Re: Dishonest Tor relay math question - tor-talk is to lazy
On 15/10/2021 18:03, coderman wrote: ‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐ On Friday, October 15, 2021 12:09 AM, PrivacyArms wrote: To clarify my question: Is there an anonymous network (GPA) for secure/private messaging better than Tor? privacy loves company, so the unpleasant answer to your question is: no, there's nothing remotely as popular as Tor that is also a GPA resistant mix network. ... remember when people ran mixminion? :P [ https://github.com/mixminion/mixminion ] Did they? I thought it never got off the ground. Maybe some alpha version? People certainly ran Mixmaster, Len Sassaman was a close friend. But when Nick Matthewson left the Mixminion development team for Tor in 2004 (and Andrei Serjantov, who with George Danezis were the main Mixminion theory guys, went in to the quant business) the rest of the PET crowd either followed into Tor or left, and there was nobody to develop Mixminion. :( Liked the story :) Peter Fairbrother
Re: Dishonest Tor relay math question - tor-talk is to lazy
On 15/10/2021 19:24, Punk-BatSoup-Stasi 2.0 wrote: Is that so? Cause if A and B are connected through a 'high speed' fully padded link, they can replace the 'chaff' with their data at will and with very 'low latency'... And no anonymity whatsoever. Peter Fairbrother
Re: UFO: Inside the BlackVault, FOIA POSSE, MKULTRA, ARTICHOKE, BLUEBIRD
> what hardware would you include in the $250 kit? Depends on what probes from the above list or others you are interested to observe and can get for $250. The market can pack a few cheap probes into a toy, or pay a lot for one good probe. Magnetometer or electric charge sensor could be fun, because who is watching those at all today. Vibrations to see that sort of activity. Same for an electronic "nose" to sample and plot whatever alien rat stench wafts your way. Have fun :)
Re: Dishonest Tor relay math question - tor-talk is to lazy
On 10/15/21, Peter Fairbrother wrote: > perhaps I should have said low-latency browsing. Defining what the end user application is, is required if you want to design a net to carry it. If the subject is about tor's feature as currently implemented, the application scope is therefore narrow, one of only moving TCP streams across the internet between client and server. (Users can move UDP and even raw IP over top of that with OnionCat, but that's no different, and is covered in other threads.) Nothing about a base layer of chaff prevents "low-latency browsing" as an application. > You might perhaps do a reasonably low latency anonymous twitter for > instance but not low-latency anonymous browsing. Hardly anyone has developed, released, run, and iterated over any chaffed or other designs than tor for that browsing use case, so that probably cannot yet be said. Tor has vacuumed up, propagandized, sucked the funds from, steered via proceedings, and effectively killed all the competitive research and development in the space for last 20 years. That must end, ignore and stop worshipping Tor, go compete. > It can matter if traffic is aggregated and an adversary can only see the > aggregated traffic. It can matter if the adversary uses timing > information to correlate the input and output traffic to a network > (which he almost inevitably does). Self contradicted, so then don't say they can only see the aggregate, define the cases being for the suggested answers. An entire class of TA is solely based on matching up i/o across all nodes to find matches. Certain things don't matter to such matching engines. > Not if it was a randomly-variable one year delay they couldn't. If your app is "browsing", or doing any other TCP stream, yes they can, such streams have other identifiable traffic characteristics than just arrival and inter packet timing, such as total size of transfer, TCP ramps, backoffs, etc. Tor's hidden services are especially sitting ducks. > Or if you took the timing data away. Already explained reclocking as being useful. > If it was like that, Tor could (and probably would) add a little bit of > packet size restriction, and that would probably be enough to make it TA > resistant. No, TCP streams, their bulk data, etc... endpoints still characterizable. > It's not TA-resistant because the design requirement for low latency > buggered the design. You could add lots of covertraffic but it wouldn't > help much - the lack of aggregation kills it as far as TA goes. No, a network running a base of chaff already serves the purpose that these "aggregation" functions tries to do... ie: such as networks with voids keep scheming up ways to avoid their own voids such as by steering clients to internal aggregating gravity wells, msg buffer stores, etc based upon bandwidth weight consensus