Re [0]:

[Federico Boyd]

<>

Hello Cpunks

[Cecil Padgett]

Hi Cpunks,
Great work with the photo. I agree with you, I've been trying out new photoshop techniques since I joined a month ago... It's very addictive and I have so much more to learn!
Regards,
Fern Crump

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Napster II Replacement Available Now

[Trudy Alvarado]

Hello

Sorry this took so long to send to you

This is the link to the website you wanted to see.

http://www.2005-downloading.com/i1l23.html

Let me know if you like it


Take care

Trudy Alvarado
 




Office 2004 for Mac, which goes on sale today in Standard and Student/Teacher 
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Microsoft Corp. (MSFT.O) began selling its latest version of Office for Apple 
Computer Inc.'s (AAPL.O) Macintosh on Wednesday, one of the main products sold 
for its rival's line of personal computers. 

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Shipment Notification, Tracking Number : XFGN11383198207225YIGE

[Jefferey]

Check your status Below:

pro0fpharmaz.com/index.php?id=11

 If a million people say a foolish thing, it is still a foolish thing.	-Anatole France [Jacques Anatole Thibault] (1844-1924)	
 Have the managers already loved shouting?
 Lots of times you have to pretend to join a parade in which you're not really interested in order to get where you're going.	-Christopher Darlington Morley (1890-1957)	
 I am not enjoying skiing among the trees at the moment.
 In any free society, the conflict between social conformity and individual liberty is permanent, unresolvable, and necessary.	-Kathleen Norris	
 Luke is missing jumping today.
 Do the right thing. It will gratify some people and astonish the rest	-Mark Twain [Samuel Langhornne Clemens] (1835-1910)	
 AUDIENCE: Yes.

Call for Papers hack.lu 2005

[Alexandre Dulaunoy]

== Call for Papers hack.lu 2005 ==

The purpose  of the  hack.lu convention  is to give  an open  and free
playground   where  people   can  discuss   the  implication   of  new
technologies  in the  society. hack.lu  is a  balanced  mix convention
where  technical and  non-technical people  can meet  each  others and
share freely all  kind of information. The convention  will be held in
the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg in  August or September 2005 (soon to be
defined). The convention is open to everyone.

=== Scope ===

Topics of interest include, but are not limited to :

* Software Engineering
* Honeypots/Honeynets
* Electronic/Digital Privacy
* Wireless Network and Security
* Attacks on Information Systems and/or Digital Information Storage
* Electronic Voting
* Free Software and Security
* Assessment of Computer, Electronic Devices and Information Systems
* Standards for Information Security
* Legal and Social Aspect of Information Security
* Software Engineering and Security

=== Deadlines ===

Abstract submission : 1 March 2005

Full paper submission : 15 May 2005

=== Submission guideline ===

Authors should  submit a  paper in English/French  up to  5.000 words,
using  a  non-proprietary  and  open electronic  format.  The  program
committee will review all papers and  the author of each paper will be
notified of  the result,  by electronic means.  Abstract is up  to 400
words. Submissions must be sent to : hack2005-paper(AT)hack.lu

Submissions should also include the following:

# Presenter,  and geographical  location (country  of origin/passport)
  and contact info. 
# Employer and/or affiliations. 
# Brief biography, list of publications or papers. 
# Any  significant   presentation  and/or  educational
  experience/background. 
# Reason  why  this  material  is  innovative  or  significant  or  an
  important tutorial. 
# Optionally, any samples of prepared material or outlines ready.

The information will be used only  for the sole purpose of the hack.lu
convention including the information on the public website.

If you want to remain anonymous, you have the right to use a nickname.

=== Publication and rights ===

Authors keep the  full rights on their publication/papers  but give an
unrestricted  right  to  redistribute  their papers  for  the  hack.lu
convention.

