Re: Dishonest Tor relay math question - tor-talk is to lazy
>> Thing is, I don't trust Claudia to get it right (we have a history... ). history? ‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐ On Saturday, October 16, 2021 1:34 PM, Peter Fairbrother wrote: > On 16/10/2021 10:12, Stefan Claas wrote: > > > On Sat, Oct 16, 2021 at 10:24 AM Peter Fairbrother pe...@tsto.co.uk wrote: > > > > > > Though there's no such thing as 100% anonymity, security, etc... > > > > there are certainly different comparative magnitudes of it available > > > > today, and higher ones are probably quite achievable with some > > > > work on new alternative models. > > > > > > Examples? > > > > https://nymtech.net/ > > Regards > > Stefan > > I had a look at the whitepaper - Claudia has outdone herself in > describing a system which could maybe work - but, and I quote, "The > specific algorithms and implementation details of each part of the > system will be fleshed out in separate documents." > > There is no proof, or even enough details, to show that it will or even > could work. It's all sweeping statements and claims, backed up by - nothing. > > Thing is, I don't trust Claudia to get it right (we have a history... ). > > The loopix part looks interesting, at first glance. Though "a > measure of sender and receiver unobservability" is not exactly reassuring.. > > Peter Fairbrother publickey - privacyarms@protonmail.com - 0x6ECBFF11.asc Description: application/pgp-keys signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature
Re: Dishonest Tor relay math question - tor-talk is to lazy
1) Is there a better way for anonymous communication than Tor? 2) Is there a global adversary resistant mixnet? 3) Someone mentioned the fact, that criminals have better ways of hiding than Tor? What methods do you had in mind? ‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐ On Tuesday, October 12, 2021 2:50 AM, PrivacyArms wrote: > 1. Is there a better way for anonymous communication than Tor? > 2. Is there a global adversary resistant mixnet? > 3. Someone mentioned the fact, that criminals have better ways of hiding > than Tor? What methods do you had in mind? > > ‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐ > On Monday, October 11, 2021 10:43 AM, grarpamp grarp...@gmail.com wrote: > > > > > Tor uses some kind of limited padding, > > > > Tor Project Inc added netflow padding after someone > > started posting on netflow, general TA, and Sybil problems. > > Then TPI censored, banned, and booted them out after > > they kept publicly posting about TA and other insidious and > > inconvenient problems such as Sybil. Now with Sybil, like before > > with padding, they never credit mention the poster's work, and try > > to phrase claim that TPI was the natural origin self impetus source > > to do the pad and Sybil just at those moments in time, when > > they had decades to do that since they knew the weaknesses > > since decades... No, they were just getting exposed is why... lol. > > Just like their netflow padding doesn't do much, > > neither does their current Sybil proposal. > > Some interest in real security surely exists, > > but it definitely gets distracted by $ponsors > > who pay for other things, all to half of said money > > for decades has been from Government, which many > > define as a problematic source of conflictive influencing. > > > > > Afaik all backbone routers can be configured for packet or per-flow > > > > At high line rates it takes serious HW to do full spyveillance > > capture or flows, sampled and aggregated flows are common > > for ISP service when those aren't needed. > > > > > can get packet logs whenever they want them. > > > > They can "get" them, but there's no need to go external > > for that when they can just troll the output of their own > > private TOP-SECRET FVEY taps that feed into their > > global internet buffers at Bluffdale and elsewhere. > > Same for what they get from their Corp-is-aware > > feeds obtained under different "authorities". > > > > > Against the elephant? Tor's padding is totally useless. > > > > Not only the elephants anymore. > > Netflow traditionally a quaint thing used by ISP's and LEA's > > to match up endpoints, subpoenas, abuse, bots, traffic > > stats, etc... it can work to some percent to follow some > > tor traffic cases, but it isn't a generalized form of TA. > > Today really anyone with a brain and some code > > can begin to general TA characterize streams of bytes > > counting and timing over various size windows, and > > hunt for that pattern where it also appeared on their > > other boxes. > > Good luck trying to make a factor of defense improvement > > against general TA without trying a fulltime enforced > > and reclocked base layer of dynamic chaff. > > Submit papers for acceptance into tor alternatives :) > > "Tor Stinks -- NSA" publickey - privacyarms@protonmail.com - 0x6ECBFF11.asc Description: application/pgp-keys signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature
Re: Dishonest Tor relay math question - tor-talk is to lazy
What I want to know is the percentage risk of x malicious nodes to deanonymize
a user by controlling the full circuit.
‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐
On Friday, October 8, 2021 7:35 AM, grarpamp wrote:
> > How can I calculate how much impact X honest Tor relays have?
> > Is it better to calculate with bandwidth consumed (250Gbps), despite the
> > number of relays (~7000)?
> > Basically, I want to get the mathematical equation to this statement:
> > I run X Tor relays at Y Mb/s each and by doing so I secure Z % of the Tor
> > network!
> > Starting thoughts:
> >
> > - Each “normal” route has three nodes involved: Guard, Middle, Exit
> > - I am aware of guard pinning and vanguard protection for middle relay
> > pinning
> >
> > - Maybe it is easier to assume an infinite usage time of the network to
> > eliminate guard and vanguard pinning
> >
> > - I guess the best is to assume a scenario with 1%, 5%, 10%, etc.
> > dishonest
> > relays
> >
> >
> > My take on this:
> > Tor has approximately 7000 relays.
> > If I consider a number of 5% malicious relays, this would be: 350
> > My calculation:
> > (1/(7000/350))(1/(7000/349))(1/(7000/348))
> > = 0.000123931
> > = 0.0123931%
>
> > 1. Is my approach correct?
>
> Generically, assuming you're only running the
> exit use case, not the HS onion case.
>
> You'll probably want to consider some adjustments...
>
> - There's not 7k exits, only ~1k, but it's a ratio term
> so then it only matters if you're expecting different
> densities of bad/good across each of the guard/mid/exit roles.
>
> - There's not 7k guards, only ... .
> - tor only uses family, /nn cidr blocks, etc once in a circuit...
> effect is not 7k nodes, but G groups made up of 1-N nodes.
> Read torspec, scrape consensus, determine the resultant
> number G that tor actually gives itself to choose from.
>
> - Some nodes are down, sleeping, busy, filtered, etc.
> - Not all exits serve the clearnet ports you want.
> - Circuits expire, nodes rotate, etc.
>
> > 2. Not every relay has the same bandwidth. How could I change the
> > calculation to make it more realistic?
> >
>
> Read torspec, scrape consensus, determine how tor is
> allocating clients across its bandwidth gravity well, etc.
> See also...
> https://metrics.torproject.org/
>
> > 3. How can I add the effect of guard fixation?
> > 4. How can I include the effect of mid-node fixation by the vanguard?
>
> You didn't really define exactly what attack ("dishonesty")
> you're trying to model, so these settings could render you
> anywhere from safe, to having no effect and thus still being
> subject to the exploit.
>
> See also...
> https://anonbib.freehaven.net/
> https://git.torproject.org/torspec/
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Dishonest Tor relay math question - tor-talk is to lazy
Dear Cypherpunks community, I came across a post on the Whonix forum recently. Since I am also interested in this question I copied it here: https://forums.whonix.org/t/math-behind-honest-tor-nodes/12464 http://forums.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion/t/math-behind-honest-tor-nodes/12464 The question (edited): How can I calculate how much impact X honest Tor relays have? Is it better to calculate with bandwidth consumed (250Gbps), despite the number of relays (~7000)? Basically, I want to get the mathematical equation to this statement: I run X Tor relays at Y Mb/s each and by doing so I secure Z % of the Tor network! Starting thoughts: - Each “normal” route has three nodes involved: Guard, Middle, Exit - I am aware of guard pinning and vanguard protection for middle relay pinning - Maybe it is easier to assume an infinite usage time of the network to eliminate guard and vanguard pinning - I guess the best is to assume a scenario with 1%, 5%, 10%, etc. dishonest relays My take on this: Tor has approximately 7000 relays. If I consider a number of 5% malicious relays, this would be: 350 My calculation: (1/(7000/350))*(1/(7000/349))*(1/(7000/348)) = 0.000123931 = 0.0123931% 1) Is my approach correct? 2) Not every relay has the same bandwidth. How could I change the calculation to make it more realistic? 3) How can I add the effect of guard fixation? 4) How can I include the effect of mid-node fixation by the vanguard? I would love to hear your thoughts about it and a concrete math equation would be amazing. publickey - privacyarms@protonmail.com - 0x6ECBFF11.asc Description: application/pgp-keys signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature
