Re: The price of failure
At 6:22 PM -0700 10/20/05, Steve Schear wrote: Quick, before they change it: search Google using the term failure Yawn. That, or something like it, has been there for years, Steve... Cheers, RAH -- - R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED] The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/ 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA ... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
Re: Judy Miller needing killing
Gil Hamilton wrote: I've never heard it disclosed how the prosecutor discovered that Miller had had such a conversation but it isn't relevant anyway. The question is, can she defy a subpoena based on membership in the privileged Reporter class that an ordinary person could not defy? Why not? while Miller could well be prosecuted for revealing the identity, had she done so - she didn't. Why should *anyone* be jailed for failing to reveal who they had talked to in confidence? I am all in favour of people being tried for their actions, but not for thoughtcrimes. On the other hand - Robert Novak got the same information, REPORTED it - and isn't in any sort of trouble at all. Somehow this isn't the issue though... and I wonder why? I don't know this either; perhaps because he immediately rolled over when he got subpoenaed? And yet Novak is the one who purportedly committed a crime - revealing the identity of an agent and thus endangering them. So the actual crime (of revealing) isn't important, but talking to a reporter is?
Re: Judy Miller needing killing
Dave Howe [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Gil Hamilton wrote: I've never heard it disclosed how the prosecutor discovered that Miller had had such a conversation but it isn't relevant anyway. The question is, can she defy a subpoena based on membership in the privileged Reporter class that an ordinary person could not defy? Why not? while Miller could well be prosecuted for revealing the identity, had she done so - she didn't. Why should *anyone* be jailed for failing to reveal who they had talked to in confidence? I am all in favour of people being tried for their actions, but not for thoughtcrimes. Miller wasn't prosecuted. She was not charged with a crime. She was not in danger of being charged if she had revealed the identity. She was jailed for contempt of court for obstructing a grand jury investigation by refusing to testify. Perhaps no one should be required to testify but current law here is that when subpoenaed by a grand jury investigating a possible crime, one is obliged to answer their questions except in a small number of exceptional circumstances (self-incrimination would be one example). Miller is seeking to be placed above the law that applies to the rest of us. And yet Novak is the one who purportedly committed a crime - revealing the identity of an agent and thus endangering them. So the actual crime (of revealing) isn't important, but talking to a reporter is? You're confused. AFAIK, no one has suggested that Novak commited a crime in this case. The actual crime (of revealing) is what the grand jury was attempting to investigate; Miller was jailed for obstructing that investigation. GH _ Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE! http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/
Re: [fc-discuss] Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like Payment Systems
On 10/19/05, Daniel A. Nagy [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf Note that nowhere in my paper did I imply that the issuer is a bank (the only mentioning of a bank in the paper is in an analogy). This is because I am strongly convinced that banks cannot, will not and should not be the principal issuers of digital cash-like payment vehicles. If you need explaination, I'm willing to provide it. I do not expect payment tokens to originate from withdrawals and end their life cycles being deposited to users' bank accounts. Suppose we consider your concept of a transaction chain, which is formed when a token is created based on some payment from outside the system, is maintained through exchanges of one token for another (we will ignore split and combine operations for now), and terminates when the token is redeemed for some outside-the-system value. Isn't it likely in practice that such transaction chains will be paid for and redeemed via existing financial systems, which are fully identified? A user will buy a token using an online check or credit card or some other non-anonymous mechanism. He passes it to someone else as a cash-like payment. Optionally it passes through more hands. Ultimately it is redeemed by someone who exchanges it for a check or deposit into a bank or credit card account. If you don't see this as the typical usage model, I'd like to hear your ideas. If this is the model, my concern is that in practice it will often be the case that there will be few intermediate exchanges. Particularly in the early stages of the system, there won't be that much to buy. Someone may accept epoints for payment but the first thing he will do is convert them to real money. A typical transaction will start with someone buying epoints from the issuer using some identified payment system, spending them online, and then the recipient redeems them using an identified payment system. The issuer sees exactly who spent, how much they spent and where they spent it. The result is that in practice the system has no anonymity whatsoever. It is just another way of transferring value online. Using currency is, essentially, a credit operation, splitting barter into the separate acts of selling and buying, thus making the promise to reciprocate (that is the eligibility to buy something of equal value from the buyer) a tradeable asset itself. It is the trading of this asset that needs to be anonymous, and the proposed system does a good enough job of protecting the anonymity of those in the middle of the transaction chains. The hard part is getting into the middle of those transaction chains. Until we reach the point where people receive their salaries in epoints, they will have little choice but to buy epoints for real money. That puts them at the beginning of a transaction chain and not in the middle. Sellers will tend to be at the end. The only people who could be in the middle would be those who sell substantially online for epoints and who also find things online that they can buy for epoints. But that will be a small fraction of users. For the rest of them, anonymity is not a sellling point of this system. If you take away the anonymity, is this technology still valuable? Does it have advantages over other online payment systems, like egold, credit cards or paypal? CP
Re: [fc-discuss] Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like Payment Systems
cyphrpunk wrote: If this is the model, my concern is that in practice it will often be the case that there will be few intermediate exchanges. Particularly in the early stages of the system, there won't be that much to buy. Someone may accept epoints for payment but the first thing he will do is convert them to real money. A typical transaction will start with someone buying epoints from the issuer using some identified payment system, spending them online, and then the recipient redeems them using an identified payment system. The issuer sees exactly who spent, how much they spent and where they spent it. The result is that in practice the system has no anonymity whatsoever. It is just another way of transferring value online. That's a merchant business model. Typically, that's not how payment systems emerge. Mostly, they emerge by a p2p model, and then migrate to a merchant model over time. How they start is generally a varied question, and somewhat a part of the inspiration of the Issuer. According to the Issuer's design, he may try and force that migration faster or slower. In a more forced system, there is typically only one or a few exchange points and that is probably the Issuer himself. If the Issuer also pushes a merchant design, and a triangular flow evolves, the tracing of transactions is relatively easy regardless of the system because time and amount give it away. But, typically, if the Issuer has designs on merchant business, he generally doesn't care about the hyphed non-tracking capabilities of the software, and also prefer the tracking to be easy for support and segmentation purposes. A game that Issuers often play is to pretend or market a system as privacy protecting, but if their intention is the merchant model then that game stops when the numbers get serious. (I gather they discuss that in the Paypal book if you want a written example.) Either way, it is kind of tough to criticise a software system for that. It's the Issuer and the market that sets the tune there; not the software system. The ideal software system allows the Issuer to decide these paramaters, but it is also kind of tough to provide all such paramaters in a big dial, and keep the system small and tight. (I suppose on this note, this is a big difference between Daniel's system and mine. His is small and tight and he talks about being able to audit the 5 page long central server ... mine is relatively large and complex, but it can do bearer and it can do fully traceable, as well as be passably extended to imitate of his design.) Meanwhile, the Issuers who want to provide privacy with a bog standard double entry online accounts system still have a better record of doing that than any other Issuers that might have boasted mathematical blah blah, they just run theirs privately. e.g., your average Swiss bank. iang
Re: [fc-discuss] Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like Payment Systems
I will provide a detailed answer a bit later, but the short answer is that anonymity and untraceability are not major selling points, as experience shows. After all, ATMs could easily record and match to the user the serial numbers of each banknote they hand out, yet, there seems to be no preference to coins vs. banknotes. The major selling point, as noted in the paper and in the presentation is that the security (and hence the transaction cost manifesting itself in the effort required for each transaction) scales with transaction value. For paying pennies, you just type, say, 12-character codes. Yet, if the transaction value warrants it, you can have a full-fledged, digitally signed audit trail within the same system. And it's completely up to the users to decide what security measures to take. Another important issue is that you never risk more than the transaction value. There is no identity to be stolen. So, in short, the selling point is flexible and potentially very high security against all sorts of threats. Someone finding out who you might be is not, by far, the most serious threat in a payment system. -- Daniel
Re: Judy Miller needing killing
On 10/18/05, Major Variola (ret.) [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: So this dupe/spy/wannabe journalist thinks that journalists should be *special*.. how nice. Where in the 1st amendment is the class journalists mentioned? She needs a WMD enema. We put up with this needs killing crap from Tim May because he was imaginative and interesting, at least when he could shake free from his racism and nihilism. You on the other hand offer nothing but bilious ignorance. If you don't have anything to say, how about if you just don't say it? The notion that someone who is willing to spend months in jail just to keep a promise of silence needs killing is beyond bizarre and is downright evil. This list supports the rights of individuals to tell the government to go to hell, and that is exactly what Judy Miller did. She should be a hero around here. It's disgusting to see these kinds of comments from a no-nothing like Major Variola. CP
Re: Judy Miller needing killing
