RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
At 10:07 PM 4/19/01 -0500, Aimee Farr wrote: >I think this is a dumb idea. (Again, I mentioned I thought it was BS.) Your >word choice will still be consistent through the translator. Although if you >threw in stylistic randomness...I dunno. Big damn difference between pie and >cake. The idea is that the Babelfish abstracts a meaning and then projects it back into some language. It may well be the case that is too mechanical to be of use for stylistic-anonymization. And as I just posted, you can't use a public server. >*bablefish* -> to Spanish and back. Screwy. Even typos. > >I think that this is a dumb idea (once again I mentioned I I thought that it >was BS.) Its option of the word still will be constant through the >translator. Although if you sent in dunno stylistic of the randomness... I. >Great damn difference between empanada and the cake. > >~Aimee Perhaps the next generation of anonymizing tools will perform linguistic abstraction in a way more sympathetic to those nuances. 'Gisting' is the formal term.But you knew that.
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
Choate said: > A simple double translation through a babblefish will totaly screw your > stats. Not to mention your meaning: What! Lost your mittens, You naughty kittens, Then you shall have no pie. Meow, meow, Then you shall have no pie. *bablefish* -> Italian and back That what! It has lost yours mittens, you kittens naughty, then you will not eat cake. Meow, the meow, then you will not eat cake. I think this is a dumb idea. (Again, I mentioned I thought it was BS.) Your word choice will still be consistent through the translator. Although if you threw in stylistic randomness...I dunno. Big damn difference between pie and cake. *bablefish* -> to Spanish and back. Screwy. Even typos. I think that this is a dumb idea (once again I mentioned I I thought that it was BS.) Its option of the word still will be constant through the translator. Although if you sent in dunno stylistic of the randomness... I. Great damn difference between empanada and the cake. ~Aimee
Re: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
Ray Dillinger writes: > Give me a few dozen writing samples from each of a > hundred known > people, and another writing sample a hundred words > long from one > of them under a pseudonym, and I can tell you to > a 90% probability > which of the hundred known people wrote it. Ray you bring up a very interesting point. Does anyone know of a source for public domain, or open source, writing analysis software that will do just that ? Perhaps using such wares for testing purposes one can craft software to make subtle grammar or spelling or usage alterations in text based communications in order to defeat this sort of analysis. E.G. you've got a remailer or portal of some kind that accepts plain text input, and according to a set of rules makes shifts, sentence length, punctuation usage, spelling usage, and so on, to alter the distinctive signatures associated with the writing patterns of the person in question. THEN afterwards this is piped into an encryption module or just transmitted piecemeal at random timings in order to defeat traffic analysis.
Re: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
On Wed, 18 Apr 2001, Sunder wrote: >Ray Dillinger wrote: >> >> On Sun, 15 Apr 2001, Declan McCullagh wrote: >> >> And your possible motive for spreading the word about his reputation, >> which ties you to an illicit transaction, is what exactly? > >Wouldn't your own reputation be blinded by a nym anyway? Nyms are not as hard as most of you seem to assume. Each instance of a nym's use is more data for traffic analysis, and writing styles contain "signature" usages that can identify particular writers with a high degree of probability. If the probability is ever deemed high enough that a search warrant can issue, and your nym is involved in all kinds of illicit deals which are verifiable through the reputation system, then you have a problem because the lions are likely to come take your favorite toys away, and may even put you through a "trial" like the one that just happened to Mr. Bell. Hmm. A worthwhile hack; I should develop a program that uses the known techniques of identifying a writer by his/her style, and then create "styles" to conform to for each nym. If I can fool my program, then there's at least a prayer of fooling other people's. Bear
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
-- At 02:06 PM 4/15/2001 -0700, Ray Dillinger wrote: >Mafia Bosses don't buy information from someone when they don't know >where that someone lives. It's the exact same enforceability of >contracts problem that other parts of society uses lawyers to deal >with. Legbreakers or cops, basically they have the same job with >regard to contract enforcement. There has to be a hook where someone >who does a ripoff can be punished, or else there is no deal. Untrue. Most people operating an illegal busines much prefer to have arrangements that do not require the threat of breaking people's arms and legs. An old school tie much reduces the cost of doing business. You do not want to know where someone lives, you want to know if he can be trusted. Indeed, if you know where someone lives, he probably knows where you live. Far better if both know the other can be trusted, and neither knows where the other lives. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG 88pjABj2EWfGPnrfWn8iaMIb+s7svtPTNRQxo8m6 4NqKVPIlwFuXqTAR6wLecxQhkb0GnZI/B/bgxX3Id - We have the right to defend ourselves and our property, because of the kind of animals that we are. True law derives from this right, not from the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state. http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ James A. Donald
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
-- >>Widespread black markets, for drugs, betting, etc., suggest otherwise. At 02:06 AM 4/16/2001 +0300, Sampo Syreeni wrote: >That doesn't really kill the argumetn. The key word is enforceable. Black >markets do it directly by guns, While personal violence is an essential part of operating in a black market, nonetheless participants tend to think in terms of "people like me", and people who are trash. If a deal goes bad with someone who is trash, one breaks some part of him, or arrange to have it broken. If a deal goes bad with someone like oneself, one has a talk with him. If the talk is unsatisfactory, one lets it be known he is not really one of us. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG q/Tee57K9yJNi1c0GkFisR7E9AFdjtOf5cARkkla 4PSTolvgMyi8+KVJr0ow2/YV2LBuqHJH5F6zPODAG - We have the right to defend ourselves and our property, because of the kind of animals that we are. True law derives from this right, not from the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state. http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ James A. Donald
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
-- At 02:11 PM 4/15/2001 -0700, Ray Dillinger wrote: >Tim; > >One thing to consider is the role of "credit histories", or >virtually any other identity-linked information, in a milieu >where the people have access to the necessary techniques and >programs to do those deals. > >You sell Alice a credit history on Bob; Bob takes a new >identity; Alice is back to square one. Why would Alice >buy credit histories? By this argument, obviously the reputational mechanism used by EBay cannot work, since it is based on freely available pseudonyms, not true names. Yet EBay is the only internet business that has been continually and heavily profitable, and its prime asset is its reputational database. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG m7GXB73nK8M1WjN8TNNa5/4yVWul271Iv4GgNzeH 46f77cWW4rMfcYkTR7iJXl63DB2kiO1QqgqD9Gdc1 - We have the right to defend ourselves and our property, because of the kind of animals that we are. True law derives from this right, not from the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state. http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ James A. Donald
Re: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
