pressured to
allow choice of ISP.




Re: Amex supports CARNIVORE enabled Anonymity System

2000-09-18 Thread R. A. Hettinga

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At 1:59 PM -0400 on 9/18/00, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:


 A Yahoo wrote [about AMEX's "anonymous" credit card technology]:
 % What a load of shit.

 That market dwarfs what ZKS/Anonymizer will ever get.

Again, boys and girls, barring unforeseen events, like repeals in the
laws of physics, and/or human behavior, :-), the *only* thing that
matters in financial operations is transaction cost, and certainly *not*
financial privacy.


The *only* way to get ubiquitous financial anonymity is for a technology,
like internet bearer transaction protocols (blind signatures, MicroMint,
small signed coins, whatever), to be *cheaper* than the alternative,
which, for the moment, is internet-executed and proprietary
network-settled book entry transactions: credit cards under SSL, cleared
by VISA and MasterCard, settled by FedWire and/or SWIFT, modulo the odd
ACH "check" transaction, bla, bla, bla...


Book-entry transactions can *not* be anonymous, folks, because, of
course, you couldn't send someone to *jail* if they lie about a
book-entry, otherwise, right?

I mean, if everyone could lie about a given book-entry transaction, and
get away with it consistently, *without* going to jail, could you imagine
that *any* book-entry transaction of that type would clear, much less
settle, ever again? I thought not...

Unlike internet bearer financial cryptography protocols, the
non-repudiation "technology" of book-entry settlement is non-existent.
Unless you count ballistic technology, anyway. :-).


More to the point, a given inherently-private technology, like Chaum's
blind signatures for instance, must be *waaay* cheaper, on a risk
adjusted basis, ceteris paribus, whatever, than a public one, like
SSL-encrypted book-entries.

Like a thousand times cheaper, say.

Which is, oddly enough, about the cost differential right now between
book-entry transactions (like stock and bond trades going through DTC or
CREST, or credit cards, or checks) and physical delivery of paper/metal
bearer instruments (like "my Brinks to your Cage" delivery versus
payment, or dollar bills, or coins or stamps).


So, until people actually *do* get bearer financial cryptography
protocols onto the net, and cheap enough (and believe me, people are
working on it :-)), it is important to remember that *any* book-entry
transaction is, almost by definition, a "public" transaction and not a
private one.  A "public" transaction "guaranteed" to be "fair" by a
*government*, at the point of a gun.

So, you shouldn't be surprised at all when, horrors, there's *no*
financial privacy in the "mainstream" markets. None in the least.
Moreover, that diminishing financial privacy will, um, increase, as
Moore's law increases that cost-differential between automated
book-entry, and its only current extant competition, which is, at the
moment, *not* internet bearer transactions, but, in fact, *paper* bearer
transactions. Paper bearer transactions which, if you'll notice, *nobody*
wants to do anymore. :-).

Contrawise, you should assume that almost *anyone* who offers you a
"private" book-entry transaction is, for lack of a better word, lying,
frankly -- okay, "marketing" :-) -- *especially* if they're promising to
do it over the net(1).

Hence the "safeguards" in just about everyone's "privacy" products, which
amount to no privacy at all.

Cheers,
RAH


(1) Okay, I *might* :-) excuse Mondex from this rule, I suppose, but only
because the smart-cards themselves are physically swappable, and thus at
the physical, card-to-card level, anyway, are bearer instruments, but I
would only say so under a regime in which those cards *contents*, the
balances therein, are exchangeable for, or better, denominated, in some
*other* internet bearer instrument like Chaumian cash, which may, I'm
afraid, defeat the economics of Mondex altogether. Obviously, Doug Barnes
has pointed this out more than once or twice here and elsewhere.

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-- 
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R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'




Re: Amex supports CARNIVORE enabled Anonymity System

2000-09-18 Thread Kerry L. Bonin

(1) Okay, I *might* :-) excuse Mondex from this rule, I suppose, but only
because the smart-cards themselves are physically swappable, and thus at
the physical, card-to-card level, anyway, are bearer instruments, but I
would only say so under a regime in which those cards *contents*, the
balances therein, are exchangeable for, or better, denominated, in some
*other* internet bearer instrument like Chaumian cash, which may, I'm
afraid, defeat the economics of Mondex altogether. Obviously, Doug Barnes
has pointed this out more than once or twice here and elsewhere.

The indirect problem with Mondex is that while the card-to-card level
transactions are theoretically less traceable than a typical online
validation, they (the cards themselves) still store at least 10 previous
transaction records including full card id.  Additionally, every programmer
of Mondex interface devices and terminals (including myself, at one time)
gets ordered by at least one involved party (the bank, the terminal
manufacturer, the terminal financier, ect.) to include full audit trail
generation from card-chip and any downloaded card-card transaction
histories for uploading as part of nightly settlement.  (Which is why I
stopped supporting Mondex...)  This defeats the otherwise good anonymity
possible with Mondex.





Re: Amex supports CARNIVORE enabled Anonymity System

2000-09-18 Thread R. A. Hettinga

At 9:39 PM -0400 on 9/18/00, R. A. Hettinga wrote:


 Someday, of course, you won't need the fiat bit, but pure commodities
 aren't the end-state. You probably need a mix of stuff, including financial
 proxies like debt and equity indices, and so on. But the core problem is
 measuring inflation. Fortunately, :-), Paul Harrison and I have this giant
 rant in the can about non-state bearer synthetic numeraires, using things
 like digital bearer warehouse receipts for the hard stuff, a proxy for the
 CPI...

By the way, the above isn't necessarily the end state, either.

A lot of people, probably me among them, subscribe to the theory advanced
by Eugene Fama (Efficient Market Hypothesis) and Fisher Black
(Black-Scholes option pricing formula) that if switching out of the
numeraire is cheap enough (insert Moore's Law here), it's probably better
to keep and price transactions in *appreciating* assets instead of assets
which don't earn a return.

Cheers,
RAH
-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'