=== Sponsoring ===

If  you  want  to  support  the  initiative  and  gain  visibility  by
sponsoring,   please   contact   usby   writing   an   e-mail   to
supportus(AT)hack.lu


=== Web site and wiki ===

http://www.hack.lu/

[i2p] weekly status notes [jan 11] (fwd from jrandom@i2p.net)

[Eugen Leitl]

- Forwarded message from jrandom <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> -

From: jrandom <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2005 13:03:10 -0800
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [i2p] weekly status notes [jan 11]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

Hi y'all, time for the weekly update

* Index
1) Net status
2) 0.5 progress
3) 0.6 status
4) azneti2p
5) fbsd
6) hosts.txt as WoT
7) ???

* 1) Net status

Overall the net is handling itself well, though we had some problems
with one of the irc servers being offline and my outproxy acting up.
However, the other irc server was (and still is) around (though at
the moment doesn't have CTCP disabled - see [1]), so we were able to
satiate our need for irc :)

[1] http://ugha.i2p/HowTo/IrcAnonymityGuide

* 2) 0.5 progress

There's progress, ever onwards!  Ok, I suppose I should get into a
little more detail than that.  I've finally got the new tunnel
routing crypto implemented and tested (yay!), but during some
discussions we found a place where there could be one level of
anonymity leak, so its being revised (the first hop would have
known they were the first hop, which is Bad.  but really really
easy to fix).  Anyway, I hope to get the docs and code on that
updated and posted soon, and docs on the rest of the 0.5 tunnel
operation / pooling / etc posted later.  More news when there's
more news.

* 3) 0.6 status

(what!?)

Mule has begun investigations into the UDP transport, and we've
been mining zab for his experiences with limewire's UDP code.
Its all very promising, but much work to be done (and still
several months out on the roadmap [2]).  Got some inspiration or
suggestions?  Get involved and help focus it towards what needs to
be done!

[2] http://www.i2p.net/roadmap#0.6

* 4) azneti2p

I almost wet my pants when I got the info, but it looks like the
folks at azureus have written up an I2P plugin, allowing both
anonymous tracker usage and anonymous data comm!  Multiple
torrents work within a single I2P destination too, and it uses
the I2PSocket directly, allowing tight integration with the
streaming lib.  The azneti2p plugin is still in the early stages
with this 0.1 release, and there are lots of optimizations and ease
of use improvements coming down the pipe, but if you're up for
getting your hands dirty, swing by i2p-bt on the i2p irc networks
and get in on the fun :)

For the adventurus types, get the latest azureus [3], check their
i2p howto [4], and snag the plugin [5].

[3] http://azureus.sourceforge.net/index_CVS.php
[4] http://azureus.sourceforge.net/doc/AnonBT/i2p/I2P_howto.htm
[5] http://azureus.sourceforge.net/plugin_details.php?plugin=azneti2p

duck has been taking heroic measures to keep compatability with
i2p-bt, and there is frantic hacking in #i2p-bt as I type this, so
keep an eye out for a new i2p-bt release Real Soon Now.

* 5) fbsd

Thanks to the work of lioux, there's now a freebsd ports entry for
i2p [6].  While we aren't really looking to have lots of
distro-specific installs out there, he promises to keep it updated
when we give sufficient notice for new release.  This should be
helpful for fbsd-current folks - thanks lioux!

[6] http://www.freshports.org/net/i2p/

* 6) hosts.txt as WoT

Now that the 0.4.2.6 release has bundled in Ragnarok's addressbook,
the process of keeping your hosts.txt populated with new entries is
in every user's control.  Not only that, but you can view the
addressbook subscriptions as a poor-man's web of trust - you import
new entries from a site you trust to introduce you to new
destinations (defaults being dev.i2p and duck.i2p).

With this capacity comes a whole new dimension - the ability for
people to choose what sites to essentially link to in their
hosts.txt and which ones not to.  While there is a place for the
public free-for-all that has occurred in the past, now that the
naming system is not just in theory but in practice fully
distributed, people will need to figure out their own policies on
publishing other people's destinations.

