Sen. Hollings plans to introduce DMCA sequel: The SSSCA
- Forwarded message from Declan McCullagh [EMAIL PROTECTED] - From: Declan McCullagh [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: FC: Sen. Hollings plans to introduce DMCA sequel: The SSSCA To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Fri, 07 Sep 2001 21:22:25 -0400 X-URL: Politech is at http://www.politechbot.com/ Text of SSSCA draft bill: http://www.politechbot.com/docs/hollings.090701.html Politech archive on DMCA: http://www.politechbot.com/cgi-bin/politech.cgi?name=dmca --- http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,46655,00.html New Copyright Bill Heading to DC By Declan McCullagh ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) 4:19 p.m. Sep. 7, 2001 PDT WASHINGTON -- Music and record industry lobbyists are quietly readying an all-out assault on Congress this fall in hopes of dramatically rewriting copyright laws. With the help of Fritz Hollings (D-S.C.), the powerful chairman of the Senate Commerce committee, they hope to embed copy-protection controls in nearly all consumer electronic devices and PCs. All types of digital content, including music, video and e-books, are covered. The Security Systems Standards and Certification Act (SSSCA), scheduled to be introduced by Hollings, backs up this requirement with teeth: It would be a civil offense to create or sell any kind of computer equipment that does not include and utilize certified security technologies approved by the federal government. It also creates new federal felonies, punishable by five years in prison and fines of up to $500,000. Anyone who distributes copyrighted material with security measures disabled or has a network-attached computer that disables copy protection is covered. Hollings' draft bill, which Wired News obtained on Friday, represents the next round of the ongoing legal tussle between content holders and their opponents, including librarians, programmers and open-source advocates. [...] - POLITECH -- Declan McCullagh's politics and technology mailing list You may redistribute this message freely if you include this notice. Declan McCullagh's photographs are at http://www.mccullagh.org/ To subscribe to Politech: http://www.politechbot.com/info/subscribe.html This message is archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ - - End forwarded message -
Sen. Hollings plans to introduce DMCA sequel: The SSSCA
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- WASHINGTON -- Music and record industry lobbyists are quietly readying an all-out assault on Congress this fall in hopes of dramatically rewriting copyright laws. With the help of Fritz Hollings (D-S.C.), the powerful chairman of the Senate Commerce committee, they hope to embed copy-protection controls in nearly all consumer electronic devices and PCs. All types of digital content, including music, video and e-books, are covered. I think any Senator who signs on for this has earned killing. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: Hush 2.0 wmAEARECACAFAjuZn90ZHGtleXNlci1zb3plQGh1c2htYWlsLmNvbQAKCRAg4ui5IoBV n+PdAJ9jUDWNMjCZz1zmymJde+ZNF4ugpwCeNHQzOK1ukMHqHhypLa1bhsfofg4= =olMy -END PGP SIGNATURE-
Re: Eric Hughes
On Fri, 7 Sep 2001, A. Melon wrote: Does anyone know Eric Hughes' current email address? the ricocet one is, of course, non-functional now. eh(a_t)speakeasy.net -- Lucky Green [EMAIL PROTECTED] PGP encrypted email preferred.
Frenchalon....