cyphrpunk [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The notion that someone who is willing to spend months in jail just to keep a promise of silence needs killing is beyond bizarre and is downright evil. Straw man alert. MV's notion is that a person who thinks journalists should be a special class of people who enjoy freedom of press (while, presumably, the rest of us don't) needs killing. That this person happens also to have spent months in jail, c, is unhappy coincidence. This list supports the rights of individuals to tell the government to go to hell, and that is exactly what Judy Miller did. She should be a hero around here. It's disgusting to see these kinds of comments from a no-nothing like Major Variola. I agree that her actions with regard to the Grand Jury situation are commendable (especially in light of my belief that the entire Grand Jury process is one of the most broken parts of our present legal system). Nevertheless, calling for the creation of a (licensed?) journalist class is stupidity so pure it's almost immoral. Repeat after me: we are all journalists. -- Riad S. Wahby [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [fc-discuss] Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like Payment Systems
Let's take a look at Daniel Nagy's list of desirable features for an ecash system and see how simple, on-line Chaum ecash fares. http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf One of the reasons, in the author s opinion, is that payment systems based on similar schemes lack some key characteristics of paper-based cash, rendering them economically infeasible. Let us quickly enumerate the most important properties of cash: 1. Money doesn't smell. Cash payments are -- potentially -- _anonymous_ and untraceable by third parties (including the issuer). This is of course the main selling point of Chaum's system, where it excels. I will point out that defining cash as merely potentially anonymous leaves a loophole whereby fully non-anonymous systems get to call themselves cash. This underplays the strength of Chaum's system. It is not just potentially anonymous, it has a strong degree of anonymity. 2. Cash payments are final. After the fact, the paying party has no means to reverse the payment. We call this property of cash transactions _irreversibility_. Certainly Chaum ecash has this property. Because deposits are unlinkable to withdrawals, there is no way even in principle to reverse a transaction. 3. Cash payments are _peer-to-peer_. There is no distinction between merchants and customers; anyone can pay anyone. In particular, anybody can receive cash payments without contracts with third parties. Again this is precisely how Chaum ecash works. Everyone can receive ecash and everyone can spend it. There is no distinction between buyers and vendors. Of course, transactions do need the aid of the issuer, but that is true of all online payment systems including Daniel's. 4. Cash allows for acts of faith or _naive transactions_. Those who are not familiar with all the antiforgery measures of a particular banknote or do not have the necessary equipment to verify them, can still transact with cash relying on the fact that what they do not verify is nonetheless verifiable in principle. I have to admit, I don't understand this point, so I can't say to what extent Chaum ecash meets it. In most cases users will simply use their software to perform transactions and no familiarity is necessary with any antiforgery or other technical measures in the payment system. In this sense all users are naive and no one is expected to be a technical expert. Chaum ecash works just fine in this model. 5. The amount of cash issued by the issuing authority is public information that can be verified through an auditing process. This is the one aspect where Chaum ecash fails. It is a significant strength of Daniel Nagy's system that it allows public audits of the amount of cash outstanding. However note that if the ecash issuer stands ready to buy and sell ecash for real money then he has an incentive not to excessively inflate his currency as it would create liabilities which exceed his assets. Similarly, in a state of competition between multiple such ecash issuers, any currency which over-inflates will be at a disadvantage relative to others, as discussed in Dan Selgin's works on free banking. Daniel Nagy also raised a related point about insider malfeasance, which is also a potential problem with Chaum ecash, but there do exist technologies such as hardware security modules which can protect keys in a highly secure manner and make sure they are used only via authorized protocols. Again, the operators of the ecash system have strong incentives to protect their keys against insider attacks. The payment system proposed in (D. Chaum, 1988) focuses on the first characteristic while partially or totally lacking all the others. In summary, I don't think this is true at all. At least the first three characteristics are met perfectly by Chaumian ecash, and possibly the fourth is met in practice as naive users can access the system without excessive complications. Only the fifth point, the ability for outsiders to monitor the amount of cash in circulation, is not satisfied. But even then, the ecash mint software, and procedures and controls followed by the issuer, could be designed to allow third party audits similarly to how paper money cash issuers might be audited today. There do exist technical proposals for ecash systems such as that from Sander and Ta-Shma which allow monitoring the amount of cash which has been issued and redeemed while retaining anonymity and unlinkability, but those are of questionable efficiency with current technology. Perhaps improved versions of such protocols could provide a payment system which would satisfy all of Daniel Nagy's desiderata while retaining the important feature of strong anonymity. CP
Re: [fc-discuss] Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like Payment Systems
Thank you for the detailed critique! I think, we're not talking about the same Chaumian cash. The referred 1988 paper proposes an off-line system, where double spending compromises anonymity and results in transaction reversal. I agree with you that it was a mistake on my part to deny its peer-to-peer nature; should be more careful in the future. I strongly disagree that potentially anonymous systems do not deserve to be called cash. For the past approx. 100 years, banknotes have been used as cash and there seems to be no preference on the market for coins, even though banknotes have unique serial numbers and are, therefore, traceable. I maintain, that anonymity and untraceability are primarily not privacy concerns but -- to some extent -- necessary conditions for irreversibility, which is the ture reason why cash is such a mainstay in commerce and why I would expect its electronic equivalent would be a desirable financial instrument in the world of electronic commerce. In a low-trust environment, irreversible payments are preferable to reversible ones. Simple on-line Chaumian blinded tokens, where the value is determined by the public key and the signed content is unimportant, as long as it is unique, are more like coins. And the most serious problem with them is that of transparent governance. Unfortunately, those hyperinflating their currency are not caught early enough. One way to handle this problem is by expiring tokens. For example, for each value, keys can be introduced in a brick-wall pattern: keys are replaced in regular intervals with two keys being valid at all times, with one expiring in the middle of the lifetime of the other. Tokens signed by the old key are always excahnged for those signed by the new one. This would allow a regular re-count of all tokens in circulation (by the time a key expires, at most as many tokens would have been exchanged for the next key as have been issued), but it raises other concerns. With simple blinded tokens, naive transactions are possible only with the already unblinded ones. One can accept them on faith, and pass on without exchanging. This does not require additional equipment/software. I know of no protocol for transfering blinded tokens with a receipt, but I do not rule out the possibility of its existence. Without it, however, the blinded tokens are useful for a very narrow range of transaction values. Namely, those small enough not to be bothered about receipts, but large enough so that the effort of making a payment does not exceed the transaction value. This confines their usability to part of the micropayment market. To reiterate, the main advantage of the proposed system is that it allows for a very large range of transaction values by providing adequate security for high-value ones, while requiring extremely little effort for low-value ones. And all that at the sole discretion of the users. Regards, -- Daninel
Re: [fc-discuss] Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like Payment Systems
On Thu, 20 Oct 2005, cyphrpunk wrote: system without excessive complications. Only the fifth point, the ability for outsiders to monitor the amount of cash in circulation, is not satisfied. But even then, the ecash mint software, and procedures and controls followed by the issuer, could be designed to allow third party audits similarly to how paper money cash issuers might be audited today. One approach, investigated by Hal Finney, is to run the mint on a platform that allows remote attestation. Check out rpow.net - he has a working implementation of a proof of work payment system hosted on an IBM 4758. -David Molnar
Re: [fc-discuss] Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like Payment Systems
Just presented at ICETE2005 by Daniel Nagy: http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf Abstract. In present paper a novel approach to on-line payment is presented that tackles some issues of digital cash that have, in the author s opinion, contributed to the fact that despite the availability of the technology for more than a decade, it has not achieved even a fraction of the anticipated popularity. The basic assumptions and requirements for such a system are revisited, clear (economic) objectives are formulated and cryptographic techniques to achieve them are proposed. This is a thorough and careful paper but the system has no blinding and so payments are traceable and linkable. The standard technique of inserting dummy transfers is proposed, but it is not clear that this adds real privacy. Worse, it appears that the database showing which coins were exchanged for which is supposed to be public, making this linkage information available to everyone, not just banking insiders. Some aspects are similar to Dan Simon's proposed ecash system from Crypto 96, in particular using knowledge of a secret such as a hash pre-image to represent possession of the cash. Simon's system is covered by patent number 5768385 and the ePoint system may need to step carefully around that patent. See http://www.mail-archive.com/cpunks@einstein.ssz.com/msg04483.html for further critique of Simon's approach. CP
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Re: [fc-discuss] Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like Payment Systems