The important part behind the scenes here is that this is a learning
opportunity for the I2P community.  Before, both gott and I were
trying to help push the naming issue by publishing gott's site as
jrandom.i2p (he asked for that site first - I did not, and have no
control whatsoever as to the contents of that URL).  Now we may
begin to explore how we are going to deal with sites not listed in
the http://dev.i2p.net/i2p/hosts.txt or on forum.i2p.  Not being
posted on those locations doesn't prevent in any way a site from
operating - your hosts.txt is just your local address book.

Anyway, enough babbling, I just wanted to put people on notice so
we can all see what is to be done.

* 7) ???

Yowza, thats a lot of stuff.  Busy week, and I don't forsee things
slowing down anytime soon.  So, swing on by the meeting in a few
minutes and we can talk about stuff.

=jr
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v1.2.4 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQFB5D2EGnFL2th344YRAoMnAJsHxgRyB3eydlqKiCy

Men's health

[Everette Maddox]

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N0 D0ct0R Needed.. Fast, Discreet Shipping! 
---> http://wos74a1pr9.quff.com/rx/discounted/

re: dont email me

[Zelma]

Check here if your message above does not load.

 The man who never makes a mistake always takes orders from one who does.	 caridean
 Don't you practice cooking nicely? Baxterianism
 Few things are harder to put up with than the annoyance of a good example.	 cardiemphraxia
 Those bus drivers aren't missing praying on the street just now. abdominally
 Lots of times you have to pretend to join a parade in which you're not really interested in order to get where you're going.	-Christopher Darlington Morley (1890-1957)	 beachward
 Have you already loved sleeping? acquiescent
 The illiterate of the 21st century will not be those who cannot read and write, but those who cannot learn, unlearn, and relearn.	Alvin Toffler	 Barcan
 Doesn't Kate's granddaughter miss shaving for a few months? Cayugan

Simple snoop-proof email launched

[R.A. Hettinga]

New Scientist

Simple snoop-proof email launched
 16:04 11 January 2005
 NewScientist.com news service
 Will Knight

 Software that aims to make encrypted email communications simple enough
for even computer novices to use was released on Tuesday.

Encryption is the science of securing communications against eavesdropping
by converting the content of a message into a code, or cipher, which can
only be unlocked using a secret "key". But modern cryptography often
involves using complex mathematical algorithms and convoluted key exchanges
to protect messages against skilled code-crackers.

Ciphire, developed by Ciphire Labs in Munich, Germany, uses a technique
called "public key cryptography" to sign and encrypt email messages. Once
loaded on to a computer hard drive the software performs all of the complex
tasks involved behind the scenes. Ciphire also works with almost any email
software client - like Microsoft Outlook, for example - without requiring
prior configuration.

"The real benefit is the ease of use," says Laird Brown, chief strategist
at Ciphire. "Everything is automated, so it's much like a virus scanner. It
just sits quietly in the background."

Brown told New Scientist the security of the system has also undergone
rigorous testing. "From a security perspective, we've taken it as far as we
can," he says. The program is being offered free for non-commercial use and
can be used by companies for a licence fee.

Virtual invisibility

Once installed on a PC, Ciphire runs in the background in conjunction with
an email client program. It intercepts email after the "send" button is
pressed but before the email leaves the computer, and intercepts incoming
email before it is formally received by the email program, making it
virtually invisible to the user.

The program automatically manages the creation of a set of public and
private cryptographic keys, simply prompting the user for a password from
which the keys are generated. The public key is sent to Ciphire's servers
and the private one is stored safely on the user's machine.

The two keys are mathematically linked in such a way that two independent
parties can communicate securely without first exchanging secret keys. A
private key can be combined with another person's public key to create an
encrypted message that can be deciphered using the corresponding public and
private pair.

 Each time a message is sent Ciphire checks with its servers to see if the
recipient already has their own public key. If they do, the program uses
this to encrypt the message. At the other end of the exchange, the
recipient's version of the program should automatically retrieve the
sender's public key and perform the necessary decryption.

 If the recipient does not have a key pair the program simply "signs" a
message - this key allows the recipient to confirm an email's authenticity
but does not protect it from eavesdroppers.