Paris Weekly Details French Electronic 'Espionnage' Abilities EUP20010406000153 Paris Le Nouvel Observateur (Internet Version-WWW) in French 05 Apr 01 [Article by Vincent Jauvert: Espionage -- How France Listens to the Whole World] [FBIS Translated Text] It is one of the largest tapping centers in the world. At this secret base protected by watchtowers, police dogs and electrified barbed wire, 13 immense parabolic antennas spy day and night on all the international communications transiting through the satellites they monitor. Where is this base whose photo Le Nouvel Observateur has published here? In the United States? In Russia? No, in the Perigord region, on the Domme plateau, next to Sarlat airport. The site is officially (and modestly) referred to as the radio center. Here, the French spy service, the DGSE [General Directorate for External Security], monitors hundreds of thousands -- millions? -- of telephone calls, e-mails, files, and faxes on a daily basis. This is the main site for the French Republic's big ears. It is not the only one. Like the United States and the English- speaking countries with close ties to it, France has over the past ten years set up a global interception network. Le Nouvel Observateur can confirm the existence -- and publish photos -- of three other DGSE satellite tapping bases. One -- code- named Fregate -- is hidden in the Guyanese forest, at the heart of the Kourou space center. The other, completed in 1998, is attached to the side of the Dziani Dzaha crater on the French island of Mayotte in the Indian Ocean. Both are managed jointly with the BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst), the German secret service. The third center is located in the western suburbs of Paris, on the Orgeval plateau, at Alluets-le-Roi. A total of about 30 antennas cover nearly the entire globe, with the exception of the Siberian North and a part of the Pacific. There will soon be other stations. Expanding its satellite tapping network is one of the DGSE's priorities, the rapporteur for the 2001 defense budget, Jean-Michel Boucheron, writes. The French secret service has more resources available every year for this purpose. A new station is being built on the Albion plateau, where nuclear missiles were stored before the silos were dismantled; a fifth is planned for the Tontouta naval air base in New Caledonia. Of course, this network is -- and will remain -- much less powerful and efficient than the US system on which it is modeled, one which has often been discussed in recent months and is commonly referred to as Echelon. The American NSA [National Security Agency] is 30 times richer than its French counterpart, the technical directorate of the DGSE. The former employs 38,000 people, the latter 1,600. The smaller Frenchelon, as the Americans and their partners call it, is no less of a threat to privacy. Including that of the French. Here is why: When they are transmitted by one of the satellites monitored by the Domme, Kourou, or Mayotte bases, our communications with other countries or the DOM-TOM [French Overseas Dominions and Territories] may be intercepted, copied, and disseminated by the DGSE, without any monitoring commission having any say in the matter. None! A situation that is unique in the West. Every democratic country that has equipped itself with satellite tapping services has set up safeguards -- laws and monitoring bodies -- to protect its citizens from the curiosity of the big ears. Every one, led by Germany and the United States. But not France. Nonetheless, our country has been spying on communications satellites for 30 years. The SDECE [Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service] set up its first parabolic antenna at Domme, at the site of a small radio interception center, in 1974. The antenna measured 25 centimeters in diameter and still exists. Another followed soon afterwards. At the beginning, there were only a few satellites, the Intelsats, explains a veteran of the technical directorate. We were able to 'suck up' a large portion of international traffic. However, in 1980, as the explosion in global telephony began, more and more satellites were put into orbit: Eutelsat, Molniya, Inmarsat, Panamsat, Arabsat. We were quickly overwhelmed, recounts a former senior official. The Domme center found itself under-equipped, ridiculous -- and we at the DGSE were a laughingstock for our American and British colleagues. In 1984, the head of the secret service, Admiral Lacoste, pressed Francois Mitterrand: We need another interception station. France, he claimed, had an ideal site for this type of operation: the Kourou space center. Ideal? It was located very near the Equator, that is, in the best possible spot for listening in on communications satellites, nearly all of which are geostationary. The base would be located a few kilometers from the Ariane launching pad, meaning that its antennas would not
Text of draft Security Systems Standards and Certification Act
- Forwarded message from Declan McCullagh [EMAIL PROTECTED] - From: Declan McCullagh [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: FC: Text of draft Security Systems Standards and Certification Act To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Fri, 07 Sep 2001 21:24:51 -0400 X-URL: Politech is at http://www.politechbot.com/ Wired News article on SSSCA: http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,46655,00.html --- http://www.politechbot.com/docs/hollings.090701.html Text of Security Systems Standards and Certification Act Sponsors: Sen. Fritz Hollings (D-S.C.), chairman of the Senate Commerce committee, and Sen. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska). Draft dated August 6, 2001. This bill has not been introduced as of September 7, 2001. Keystroked by Declan McCullagh, all typos his. Comments in [brackets] are his. The bill is 19 pages long; much of the text is summarized and placed in brackets. _ Title I -- Security System Standards Sec. 101: Prohibition of Certain Devices (a) In General -- It is unlawful to manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide or otherwise traffic in any interactive digital device that does not include and utilize certified security technologies that adhere to the security system standards adopted under section 104. (b) Exception -- Subsection (a) does not apply to the offer for sale or provision of, or other trafficking in, any previously-owned interactive digital device, if such device was legally manufactured or imported, and sold, prior to the effective date of regulations adopted under section 104 and not subsequently modified in violation of subsection (a) or 103(a). Sec. 102: Preservation of the Integrity of Security An interactive computer service shall store and transmit with integrity any security measure associated with certified security techologies that is used in connection with copyrighted material or other protected content such service transmits or stores. Sec. 103: Prohibited Acts (a) Removal or Alteration of Security -- No person may -- (1) remove or alter any certified security technology in an interactive digital device; or (2) transmit or make available to the public any copyrighted material or other protected content where the security measure associated with a certified security technology has been removed or altered. [Summary: Personal TV/cable/satellite time-shifting copies normally must be allowed by certified security technologies] Sec. 104: Adoption of Security System Standards [Summary: The private sector has 12 months to agree on a standard, or the Secretary of Commerce will step in. Industry groups that can participate: representatives of interactive digital device manufacturers and representatives of copyright owners. If industry can agree, the secretary will turn their standard into a regulation; if not, normal government processes apply and NTIA takes the lead. The standard can be later modified. The secretary must certify technologies that adhere to those standards. Also: The secretary shall certify only those conforming technologies that are available for licensing on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms. FACA, a federal sunshine law, does not apply, and an antitrust exemption is included.] Sec. 108: Enforcement The provisions of section 1203 and 1204 of title 17, United States Code, shall apply to any violation of this title as if -- (1) a violation of section 101 or 103(a)(1) of this Act were a violation of section 1201 of title 17, United States Code; and (2) a violation of section 102 or section 103(a)(2) of this Act were a violation of section 1202 of that title. Sec. 109. Definitions In this title: (1) Certified security technology -- The term certified security technology means a security technology certified by the Secretary of Commerce under section 105. (2) Interactive computer service -- The term interactive computer service has the meaning given that term in section 230(f) of the Communications Act of 1984 (47 U.S.C. 230(f)). [Note: According to 47 U.S.C. 230(f), an interactive computer service means any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.] (3) Interactive digital device -- The term interactive digital device means any machine, device, product, software, or technology, whether or not included with
Re: US v Miller (was Re: Naughty Journal Author Denied Plea Change
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- What is your source for all this? This case is a point of interest for me and such details as you have provided are not contained in the text of the ruling, so where did they come from? See https://www.keepandbeararms.com/information/XcIBViewItem.asp?ID=2337 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: Hush 2.0 wmAEARECACAFAjuZWv8ZHGtleXNlci1zb3plQGh1c2htYWlsLmNvbQAKCRAg4ui5IoBV n18HAKCyudlJecWK7ZT/FGjoscp+qRbvlACfSeiv9CiwbNWW8ga8JQU1YWJ2ijY= =eR8i -END PGP SIGNATURE-
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Re: CDR: Re: Naughty Journal Author Denied Plea Change
On Wed, 5 Sep 2001, Declan McCullagh wrote: Mere possession (not creation) of visual depictions of child pornography has been a federal felony for at least a decade. Someone who's a collector who did not publish the material would be a felon. We are not talking about visual depictions (cute Fedz euphemism for photographs or photograph like imagery) here, we are talking about *written words*. The anti-imaging laws are justified on the grounds that producing the stuff requires, by definition, a child, and therefore, outlawing the stuff Saves Children. As I understand this story, the guy had a diary which contained written descriptions of things he would *like* to do, not a photo album of kids bent over a table... Big difference. A a journalist, I'm sure you can see where this not so subtle difference lies... -- Yours, J.A. Terranson [EMAIL PROTECTED] If Governments really want us to behave like civilized human beings, they should give serious consideration towards setting a better example: Ruling by force, rather than consensus; the unrestrained application of unjust laws (which the victim-populations were never allowed input on in the first place); the State policy of justice only for the rich and elected; the intentional abuse and occassionally destruction of entire populations merely to distract an already apathetic and numb electorate... This type of demogoguery must surely wipe out the fascist United States as surely as it wiped out the fascist Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The views expressed here are mine, and NOT those of my employers, associates, or others. Besides, if it *were* the opinion of all of those people, I doubt there would be a problem to bitch about in the first place...