On Tue, Oct 18, 2005 at 11:27:53PM -0700, cyphrpunk wrote: Just presented at ICETE2005 by Daniel Nagy: http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf This is a thorough and careful paper but the system has no blinding and so payments are traceable and linkable. The standard technique of inserting dummy transfers is proposed, but it is not clear that this adds real privacy. Worse, it appears that the database showing which coins were exchanged for which is supposed to be public, making this linkage information available to everyone, not just banking insiders. Some aspects are similar to Dan Simon's proposed ecash system from Crypto 96, in particular using knowledge of a secret such as a hash pre-image to represent possession of the cash. Simon's system is covered by patent number 5768385 and the ePoint system may need to step carefully around that patent. See http://www.mail-archive.com/cpunks@einstein.ssz.com/msg04483.html for further critique of Simon's approach. At the time of writing, I was already familiar with Simon's proposal and its above mentioned critique (I learnt about them from Stefan Brands' blog). At that time, the design and the implementation were already complete and the process of writing up the paper was also well advanced. Wishing to postpone the discussion of patents for as long as possible, I decided against citing Dan Simon's work in references, which may be regarded as an act of academic dishonesty on my part. Mea culpa. I am reasonably confident that I can legally defend the point that there are sufficient differences between my proposal and Simon's, but I might not be ready to fight off a legal assault from Microsoft (lack of time and money) right now. Leaving the patent issue at that, let us proceed to the substance. I will probably need to write another paper, clarifiing some of these issues. Let me, however, re-emphasize some of the points already present in the paper and perhaps cast them in a slightly different light. In my paper, I am explicitly and implicitly challenging Chaum's assumptions about the very problem of digital cash-like payment. One can, of course, criticize my proposal under chaumian assumptions, but that would miss the point entirely. I think, a decade of consistent failure at introducing chaumian digital cash to the market is good enough a reason to re-think the problem from the very basics. Note that nowhere in my paper did I imply that the issuer is a bank (the only mentioning of a bank in the paper is in an analogy). This is because I am strongly convinced that banks cannot, will not and should not be the principal issuers of digital cash-like payment vehicles. If you need explaination, I'm willing to provide it. I do not expect payment tokens to originate from withdrawals and end their life cycles being deposited to users' bank accounts. Insider fraud is a very serious risk in financial matters. A system that provides no safeguards against a fraudulent issuer will sooner or later be exploited that way. Financial systems (not just electronic ones) often fall to insider attacks. They must be addressed in a successful system. All chaumian systems are hopelessly vulnerable to insider fraud. And now some points missing from the paper: Having a long-term global secret, whose disclosure leads to immediate, catastrophic failure of the whole system is to be avoided in security engineering (using Schneier's terminology, it makes a hard system brittle). The private key of a blinding-based system is exactly such a component. Note that in the proposed system, the digital signature of the issuer is just a fancy integrity protection mechanism for public records, which can be supplemented and even temporarily substituted (while a new key is phased in in the case of compromise) by other mechanisms of integrity protection. It is the public audit trail that provides most of the security. Using currency is, essentially, a credit operation, splitting barter into the separate acts of selling and buying, thus making the promise to reciprocate (that is the eligibility to buy something of equal value from the buyer) a tradeable asset itself. It is the trading of this asset that needs to be anonymous, and the proposed system does a good enough job of protecting the anonymity of those in the middle of the transaction chains. Hope, this helps. -- Daniel
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Re: Judy Miller needing killing
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 You're just trolling, right? Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Sending a reporter to jail for not revealing her source sure sounds like its infringing on freedom of the press to me. The issue isn't HER. The issue is that if I'm someone that wants to blow the whistle on something, I'm going to be less likely to do it if the reporter I tell might reveal me as her source. And of course, reporters might be less likely to cover such stories if they may end up choosing between protecting the source and jail. On July of 2005, Miller was jailed for contempt of court by refusing to testify before a federal grand jury investigating a leak naming Valerie Plame as a covert CIA agent. Miller did not write about Plame, but is reportedly in possession of evidence relevant to the leak investigation. According to a subpoena, Miller met with an unnamed government official ? later revealed to be Scooter Libby, Vice President Cheney's Chief of Staff ? on July 8, 2003, two days after former ambassador Joseph Wilson published an Op-Ed in the Times criticizing the Bush administration for twisting intelligence to justify war in Iraq. (Plame's CIA identity was revealed by political commentator Robert Novak on July 14, 2003.) That woman went to jail for not revealing the source, on a story SHE NEVER EVEN WROTE. Thats dedication. Major Variola (ret.) wrote: So this dupe/spy/wannabe journalist thinks that journalists should be *special*.. how nice. Where in the 1st amendment is the class journalists mentioned? She needs a WMD enema. LAS VEGAS (AP) -- New York Times reporter Judith Miller defended her decision to go to jail to protect a source and told a journalism conference Tuesday that reporters need a federal shield law so that others won't face the same sanctions. http://wireservice.wired.com/wired/story.asp?section=BreakingstoryId=1104064 - -- Chris Clymer - [EMAIL PROTECTED] PGP: E546 19B6 D1EC 47A7 CAA0 8623 C807 398C CD27 15B8 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.2.7 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFDVnALyAc5jM0nFbgRAhiIAKCCDAizX/32F3U8BEAEZo1jmbufjACeOATk UAp601vKKywgkklcAWd0iaI= =73ed -END PGP SIGNATURE- begin:vcard fn:Chris Clymer n:Clymer;Chris org:Youngstown Linux User Group adr:;;252 Colonial Drive;Canfield;Ohio;44406;United States of America email;internet:[EMAIL PROTECTED] title:Founder tel;cell:330.507.3651 x-mozilla-html:FALSE url:http://www.chrisclymer.com version:2.1 end:vcard
Re: Judy Miller needing killing
Unfortunately, it's not as simple as protecting a source. Most shield laws, or proposed shield laws, as I understand them, protect a journalist from revealing a source who is exposing wrongdoing that is in the public interest. This is not the same thing. The act of leaking the identity of Ms. Plame is, itself, a crime, not the exposing of wrongdoing. Now, sending her to jail certainly betrays the spirit of shield laws, but freedom of the press does not necessarily protect a journalist who is shielding a felon. On 10/19/05, Chris Clymer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 You're just trolling, right? Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Sending a reporter to jail for not revealing her source sure sounds like its infringing on freedom of the press to me. The issue isn't HER. The issue is that if I'm someone that wants to blow the whistle on something, I'm going to be less likely to do it if the reporter I tell might reveal me as her source. And of course, reporters might be less likely to cover such stories if they may end up choosing between protecting the source and jail. On July of 2005, Miller was jailed for contempt of court by refusing to testify before a federal grand jury investigating a leak naming Valerie Plame as a covert CIA agent. Miller did not write about Plame, but is reportedly in possession of evidence relevant to the leak investigation. According to a subpoena, Miller met with an unnamed government official ? later revealed to be Scooter Libby, Vice President Cheney's Chief of Staff ? on July 8, 2003, two days after former ambassador Joseph Wilson published an Op-Ed in the Times criticizing the Bush administration for twisting intelligence to justify war in Iraq. (Plame's CIA identity was revealed by political commentator Robert Novak on July 14, 2003.) That woman went to jail for not revealing the source, on a story SHE NEVER EVEN WROTE. Thats dedication. Major Variola (ret.) wrote: So this dupe/spy/wannabe journalist thinks that journalists should be *special*.. how nice. Where in the 1st amendment is the class journalists mentioned? She needs a WMD enema. LAS VEGAS (AP) -- New York Times reporter Judith Miller defended her decision to go to jail to protect a source and told a journalism conference Tuesday that reporters need a federal shield law so that others won't face the same sanctions. http://wireservice.wired.com/wired/story.asp?section=BreakingstoryId=1104064 - -- Chris Clymer - [EMAIL PROTECTED] PGP: E546 19B6 D1EC 47A7 CAA0 8623 C807 398C CD27 15B8 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.2.7 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFDVnALyAc5jM0nFbgRAhiIAKCCDAizX/32F3U8BEAEZo1jmbufjACeOATk UAp601vKKywgkklcAWd0iaI= =73ed -END PGP SIGNATURE-
Re: Judy Miller needing killing
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 My understanding is that she only went to jail because of a federal law passed in the early 80's designed to protect undercover federal agents. Maybe I'm misunderstanding, but I was under the impression that were it not for that law, there would be no need for a shield law...just stronger clarification of that law. Did this issue go before the supreme court...have they ruled that the law is constitutional? Freedom of the press should protect a reporter from prosecution fromt he reporting of ANYTHING. Reporting about a felon is fine(i don't think current laws dispute this). If in addition to that, the reporter is breaking ANOTHER law by shielding a felon, thats another issue altogether. We're talking freedom to report things, not freedom for a reporter to do anything they wish. Shawn Duffy wrote: Unfortunately, it's not as simple as protecting a source. Most shield laws, or proposed shield laws, as I understand them, protect a journalist from revealing a source who is exposing wrongdoing that is in the public interest. This is not the same thing. The act of leaking the identity of Ms. Plame is, itself, a crime, not the exposing of wrongdoing. Now, sending her to jail certainly betrays the spirit of shield laws, but freedom of the press does not necessarily protect a journalist who is shielding a felon. On 10/19/05, Chris Clymer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You're just trolling, right? Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Sending a reporter to jail for not revealing her source sure sounds like its infringing on freedom of the press to me. The issue isn't HER. The issue is that if I'm someone that wants to blow the whistle on something, I'm going to be less likely to do it if the reporter I tell might reveal me as her source. And of course, reporters might be less likely to cover such stories if they may end up choosing between protecting the source and jail. On July of 2005, Miller was jailed for contempt of court by refusing to testify before a federal grand jury investigating a leak naming Valerie Plame as a covert CIA agent. Miller did not write about Plame, but is reportedly in possession of evidence relevant to the leak investigation. According to a subpoena, Miller met with an unnamed government official ? later revealed to be Scooter Libby, Vice President Cheney's Chief of Staff ? on July 8, 2003, two days after former ambassador Joseph Wilson published an Op-Ed in the Times criticizing the Bush administration for twisting intelligence to justify war in Iraq. (Plame's CIA identity was revealed by political commentator Robert Novak on July 14, 2003.) That woman went to jail for not revealing the source, on a story SHE NEVER EVEN WROTE. Thats dedication. Major Variola (ret.) wrote: So this dupe/spy/wannabe journalist thinks that journalists should be *special*.. how nice. Where in the 1st amendment is the class journalists mentioned? She needs a WMD enema. LAS VEGAS (AP) -- New York Times reporter Judith Miller defended her decision to go to jail to protect a source and told a journalism conference Tuesday that reporters need a federal shield law so that others won't face the same sanctions. http://wireservice.wired.com/wired/story.asp?section=BreakingstoryId=1104064 -- Chris Clymer - [EMAIL PROTECTED] PGP: E546 19B6 D1EC 47A7 CAA0 8623 C807 398C CD27 15B8 - -- Chris Clymer - [EMAIL PROTECTED] PGP: E546 19B6 D1EC 47A7 CAA0 8623 C807 398C CD27 15B8 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.2.7 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFDVo3MyAc5jM0nFbgRAtKQAJ427wj//CP8W7eyV4zzzlytFX1RZwCfd3Zi pmfTHmDlqSqLwMNAlZs++gY= =MAHe -END PGP SIGNATURE- begin:vcard fn:Chris Clymer n:Clymer;Chris org:Youngstown Linux User Group adr:;;252 Colonial Drive;Canfield;Ohio;44406;United States of America email;internet:[EMAIL PROTECTED] title:Founder tel;cell:330.507.3651 x-mozilla-html:FALSE url:http://www.chrisclymer.com version:2.1 end:vcard