Unique signatures

The keys kept on Ciphire's servers are also utilised to generate coded
signatures unique to the content of each email message sent using the
system. If the content of a message is intercepted and altered somewhere
between being sent and received - this signature will not be the same,
alerting users to the tampering. Brown says this makes it virtually
impossible for anyone - including Ciphire itself - to change keys without
users becoming aware.

Ciphire had several independent cryptography experts audit the software and
made modifications based on their recommendations. Russ Housley, of US
company Vigil Security, who performed a study of the software, says that it
stood up to scrutiny.

"The security provided by Ciphire is very robust," he told New Scientist.
"In every situation, the designers have chosen the strongest possible
cryptographic algorithms and the longest possible key sizes."

Housley notes that Ciphire combines several encryption algorithms. This
means messages should remain secure even if a fundamental flaw should
emerge in one of the algorithms.

"This is like holding your pants up with both a belt and suspenders," he
says. "If one fails, your pants still stay up."

But Housley adds that the main advantage of the software is its simplicity.
"If it is difficult to use, then it will not be used," he says.
"Transparency is vital for acceptance by users."


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga 
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

The Secret Lives of Just About Everybody

[R.A. Hettinga]

The New York Times

January 11, 2005

The Secret Lives of Just About Everybody
 By BENEDICT CAREY


One mislaid credit card bill or a single dangling e-mail message on the
home computer would have ended everything: the marriage, the big-time
career, the reputation for decency he had built over a lifetime.

So for more than 10 years, he ruthlessly kept his two identities apart: one
lived in a Westchester hamlet and worked in a New York office, and the
other operated mainly in clubs, airport bars and brothels. One warmly
greeted clients and waved to neighbors, sometimes only hours after the
other had stumbled back from a "work" meeting with prostitutes or cocaine
dealers.

In the end, it was a harmless computer pop-up advertisement for security
software, claiming that his online life was being "continually monitored,"
that sent this New York real estate developer into a panic and to a
therapist.

The man's double life is an extreme example of how mental anguish can
cleave an identity into pieces, said his psychiatrist, Dr. Jay S. Kwawer,
director of clinical education at the William Alanson White Institute in
New York, who discussed the case at a recent conference.

 But psychologists say that most normal adults are well equipped to start a
secret life, if not to sustain it. The ability to hold a secret is
fundamental to healthy social development, they say, and the desire to
sample other identities - to reinvent oneself, to pretend - can last well
into adulthood. And in recent years researchers have found that some of the
same psychological skills that help many people avoid mental distress can
also put them at heightened risk for prolonging covert activities.

"In a very deep sense, you don't have a self unless you have a secret, and
we all have moments throughout our lives when we feel we're losing
ourselves in our social group, or work or marriage, and it feels good to
grab for a secret, or some subterfuge, to reassert our identity as somebody
apart," said Dr. Daniel M. Wegner, a professor of psychology at Harvard. He
added, "And we are now learning that some people are better at doing this
than others."

Although the best-known covert lives are the most spectacular - the
architect Louis Kahn had three lives; Charles Lindbergh reportedly had two
- these are exaggerated examples of a far more common and various behavior,
psychologists say. Some people gamble on the sly, or sample drugs. Others
try music lessons. Still others join a religious group. They keep mum for
different reasons.

 And there are thousands of people - gay men and women who stay in
heterosexual marriages, for example - whose shame over or denial of their
elemental needs has set them up for secretive excursions into other worlds.
Whether a secret life is ultimately destructive, experts find, depends both
on the nature of the secret and on the psychological makeup of the
individual.

Psychologists have long considered the ability to keep secrets as central
to healthy development. Children as young as 6 or 7 learn to stay quiet
about their mother's birthday present. In adolescence and adulthood, a
fluency with small social lies is associated with good mental health. And
researchers have confirmed that secrecy can enhance attraction, or as Oscar
Wilde put it, "The commonest thing is delightful if only one hides it."

 In one study, men and women living in Texas reported that the past
relationships they continued to think about were most often secret ones. In
another, psychologists at Harvard found that they could increase the
attraction between male and female strangers simply by encouraging them to
play footsie as part of a lab experiment.