-- At 05:29 PM 4/15/2001 -0400, Declan McCullagh wrote: > If I know a person's meatspace identity and > ties with religious/social/family groups, I'm far more likely to lend > them money then if they're using a throwaway hushmail account. > > If Bob is doing the latter, he won't get credit in the first place. If > he's using a known meatspace identity, I can do the research and > likely succeed. But people on EBay do use nyms. Naturally they prefer to do business with a nym that has a long history of honestly completing deals on EBay. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG bozoFF8pZ3WC8eVjUTzYPNmML3V5P4XS5IwNl8ce 4iisrxL8cQKwFyCFBpvG7wV86Wzmx6LENVNNQIW/b - We have the right to defend ourselves and our property, because of the kind of animals that we are. True law derives from this right, not from the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state. http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ James A. Donald
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
-- At 02:06 PM 4/15/2001 -0700, Ray Dillinger wrote: > This is true, but look at the mechanisms for enforcing contracts > that they *do* use. Most of them are not compatible with anonymity, > and only a few are compatible with pseudonymity. A common mechanism that they do use in Australia is an old school tie. Such a mechanism can be readily adapted to anonymity. For example one could have anonymous credentials proving that this person is a member of a certain group, credentials that the group can use to identify him as a specific member of the group, but which outsiders cannot use to determine which specific member of the group he is. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG 47YeAg9+TArpQDzL5n7RWzi2JSPVpZzn0gZb7A85 4mjN0t0N0+mSUv3M166tnHiT/IUk9mF3TfmBWJ+s8 - We have the right to defend ourselves and our property, because of the kind of animals that we are. True law derives from this right, not from the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state. http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ James A. Donald
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
At 09:24 PM 4/17/01 -0500, Aimee Farr wrote: >No, I don't claim that meatspace identity is necessary, and I have read some >"smart contract" theory. (I was dealing with the diplomatic and licensure >peculiarities of my hypothetical, and agency theory, but that is a >discussion for elsewhere.) > >Nevertheless, my hypothetical principals say that reputational system >accountability and escrow concepts alone are highly inadequate in the >proposed transactional environment. "Implementation detail" Because of the unique injuries which >could result, in certain circumstances any adequate remedy necessarily >involves unmasking the "bad infomerchant." Additionally, within this >"unique" transactional environment, participants must know that should >circumstances warrant, there is accountability beyond the reputational >system. >In regard to your Rabbi polycentric governance, I guess you could allow for Reputational librarians have themselves reputations. You trust the UL, you trust your , right? Maybe you trust your particular brand of and not the slight variant that your neighbor subscribes to. Your choice. > >C-4. > Yes, we are normally benign, but we can be cutting if set off correctly.
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
David Honig said: > At 05:24 PM 4/15/01 -0500, Aimee Farr wrote: > >Bear said: > >> >Nobody in conventional > >> >business is going to want to do a deal with someone when they can't > >> >create a legally enforceable contract. > > > >Actually, I'm past this. I don't need it. > > > >My problem is the value of the information within an information > mercantile > >system - which involves policing the polycentric merchant community. > >Otherwise, such a system would become subject to "information > policymaking, > >information peacekeeping / diplomacy - massive misinformation." > Just basic > >abuse considerations, but with extreme ramifications in the > context of the > >"Intel agora" hypothetical I posed. > > > You've identified one of several attacks on a distributed > reputation system. > The next step is to identify solutions to these problems. > Then iterate, until you're proposing really hard attacks on the part of > your adversary. At which point you've learned something. > > Remembering that disinfo, psyops, nym-unmasking, and other forms of social > engineering > are available options. If you can tie the meat to the T-shaped > crucifix and > inject what you want, you win. > > That's the game. But you knew that. Hm. > If you wish to claim that enforcable contracts require meatspace identity, > claim that, and listen to the discussion. No, I don't claim that meatspace identity is necessary, and I have read some "smart contract" theory. (I was dealing with the diplomatic and licensure peculiarities of my hypothetical, and agency theory, but that is a discussion for elsewhere.) Nevertheless, my hypothetical principals say that reputational system accountability and escrow concepts alone are highly inadequate in the proposed transactional environment. Because of the unique injuries which could result, in certain circumstances any adequate remedy necessarily involves unmasking the "bad infomerchant." Additionally, within this "unique" transactional environment, participants must know that should circumstances warrant, there is accountability beyond the reputational system. In regard to your Rabbi polycentric governance, I guess you could allow for unmasking by the use of an anonymous (possibly elected by lot) tribunal, allowing for the extreme situation where a participating info merchant could be unmasked. Of course, identity could not be knowable/vulnerable to discovery at any other time, or in any other circumstance. Nevermind how you would do it, what do you call it? (I realize most of you would call it stupid.) Identity escrow? > Don't play with us unless you're sincere. Ok. > "Like sodium and water", C-4. ~Aimee
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
At 04:07 PM 4/15/01 -0700, Ray Dillinger wrote: >On Sun, 15 Apr 2001, Declan McCullagh wrote: > >And your possible motive for spreading the word about his reputation, >which ties you to an illicit transaction, is what exactly? > > Bear Anonymity is the shield; Human nature is the motivation. Any questions?
Re: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
At 02:53 PM 4/15/01 -0700, Tim May wrote: >And to make sure that Ray Dillinger is not confused, let me point out >that my "credit rating data haven" is not necessarily for cyberspace >nyms. Rather, it's for the meatspace world of credit evaluation. > "Credit" has many dimensions (or application). The NYT has more journalistic "credit" than Drudge. Don Trump has more financial "credit" than readers of this list :-) Various members of this list have more list "credit" when it comes to e.g., physical explanations than others. Since corporations are virtual citizens, and citizens may participate in a multitude virtual corporations, there's a lot of behavior to keep track of. Social primates are uniquely equipt to monitor conformance with social contracts. The automation of reputation is so natural its not funny.
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
At 02:06 PM 4/15/01 -0700, Ray Dillinger wrote: >regard to contract enforcement. There has to be a hook where someone >who does a ripoff can be punished, or else there is no deal. In infospace, there is only reputation, not meat and bones, that can be damaged.
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
At 02:11 PM 4/15/01 -0700, Ray Dillinger wrote: >Tim; > >One thing to consider is the role of "credit histories", or >virtually any other identity-linked information, in a milieu >where the people have access to the necessary techniques and >programs to do those deals. > >You sell Alice a credit history on Bob; Bob takes a new >identity; Alice is back to square one. Why would Alice >buy credit histories? Because it decreases her risk when lending, ie, increases her efficiency. Evolution is about efficiency. > >For that matter, why would anyone loan money in the first >place? What credit histories could there possibly be? > > Bear Because the service of Carol the CreditHistoryLibrarian is much cheaper than making loans without that service, both Carol and the lenders can exist. Lenders don't lend to folks without CreditHistory. Any train of thought that concludes that bankers can't exist is wrong somewhere.