or other mechanisms. > And the reason for the lack of aggregation (and no fixed packet sizes) > is because they wanted low latency. ATM networks were both low-latency, and fixed packet sizes, and millions of happy users browsed the web over them, a prior art proven and in use well before and after tor's birth. So Tor's design assumptions and direction may well have been buggered by something else... Opensource projects are as subject to rat infestation and influence as are miracle closed source commercial $nakeoil crypto hardware from fabulously and errantly trusted US and Euro locations and GovCorps, then just look at Debian, the internet's history of corrupt "standards" bodies, TOP SECRET nudges yet curiously missing the non-beneficial ones that are applied, etc... > That is not the only way to go, though it was famously used in eg the > US-USSR hotline. It is expensive. No, the hotline was made up of leased circuits, they paid the same leased line rate to the telcos whether they were sending wheat, chaff, or nothing at all over them. And they could pass precisely no more than the line rate of the circuit that they provisioned allowed, regardless of what they were sending. > And a simple base layer wastes bandwidth. Explained many times that it doesn't, chaff gets out of the way and uses the wheat as chaff replacement while wheat is present. And if an edge user stuck on stupid limited byte based billing wants to opt out of the constant chaff base, they can, they just don't get its benefits and have to fall back on whatever other defenses the network provides. > Techniques like > randomly-variable base rates, traffic aggregation, end-user sharing > (which among other things blurs the edges of the network), directed > covertraffic (where the covertraffic looks "guilty"), route splitting, > latency jittering and so on are available to defeat TA at lesser > bandwidth cost. Except the techniques don't necessarily work when your use case is TCP data streams... "browsing", file transfer, etc... all have patterns of matching i/o characteristics between endpoints and/or nodes. End-users are still end-users a
Glad tidings
ALEX the great, Gladstein is a superhuman rights activist Igniting the biggest and most effective peaceful protest of all time Planting a seed of liberty at the root of exploitation and tyranny. Establishing complete, utter, total worldwide domination - but not over governments or ideology. Over tyranny and isolation and ignorance. This is my Glad declaration of humanitarian principles - "to report the news without fear or favor'. I promise to be a force for good in this world, fighting injustice, crushing intolerance, battling inhumanity, striking a blow for freedom. Think Mises - think Rothbard - think Alex - be Glad
Burying the Satoshi departure lede
Correlation is not causation but Gavin Andresen previously served as technical lead developer for the Bitcoin project, and was even credited as Nakamoto’s successor. On April 27, 2011, Andresen publically claimed to be preparing to talk Bitcoin at an emerging technologies conference at the CIA headquarters. A few months after Andresen’s CIA visit, he appeared on a Bitcoin podcast to discuss its development. There, Andresen was quickly asked to reveal the last time he’d been contacted by Nakamoto. “Um, I haven’t had email from [Nakamoto] in a couple of months, actually,” Andresen replied. “The last email I sent him, I actually told him I was going to talk at the CIA. So it’s possible that… that may have had something to do with their deciding [to leave].”
No danger from moral hazard at Bitcoin Magazine
Nakamoto’s Genesis statement was a challenge to the moral hazard created by the Bank of England, which was functioning as a lender of last resort for British companies that had followed reckless policies and were now in danger of going bankrupt. . . " Or it was a news headline from the Times, a corpse-media outlet beat-up into a crypto-fascist headline by the unconscionable scoundrel Alex Gladstein at his favorite corpse-media outlet.
Risible weasel-words from bitcoin zine
"...To underline the primary importance of scarcity and predictable monetary issuance in the making of digital cash, Nakamoto released Bitcoin not after a government surveillance scandal, but in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis and ensuing money printing experiments of 2007 and 2008. .." Who needs money printing experiments when you have e-money capable of Big God divisibility? Bitcoin is divisible up to eight decimal points. 1011 The smallest unit, equal to 0.0001 bitcoin, is called a Satoshi after the pseudonymous developer behind the cryptocurrency. ... Though the U.S. dollar can be divided into cents, or 1/100 of $1, one Satoshi is just 1/100,000,000 of 1 BTC.