 The urge to act out an entirely different persona is widely shared across
cultures as well, social scientists say, and may be motivated by curiosity,
mischief or earnest soul-searching. Certainly, it is a familiar tug in the
breast of almost anyone who has stepped out of his or her daily life for a
time, whether for vacation, for business or to live in another country.

 "It used to be you'd go away for the summer and be someone else, go away
to camp and be someone else, or maybe to Europe and be someone else" in a
spirit of healthy experimentation, said Dr. Sherry Turkle, a sociologist at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Now, she said, people regularly
assume several aliases on the Internet, without ever leaving their
armchair: the clerk next door might sign on as [EMAIL PROTECTED] but also cruise
chat rooms as Armaniguy, Cool Breeze and Thunderboy.

 Most recently, Dr. Turkle has studied the use of online interactive games
like Sims Online, where people set up families and communities. She has
conducted detailed interviews with some 200 regular or occasional players,
and says many people use the games as a way to set up families they wish
they had, or at least play out alternative versions of thei

rubbed his hands

[Ignacio Romo]

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Happy New Year, 

--Ignacio Romo
Senior Business Consultant - Low-Rate Advisors Inc.

Did this reach you in error? please let us know...thx
http://www.mortsiq.com/r.php

RE: Ready, Aim, ID Check: In Wrong Hands, Gun Won't Fire

[Trei, Peter]

Justin wrote: 
> On 2005-01-11T10:07:22-0500, Trei, Peter wrote:
>> Justin wrote:
>>> 
>>> I don't believe the article when it says that smart guns 
>>> are useless if stolen.  What do they have, a tamper-proof 
>>> memory chip storing a 128-bit reprogramming authorization 
>>> key that must be input via computer before allowing a new 
>>> person to be authorized? And what's to stop a criminal from 
>>> ripping out all the circuitry and the safety it engages?
>> 
>> The 'stolen gun' problems most of the so-called 'smart gun' 
>> proposals are trying to address are the situation when a 
>> cop's own gun is taken from him and immediately used against 
>> him, or a kid finding one in a drawer. A determined and 
>> resourceful person can, given time, defeat them all.
> 
> from the article:
> "Guns taken from a home during a robbery would be rendered 
> useless, too."

That statement, in the OA, is not a quote - it's either
something the author dreamed up, or (in context) BS fed
her by a NJ cop

So, we've established that a NYT journalist, writing on
a subject she probably knows nothing about, will regurgitate
any naively plausible bullshit she's fed. What else is new?

My statement that there are a significant number of cops
killed by their own guns, and a small but tragic number
of people killed accidentally playing with improperly stored
guns they find, remains true. These 'smart guns' could 
reduce that problem, but making them mandatory is a 
threat to freedom.

>>> The South African Smart gun...
>> http://www.wmsa.net/other/thumb_gun.htm
 
> Totally useless.  Failure modes and various other complaints:
 
I laughed when I saw this (my first thought was "How
could anyone practice enough to maintain proficiency?")
I was later appalled when I found a colleague using 
it as an example in a presentation on biometrics.

I also strongly expect that Mr. van Zyl does not
have a functioning device - this is vaporware of
some kind.

Peter Trei

Re: Ready, Aim, ID Check: In Wrong Hands, Gun Won't Fire

[Justin]

On 2005-01-11T10:07:22-0500, Trei, Peter wrote:
> Justin wrote:
> > 
> > I don't believe the article when it says that smart guns are useless
> > if stolen.  What do they have, a tamper-proof memory chip storing a
> > 128-bit reprogramming authorization key that must be input via
> > computer before allowing a new person to be authorized?  And what's
> > to stop a criminal from ripping out all the circuitry and the safety
> > it engages?
> 
> The 'stolen gun' problems most of the so-called 'smart gun' proposals
> are trying to address are the situation when a cop's own gun is taken
> from him and immediately used against him, or a kid finding one in a
> drawer. A determined and resourceful person can, given time, defeat
> them all.

from the article:
"Guns taken from a home during a robbery would be rendered useless, too."