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
At 12:36 PM 4/15/01 -0700, Tim May wrote: >There are many markets out there which do not rely on the official >court system to enforce contracts for. > The diamond-trading jews of New York use reputation (ostracism from the community, centrally enforced by a council that rules their voluntary association) to handle 'arbitration'. Jews also use a non-governmental USDA to keep their food clean. FWIW
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
At 4:07 PM -0700 4/15/01, Ray Dillinger wrote: >On Sun, 15 Apr 2001, Declan McCullagh wrote: > >>At 02:06 PM 4/15/01 -0700, Ray Dillinger wrote: >>>When you talk about a one-time transaction, it pretty much has to >>>involve something whose value can be ascertained ON THE SPOT. >>>otherwise, there is either a continuing relationship that can't >>>be unilaterally broken (ie, they know where you live) or there is >> >>I think this is a bit short-sighted. >> >>Assume there is an anonymous seller who has established reputation capital >>over time for small transactions on the order of pennies. I may be willing >>to risk a ten-cent transaction (to purchase an illicit MP3 or somesuch) if >>the perceived reward is sufficient. If I am successful and word spreads >>that the seller is to be trusted, the amount people will be willing to risk >>larger amounts will presumably increase. > >And your possible motive for spreading the word about his reputation, >which ties you to an illicit transaction, is what exactly? > > Bear Ray, or "Bear," you really need to think about these things more deeply. There are many ways in which a buyer can signal approval...without even linking himself to a specific transaction. (Which is likely, in this "ten-cent transction" to be of any interest to LE anyway.) A simple assertion of the form "I recommend Danny the Dealer" is not a statement implicating the speaker in any illicit transaction which is prosecutable. You once said you were a law student...unless I'm misremembering. If so, how could you make such an elementary error? There are other ways to make the same "word spreads" endorsements, too. From a nym, in an article, etc. As to why someone like Declan might _want_ to help spread the word, there are multiple reasons: to encourage more such reputable dealers, to discourage bad dealers, as a kind of "attaboy" for the good dealings, and so on. Isn't this all pretty obvious? --Tim May -- Timothy C. May [EMAIL PROTECTED]Corralitos, California Political: Co-founder Cypherpunks/crypto anarchy/Cyphernomicon Technical: physics/soft errors/Smalltalk/Squeak/agents/games/Go Personal: b.1951/UCSB/Intel '74-'86/retired/investor/motorcycles/guns
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
At 2:11 PM -0700 4/15/01, Ray Dillinger wrote: >Tim; > >One thing to consider is the role of "credit histories", or >virtually any other identity-linked information, in a milieu >where the people have access to the necessary techniques and >programs to do those deals. > >You sell Alice a credit history on Bob; Bob takes a new >identity; Alice is back to square one. Why would Alice >buy credit histories? > >For that matter, why would anyone loan money in the first >place? What credit histories could there possibly be? > As Declan pointed out in his follow-up, you assume nyms will be adopted and abandoned freely. Some will, some won't. "A Melon" doesn't have much reputation capital, but "Pr0duct Cypher" does. The former will vanish and reappear like quantum foam, the latter will not. This is not a zero friction system. In any case, "credit histories" are nothing more than assertions. Some assertions are true, some are false, some are of little value, some are of great value. Historically, some assertions about credit history are valuable to others. The issue of Alice and Bob being pseudonymous is close to be orhtogonal to this point. In any case, caveat emptor works pretty well. If such assertions are of zero value, as you imply, then this is what the market will show. If not... --Tim May -- Timothy C. May [EMAIL PROTECTED]Corralitos, California Political: Co-founder Cypherpunks/crypto anarchy/Cyphernomicon Technical: physics/soft errors/Smalltalk/Squeak/agents/games/Go Personal: b.1951/UCSB/Intel '74-'86/retired/investor/motorcycles/guns
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
On Sun, 15 Apr 2001, Declan McCullagh wrote: >At 02:06 PM 4/15/01 -0700, Ray Dillinger wrote: >>When you talk about a one-time transaction, it pretty much has to >>involve something whose value can be ascertained ON THE SPOT. >>otherwise, there is either a continuing relationship that can't >>be unilaterally broken (ie, they know where you live) or there is > >I think this is a bit short-sighted. > >Assume there is an anonymous seller who has established reputation capital >over time for small transactions on the order of pennies. I may be willing >to risk a ten-cent transaction (to purchase an illicit MP3 or somesuch) if >the perceived reward is sufficient. If I am successful and word spreads >that the seller is to be trusted, the amount people will be willing to risk >larger amounts will presumably increase. And your possible motive for spreading the word about his reputation, which ties you to an illicit transaction, is what exactly? Bear
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
On Sun, 15 Apr 2001, Tim May wrote: >>As presented, I think she's probably right. Nobody in conventional >>business is going to want to do a deal with someone when they can't >>create a legally enforceable contract. > >Widespread black markets, for drugs, betting, etc., suggest otherwise. That doesn't really kill the argumetn. The key word is enforceable. Black markets do it directly by guns, the society at large needs the legal system to mediate. The lack of legal enforceability *is* a problem. OTOH, one could imagine reputations being built without them being linked to a fixed pseudonym. Whether the necessary crypto exists, or if the resulting web of trust can be made strong enough, I have no idea. Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy, mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED], gsm: +358-50-5756111 student/math+cs/helsinki university, http://www.iki.fi/~decoy/front
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
Ray & Tim, easy to see who said what: Bear: > >>As presented, I think she's probably right. Nobody in conventional > >>business is going to want to do a deal with someone when they can't > >>create a legally enforceable contract. > > > >Widespread black markets, for drugs, betting, etc., suggest otherwise. > > > >There are many markets out there which do not rely on the official > >court system to enforce contracts for. Again, I'm trying to cut out all the lawyers, contracts and so forth, there are other ways to regulate, but it's all variables: a combination of nym alternative dispute resolution, escrow concepts (money, and ID) and reputational systems. Participants can choose disclosed, an agency-infomediary or a "zeroknowledge" participation level, and define who they are comfortable dealing with... just what you guys talk about, and just like real life. > When you talk about a one-time transaction, it pretty much has to > involve something whose value can be ascertained ON THE SPOT. > otherwise, there is either a continuing relationship that can't > be unilaterally broken (ie, they know where you live) or there is > no deal. The value of information (other than entertainment > value) is not generally ascertainable on the spot, because if > you don't have at least some of the information, you can't check > something that claims to be the information. Also, you often > have to do a couple days work figuring out information formats > and problems before you can even do your checking against it, > particularly with financial data. Exactly, and this is where I run into trouble. However, as long as SOMEBODY is accountable, the goat of the wrongdoer isn't always required for the transacting party. I am more concerned about policing the community, but I do think it's possible outside of traditional legal and transactional frameworks, reverting back, as Tim made reference to (as I have I, damnit) the old polycentric merchant society frameworks. > Real business involves lasting relationships. You don't want > to be owed money, or merchandise either, by someone who can > just shed the pseudonym and disappear. > > >>And "reputation capital" > >>that would counteract that point to some extent depends on maintaining > >>a consistent traceable pseudonym as someone who does something illegal, > >>for decades, without getting linked to it. > > > >As with Aimee, you haven't thought outside the box. > > > >You being a lawyer larvae, and Aimee being an official lawyer, is > >this something that _comes_ from being a lawyer, or is this something > >that causes a person to give up doing something real, like > >programming or designing chips, to _become_ a lawyer? > > > Tim, I don't know why you're calling me "Lawyer larvae". I'm > not in Law school, nor have I ever been. > > What Aimee and I both seem to be pointing out here is that while > it is *possible* for people to do business anonymously/pseudonymously, > a whole new economy would have to grow up that way in order for it > to become routine. You are really and truly talking about building > from scratch with effectively no interface to the way business is > currently done. I can respect that, but keep in mind that all the > peripheral mechanisms of the way business is currently done will > be trying to stomp the "aberration" out. Eh, I was just trying to envision a live pitch opportunity. An intelligence development contract seemed in the ballpark for serious bank, and privatization changes might be breeding some opportunity. Clearly, an open source information mercantile system is already making the intelligence agenda. I find it "not unthinkable" that Tim's agora will first see the light of day as part of a legitimate intelligence endeavor. ~Aimee
Re: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
At 5:29 PM -0400 4/15/01, Declan McCullagh wrote: >On Sun, Apr 15, 2001 at 02:11:56PM -0700, Ray Dillinger wrote: >> You sell Alice a credit history on Bob; Bob takes a new >> identity; Alice is back to square one. Why would Alice >> buy credit histories? > >Not everyone will choose to be lost in the Net. > >So the solution is simple: I sell Alice a new report on Bob's new >identity, after doing the appropriate research and employing the >relevant investigators. > >All credit is a gamble. If I know a person's meatspace identity and >ties with religious/social/family groups, I'm far more likely to lend >them money then if they're using a throwaway hushmail account. > >If Bob is doing the latter, he won't get credit in the first place. If >he's using a known meatspace identity, I can do the research and >likely succeed. > And to make sure that Ray Dillinger is not confused, let me point out that my "credit rating data haven" is not necessarily for cyberspace nyms. Rather, it's for the meatspace world of credit evaluation. The point of moving it outside a jurisdiction like the U.S., and perhaps beyond _any_ physical jurisdiction, is because meatspace credit data bases and reporting services are heavily regulated. (Also a good reason why seller-untraceability is as important as buyer-untraceability.) --Tim May -- Timothy C. May [EMAIL PROTECTED]Corralitos, California Political: Co-founder Cypherpunks/crypto anarchy/Cyphernomicon Technical: physics/soft errors/Smalltalk/Squeak/agents/games/Go Personal: b.1951/UCSB/Intel '74-'86/retired/investor/motorcycles/guns
Re: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
On Sun, Apr 15, 2001 at 02:11:56PM -0700, Ray Dillinger wrote: > You sell Alice a credit history on Bob; Bob takes a new > identity; Alice is back to square one. Why would Alice > buy credit histories? Not everyone will choose to be lost in the Net. So the solution is simple: I sell Alice a new report on Bob's new identity, after doing the appropriate research and employing the relevant investigators. All credit is a gamble. If I know a person's meatspace identity and ties with religious/social/family groups, I'm far more likely to lend them money then if they're using a throwaway hushmail account. If Bob is doing the latter, he won't get credit in the first place. If he's using a known meatspace identity, I can do the research and likely succeed. -Declan
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
At 02:06 PM 4/15/01 -0700, Ray Dillinger wrote: >When you talk about a one-time transaction, it pretty much has to >involve something whose value can be ascertained ON THE SPOT. >otherwise, there is either a continuing relationship that can't >be unilaterally broken (ie, they know where you live) or there is I think this is a bit short-sighted. Assume there is an anonymous seller who has established reputation capital over time for small transactions on the order of pennies. I may be willing to risk a ten-cent transaction (to purchase an illicit MP3 or somesuch) if the perceived reward is sufficient. If I am successful and word spreads that the seller is to be trusted, the amount people will be willing to risk larger amounts will presumably increase. Obviously there is the possibility for the seller to cut and run when the trust factor gets sufficiently high and transactions increase accordingly, but buyers aren't entirely dumb, so a rational buyer will take that into account. One factor is how many people at once are entering into transactions with the seller -- and that may not be knowable. If the seller goes bad, what is the time delay before the bad actor status can be known and published? Escrow agents and bonds posted by the seller can accelerate this process substantially. In order to grow an anonymous economy, you'd need literally decades >of time during which there were few conflicts with any part of the >established infrastructure, and so that the emerging system could Not so. You can grow it quickly, organically, in a much shorter time. You'd be right if you're talking about an entirely new economy, but not if you're talking about the more likely prospect: a system that gradually supplements the existing economy. It won't replace it, of course. Remember, one still buys a loaf of bread in meatspace. -Declan
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
Bear wrote: (Bear, read the entire before you reply...) I said: > >That is an over-simplification, but yes. Intelligence is not > headlines. To a > >large extent, "what's happening" is not analyzed correctly, because the > >intelligence community lacks sufficient expert analysis to cope with the > >dataload. This capability is in the private sector. These > information flows, > >between the government sector and the private sector, are unmapped. I want to paddle back to the kiddie pool, but I'll try to address you Bear, you are way over my little headand so is this subject matter. > This is not true any more. The automated analysis of trawled data has > advanced considerably beyond keyword searching at this point; there are > programs out there now specifically looking for much more subtle and > complicated things, which were formerly the domain of intelligence > analysts, and they are actually pretty damn good. The simple keyword > searchers and keyphrase searchers you hear about with echelon are only > the front line; they pass their data back to much more sophisticated > AI programs that analyze content, and synthesize information gleaned > from massive numbers of such missives. Yes, but I'm still speaking of information that is not online, not siphonable and locked in the overt experts in the private sector. It is not "current events" or "happenings" or "what's going on." It's analysis and intricacies that are critical for decision making. Not raw data or intelligence headlines. It's Mr. X and his theories on Y, that nobody knows about - Mr. X is hidden away in the private intelligence sector or some university closet. He's a specialist on ...uhmSouth African Zulu Warrior Chieftains dress and culture. He can tell you that when Zulus get in war dress and bring knives and spears to your VIP meeting - it's a sign of respect, and not a violence indicator. (I just ripped off the basics of this hypo from this guy: http://www.icon.co.za/~agrudko/ representative of the private intelligence sector) Without knowing this information, your diplomatic protection force is going to rat-tat-tat them to pieces and lead to a "diplomatic snafu" of major proportions. They need this information NOW, because the helicopter with your diplomat just landed in a remote area for this roundtable in a big grass hut, and is facing 1,000 Zulu Warriors jumping up and down and chanting in full war dress, and the protection force of 5 is counting rounds in the back of their heads. Their protocol officer fainted and is receiving medical assistance in the 'copter. They place a call - decision time is 8-10 minutes. Somebody has got