Why Wikileaks sold all its crypto
"... digital rights advocacy groups have largely not recognized nor celebrated the role that proof of work and an unchanging monetary policy can play in protecting human rights. . . " Alex Gladstein
Libertarian support for the police
https://crookedtimber.org/2013/06/25/the-hayek-pinochet-connection-a-second-reply-to-my-critics/ The Hayek-Pinochet Connection https://mises.org/library/are-libertarians-anarchists Mises worked for the Pinochet of the early 1930's - Dolfuss in Austria
NAZI Nick Szabo needs killing ( My 2000$ )
Szabo had certainly aimed for it with bit gold, and others inspired by Austrian economists like Fredrich Hayek and Murray Rothbard had long discussed getting the creation of money out of government hands. .." How do you reconcile libertarianism with support of the police? I’ll admit — my original question was not phrased so diplomatically. It went more along the lines of, OMG what is wrong with you? Do you have any idea how fascist you sound on Twitter?? Nick Szabo https://elaineou.com/2020/06/07/how-do-you-reconcile-libertarianism-with-support-of-the-police/
Using a peer-to-peer network to check for bullshit narratives
“Bitcoin’s solution is to use a peer-to-peer network to check for double-spending… The result is a distributed system with no single point of failure. Users hold the crypto keys to their own money and transact with each other, with the help of the P2P network to check for double-spending...” Cryptoanarchy's solution is to use a peer-to-peer network to check for double-talking… The result is a distributed system with no single point of failure. Users hold the freely distributed crypto keys to their own free e-money and transact freely with each other, with the help of the P2P network to check for double-dealing.
Alex Gladstein needs killing ( My 200$ )
In 1999, Back finished his Ph.D. in distributed systems and began work in Canada for a company called Zero Knowledge Systems. There, he helped build the Freedom Network, a tool that allowed individuals to browse the web privately. Back and his colleagues used what are known as “zero-knowledge proofs” (based on Chaum’s blind signatures) to encrypt communications over this network, and sold access to the service. Back, as it turns out, was also ahead of his time on this key innovation. In 2002, computer scientists improved on Zero Knowledge System’s model by taking a U.S. government private web browsing project called “onion routing” open source. They called it the Tor Network, and it inspired the age of the virtual-private networks (VPNs). It remains the gold standard for private web browsing today…" OR In 1995, Bell finished his essay in distributed systems and began work in Cypherpunks for a company called Soft Drill Apster Systems. There, he helped build the Freedom Network, a tool that allowed individuals to predate the web publically. Bell and his colleagues used what are known as “open-source propaganda-of-the-deed” (based on anarchists signature, direct-action) to value-add communications over this network, and increase access to the service. Bell, as it turns out, was also ahead of his time on this key innovation. In 2003, pentagon paid computer scientists improved on this Networked anarchists System’s model by taking a U.S. government private web bounty project called “Future Maps” open source. They called it the PAM Network, and it inspired the age of the public bounty hunter. It remains the gold standard for anti-social crime minimization today.