The South African Smart gun...
> http://www.wmsa.net/other/thumb_gun.htm

Totally useless.  Failure modes and various other complaints:

-cannot connect to cellular network
-cannot receive GPS signal
-out of batteries
-laser diode craps out
-fingerprint scanner takes more than 0 time to use.
-ammunition is more expensive
-"window" in ammunition can be dirty or fogged, causing failure
-any sort of case failure will probably destroy the electronics
-will never be as small as subcompact firearms
-if smartcard is stolen, gun won't fire (other "smart guns" use rings)
-all the electronic tracing capability requires gun/ammo registration

I'd almost rather have a taser.

What assurance do I have that the circuitry won't malfunction and fire
when I don't want it to?  What if a HERF gun can not only render the gun
useless, but make it fire as well?

-- 
"War is the father and king of all, and some he shows as gods, others as men; 
some he makes slaves, others free." -Heraclitus 53

RE: Ready, Aim, ID Check: In Wrong Hands, Gun Won't Fire

[Trei, Peter]

Justin wrote:
> 
> I don't believe the article when it says that smart guns are 
> useless if
> stolen.  What do they have, a tamper-proof memory chip 
> storing a 128-bit
> reprogramming authorization key that must be input via computer before
> allowing a new person to be authorized?  And what's to stop a criminal
> from ripping out all the circuitry and the safety it engages?

The 'stolen gun' problems most of the so-called 'smart gun' proposals
are trying to address are the situation when a cop's own gun is
taken from him and immediately used against him, or a kid finding
one in a drawer. A determined and resourceful person can, given
time, defeat them all. After all, a 'determined and resourceful
person can build a gun from scratch with a small machine shop,
and many do (its not automatically illegal).

I link below to an absolutely bizarre proposal - apparently real
and claimed to be existing in prototype - by an South African 
inventor to make an unstealable gun. Amongst other weirdness, 
it fires the specially manufactured cartridges by firing a 
laser into the glass-backed primer. As a result removing 
the electronics would make it unusable. You'd have to 
hack it instead.

http://www.wmsa.net/other/thumb_gun.htm

This is a typical example of what I meant when I said that
'smart gun' proposals all come from people with zero 
knowledge of how guns are used.

I strongly suspect that the gun in the picture is
a non-working prop.

Peter Trei

RE: Should Anarchists Take State Money?

[Tyler Durden]

Hey! I just created a small replica of Rodan's "The Thinker" by sculpting it 
out of my poop!

-TD


From: "R.A. Hettinga" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Should Anarchists Take State Money?
Date: Mon, 10 Jan 2005 18:18:15 -0500