to finger and find Mr. X's knowledge. This information is NOT online, not siphonable, outside of regular intelligence channels - it's in Mr. X. Mr. X is one of five western people in the world that know about these things. Right then, Chief Zulu walks up and points his knife at your diplomat. Was that a threat? Your diplomat pees in his pants in front of 1,000 Zulu Warriors. Ramifications? BTW, your diplomat is also president of a transcontinental resource-extractive company with operations in ZA and is a top-level kidnapping and hostage risk - his capture or death would have diplomatic ramifications and would affect upcoming treaty negotiations related to the world diamond market. National events often turn on intimate knowledge of the strangest facts - these facts are known by people like Mr. X. You have 8 minutes to tell these guys what to do. You can mine you data, use your CIA-google, ask your AI, make some phone calls - and you are still whistling Dixie. So, this is what you do: You CIA analyst, fire up your SIGINT/ELINT fed AI and analysis programs, you call around What have those Zulu Warrior's been talking about lately? You find, to your dismay, little informationZulus don't even use phones. So what do you do? You find pictures of "Zulu War Dress" and some basic protocol. Your internal experts agree. Your call: "Zulu War Dress = War = Aggression = take immediate evasive action." You go look at online and offline sources on this diplomat's diamond company. Sadly, you do not have an expert's competitive intelligence analysis which would have told you this man is about to become pivotal in the world diamond market, due to a secretly planned merger and acquisition with a gem company. Because of this one man, the entire gem and diamond markets are about to be revolutionized. *bloody gunfire exchange* Confused Zulu Warriors. The chief was just giving a sign of respect. Dead diplomat. Zulus go on the offensive. World diamond market: kaput. Mr. X happens to consult with PPS (private protection services) in ZA in Zulu territory. Private intelligence. Yet, for some reason, Mr. X doesn't appear on your screen. Why? Because you haven't developed information flows between yourself and the private intelligence sector. By and large, you don't talk to them. If you did, Mr. X's information
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
Tim; One thing to consider is the role of "credit histories", or virtually any other identity-linked information, in a milieu where the people have access to the necessary techniques and programs to do those deals. You sell Alice a credit history on Bob; Bob takes a new identity; Alice is back to square one. Why would Alice buy credit histories? For that matter, why would anyone loan money in the first place? What credit histories could there possibly be? Bear
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
On Sun, 15 Apr 2001, Tim May wrote: >At 11:30 AM -0700 4/15/01, Ray Dillinger wrote: >> >>As presented, I think she's probably right. Nobody in conventional >>business is going to want to do a deal with someone when they can't >>create a legally enforceable contract. > >Widespread black markets, for drugs, betting, etc., suggest otherwise. > >There are many markets out there which do not rely on the official >court system to enforce contracts for. This is true, but look at the mechanisms for enforcing contracts that they *do* use. Most of them are not compatible with anonymity, and only a few are compatible with pseudonymity. Mafia Bosses don't buy information from someone when they don't know where that someone lives. It's the exact same enforceability of contracts problem that other parts of society uses lawyers to deal with. Legbreakers or cops, basically they have the same job with regard to contract enforcement. There has to be a hook where someone who does a ripoff can be punished, or else there is no deal. When you talk about a one-time transaction, it pretty much has to involve something whose value can be ascertained ON THE SPOT. otherwise, there is either a continuing relationship that can't be unilaterally broken (ie, they know where you live) or there is no deal. The value of information (other than entertainment value) is not generally ascertainable on the spot, because if you don't have at least some of the information, you can't check something that claims to be the information. Also, you often have to do a couple days work figuring out information formats and problems before you can even do your checking against it, particularly with financial data. >Besides Mafia markets, there are international trade systems which >typically don't invoke the laws of Fiji or Botswana or even the U.S. >to make them work. But which are generally not done anonymously. In these cases, there is no test of a protocol's ability to protect pseudonymity from a determined opponent, nor of the willingness to do business anonymously or pseudonymously. Moreover, the determined opponent is often watching, even if no enforcement is attempted. >In fact, most of our ordinary decisions and dealings are done >"anarchically," from deciding which restaurants to visit to the >buying of books and whatnot. So far I have seen no example of a non-contracted business agreement between people who are unable to identify each other, which extends beyond a single transaction. Basically one goes one way with his merchandise and the other goes the other way with her money, and it's over. There's no business relationship that's ongoing; if they ever meet again, it's just a coincidence. If the transaction is illegal, then any business relationship that may be formed is a liability to all participants; they never know when the lions are going to grab someone and when that happens, the lions usually find out everything that someone knows. Real business involves lasting relationships. You don't want to be owed money, or merchandise either, by someone who can just shed the pseudonym and disappear. >>And "reputation capital" >>that would counteract that point to some extent depends on maintaining >>a consistent traceable pseudonym as someone who does something illegal, >>for decades, without getting linked to it. > >As with Aimee, you haven't thought outside the box. > >You being a lawyer larvae, and Aimee being an official lawyer, is >this something that _comes_ from being a lawyer, or is this something >that causes a person to give up doing something real, like >programming or designing chips, to _become_ a lawyer? Tim, I don't know why you're calling me "Lawyer larvae". I'm not in Law school, nor have I ever been. What Aimee and I both seem to be pointing out here is that while it is *possible* for people to do business anonymously/pseudonymously, a whole new economy would have to grow up that way in order for it to become routine. You are really and truly talking about building from scratch with effectively no interface to the way business is currently done. I can respect that, but keep in mind that all the peripheral mechanisms of the way business is currently done will be trying to stomp the "aberration" out. In order to grow an anonymous economy, you'd need literally decades of time during which there were few conflicts with any part of the established infrastructure, and so that the emerging system could grow its own traditions and customs and routines. Within that separate space, you could do business as you describe. But during the whole building time, and until the new economy's traditions and routines are reflected in a robust system with enforcement capabilities, almost any contact with the existing economy would be destructive. It would be like building in the outlands, beyond civilization entirely. It will happen, and it should;
Re: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
At 01:46 AM 4/15/2001 -0700, Ryan Sorensen wrote: > > Read the hundreds of articles on these matters. Read "The Enterprise > > of Law: Justice without the State," by Bruce Benson. Read David > > Friedman's "Machinery of Freedom," and his other books. Read... > > > > The point is, Aimee, _read the background material_. > > >Admittedly, I'm not Aimee. >I was wondering if I could get a few helpful pointers towards the >background material? >Any assistance would be much appreciated. You might also take a look at Robert Axelrod's _The Evolution of Cooperation_. -- Greg Broiles [EMAIL PROTECTED] "Organized crime is the price we pay for organization." -- Raymond Chandler
Re: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