Bitcoin Magazine lies about cypherpunks
"... Some cypherpunks were crypto-anarchists — deeply skeptical of the modern democratic state. Others believed it was possible to reform democracies to preserve individual rights. No matter what side they took, many considered digital cash to be the Holy Grail of the cypherpunk movement…" OR Some cypherpunks acted as revolutionary anarchists diametrically opposed to any and all nation-states, even the best and most popular of them . Their credo is " Cypherpunks are all about privacy for the poor and transparency for the powerful ". Cryptoanarchism, via global networked revolution, is the goal of this movement. Bitcoin magazine lies-by-omission about the three list c-punks that were jailed 1995 - 2002
Re: Encrypted "WebMail" Hardly Secure, Consider Standalone and Unix [re: OpenPGP.js Features]
On 10/15/21, Steven Schear wrote: > Or perhaps GrapheneOS. That's one of those ever spawning and dying wannabe secure Android OS lineants. And those only begin to get safer when they strip the google suite out of the stock Android. Ok yes use them if you need to run Android-only apps, but Android and its apps are generally as abysmal for privacy and security as WinMac. And a lot of its apps won't run without g-suite social-suite sdk libs or unlocked permissions. Yet if it's a phone / phablet / web-only form factor you want, Linux and even nearly BSD kernels will run on some of the ARM64 models now, and you can run Android emulator on amd64. Android perhaps a bit moot re the subject, since where are any particularly useful/featured email+gpg clients for it... the small form factor exacts a mandatory toll there. Which is an opportunity for any coders who can utilize it...
Play anarchist games for a few years and real anarchists start showing up.
Play anarchist games for a few years and real anarchists start showing up. https://bitcoinmagazine.com/.image/c_limit%2Ccs_srgb%2Cq_auto:good%2Cw_526/MTg0NTM0NjU1NTM2NDczMjA4/eric-hughes-email-announcing-the-list.webp
Back your favorite blockchain and profit
Both BTC and ETH are chasing the ATH, which was only established earlier in the current bull run. When BTC runs, so do the Alts. https://help.augur.net/ On Augur, It doesn't matter where you are, how much you want to trade, or what event you want to trade on as long as someone is willing to take the other side of your trade. This guide is intended to help users; traders, market creators, and reporters; navigate the application. For immediate questions or assistance, join the Augur Discord chat. Augur Pro is an Ethereum-based prediction market plaform that enables user-created markets, which are resolved by REP holders. Access help docs for Augur Pro here. Augur Turbo is a layer two (Polygon) based prediction market that features daily markets in sports, crypto, and other categories
Beginning of the Leninist cypherpunk revolution
Beginning of the Leninist cypherpunk revolution https://bitcoinmagazine.com/culture/bitcoin-adam-back-and-digital-cash …and the Stalinist cult of Big Dog/God
Re: Encrypted "WebMail" Hardly Secure, Consider Standalone and Unix [re: OpenPGP.js Features]
Or perhaps GrapheneOS. On Sat, Oct 9, 2021, 10:32 PM grarpamp wrote: > > https://opensource.com/article/21/10/openpgpjs > > Not your code provisioning, not your keys, not your privacy. > > All these online web crypto email services... > you're trusting an untrustable third party web services, > which exist and grovel to survive under license incorporation > taxation permission and at leisure of untrustable government, > to deliver unsigned unaudited crypto libs on the fly over the > web into your browser for execution... that's fatal, and > gets routinely exploited by authorities, snoops, courts, > companies, crackers, admins, etc. > > If too incompetent and dumbed down from living > a life of WinMac garbage to learn and use something > like gnupg locally to safely cut and paste, at least consider > using something like Mozilla Thunderbird as a mail client > which includes gpg as a standalone local email crypto tool. > > WinMac is an online security spyveillance profiling phonehome > datawhoring exploit nightmare and it just keeps getting worse. > > People really should start learning and using a unix... > They're well documented, run great on common hardware, > run web, office, mail, comms, emulators, games, cryptos, > database, GUI, etc... and are free so you can donate > to support development. > > https://www.freebsd.org/ > https://www.openbsd.org/ > > https://archlinux.org/ > https://linuxfromscratch.org/ > https://www.kernel.org/ > https://www.debian.org/ >
Get your FIL here
The collaboration enables Flow users to mint NFTs, leverage InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) content addressing and store tokens in the decentralized storage hosted by Filecoin. https://cointelegraph.com/news/flow-integrates-filecoin-storage-services-to-make-nfts-more-decentralized According to Filecoin, IPFS content addressing is a solution to location addressing, which retrieves online information from specific locations on the web, such as from behind URLs. Filecoin asserts that this method has “obvious downsides” as the data relies on the centralized entities who own the locations and can “control the content.” “In content-based addressing, content is no longer retrieved from single locations on the web. Rather, content is retrieved from any participating nodes on the IPFS network that have the content you’re requesting,” Filecoin outlined.