Re: Judy Miller needing killing
On 10/19/05, Chris Clymer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You're just trolling, right? [snip] Major Variola (ret.) wrote: So this dupe/spy/wannabe journalist thinks that journalists should be *special*.. how nice. Where in the 1st amendment is the class journalists mentioned? She needs a WMD enema. The problem is that reporters want to be made into a special class of people that don't have to abide by the same laws as the rest of us. Are you a reporter? Am I? Is the National Inquirer? How about Drudge? What about bloggers? Which agency will you have to apply to in order to get a Journalism License? And will this License to Report entitle one to ignore subpoenas from federal grand juries? Reporters should have no rights the rest of us don't have. It's hard to imagine the framers of the constitution approving an amendment that said freedom of the press is granted to all those who first apply for and receive permission from the government. GH _ Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE! http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/
Re: Judy Miller needing killing
On 2005-10-19T19:59:18+, Gil Hamilton wrote: Reporters should have no rights the rest of us don't have. It's hard to imagine the framers of the constitution approving an amendment that said freedom of the press is granted to all those who first apply for and receive permission from the government. Blame the framers. They separately enumerated freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which suggests at least a little bit that freedom of the press includes something extra. -- Do you know what your sin is?
Re: [Politech] More on Barney lawyer yearning to hack copyright infringers' sites [ip]
On 2005-10-19T10:37:55-0700, Declan McCullagh wrote: Previous Politech message: http://www.politechbot.com/2005/10/17/barney-lawyer-recommends/ Responses: http://www.politechbot.com/2005/10/19/more-on-barney/ Some of the first-round responses mentioned the iniquities involved in attacking hosted sites, but what if the site that appears to be involved in copyright infringement isn't? There is no assurance that the suspect IP address isn't forwarding illegal (outgoing) traffic from some other machine, or that it doesn't forward incoming traffic to some other machine. Suppose someone has a wireless firewall appliance set up to forward a number of common ports to an interior server. Attacking a suspect IP results in an attack on an uninvolved interior server. The copyright violation might be some unauthorized person connecting through a wireless gateway, so the owner of the interior server might not be in any way connected to the copyright violation. Suppose someone is running a web proxy. An attack on a suspect IP address results in an attack on the machine running the web proxy. An open web proxy, while it may violate an ISP contract, is not illegal, and by itself the proxy is not connected to any illegal activity (except maybe in China, etc.). Suppose someone is involved in copyright infringement, but forwards all incoming connections on certain ports [while dropping traffic to the rest...] to an IP address associated with the Chinese Embassy. Is it clear who's responsible when a copyright holder ends up attacking a Chinese computer? Even if the person who set up the port forwarding is responsible for _connections_ to the Chinese Embassy made as a result, does that make him responsible for willful attacks conducted by copyright holders? If copyright hackers get immunity as long as they attack the public IP address that appears to be distributing copyrighted material, the consequences will be much worse than those of DMCA take-down provisions. ISPs everywhere would police their own networks with a vengeance to mitigate the risk that some copyright holder would find something first, attack the ISP, and cause major damage (not to mention subsequent loss of customers). At least with the DMCA, ISPs get notified and have a chance to act before something bad happens, which generally means low levels of in-house policing.
Re: Judy Miller needing killing
Gil Hamilton wrote: The problem is that reporters want to be made into a special class of people that don't have to abide by the same laws as the rest of us. Are you a reporter? Am I? Is the National Inquirer? How about Drudge? What about bloggers? Which agency will you have to apply to in order to get a Journalism License? And will this License to Report entitle one to ignore subpoenas from federal grand juries? Problem there is - Miller didn't write the story, pass on the info to anyone else, or indeed do much more than have a conversation with an unnamed source where a classified name was revealed. The Grand Jury is aware that Miller had this info but refused to reveal who the informant was. On the other hand - Robert Novak got the same information, REPORTED it - and isn't in any sort of trouble at all. Somehow this isn't the issue though... and I wonder why?
Re: Judy Miller needing killing
Dave Howe wrote: Gil Hamilton wrote: The problem is that reporters want to be made into a special class of people that don't have to abide by the same laws as the rest of us. Are you a reporter? Am I? Is the National Inquirer? How about Drudge? What about bloggers? Which agency will you have to apply to in order to get a Journalism License? And will this License to Report entitle one to ignore subpoenas from federal grand juries? Problem there is - Miller didn't write the story, pass on the info to anyone else, or indeed do much more than have a conversation with an unnamed source where a classified name was revealed. The Grand Jury is aware that Miller had this info but refused to reveal who the informant was. I've never heard it disclosed how the prosecutor discovered that Miller had had such a conversation but it isn't relevant anyway. The question is, can she defy a subpoena based on membership in the privileged Reporter class that an ordinary person could not defy? On the other hand - Robert Novak got the same information, REPORTED it - and isn't in any sort of trouble at all. Somehow this isn't the issue though... and I wonder why? I don't know this either; perhaps because he immediately rolled over when he got subpoenaed? GH _ Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE! http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/
Re: Judy Miller needing killing
Justin [EMAIL PROTECTED]wrote: On 2005-10-19T19:59:18+, Gil Hamilton wrote: Reporters should have no rights the rest of us don't have. It's hard to imagine the framers of the constitution approving an amendment that said freedom of the press is granted to all those who first apply for and receive permission from the government. Blame the framers. They separately enumerated freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which suggests at least a little bit that freedom of the press includes something extra. Yes, it specifies printed material rather than spoken; this wouldn't have been unusual to them -- English law has long distinguished libel from slander, for example. Your statement implies that you think the framers were being deliberately vague or encoding various sorts of subtle nuances in the amendment's language. It's much simpler to presume that they said what they intended to say. GH _ Dont just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search! http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/
Re: [fc-discuss] Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like Payment Systems
On 10/19/05, Daniel A. Nagy [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf Note that nowhere in my paper did I imply that the issuer is a bank (the only mentioning of a bank in the paper is in an analogy). This is because I am strongly convinced that banks cannot, will not and should not be the principal issuers of digital cash-like payment vehicles. If you need explaination, I'm willing to provide it. I do not expect payment tokens to originate from withdrawals and end their life cycles being deposited to users' bank accounts. Suppose we consider your concept of a transaction chain, which is formed when a token is created based on some payment from outside the system, is maintained through exchanges of one token for another (we will ignore split and combine operations for now), and terminates when the token is redeemed for some outside-the-system value. Isn't it likely in practice that such transaction chains will be paid for and redeemed via existing financial systems, which are fully identified? A user will buy a token using an online check or credit card or some other non-anonymous mechanism. He passes it to someone else as a cash-like payment. Optionally it passes through more hands. Ultimately it is redeemed by someone who exchanges it for a check or deposit into a bank or credit card account. If you don't see this as the typical usage model, I'd like to hear your ideas. If this is the model, my concern is that in practice it will often be the case that there will be few intermediate exchanges. Particularly in the early stages of the system, there won't be that much to buy. Someone may accept epoints for payment but the first thing he will do is convert them to real money. A typical transaction will start with someone buying epoints from the issuer using some identified payment system, spending them online, and then the recipient redeems them using an identified payment system. The issuer sees exactly who spent, how much they spent and where they spent it. The result is that in practice the system has no anonymity whatsoever. It is just another way of transferring value online. Using currency is, essentially, a credit operation, splitting barter into the separate acts of selling and buying, thus making the promise to reciprocate (that is the eligibility to buy something of equal value from the buyer) a tradeable asset itself. It is the trading of this asset that needs to be anonymous, and the proposed system does a good enough job of protecting the anonymity of those in the middle of the transaction chains. The hard part is getting into the middle of those transaction chains. Until we reach the point where people receive their salaries in epoints, they will have little choice but to buy epoints for real money. That puts them at the beginning of a transaction chain and not in the middle. Sellers will tend to be at the end. The only people who could be in the middle would be those who sell substantially online for epoints and who also find things online that they can buy for epoints. But that will be a small fraction of users. For the rest of them, anonymity is not a sellling point of this system. If you take away the anonymity, is this technology still valuable? Does it have advantages over other online payment systems, like egold, credit cards or paypal? CP
Re: Judy Miller needing killing
Gil Hamilton wrote: I've never heard it disclosed how the prosecutor discovered that Miller had had such a conversation but it isn't relevant anyway. The question is, can she defy a subpoena based on membership in the privileged Reporter class that an ordinary person could not defy? Why not? while Miller could well be prosecuted for revealing the identity, had she done so - she didn't. Why should *anyone* be jailed for failing to reveal who they had talked to in confidence? I am all in favour of people being tried for their actions, but not for thoughtcrimes. On the other hand - Robert Novak got the same information, REPORTED it - and isn't in any sort of trouble at all. Somehow this isn't the issue though... and I wonder why? I don't know this either; perhaps because he immediately rolled over when he got subpoenaed? And yet Novak is the one who purportedly committed a crime - revealing the identity of an agent and thus endangering them. So the actual crime (of revealing) isn't important, but talking to a reporter is?