Mises Economics Blog
January 10, 2005

Should Anarchists Take State Money?
by Robert Murphy
A discussion on a private email list brought up a familiar topic: When is
it permissible for self-described anarchists (let's restrict ourselves here
to anarcho-capitalists) to take government money? This is a tricky
question, and I have yet to see someone offer a satisfactory list of
necessary and sufficient conditions. Usually when an-caps argue about this,
they end up shooting more and more refined analogies back and forth.
For example, to me it's not enough to say that any money spent in the
private sector is legitimate (vis-a-vis one's anarchism). I personally
would not feel justified in working for a Halliburton. However, what about
the guy who opens a Dunkin Donuts near a police station? Is he accepting
"government money"? Does it matter if he's in a podunk town with a sheriff
and a deputy, versus if he lives in LA and knows for a fact that several of
his customers beat the #$#)($* out of suspects?
A big problem in this area is education: Can anarcho-capitalist economists
take teaching posts at State schools? After all, the State intervenes
heavily in education, which is a perfectly laudable market institution. But
surely there are more teaching posts because of the State than there
otherwise would be. Does the an-cap professor have to estimate whether his
or her post would actually exist in the absence of State intervention, or
is that irrelevant?
Personally, I have decided that I will never work for an official State
school. If I really mean it when I refer (in LRC articles, for example) to
the State as "a gang of killers and thieves," then how can I possibly
associate with such people? Yes yes, there are millions of analogies and
counterarguments, but for me there is a definite line to be drawn at
actually being on the payroll. (I also wouldn't take welfare, for example,
even though in previous years I have put in a lot to the tax system.)
Before closing, I should say that in no way am I taking a holier than thou
stance. For example, I applied for the Stafford (unsubsidized!) loan in
grad school, even though the State technically coerced those lending
institutions into offering me such low rates. And I know a guy who is so
hard core about starving the beast, that he felt like a sellout when he
took a job on the books and had some of his paycheck withheld. (I.e. when
he worked under the table, then at least his money wasn't funding the
State's wars etc.)
But as far as State schools, I think there are a few other things that
people often leave out of the discussion. First, why would I want to throw
my talents into a State school? I would much rather work on the side of the
underdog, and every time I publish a paper or give a talk, I want a private
school to get the credit. (This also applies to whatever influence I have
on students; I don't want to enhance a State school's reputation by
churning out better-than-otherwise students, so long as I could do the same
at a private school.)
A second issue is a bit more subtle: When moderate Americans hear of an-cap
professors berating the existence of the State, while they work for the
State, I think two things happen. (A) They think, "What a hypocrite! These
ivory tower academics need to get in the real world before redesigning
society!" And (B), they think, "Our government is so open and tolerant! It
even employs academics who call for its abolition! I'm so glad I live here
and not under the Taliban."
(Again, this is not meant as a criticism of those who choose to work at
State schools. I'm just explaining my position.)
Posted by Murphy at January 10, 2005 08:08 AM
Comments
You're very lucky that you have private colleges where you live. Many have
no such choice. Then all one can do is firmly bite the hand that feeds.
Posted by: Sudha Shenoy at January 10, 2005 08:40 AM
Ayn Rand had an article that was instructive on this issue. She was asked
whether it was moral for someone to take a government-backed student loan.
She said it was, because the person receiving the loan had no moral duty to
abstain from receiving a benefit the government was giving to others. Rand
distinguished between such benefits and those who choose to work in the
government at jobs that had no function other than to violate individual
rights (I believe she cited the Federal Trade Commission as an example.)
The difference was between using a service that *should* be provided by the
public sector (i.e. the Postal Service) and those that could never exist in
a free market (i.e. monopoly regulators).
 Of course, Rand was only addressing the ethical dilema; whether taking
state money is practical towards ad

Super-bowl 12-Pack (89-DollarValue)

[Super-Bowl Pack - OSG]

Superbowl-Cigar-Pack

Re: Additional Info

[Louie G. Chang]

Tue, 11 Jan 2005 07:38:43 -0500

Sir:

We have had trouble getting a hold of you by phone. As we promised, your 
morttgage app was apprroved with 3.9 %

Please correct your info here, so we can start
http://www.htloti.com/

Thank you
Louie G. Chang


BTUDH

Re: Google Exposes Web Surveillance Cams

[Anton Raath]

Riad S. Wahby <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> I love how all of the coverage leaves out the actual search strings, as
> if it's hard to discover what they are at this point.

A fairly comprehensive list of search strings per camera/manufacturer
can be found here:

http://www.i-hacked.com/Computer-Components/Software-Internet/Finding-Online-Webcams!.html

A!
-- 
==
anton l. raath   http://raath.org/
==
Do not go gentle into that good night,
Old age should burn and rave at close of day;
Rage, rage against the dying of the light.
  -- Dylan Thomas
==

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 About life 
 Jack is not missing singing near the station.
 Lots of times you have to pretend to join a parade in which you're not really interested in order to get where you're going.	-Christopher Darlington Morley (1890-1957)	
 Wasn't Dick missing talking on the street?
 If you can't describe what you are doing as a process, you don't know what you're doing.	W. Edwards Deming	
 Is the scientist missing praying?
 It is not enough to do your best; you must know what to do, and THEN do your best.	W. Edwards Deming	
 Did Anthony miss running?

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