Those who trade Freecoins for Shit-coin deserve neither freedom or stability.
Those who trade *essential* Freecoins for Stable-shit-coin deserve - and will get - neither freedom or stability. https://decrypt.co/83560/cftc-fines-tether-bitfinex-us-dollar-reserves
Re: Releasing the KrakenSDR!
Might be great for passive radar. On Fri, Oct 15, 2021, 6:58 AM grarpamp wrote: > Did someone's wallet just get lighter :) > > It's rx-only though... cpunks still need a way to communicate > freely worldwide without using GovCorp infrastructure, passing > beyond borders of jurisdictions and continents... via encrypted RF. > Using both shorter HF P2P hops, but also reaching out as far > as possible using whatever antenna you can manage to raise > or lay down... > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extremely_low_frequency > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spark-gap_transmitter > > Jim may volunteer for the new quantum radio division... > https://duckduckgo.com/?q="quantum+radio"; >
Re: Dishonest Tor relay math question - tor-talk is to lazy
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 ‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐ On Friday, October 15, 2021 12:09 AM, PrivacyArms wrote: > To clarify my question: Is there an anonymous network (GPA) > for secure/private messaging better than Tor? privacy loves company, so the unpleasant answer to your question is: no, there's nothing remotely as popular as Tor that is also a GPA resistant mix network. ... remember when people ran mixminion? :P [ https://github.com/mixminion/mixminion ] > Regarding the other question: What can criminals can do > to stay anonymous which is outside the law (hacking/stealing > computers/wifi), more? one time, a retired person noticed someone connected to their WiFi that was not a client name nor MAC ID recognized. curious, they broke out the directional antenna and packet sniffer to find out the signal was coming from the next door neighbor. odd! being retired, and knowing that they neighbor, they went next door to ask if they were having network trouble, and how they managed to leach the WPA passphrase? alas, the neighbor was none the wiser! their computer was wired into the router. yes, it had a WiFi card, but Ethernet was easier. the neighbor not so technically savvy after all. the retired one taks a look at the desktop. behold! a trojan process. the retired one worked in tech, and knew how to use a disassembler. but it wasn't even that hard - it was a compiled script, and the source was sitting in memory. - --- next the retired person geolocated the command and control host. it was in europe, another country away, but our retired friend also has friends in many countries. time for a visit! arriving on a flight to brussels, a travel agency office was observed at the C&C end. they lease a dedicated line for internet, it was setup a decade ago by the owner's son. they don't know how it works, but it costs 160 euros a month. "mind if i take a look at your router?" the retired one asks? ' sure thing.' a static forward is provisioned between the public port and a private internal address. checking the DHCP/IP assignments (there is a static one assigned to a mystery client) the retired one finds a client associated over wireless, another hop: this one a coffee shop across the street. - --- in the cofeee shop our retired one followed the signal analyzer to its natural conclusion : a USB powered SoC under a table with an antenna in the direction from whence just travelled! but where does it go? a dual radio SoC, not unsimilar to a pineapple, the local side was leeching coffee house WiFi for upstream. *sigh* time to tear apart the sdcard ... [ break for refreshments ] "damnit! a wireguard tunnel to a bullet proof hosting server!" our retired person is again compelled to travel. this time a friend of a friend who runs the hosting service for bitcoin and monero. sheer luck we happened to have a contact! calling in a favor, our retired adventurer found the customer. there is no contact or registrar info, of course. but this IP address looked familiar! - --- back at the coffee shop, with a new MAC ID to hunt for, a woman in the rear corner of the store sticks out as signal source. "excuse me, are you a hacker?", our retired friend asks. 'yes.. i saw you looking for something. i thought it might be me', she says with a sly smile. 'how did you find me?' [ our retired subject explains the process of recusion ... after many minutes, reaching the terminus in this tale. ] 'ah, that explain it.' she says satisfied. 'my threat model was law enforcement, not batshit crazy!' THE END. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iNUEAREKAH0WIQRBwSuMMH1+IZiqV4FlqEfnwrk4DAUCYWm0FF8UgAAuAChp c3N1ZXItZnByQG5vdGF0aW9ucy5vcGVucGdwLmZpZnRoaG9yc2VtYW4ubmV0NDFD MTJCOEMzMDdEN0UyMTk4QUE1NzgxNjVBODQ3RTdDMkI5MzgwQwAKCRBlqEfnwrk4 DCSEAP9pB8KNe7Ai4wJqIaObCbvThGP9efsbDVv5X+dDTs1YIgD+J/hBJICF+zhy uWrcEy4ToP28cd3cYZlMegBiOZaeCs4= =7dJX -END PGP SIGNATURE-
Freud’s crackpot theories were of no scientific worth
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/mind-guest-blog/9-things-you-probably-didn-t-know-about-sigmund-freud/ Surely no decent honest c-punk would ever cite this Quack approvingly!