Re: Phairmcy Good Day
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Re: [fc-discuss] Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like Payment Systems
I will provide a detailed answer a bit later, but the short answer is that anonymity and untraceability are not major selling points, as experience shows. After all, ATMs could easily record and match to the user the serial numbers of each banknote they hand out, yet, there seems to be no preference to coins vs. banknotes. The major selling point, as noted in the paper and in the presentation is that the security (and hence the transaction cost manifesting itself in the effort required for each transaction) scales with transaction value. For paying pennies, you just type, say, 12-character codes. Yet, if the transaction value warrants it, you can have a full-fledged, digitally signed audit trail within the same system. And it's completely up to the users to decide what security measures to take. Another important issue is that you never risk more than the transaction value. There is no identity to be stolen. So, in short, the selling point is flexible and potentially very high security against all sorts of threats. Someone finding out who you might be is not, by far, the most serious threat in a payment system. -- Daniel
[Clips] FDIC: FIL-103-2005: Authentication in an Internet Banking Environment
--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2005 00:39:49 -0400 To: Philodox Clips List [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: R.A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [Clips] FDIC: FIL-103-2005: Authentication in an Internet Banking Environment Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2005/fil10305.html ? Home News Events Financial Institution Letters Financial Institution Letters FFIEC Guidance Authentication in an Internet Banking Environment FIL-103-2005 October 12, 2005 Summary: The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) has issued the attached guidance, Authentication in an Internet Banking Environment. For banks offering Internet-based financial services, the guidance describes enhanced authentication methods that regulators expect banks to use when authenticating the identity of customers using the on-line products and services. Examiners will review this area to determine a financial institution's progress in complying with this guidance during upcoming examinations. Financial Institutions will be expected to achieve compliance with the guidance no later than year-end 2006. Highlights: *Financial institutions offering Internet-based products and services should use effective methods to authenticate the identity of customers using those products and services. *Single-factor authentication methodologies may not provide sufficient protection for Internet-based financial services. *The FFIEC agencies consider single-factor authentication, when used as the only control mechanism, to be inadequate for high-risk transactions involving access to customer information or the movement of funds to other parties. *Risk assessments should provide the basis for determining an effective authentication strategy according to the risks associated with the various products and services available to on-line customers. *Customer awareness and education should continue to be emphasized because they are effective deterrents to the on-line theft of assets and sensitive information. Distribution: FDIC-Supervised Banks (Commercial and Savings) Suggested Routing: Chief Executive Officer Chief Information Security Officer Related Topics: * FIL-66-2005, Guidance on Mitigating Risks From Spyware, issued July 22, 2005 * FIL-64-2005, Guidance on How Financial Institutions Can Protect Against Pharming Attacks, issued July 18, 2005 * FIL-27-2004, Guidance on Safeguarding Customers Against E-Mail and Internet Related Fraud, issued March 12, 2004 * FFIEC Information Security Handbook, issued November 2003 * Interagency Informational Brochure on Phishing Scams, contained in FIL-113-2004, issued September 13, 2004 * Putting an End to Account- Hijacking Identity Theft, FDIC Study, issued December 14, 2004 * FDIC Identity Theft Study Supplement on Account-Highjacking Identity Theft, issued June 17, 2005 Attachment: FFIEC Guidance: Authentication in an Internet Banking Environment - PDF 163k (PDF Help) Contact: Senior Policy Analyst Jeffrey Kopchik at [EMAIL PROTECTED] or (202) 898-3872, or Senior Technology Specialist Robert D. Lee at [EMAIL PROTECTED] or (202) 898-3688 Printable Format: FIL-103-2005 - PDF 41k (PDF Help) Note: FDIC Financial Institution Letters (FILs) may be accessed from the FDIC's Web site at www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2005/index.html. To receive FILs electronically, please visit http://www.fdic.gov/about/subscriptions/fil.html. Paper copies of FDIC FILs may be obtained through the FDIC's Public Information Center, 801 17th Street, NW, Room 100, Washington, DC 20434 (1-877-275-3342 or 202-416-6940). Last Updated 10/12/2005 [EMAIL PROTECTED] HomeContact UsSearchHelpSiteMapForms Freedom of Information ActWebsite PoliciesFirstGov.gov -- - R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED] The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/ 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA ... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' ___ Clips mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- - R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED] The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/ 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA ... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of
[Clips] FDIC: Putting an End to Account-Hijacking Identity Theft Study Supplement
--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2005 00:39:23 -0400 To: Philodox Clips List [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: R.A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [Clips] FDIC: Putting an End to Account-Hijacking Identity Theft Study Supplement Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/idtheftstudysupp/index.html ? Home Consumer Protection Consumer Resources Putting an End to Account-Hijacking Identity Theft Study Supplement Putting an End to Account-Hijacking Identity Theft Study Supplement Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection Technology Supervision Branch June 17, 2005 This publication supplements the FDIC's study Putting an End to Account-Hijacking Identity Theft published on December 14, 2004. Printable Version - PDF 105k (PDF Help) Table of Contents Executive Summary and Findings Focus of Supplement Identity theft in general and account hijacking in particular continue to be significant problems for the financial services industry and consumers. Recent studies indicate that identity theft is evolving in more complicated ways that make it more difficult for consumers to protect themselves. Recent studies also indicate that consumers are concerned about online security and may be receptive to using two-factor authentication if they perceive it as offering improved safety and convenience. This Supplement discusses seven additional technologies that were not discussed in the Study. These technologies, as well as those considered in the Study, have the potential to substantially reduce the level of account hijacking (and other forms of identity theft) currently being experienced. Findings Different financial institutions may choose different solutions, or a variety of solutions, based on the complexity of the institution and the nature and scope of its activities. The FDIC does not intend to propose one solution for all, but the evidence examined here and in the Study indicates that more can and should be done to protect the security and confidentiality of sensitive customer information in order to prevent account hijacking. Thus, the FDIC presents the following updated findings: 1 The information security risk assessment that financial institutions are currently required to perform should include an analysis to determine (a) whether the institution needs to implement more secure customer authentication methods and, if it does, (b) what method or methods make most sense in view of the nature of the institution's business and customer base. 2 If an institution offers retail customers remote access to Internet banking or any similar product that allows access to sensitive customer information, the institution has a responsibility to secure that delivery channel. More specifically, the widespread use of user ID and password for remote authentication should be supplemented with a reliable form of multifactor authentication or other layered security so that the security and confidentiality of customer accounts and sensitive customer information are adequately protected. Last Updated 6/27/2005 [EMAIL PROTECTED] HomeContact UsSearchHelpSiteMapForms Freedom of Information ActWebsite PoliciesFirstGov.gov -- - R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED] The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/ 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA ... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' ___ Clips mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- - R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED] The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/ 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA ... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
Re: [fc-discuss] Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like Payment Systems
cyphrpunk wrote: If this is the model, my concern is that in practice it will often be the case that there will be few intermediate exchanges. Particularly in the early stages of the system, there won't be that much to buy. Someone may accept epoints for payment but the first thing he will do is convert them to real money. A typical transaction will start with someone buying epoints from the issuer using some identified payment system, spending them online, and then the recipient redeems them using an identified payment system. The issuer sees exactly who spent, how much they spent and where they spent it. The result is that in practice the system has no anonymity whatsoever. It is just another way of transferring value online. That's a merchant business model. Typically, that's not how payment systems emerge. Mostly, they emerge by a p2p model, and then migrate to a merchant model over time. How they start is generally a varied question, and somewhat a part of the inspiration of the Issuer. According to the Issuer's design, he may try and force that migration faster or slower. In a more forced system, there is typically only one or a few exchange points and that is probably the Issuer himself. If the Issuer also pushes a merchant design, and a triangular flow evolves, the tracing of transactions is relatively easy regardless of the system because time and amount give it away. But, typically, if the Issuer has designs on merchant business, he generally doesn't care about the hyphed non-tracking capabilities of the software, and also prefer the tracking to be easy for support and segmentation purposes. A game that Issuers often play is to pretend or market a system as privacy protecting, but if their intention is the merchant model then that game stops when the numbers get serious. (I gather they discuss that in the Paypal book if you want a written example.) Either way, it is kind of tough to criticise a software system for that. It's the Issuer and the market that sets the tune there; not the software system. The ideal software system allows the Issuer to decide these paramaters, but it is also kind of tough to provide all such paramaters in a big dial, and keep the system small and tight. (I suppose on this note, this is a big difference between Daniel's system and mine. His is small and tight and he talks about being able to audit the 5 page long central server ... mine is relatively large and complex, but it can do bearer and it can do fully traceable, as well as be passably extended to imitate of his design.) Meanwhile, the Issuers who want to provide privacy with a bog standard double entry online accounts system still have a better record of doing that than any other Issuers that might have boasted mathematical blah blah, they just run theirs privately. e.g., your average Swiss bank. iang
Re: Color Laser Printer Snitch Codes
At 12:24 PM 10/17/05 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: Soon we'll find out that toothbrushes are able to determine what I ate for dinner and are regularly sending the info... Soon there will be sensors in urinals that page the DEA..