> Read the hundreds of articles on these matters. Read "The Enterprise > of Law: Justice without the State," by Bruce Benson. Read David > Friedman's "Machinery of Freedom," and his other books. Read... > > The point is, Aimee, _read the background material_. > Admittedly, I'm not Aimee. I was wondering if I could get a few helpful pointers towards the background material? Any assistance would be much appreciated. > --Tim May --Ryan Sorensen
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
At 11:30 AM -0700 4/15/01, Ray Dillinger wrote: >On Sat, 14 Apr 2001, Tim May wrote: > >>>If >>>there is not a value proposition for an information marketplace between the >>>government and the private sector, there could be a value proposition within >>>the private sector intelligence channels, moving closer to your "credit >>>rating market" proposition. >> >>English, please. Or at least Ebonics. > > >Her point, Tim, is that she doubts such a thing will ever be deployed >widely or accepted, because she can't see a way for someone to make >money at it. > >As presented, I think she's probably right. Nobody in conventional >business is going to want to do a deal with someone when they can't >create a legally enforceable contract. Widespread black markets, for drugs, betting, etc., suggest otherwise. There are many markets out there which do not rely on the official court system to enforce contracts for. Besides Mafia markets, there are international trade systems which typically don't invoke the laws of Fiji or Botswana or even the U.S. to make them work. In fact, most of our ordinary decisions and dealings are done "anarchically," from deciding which restaurants to visit to the buying of books and whatnot. The laws that exist have almost no role in such decisions (lest anyone cite "health standards" for restaurants, this is both secondary to decisions and has historically been handled without governmental regulation). >And "reputation capital" >that would counteract that point to some extent depends on maintaining >a consistent traceable pseudonym as someone who does something illegal, >for decades, without getting linked to it. As with Aimee, you haven't thought outside the box. You being a lawyer larvae, and Aimee being an official lawyer, is this something that _comes_ from being a lawyer, or is this something that causes a person to give up doing something real, like programming or designing chips, to _become_ a lawyer? --Tim May -- Timothy C. May [EMAIL PROTECTED]Corralitos, California Political: Co-founder Cypherpunks/crypto anarchy/Cyphernomicon Technical: physics/soft errors/Smalltalk/Squeak/agents/games/Go Personal: b.1951/UCSB/Intel '74-'86/retired/investor/motorcycles/guns
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
On Sat, 14 Apr 2001, Tim May wrote: >>If >>there is not a value proposition for an information marketplace between the >>government and the private sector, there could be a value proposition within >>the private sector intelligence channels, moving closer to your "credit >>rating market" proposition. > >English, please. Or at least Ebonics. Her point, Tim, is that she doubts such a thing will ever be deployed widely or accepted, because she can't see a way for someone to make money at it. As presented, I think she's probably right. Nobody in conventional business is going to want to do a deal with someone when they can't create a legally enforceable contract. And "reputation capital" that would counteract that point to some extent depends on maintaining a consistent traceable pseudonym as someone who does something illegal, for decades, without getting linked to it. Bear
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
On Sat, 14 Apr 2001, Aimee Farr wrote: >That is an over-simplification, but yes. Intelligence is not headlines. To a >large extent, "what's happening" is not analyzed correctly, because the >intelligence community lacks sufficient expert analysis to cope with the >dataload. This capability is in the private sector. These information flows, >between the government sector and the private sector, are unmapped. This is not true any more. The automated analysis of trawled data has advanced considerably beyond keyword searching at this point; there are programs out there now specifically looking for much more subtle and complicated things, which were formerly the domain of intelligence analyists, and they are actually pretty damn good. The simple keyword searchers and keyphrase searchers you hear about with echelon are only the front line; they pass their data back to much more sophisticated AI programs that analyze content, and synthesize information gleaned from massive numbers of such missives. Every time a situation like the Aum Shenrikyo (spelled?) subway attack happens, if the automated analysis suite didn't point it out first, human analysts come in and check out the dataflows that ran before it and around it, and create a new auto-analysis program. And then later, when another group that has anything like the same rhetoric and seems to be going through the same logistical steps pops up, the auto-analysis finds it without human help. I do not speak of specific known programs here; but my primary background is in AI and expert systems, and I can state unequivocally that intelligence analysis funded most of the research in the field for a very long time, and that programs such as I described above are well within the current state of the art. It is unusual for them to be deployed very widely in private industry because in private industry there is a real problem of retaining personnel with the proper expertise to work on them. They tend to be delicate in their operation -- you go to make a minor change in the data or the rules or the schemas and the performance of all other parts of the system degrades unless you are extremely careful, well-trained, and, let's face it, consistently just plain smarter than normal people. But when they are in tune, and their vocabulary tables are up-to-date, they are highly accurate. The problem of keeping these systems in tune is what drives most practical AI research today; the systems are effective, but brittle and unable to cope with subtle changes and variations very well. "Fuzzy" approaches like ANN's and Genetic Algorithms are attempts to get past this problem by making self-adjusting systems, but the volumes of data required to get self-adjustment working using such approaches are a problem; you'd have to have data from hundreds of Aum Shenrikyo type attacks before your GA or ANN really had a good chance of picking out what parts of the dataflow were relevant. So here's my speculation: human analysts are probably called in only after something takes the automatic tools by surprise, or when there is an administrative need for specific analysis that the automatic tools do not provide. Bear
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
At 2:59 PM -0500 4/14/01, Aimee Farr wrote: > >I agree with you, I did not put forth my argument well, and I was lazy to >snip out context from several offlist conversations. And, you are correct, >it is difficult for me to make a compelling argument, due to the fact that I >am a far cry from an expert in this area. These are challenging concepts. >However, with respect, I did take on a mega-proposition for the application >of your concepts. Eschew grandiloquence. > > > "A twist of legitimacy"? Some kind of appeal to authority/ > >An appeal for a contract. I was trying to hypothesize a value proposition >for a legitimate application of these technologies. You'll need to translate this into straightforward English, please. >What you proposed, via a >"credit rating market," is an open source information mercantile system. I >was looking for a better market, which attaches high value to information: >intelligence. What you were "looking for" is irrelevant to what I wrote about. You can try hiring me as your personal consultant, at my usual daily rate, and I will try to put something together that is closer to what you're "looking for." In any case, the straightforward moving of credit ratings to a place where the Fair Credit Reporting Act and other such statist measures cannot reach is a much, much better example of the regulatory arbitrage issues of interest here than some nebulous "open source intelligence" project such as Robert Steele and OSS have been advocating. More power to him if he pulls off something interesting and important, but so far it is smoke and mirrors and vague claims. >I wonder if these applications