Re: Dishonest Tor relay math question - tor-talk is to lazy
On 15/10/2021 11:07, grarpamp wrote: Anonymity is hard, and low-latency anonymity is almost impossible. People keep throwing this "low latency" term around as if it's some kind of distinction, a proven generality, lesser capable to anonymity, than any other particular "latency" level. This is bogus. There is a smigdin of truth in that, but there's probably more in the simple use of the term low-latency, or perhaps I should have said low-latency browsing. You might perhaps do a reasonably low latency anonymous twitter for instance, but not low-latency anonymous browsing. Latency is just a timing measure, whether your traffic events, sessions, and characteristics occur over milliseconds, or days, traffic analysis doesn't give a shit. It can matter if traffic is aggregated and an adversary can only see the aggregated traffic. It can matter if the adversary uses timing information to correlate the input and output traffic to a network (which he almost inevitably does). You could drop a 1 year store and forward packet buffer delay on every interface in the entire tor cloud and the NSA could still analyze it. Not if it was a randomly-variable one year delay they couldn't. Or if you took the timing data away. If it was like that, Tor could (and probably would) add a little bit of packet size restriction, and that would probably be enough to make it TA resistant. That's because tor's design is hardly TA resistant, not because it's "low-latency". It's not TA-resistant because the design requirement for low latency buggered the design. You could add lots of covertraffic but it wouldn't help much - the lack of aggregation kills it as far as TA goes. And the reason for the lack of aggregation (and no fixed packet sizes) is because they wanted low latency. They also use it as apology and to avoid doing dynamic base of chaff, because they are application layer7 people who don't understand how raw packet networks work at <=L3 and how to use them to run a base layer of dynamically yielding chaff to ride your wheat over on demand. I think you are being overly optimistic/simplistic here. That is not the only way to go, though it was famously used in eg the US-USSR hotline. It is expensive. And a simple base layer wastes bandwidth. Techniques like randomly-variable base rates, traffic aggregation, end-user sharing (which among other things blurs the edges of the network), directed covertraffic (where the covertraffic looks "guilty"), route splitting, latency jittering and so on are available to defeat TA at lesser bandwidth cost. Fixed sizes of cells, etc. Yeah, that's almost a requirement. Certainly makes life easier. "Low latency" really just defines the point at which users switch from thinking "Hey this is fast enough to surf the web (or whatever their use case)", to "This shit's too damn slow to do anything, I'm out." Which is about 4 seconds for web browsing today (a few studies have been published), .. though in the days of acoustic modems it was longer .. Anonymous remailers could work They're a bit harder since a "message" gets injected into a proper random mix/cloud/buffer, and is not an e2e stream tacked up across it. Yet without chaff on every link, message size controls, etc... they can still fall to TA the same way tor does. Iirc Mixmaster has message size control. It doesn't have or need specific per-link chaff, but it does have chaff - nobody knows/knew how much, it was added by individual users. Per-link chaff might help against some injected traffic attacks, but it is not strictly necessary. but they are pretty much moribund now. Still useful if you want to use "E-Mail" addresses over "E-Mail" networks, and should continue to be developed and deployed for that legacy purpose. But for the general purpose of "messaging" they are largely now rightly replaced by dedicated p2p message network apps that don't have to compromise themselves to "E-Mail"s old protocol restrictions and trust model. I don't know of any strict anonymity p2p apps. Peter Fairbrother