Judy Miller needing killing
So this dupe/spy/wannabe journalist thinks that journalists should be *special*.. how nice. Where in the 1st amendment is the class journalists mentioned? She needs a WMD enema. LAS VEGAS (AP) -- New York Times reporter Judith Miller defended her decision to go to jail to protect a source and told a journalism conference Tuesday that reporters need a federal shield law so that others won't face the same sanctions. http://wireservice.wired.com/wired/story.asp?section=BreakingstoryId=1104064
Re: [fc-discuss] Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like Payment Systems
Just presented at ICETE2005 by Daniel Nagy: http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf Abstract. In present paper a novel approach to on-line payment is presented that tackles some issues of digital cash that have, in the author s opinion, contributed to the fact that despite the availability of the technology for more than a decade, it has not achieved even a fraction of the anticipated popularity. The basic assumptions and requirements for such a system are revisited, clear (economic) objectives are formulated and cryptographic techniques to achieve them are proposed. This is a thorough and careful paper but the system has no blinding and so payments are traceable and linkable. The standard technique of inserting dummy transfers is proposed, but it is not clear that this adds real privacy. Worse, it appears that the database showing which coins were exchanged for which is supposed to be public, making this linkage information available to everyone, not just banking insiders. Some aspects are similar to Dan Simon's proposed ecash system from Crypto 96, in particular using knowledge of a secret such as a hash pre-image to represent possession of the cash. Simon's system is covered by patent number 5768385 and the ePoint system may need to step carefully around that patent. See http://www.mail-archive.com/cpunks@einstein.ssz.com/msg04483.html for further critique of Simon's approach. CP
Re: [fc-discuss] Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like Payment Systems
On Tue, Oct 18, 2005 at 11:27:53PM -0700, cyphrpunk wrote: Just presented at ICETE2005 by Daniel Nagy: http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf This is a thorough and careful paper but the system has no blinding and so payments are traceable and linkable. The standard technique of inserting dummy transfers is proposed, but it is not clear that this adds real privacy. Worse, it appears that the database showing which coins were exchanged for which is supposed to be public, making this linkage information available to everyone, not just banking insiders. Some aspects are similar to Dan Simon's proposed ecash system from Crypto 96, in particular using knowledge of a secret such as a hash pre-image to represent possession of the cash. Simon's system is covered by patent number 5768385 and the ePoint system may need to step carefully around that patent. See http://www.mail-archive.com/cpunks@einstein.ssz.com/msg04483.html for further critique of Simon's approach. At the time of writing, I was already familiar with Simon's proposal and its above mentioned critique (I learnt about them from Stefan Brands' blog). At that time, the design and the implementation were already complete and the process of writing up the paper was also well advanced. Wishing to postpone the discussion of patents for as long as possible, I decided against citing Dan Simon's work in references, which may be regarded as an act of academic dishonesty on my part. Mea culpa. I am reasonably confident that I can legally defend the point that there are sufficient differences between my proposal and Simon's, but I might not be ready to fight off a legal assault from Microsoft (lack of time and money) right now. Leaving the patent issue at that, let us proceed to the substance. I will probably need to write another paper, clarifiing some of these issues. Let me, however, re-emphasize some of the points already present in the paper and perhaps cast them in a slightly different light. In my paper, I am explicitly and implicitly challenging Chaum's assumptions about the very problem of digital cash-like payment. One can, of course, criticize my proposal under chaumian assumptions, but that would miss the point entirely. I think, a decade of consistent failure at introducing chaumian digital cash to the market is good enough a reason to re-think the problem from the very basics. Note that nowhere in my paper did I imply that the issuer is a bank (the only mentioning of a bank in the paper is in an analogy). This is because I am strongly convinced that banks cannot, will not and should not be the principal issuers of digital cash-like payment vehicles. If you need explaination, I'm willing to provide it. I do not expect payment tokens to originate from withdrawals and end their life cycles being deposited to users' bank accounts. Insider fraud is a very serious risk in financial matters. A system that provides no safeguards against a fraudulent issuer will sooner or later be exploited that way. Financial systems (not just electronic ones) often fall to insider attacks. They must be addressed in a successful system. All chaumian systems are hopelessly vulnerable to insider fraud. And now some points missing from the paper: Having a long-term global secret, whose disclosure leads to immediate, catastrophic failure of the whole system is to be avoided in security engineering (using Schneier's terminology, it makes a hard system brittle). The private key of a blinding-based system is exactly such a component. Note that in the proposed system, the digital signature of the issuer is just a fancy integrity protection mechanism for public records, which can be supplemented and even temporarily substituted (while a new key is phased in in the case of compromise) by other mechanisms of integrity protection. It is the public audit trail that provides most of the security. Using currency is, essentially, a credit operation, splitting barter into the separate acts of selling and buying, thus making the promise to reciprocate (that is the eligibility to buy something of equal value from the buyer) a tradeable asset itself. It is the trading of this asset that needs to be anonymous, and the proposed system does a good enough job of protecting the anonymity of those in the middle of the transaction chains. Hope, this helps. -- Daniel
Re: Judy Miller needing killing
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 My understanding is that she only went to jail because of a federal law passed in the early 80's designed to protect undercover federal agents. Maybe I'm misunderstanding, but I was under the impression that were it not for that law, there would be no need for a shield law...just stronger clarification of that law. Did this issue go before the supreme court...have they ruled that the law is constitutional? Freedom of the press should protect a reporter from prosecution fromt he reporting of ANYTHING. Reporting about a felon is fine(i don't think current laws dispute this). If in addition to that, the reporter is breaking ANOTHER law by shielding a felon, thats another issue altogether. We're talking freedom to report things, not freedom for a reporter to do anything they wish. Shawn Duffy wrote: Unfortunately, it's not as simple as protecting a source. Most shield laws, or proposed shield laws, as I understand them, protect a journalist from revealing a source who is exposing wrongdoing that is in the public interest. This is not the same thing. The act of leaking the identity of Ms. Plame is, itself, a crime, not the exposing of wrongdoing. Now, sending her to jail certainly betrays the spirit of shield laws, but freedom of the press does not necessarily protect a journalist who is shielding a felon. On 10/19/05, Chris Clymer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You're just trolling, right? Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Sending a reporter to jail for not revealing her source sure sounds like its infringing on freedom of the press to me. The issue isn't HER. The issue is that if I'm someone that wants to blow the whistle on something, I'm going to be less likely to do it if the reporter I tell might reveal me as her source. And of course, reporters might be less likely to cover such stories if they may end up choosing between protecting the source and jail. On July of 2005, Miller was jailed for contempt of court by refusing to testify before a federal grand jury investigating a leak naming Valerie Plame as a covert CIA agent. Miller did not write about Plame, but is reportedly in possession of evidence relevant to the leak investigation. According to a subpoena, Miller met with an unnamed government official ? later revealed to be Scooter Libby, Vice President Cheney's Chief of Staff ? on July 8, 2003, two days after former ambassador Joseph Wilson published an Op-Ed in the Times criticizing the Bush administration for twisting intelligence to justify war in Iraq. (Plame's CIA identity was revealed by political commentator Robert Novak on July 14, 2003.) That woman went to jail for not revealing the source, on a story SHE NEVER EVEN WROTE. Thats dedication. Major Variola (ret.) wrote: So this dupe/spy/wannabe journalist thinks that journalists should be *special*.. how nice. Where in the 1st amendment is the class journalists mentioned? She needs a WMD enema. LAS VEGAS (AP) -- New York Times reporter Judith Miller defended her decision to go to jail to protect a source and told a journalism conference Tuesday that reporters need a federal shield law so that others won't face the same sanctions. http://wireservice.wired.com/wired/story.asp?section=BreakingstoryId=1104064 -- Chris Clymer - [EMAIL PROTECTED] PGP: E546 19B6 D1EC 47A7 CAA0 8623 C807 398C CD27 15B8 - -- Chris Clymer - [EMAIL PROTECTED] PGP: E546 19B6 D1EC 47A7 CAA0 8623 C807 398C CD27 15B8 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.2.7 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFDVo3MyAc5jM0nFbgRAtKQAJ427wj//CP8W7eyV4zzzlytFX1RZwCfd3Zi pmfTHmDlqSqLwMNAlZs++gY= =MAHe -END PGP SIGNATURE- begin:vcard fn:Chris Clymer n:Clymer;Chris org:Youngstown Linux User Group adr:;;252 Colonial Drive;Canfield;Ohio;44406;United States of America email;internet:[EMAIL PROTECTED] title:Founder tel;cell:330.507.3651 x-mozilla-html:FALSE url:http://www.chrisclymer.com version:2.1 end:vcard