would find the most relevance >in the intelligence sector, despite thoughts of subversive applications. "I wonder, I wonder, I wonder..." Do some background reading, think about the issues, and actually begin participating in a meaningful way in the debate and then maybe you won't appear to be such an airhead. >If >there is not a value proposition for an information marketplace between the >government and the private sector, there could be a value proposition within >the private sector intelligence channels, moving closer to your "credit >rating market" proposition. English, please. Or at least Ebonics. > > > Read the hundreds of articles on these matters. Read "The Enterprise >> of Law: Justice without the State," by Bruce Benson. Read David >> Friedman's "Machinery of Freedom," and his other books. Read... >> >> The point is, Aimee, _read the background material_. > >> Then you can ask specific questions, instead of just throwing a dozen >> or two dozen points of confusion you have against the wall and asking >> me to make it all clear to you. > >Tim, I didn't expect you to make it all clear to me. (i.e., "Just lotsa >questions." Indeed, I have some answers, but thank you for the book recs.) I >was merely reflecting that anonymous cash is not a cure-all, and that it >might not even necessary for a highly sensitive information marketplace. I never claimed it was a cure-all. None of us has. It's part of an overall approach, outlook, worldview. As for it being "necessary for a highly sensitive information marketplace," it depends. No doubt within the CIA it is not needed, though the equivalent of cash is still used (CPU hours allottable to various users, signatures to gain access to data, etc.) As for outsiders, imagine buying "sensitive information" without untraceable cash...whoops, it's a sting, and the Saudi Royal Guard is on its way. Or Jeff Gordon is about to raid your house. You seem not to have thought about these issues. You need to do some reading before you make a fool of yourself further. >I >was questioning the value proposition that you posed in the context of a >more sophisticated model -- an admittedly fantastical one. Finally, I >questioned if it was so fantastical, given Steele (et. al.) and thoughts of >functioning OSINT communities. I can't understand your writing. I'd normally say "So sue me," except lawyers like you typically try this. > >You are a prickly, philosophical, violence-inclined prick tease that won't >put out for me. Clearly, I stand little chance of EVER getting into your >intellectual pants. Give me some indication of how good your dick really is, >because I'm thinking it isn't worth continued loss of blood on my end to >even entertain thoughts of pursuing such a long-term, high-risk, >book-reading, flesh-eating endeavor. * P L O N K *, again, and this time, I expect for good. People who can't write clearly and yet who use such language as you use above do not deserve to be taken seriously. I thought I'd seen it all. At least now I can "Aimee" to the pantheon: Detweiler, Vulis, Cohen, Toto, and Aimee. --Tim May -- Timothy C. May [EMAIL PROTECTED]Corralitos, California Political: Co-founder Cypherpunks/crypto anarchy/Cyphernomicon Technical: physics/soft errors/Smalltalk/Squeak/agents
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
Tim May wrote: > At 1:51 PM -0500 4/13/01, Aimee Farr wrote: > >Even though I'm PLUNKED, and he is currently on a lawyer-hate rampage... > > > >Tim May said: > >> For those of you who don't fully appreciate what I am getting at, > >> being newcomers, let me move away from such banalities as "kiddie > >> porn" market--though this is a real market which any truly > >> untraceable tools will facilitate, obviously--and focus instead on > >> the "credit rating market." > > > >Ah, yes. The (illicit) "credit rating market." > > If you claim to know about it, how do you actually know so > _little_ about it? > Yes, I have your post filtered into my Trash folder. Sometimes I > look, sometimes I don't. > For someone who presumably graduated from a real law school and > passes a real bar exam, you have a demonstrated tendency to ramble > and just "ditz" your way through arguments. > Do you ever write in > complete sentences, in complete paragraphs, arguing complete points? I agree with you, I did not put forth my argument well, and I was lazy to snip out context from several offlist conversations. And, you are correct, it is difficult for me to make a compelling argument, due to the fact that I am a far cry from an expert in this area. These are challenging concepts. However, with respect, I did take on a mega-proposition for the application of your concepts. > >Thank you for the "Dick & Jane" version. I may not be the smartest kid in > >the class, but I am going to skip a grade, and address the value > proposition > >Mr. May is *really* talking about, although with a twist of legitimacy: > > > > > >Found in my inbox: > > > > > 1. MERCHANT INFORMATION BANKING - "Open Source Intelligence Haven" > > > STEELE: > > http://www.oss.net/infoMerchantBank.html > > "A twist of legitimacy"? Some kind of appeal to authority/ An appeal for a contract. I was trying to hypothesize a value proposition for a legitimate application of these technologies. What you proposed, via a "credit rating market," is an open source information mercantile system. I was looking for a better market, which attaches high value to information: intelligence. I wonder if these applications would find the most relevance in the intelligence sector, despite thoughts of subversive applications. If there is not a value proposition for an information marketplace between the government and the private sector, there could be a value proposition within the private sector intelligence channels, moving closer to your "credit rating market" proposition. > As it happens, I've known Robert Steele since his first got invited > to the Hackers Conference...must have been around 1993-4 or so. > Talked to him at length. Several other list members know him, too. > He's been pushing this Del Torto-esque "hackers will be our real > agents" project for a while. We do have some most recent evidence of this. > Nothing wrong with the "open > intelligence" idea...except that it's not his idea. However, Steele does have an interesting prototype community. Furthermore, he has explored private sector opportunities as the intelligence community restructures and privatizes. > The intelligence > agencies of the world have been vacuum sweeping the Net since its > earliest days. I don't mean in some paranoid sense, but in the sense > of what is readily known. But much strategically valuable information is not online. I said "NOT ONLINE." The intelligence needed is in regard to third-world countries and hotspots. This insight is damn sure not on the Net. I can't find the intricacies in regard to [fill-in-the-blank] on the Net. There are some things you can't mine. Even where you can, it's raw information, stale, and not analysis. Furthermore, I would think this information is often of little strategic value. > The "Analyst" project at the CIA, for example, has been going on > since at least the early 80s, monitoring publically visible (and > perhaps less visible stuff gotten from the NSA, DIA, NRO, etc.) > material. Yes. But when they get this information... "what does it mean?" They are drowning in information that they can't make sense of. Any such an endeavor would target information that is NOT SIPHONABLE AND OUTSIDE OF EXISTING INTELLIGENCE FLOWS. The endeavor would tap the private intelligence sector, developing nonexistent intelligence channels to tap private experts, agents, analysts, primary sources, etc. - information available, but for a price. > We knew by 1993 that the NSA and CIA had folks reading our list...I > talked to a couple of these readers at the Hackers Conference in Lake > Tahoe and at a conference at Asilomar. Well, in the unlikely event the NSA and CIA folks are still around: They need LESS noise - more private analysis and sourcepoint intelligence. The problem with the US intelligence community, as seen by many, is that they are over-focused on mass mining strategies and related technologies, and need to re-fo
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