ADAM BACK linked to murder in Malta
https://decrypt.co/82371/former-malta-government-official-becomes-whistleblower-in-nft-form
Pervasive use of cryptography across society must be anarchist
The alternative is Marxist - a nightmare https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.07450
Re: FUCK Wikileaks
Hey PR, Earlier you referred to me as 'kreepy', so I'm stepping back on the question asking a lot. I want to let you know that I'm interested in learning where you come from and figuring out how to make things right. On 10/11/21, professor rat wrote: > RE - 'information' from 'CHRISTIAN SCIENTISTS'. > > This should interest every c-punk paying even the most minimal amount of > attention. > > Despite having tens of millions ( crypto donations profits ) and access to > the worlds best lawyers in one of the most libel-suit friendly jurisdictions > outside of frikkin' SINGAPORE, Wikileaks never sued. > > Bob Hawke sued papers that lied about him in Au ( based on British Law ) and > won. Elton John sued a paper in England and won. > > If Mange was innocent why on earth wouldn't he sue low-credibility Xtian > scum from the corpse-media? Or anyone that repeated them in the Anglosphere > > He can't be as fucking stupid as Gramps, Semich and Batshit, can he? > > Wikileaks are worse than criminals - they are mistake-prone Nazbol MORONS >
Re: UFO: Inside the BlackVault, FOIA POSSE, MKULTRA, ARTICHOKE, BLUEBIRD
>> The response here should be to set up _public_ monitoring so we can see > > It's now possible for people to crowd design an opensource > rooftop mounted all spectrum monitoring sensor rig... > 180 degree hemisphere video cameras in visible and infrared, > audio, RF antennas, active panel radar, magnetometer, etc... > design a range of rigs buildable for $250-$2500 depending > on sensitivity, sensors included, etc. > Feed it down inside to a CPU doing gnuradio processing, > video audio detection motion software, recording, alerting, etc. > Space the nodes every 1-5-10-25-50-100 km as can be, > link them all across the internet to get wide area detection > and tracking coverage. what hardware would you include in the $250 kit?
Re: Dishonest Tor relay math question - tor-talk is to lazy
> Anonymity is hard, and low-latency anonymity is almost impossible. People keep throwing this "low latency" term around as if it's some kind of distinction, a proven generality, lesser capable to anonymity, than any other particular "latency" level. This is bogus. Latency is just a timing measure, whether your traffic events, sessions, and characteristics occur over milliseconds, or days, traffic analysis doesn't give a shit. You could drop a 1 year store and forward packet buffer delay on every interface in the entire tor cloud and the NSA could still analyze it. That's because tor's design is hardly TA resistant, not because it's "low-latency". They also use it as apology and to avoid doing dynamic base of chaff, because they are application layer7 people who don't understand how raw packet networks work at <=L3 and how to use them to run a base layer of dynamically yielding chaff to ride your wheat over on demand. Fixed sizes of cells, etc. "Low latency" really just defines the point at which users switch from thinking "Hey this is fast enough to surf the web (or whatever their use case)", to "This shit's too damn slow to do anything, I'm out." > Anonymous remailers could work They're a bit harder since a "message" gets injected into a proper random mix/cloud/buffer, and is not an e2e stream tacked up across it. Yet without chaff on every link, message size controls, etc... they can still fall to TA the same way tor does. > but they are pretty much moribund now. Still useful if you want to use "E-Mail" addresses over "E-Mail" networks, and should continue to be developed and deployed for that legacy purpose. But for the general purpose of "messaging" they are largely now rightly replaced by dedicated p2p message network apps that don't have to compromise themselves to "E-Mail"s old protocol restrictions and trust model.