Re: Judy Miller needing killing
Unfortunately, it's not as simple as protecting a source. Most shield laws, or proposed shield laws, as I understand them, protect a journalist from revealing a source who is exposing wrongdoing that is in the public interest. This is not the same thing. The act of leaking the identity of Ms. Plame is, itself, a crime, not the exposing of wrongdoing. Now, sending her to jail certainly betrays the spirit of shield laws, but freedom of the press does not necessarily protect a journalist who is shielding a felon. On 10/19/05, Chris Clymer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 You're just trolling, right? Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Sending a reporter to jail for not revealing her source sure sounds like its infringing on freedom of the press to me. The issue isn't HER. The issue is that if I'm someone that wants to blow the whistle on something, I'm going to be less likely to do it if the reporter I tell might reveal me as her source. And of course, reporters might be less likely to cover such stories if they may end up choosing between protecting the source and jail. On July of 2005, Miller was jailed for contempt of court by refusing to testify before a federal grand jury investigating a leak naming Valerie Plame as a covert CIA agent. Miller did not write about Plame, but is reportedly in possession of evidence relevant to the leak investigation. According to a subpoena, Miller met with an unnamed government official ? later revealed to be Scooter Libby, Vice President Cheney's Chief of Staff ? on July 8, 2003, two days after former ambassador Joseph Wilson published an Op-Ed in the Times criticizing the Bush administration for twisting intelligence to justify war in Iraq. (Plame's CIA identity was revealed by political commentator Robert Novak on July 14, 2003.) That woman went to jail for not revealing the source, on a story SHE NEVER EVEN WROTE. Thats dedication. Major Variola (ret.) wrote: So this dupe/spy/wannabe journalist thinks that journalists should be *special*.. how nice. Where in the 1st amendment is the class journalists mentioned? She needs a WMD enema. LAS VEGAS (AP) -- New York Times reporter Judith Miller defended her decision to go to jail to protect a source and told a journalism conference Tuesday that reporters need a federal shield law so that others won't face the same sanctions. http://wireservice.wired.com/wired/story.asp?section=BreakingstoryId=1104064 - -- Chris Clymer - [EMAIL PROTECTED] PGP: E546 19B6 D1EC 47A7 CAA0 8623 C807 398C CD27 15B8 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.2.7 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFDVnALyAc5jM0nFbgRAhiIAKCCDAizX/32F3U8BEAEZo1jmbufjACeOATk UAp601vKKywgkklcAWd0iaI= =73ed -END PGP SIGNATURE-
Re: Judy Miller needing killing
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 You're just trolling, right? Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Sending a reporter to jail for not revealing her source sure sounds like its infringing on freedom of the press to me. The issue isn't HER. The issue is that if I'm someone that wants to blow the whistle on something, I'm going to be less likely to do it if the reporter I tell might reveal me as her source. And of course, reporters might be less likely to cover such stories if they may end up choosing between protecting the source and jail. On July of 2005, Miller was jailed for contempt of court by refusing to testify before a federal grand jury investigating a leak naming Valerie Plame as a covert CIA agent. Miller did not write about Plame, but is reportedly in possession of evidence relevant to the leak investigation. According to a subpoena, Miller met with an unnamed government official ? later revealed to be Scooter Libby, Vice President Cheney's Chief of Staff ? on July 8, 2003, two days after former ambassador Joseph Wilson published an Op-Ed in the Times criticizing the Bush administration for twisting intelligence to justify war in Iraq. (Plame's CIA identity was revealed by political commentator Robert Novak on July 14, 2003.) That woman went to jail for not revealing the source, on a story SHE NEVER EVEN WROTE. Thats dedication. Major Variola (ret.) wrote: So this dupe/spy/wannabe journalist thinks that journalists should be *special*.. how nice. Where in the 1st amendment is the class journalists mentioned? She needs a WMD enema. LAS VEGAS (AP) -- New York Times reporter Judith Miller defended her decision to go to jail to protect a source and told a journalism conference Tuesday that reporters need a federal shield law so that others won't face the same sanctions. http://wireservice.wired.com/wired/story.asp?section=BreakingstoryId=1104064 - -- Chris Clymer - [EMAIL PROTECTED] PGP: E546 19B6 D1EC 47A7 CAA0 8623 C807 398C CD27 15B8 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.2.7 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFDVnALyAc5jM0nFbgRAhiIAKCCDAizX/32F3U8BEAEZo1jmbufjACeOATk UAp601vKKywgkklcAWd0iaI= =73ed -END PGP SIGNATURE- begin:vcard fn:Chris Clymer n:Clymer;Chris org:Youngstown Linux User Group adr:;;252 Colonial Drive;Canfield;Ohio;44406;United States of America email;internet:[EMAIL PROTECTED] title:Founder tel;cell:330.507.3651 x-mozilla-html:FALSE url:http://www.chrisclymer.com version:2.1 end:vcard
Re: Judy Miller needing killing
On 10/19/05, Chris Clymer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You're just trolling, right? [snip] Major Variola (ret.) wrote: So this dupe/spy/wannabe journalist thinks that journalists should be *special*.. how nice. Where in the 1st amendment is the class journalists mentioned? She needs a WMD enema. The problem is that reporters want to be made into a special class of people that don't have to abide by the same laws as the rest of us. Are you a reporter? Am I? Is the National Inquirer? How about Drudge? What about bloggers? Which agency will you have to apply to in order to get a Journalism License? And will this License to Report entitle one to ignore subpoenas from federal grand juries? Reporters should have no rights the rest of us don't have. It's hard to imagine the framers of the constitution approving an amendment that said freedom of the press is granted to all those who first apply for and receive permission from the government. GH _ Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE! http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/
Re: Judy Miller needing killing
Justin [EMAIL PROTECTED]wrote: On 2005-10-19T19:59:18+, Gil Hamilton wrote: Reporters should have no rights the rest of us don't have. It's hard to imagine the framers of the constitution approving an amendment that said freedom of the press is granted to all those who first apply for and receive permission from the government. Blame the framers. They separately enumerated freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which suggests at least a little bit that freedom of the press includes something extra. Yes, it specifies printed material rather than spoken; this wouldn't have been unusual to them -- English law has long distinguished libel from slander, for example. Your statement implies that you think the framers were being deliberately vague or encoding various sorts of subtle nuances in the amendment's language. It's much simpler to presume that they said what they intended to say. GH _ Dont just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search! http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/
Re: Judy Miller needing killing
Dave Howe wrote: Gil Hamilton wrote: The problem is that reporters want to be made into a special class of people that don't have to abide by the same laws as the rest of us. Are you a reporter? Am I? Is the National Inquirer? How about Drudge? What about bloggers? Which agency will you have to apply to in order to get a Journalism License? And will this License to Report entitle one to ignore subpoenas from federal grand juries? Problem there is - Miller didn't write the story, pass on the info to anyone else, or indeed do much more than have a conversation with an unnamed source where a classified name was revealed. The Grand Jury is aware that Miller had this info but refused to reveal who the informant was. I've never heard it disclosed how the prosecutor discovered that Miller had had such a conversation but it isn't relevant anyway. The question is, can she defy a subpoena based on membership in the privileged Reporter class that an ordinary person could not defy? On the other hand - Robert Novak got the same information, REPORTED it - and isn't in any sort of trouble at all. Somehow this isn't the issue though... and I wonder why? I don't know this either; perhaps because he immediately rolled over when he got subpoenaed? GH _ Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE! http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/
Re: [Politech] More on Barney lawyer yearning to hack copyright infringers' sites [ip]