At 1:51 PM -0500 4/13/01, Aimee Farr wrote: >Even though I'm PLUNKED, and he is currently on a lawyer-hate rampage... > >Tim May said: >> For those of you who don't fully appreciate what I am getting at, >> being newcomers, let me move away from such banalities as "kiddie >> porn" market--though this is a real market which any truly >> untraceable tools will facilitate, obviously--and focus instead on >> the "credit rating market." > >Ah, yes. The (illicit) "credit rating market." If you claim to know about it, how do you actually know so _little_ about it? Yes, I have your post filtered into my Trash folder. Sometimes I look, sometimes I don't. For someone who presumably graduated from a real law school and passes a real bar exam, you have a demonstrated tendency to ramble and just "ditz" your way through arguments. Do you ever write in complete sentences, in complete paragraphs, arguing complete points? > >Thank you for the "Dick & Jane" version. I may not be the smartest kid in >the class, but I am going to skip a grade, and address the value proposition >Mr. May is *really* talking about, although with a twist of legitimacy: > > >Found in my inbox: > > > 1. MERCHANT INFORMATION BANKING - "Open Source Intelligence Haven" > > STEELE: > http://www.oss.net/infoMerchantBank.html "A twist of legitimacy"? Some kind of appeal to authority/ As it happens, I've known Robert Steele since his first got invited to the Hackers Conference...must have been around 1993-4 or so. Talked to him at length. Several other list members know him, too. He's been pushing this Del Torto-esque "hackers will be our real agents" project for a while. Nothing wrong with the "open intelligence" idea...except that it's not his idea. The intelligence agencies of the world have been vacuum sweeping the Net since its earliest days. I don't mean in some paranoid sense, but in the sense of what is readily known. The "Analyst" project at the CIA, for example, has been going on since at least the early 80s, monitoring publically visible (and perhaps less visible stuff gotten from the NSA, DIA, NRO, etc.) material. We knew by 1993 that the NSA and CIA had folks reading our list...I talked to a couple of these readers at the Hackers Conference in Lake Tahoe and at a conference at Asilomar. "Open source intelligence" is just his buzz phrase for "observe what's happening." > >Steele, March 23 Letter to President: >http://www.oss.net/Papers/white/LettertothePresident.doc) > >>Making the agora disappear into cyberspace, whether by sheer numbers >>of sellers and buyers (peer-to-peer) or by robust encryption (a la >>BlackNet) is an important goal. > >Agora, hm. Learn our terms as we learn your terms. > >I find open source information banking/trading/merchant (whatever) systems >problematic propositions, beyond anonymous cash, especially viewed in light >of this hypothetical on a distributed open source intelligence >haven-brokerage. > > i.e. How do you set yourself up as an anonymous, neutral, >info-Switzerland? >...How will youobtain critical mass and critical trust? >...Where is your >back-door, infosec accountability if you are nothing but digital wind? >...How do you set up a buy-sell marketplace forintelligence >-- the value >of which cannot be determined prior to analysis, even where there is a >robust reputation capital metric in place? ...How do you enforce polycentric >merchant society rules in the context of an anonymous >transactional system? >...Requirements foradmission? ...Quality control? Reputational >systems?...What is your post-transactional enforcement mechanism? ...MUST >you have anon cash? (Just lotsa questions.) Read the hundreds of articles on these matters. Read "The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State," by Bruce Benson. Read David Friedman's "Machinery of Freedom," and his other books. Read... The point is, Aimee, _read the background material_. Then you can ask specific questions, instead of just throwing a dozen or two dozen points of confusion you have against the wall and asking me to make it all clear to you. As it is, you have yet to contribute anything interesting, at least that I have seen. I admit I don't see most of your contributions these days, but the lack of follow-up from others tells me that others are also not finding much of substance. Given that you write in a confusing, ditzy way, perhaps they just can't extract the nuggets from the mud. --Tim May -- Timothy C. May [EMAIL PROTECTED]Corralitos, California Political: Co-founder Cypherpunks/crypto anarchy/Cyphernomicon Technical: physics/soft errors/Smalltalk/Squeak/agents/games/Go Personal: b.1951/UCSB/Intel '74-'86/retired/investor/motorcycles/guns
RE: Making the Agora Vanish | OSINT distributed haven (Intellagora)
Even though I'm PLUNKED, and he is currently on a lawyer-hate rampage... Tim May said: > For those of you who don't fully appreciate what I am getting at, > being newcomers, let me move away from such banalities as "kiddie > porn" market--though this is a real market which any truly > untraceable tools will facilitate, obviously--and focus instead on > the "credit rating market." Ah, yes. The (illicit) "credit rating market." Thank you for the "Dick & Jane" version. I may not be the smartest kid in the class, but I am going to skip a grade, and address the value proposition Mr. May is *really* talking about, although with a twist of legitimacy: Found in my inbox: > 1. MERCHANT INFORMATION BANKING - "Open Source Intelligence Haven" > STEELE: http://www.oss.net/infoMerchantBank.html We already have an OSINT prototype community. > The world intelligence market is going private and adopting a distributed > model, most relevant intelligence information is human, IS NOT ONLINE, not > SIGINT, and is trapped in the private sector. IT'S NOT SECRET, EITHER. > The problem is old > notions of the > intelligence (COLD WAR) keep private||government apart. "credit > The private rating> intelligence market market"---> is $300 billion. China, Israel, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, > South Africa, Sweden and the United Kingdom are already > privatizing adopting OSINT tactics, according to Steele. Steele, March 23 Letter to President: http://www.oss.net/Papers/white/LettertothePresident.doc) >Making the agora disappear into cyberspace, whether by sheer numbers >of sellers and buyers (peer-to-peer) or by robust encryption (a la >BlackNet) is an important goal. Agora, hm. > The problem with open source intelligence havens > is that the information has to be of strategic relevance and time > actionable. If you give me the secret recipe to KFC, I'm still nothing > without the red-and-white-bucket. > I have to be able to tap the source. > : critical mass and critical trust. > : analysis/value > So, what's the solution? > The solution is that the technology clearly exists to allow entities > to reside in cyberspace. What is lacking, as always, is the means to > collect untraceable digital cash. I find open source information banking/trading/merchant (whatever) systems problematic propositions, beyond anonymous cash, especially viewed in light of this hypothetical on a distributed open source intelligence haven-brokerage. i.e. How do you set yourself up as an anonymous, neutral, info-Switzerland? ...How will you obtain critical mass and critical trust? ...Where is your back-door, infosec accountability if you are nothing but digital wind? ...How do you set up a buy-sell marketplace for intelligence -- the value of which cannot be determined prior to analysis, even where there is a robust reputation capital metric in place? ...How do you enforce polycentric merchantsociety rules in the context of an anonymous transactional system? ...Requirements for admission? ...Quality control? Reputational systems?...What is your post-transactional enforcement mechanism? ...MUST you have anon cash? (Just lotsa questions.) On the other hand, take Steele's concept, turn it into an distributed ghosty "INTELLAGORA" (?) to facilitate and tap these new public-private and private-private transcontinental intelligence flows, attain critical mass, and you would have an exceptional value proposition. Nothing happens without a value proposition, and there is only one lucrative "live" information market: the intelligence habit. Whoever gets in the middle of this public<-->private intelligence collision stands to make serious bank. There is no legacy system, so, if doable, it's load and lock-in. In comparison, the likes of ZKS and MojoNation seem small footsteps -- not just in terms of the potential market, but also in terms of the opportunity for the mass incorporation of cypherpunk concepts. (This is not "subversive" hypothetical. Western/Allied intelligence communities would be the primary benefactors and contractors.) ~Aimee