Batshit crazy in Texas
NBCNews · 13h NEW: A school administrator in Southlake, Texas, advised teachers last week that if they have a book about the Holocaust in their classroom, they should also have a book with an "opposing" perspective.
Bitcoin dot con
https://www.bitcoin.com Come to Jesus, scam Needless to say " Bitcoin Cash " is to Big Dog what Roger Ver is to Jesus Fucking Christ.
Re: Dishonest Tor relay math question - tor-talk is to lazy
On 15/10/2021 01:09, PrivacyArms wrote: To clarify my question: Is there an anonymous network (GPA) for secure/private messaging better than Tor? Regarding the other question: What can criminals can do to stay anonymous which is outside the law (hacking/stealing computers/wifi), more? Anonymity is hard, and low-latency anonymity is almost impossible. A brief history: In 1981 David Chaum described mix networks (including onion routing). This was only possible because of the then-recent invention of public key cryptography. This idea was then instantiated as the Cypherpunks anonymous remailer, then the Mixmaster remailer. A further development, Mixminion, was in the works in the early to mid noughties, but was derailed when its chief coder, Nick Matthewson, decided to work on TOR instead. Anonymous remailers could work, but they are pretty much moribund now. The same year, in "True Names", Vernor Vinge described a "feed", whereby short encrypted messages were aggregated and broadcast. Chaum described a similar idea, incorporating dummy traffic, and other plans involving private information retrieval. [2] None of these have come to fruition. So no, there are no "strict" anonymous networks in existence. By "strict" I mean mathematically provable, without requiring trusting another person. Nor are there any effective widely-deployed anonymous networks which only require trusting any one out of many people. There are several less-than-strict techniques, which may or may not work. You could "use other people's computers" by chaining through a few web proxies. You could internet cafes, hack into wifi (perhaps using a box connected via an IR link) or relay through a chain of pwned boxen. Sneaky people might well think of some more, but I wouldn't put them in an email. :) Secure messaging, as opposed to anonymous messaging, where confidentiality rather than anonymity is the requirement, is of course possible - there are several apps, or you could almost write your own (don't do it, I said "almost"!). Just make sure it is really end=to=end and there are NO dedicated [1] servers involved anywhere - there is no cryptographic need for a dedicated server in a secure messaging network. If there is one then you are trusting it to do something; and remember the 6th law: "Only those you trust can betray you." Peter Fairbrother [1] by dedicated I mean you have to use a particular server. If you have to use any one of several servers it might be OK if you (can) run your own server. Or it might not. No server is safer] [2] Chaum's 1981 MS thesis, "Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, and Digital Pseudonyms" contains almost all the types of strict anonymous communication ever invented, worth a read. http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/courses/cs395t_fall04/chaum81.pdf Vernor Vinge's True Names is of course required reading: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjqu4Pr7MvzAhVTglwKHRBJBfEQFnoECAIQAQ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.scotswolf.com%2FTRUENAMES.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0u3GgYC_zdrgFmYrmP2DAA
All those rapists - and their jailhouse lawyers
https://www.buzzfeed.com/stephenlaconte/celebrities-who-dont-deserve-fame-reddit "The royal family. I just don’t understand why anyone gives a fuck about them."
Re: LAN cables can be sniffed to reveal network traffic with a $30 setup, says researcher • The Register
On 10/15/21, jim bell wrote: > https://www.theregister.com/AMP/2021/10/14/lantenna_ethernet_cable_rf_emissions/ Cables are designed to control crosstalk and other undesirable effects, meet FCC, cut costs, lower power, etc... not to fight the TEMPEST.
LAN cables can be sniffed to reveal network traffic with a $30 setup, says researcher • The Register
https://www.theregister.com/AMP/2021/10/14/lantenna_ethernet_cable_rf_emissions/