[RRE]Your Face Is Not a Bar Code (fwd)
-- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://www.lrz.de/~ui22204/;leitl/a __ ICBMTO : N48 10'07'' E011 33'53'' http://www.lrz.de/~ui22204 57F9CFD3: ED90 0433 EB74 E4A9 537F CFF5 86E7 629B 57F9 CFD3 -- Forwarded message -- Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2001 15:53:48 -0700 From: Phil Agre [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Red Rock Eater News Service [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [RRE]Your Face Is Not a Bar Code =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= This message was forwarded through the Red Rock Eater News Service (RRE). You are welcome to send the message along to others but please do not use the redirect option. For information about RRE, including instructions for (un)subscribing, see http://dlis.gseis.ucla.edu/people/pagre/rre.html =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Your Face Is Not a Bar Code: Arguments Against Automatic Face Recognition in Public Places Phil Agre http://dlis.gseis.ucla.edu/pagre/ Version of 7 September 2001. 2600 words. Copyright 2001 by Phil Agre. You are welcome to forward this article in electronic form to anyone for any noncommercial reason. Please do not post it on any Web sites; instead, link to it here: http://dlis.gseis.ucla.edu/people/pagre/bar-code.html Given a digital image of a person's face, face recognition software matches it against a database of other images. If any of the stored images matches closely enough, the system reports the sighting to its owner. Research on automatic face recognition has been around for decades, but accelerated in the 1990s. Now it is becoming practical, and face recognition systems are being deployed on a large scale. Some applications of automatic face recognition systems are relatively unobjectionable. Many facilities have good reasons to authenticate everyone who walks in the door, for example to regulate access to weapons, money, criminal evidence, nuclear materials, or biohazards. When a citizen has been arrested for probable cause, it is reasonable for the police to use automatic face recognition to match a mug shot of the individual against a database of mug shots of people who have been arrested previously. These uses of the technology should be publicly justified, and audits should ensure that the technology is being used only for proper purposes. Face recognition systems in public places, however, are a matter for serious concern. The issue recently came to broad public attention when it emerged that fans attending the Super Bowl had unknowingly been matched against a database of alleged criminals, and when the city of Tampa deployed a face-recognition system in the nightlife district of Ybor City. But current and proposed uses of face recognition are much more widespread, as the resources at the end of this article demonstrate in detail. The time to consider the acceptability of face recognition in public places is now, before the practice becomes entrenched and people start getting hurt. Nor is the problem limited to the scattered cases that have been reported thus far. As the underlying information and communication technologies (digital cameras, image databases, processing power, and data communications) become radically cheaper over the next two decades, face recognition will become dramatically cheaper as well, even without assuming major advances in technologies such as image processing that are specific to recognizing faces. Legal constraints on the practice in the United States are minimal. (In Europe the data protection laws will apply, providing at least some basic rights of notice and correction.) Databases of identified facial images already exist in large numbers (driver's license and employee ID records, for example), and new facial-image databases will not be hard to construct, with or without the knowledge or consent of the people whose faces are captured. (The images need to be captured under controlled conditions, but most citizens enter controlled, video-monitored spaces such as shops and offices on a regular basis.) It is nearly certain, therefore, that automatic face recognition will grow explosively and become pervasive unless action is taken now. I believe that automatic face recognition in public places, including commercial spaces such as shopping malls that are open to the public, should be outlawed. The dangers outweigh the benefits. The necessary laws will not be passed, however, without overwhelming pressure of public opinion and organizing. To that end, this article presents the arguments against automatic face recognition in public places, followed by responses to the most common arguments in favor. Arguments against automatic face recognition in public places * The potential for abuse is astronomical. Pervasive automatic face recognition could be used to track individuals wherever they go. Systems operated by different
Re: Request for SSSCA mirror help
Looks like we're set. Thanks, folks. http://gnu-darwin.sourceforge.net/sssca-draft.pdf http://www.nullify.org/sssca-draft.pdf http://sites.inka.de/risctaker/sssca-draft.pdf http://www.parrhesia.com/sssca-draft.pdf -Declan On Sat, Sep 08, 2001 at 12:25:18PM -0400, Declan McCullagh wrote: I've put the complete SSSCA draft text in a PDF file here: http://www.well.com/~declan/sssca-draft.pdf Can I talk some folks who can spare the bandwidth into mirroring it and sending me the URL? The file's 2.5 MB, and I don't want to overload the Well's poor servers. Then I'll distribute a list of the original and the mirror sites. Please disregard this message after 3 pm ET Saturday. Thanks, Declan