On 2005-10-19T10:37:55-0700, Declan McCullagh wrote: Previous Politech message: http://www.politechbot.com/2005/10/17/barney-lawyer-recommends/ Responses: http://www.politechbot.com/2005/10/19/more-on-barney/ Some of the first-round responses mentioned the iniquities involved in attacking hosted sites, but what if the site that appears to be involved in copyright infringement isn't? There is no assurance that the suspect IP address isn't forwarding illegal (outgoing) traffic from some other machine, or that it doesn't forward incoming traffic to some other machine. Suppose someone has a wireless firewall appliance set up to forward a number of common ports to an interior server. Attacking a suspect IP results in an attack on an uninvolved interior server. The copyright violation might be some unauthorized person connecting through a wireless gateway, so the owner of the interior server might not be in any way connected to the copyright violation. Suppose someone is running a web proxy. An attack on a suspect IP address results in an attack on the machine running the web proxy. An open web proxy, while it may violate an ISP contract, is not illegal, and by itself the proxy is not connected to any illegal activity (except maybe in China, etc.). Suppose someone is involved in copyright infringement, but forwards all incoming connections on certain ports [while dropping traffic to the rest...] to an IP address associated with the Chinese Embassy. Is it clear who's responsible when a copyright holder ends up attacking a Chinese computer? Even if the person who set up the port forwarding is responsible for _connections_ to the Chinese Embassy made as a result, does that make him responsible for willful attacks conducted by copyright holders? If copyright hackers get immunity as long as they attack the public IP address that appears to be distributing copyrighted material, the consequences will be much worse than those of DMCA take-down provisions. ISPs everywhere would police their own networks with a vengeance to mitigate the risk that some copyright holder would find something first, attack the ISP, and cause major damage (not to mention subsequent loss of customers). At least with the DMCA, ISPs get notified and have a chance to act before something bad happens, which generally means low levels of in-house policing.
Re: Judy Miller needing killing
Gil Hamilton wrote: The problem is that reporters want to be made into a special class of people that don't have to abide by the same laws as the rest of us. Are you a reporter? Am I? Is the National Inquirer? How about Drudge? What about bloggers? Which agency will you have to apply to in order to get a Journalism License? And will this License to Report entitle one to ignore subpoenas from federal grand juries? Problem there is - Miller didn't write the story, pass on the info to anyone else, or indeed do much more than have a conversation with an unnamed source where a classified name was revealed. The Grand Jury is aware that Miller had this info but refused to reveal who the informant was. On the other hand - Robert Novak got the same information, REPORTED it - and isn't in any sort of trouble at all. Somehow this isn't the issue though... and I wonder why?
Re: Judy Miller needing killing
On 2005-10-19T19:59:18+, Gil Hamilton wrote: Reporters should have no rights the rest of us don't have. It's hard to imagine the framers of the constitution approving an amendment that said freedom of the press is granted to all those who first apply for and receive permission from the government. Blame the framers. They separately enumerated freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which suggests at least a little bit that freedom of the press includes something extra. -- Do you know what your sin is?
Mobile phones talk the talk, will soon walk the walk
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20051013/tc_afp/finlandtelecomsciencemobile Finnish researchers presented new technology designed to prevent thefts of mobile phones and laptops, using biometrics to recognize the gait of the device's owner. A sensor-based so-called gaitcode embedded in the device registers and memorizes the movements of the owner in three- dimensional form, and is reliable in 90 percent of cases, the researchers said Thursday. If it does not recognize the walk, it asks for a password. If given an incorrect password, the device automatically locks itself down. The gaitcode can also be used in a smartcard, attache case, weapon or USB device. We think that if it is no longer useful for a person to steal somebody else's mobile device, the number of crimes will decrease, professor Heikki Ailisto of the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland told a press conference. More than 300,000 mobile phones are stolen each year in Britain and some 100,000 in both Germany and Sweden, according to statistics for recent years given by VTT. The technology can also be connected to a voice-recognition system. VTT spokesman Olli Ernvall said the invention was being patented on the most important markets, but refused to disclose which company or companies were interested in its production
[EMAIL PROTECTED]: nym-0.3 released]
- Forwarded message from Jason Holt [EMAIL PROTECTED] - From: Jason Holt [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Thu, 13 Oct 2005 01:17:09 + (UTC) To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: nym-0.3 released Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Hacking MediaWiki to map client certificates to IP addresses turns out to be quite trivial. nym-0.3 includes the 17 line patch, as well as the security fix proposed by cyphrpunk. The live demo at erg.no-ip.org now includes a live, patched MediaWiki called NymWiki. http://lunkwill.org/src/nym/nym-0.3.tar.gz http://www.lunkwill.org/src/nym/Readme http://www.lunkwill.org/src/nym/CHANGELOG If you want to be able to edit wikipedia through tor, I suggest you try out the code and email me, so that we can make a case that there's actual demand for inclusion of the patches. -J - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
[EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: Interoperating with p2p traffic]
- Forwarded message from Brian C [EMAIL PROTECTED] - From: Brian C [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2005 18:26:58 -0700 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Interoperating with p2p traffic User-Agent: Thunderbird 1.4 (Macintosh/20050908) Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Hi, Matt Thorne wrote: That isn't a bad Idea, and possibly something that They (with help ofcourse :-) could build into their P2P software. Probably not a bad thing for them to lookinto just for their own use, not because We ask them to, but becuase that would really mess with the heads of the people at (Insert 4 letter accronym here). question: how do the people who feel posesive towards tor think about this idea? -=Matt=- On 10/12/05, *Arrakistor* wrote What if we designated some type of tor family specifically for p2p content, and coordinated with the software developers? If an anonymizing service based on Tor were integrated into some p2p project or if a fork of Tor were to devote itself to serving p2p, then that should only be encouraged by the current Tor community if 1. It didn't take away any current tor servers or tor resources. 2. It used another name and was clearly its own standalone effort. The reason for 1 is obvious. If the point is to make Tor more usable, then we shouldn't support a migration of its resources elsewhere. The reason for 2 should also be obvious. Tor is a neutral technology that allows privacy. Some people use their privacy for uses we want to support; others for uses we wish they wouldn't engage in. But, if something were called Tor and were devoted to p2p traffic then it would taint the whole Tor project. Don't get me wrong. p2p also has legitimate uses. But in the current climate anything remotely associated with file-sharing is assumed to be illegal. Let's not let that shadow be cast upon Tor. It has enough reputational problems already. Also, Tor is open source. If someone wants to take the code and change it to use their own farm of servers exclusively for p2p traffic then there's nothing the Tor community can do to stop them. I'm not suggesting we should try to stop them. Rather, I'm suggesting we insist that if someone does do that, then they should not call it Tor or anything confusingly similar. Brian - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Benachrichtung zum =?unicode-1-1-utf-7?Q?+ANw-bermittlungsstatus (Fehlgeschlagen)?=
Dies ist eine automatisch erstellte Benachrichtigung +APw-ber den Zustellstatus.
+ANw-bermittlung an folgende Empf+AOQ-nger fehlgeschlagen.
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reporting-MTA: dns;deex.docomolab-euro.com
Received-From-MTA: dns;deprox.docomolab-euro.com
Arrival-Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2005 16:32:53 +0200
Final-Recipient: rfc822;hirschfeld@docomolab-euro.com
Action: failed
Status: 5.1.1
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** Message from InterScan E-Mail VirusWall NT **
** WARNING! Attached file docomolab-euro.com.zip contains:
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[EMAIL PROTECTED]: [IP] reply from Tropos on 1 more on Limits on wireless le ave U.S. at risk]
- Forwarded message from David Farber [EMAIL PROTECTED] - From: David Farber [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2005 11:07:11 -0500 To: ip@v2.listbox.com Subject: [IP] reply from Tropos on 1 more on Limits on wireless le ave U.S. at risk Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] X-Mailer: EPOC Email Version 2.10 ___ Forward Header ___ Subject:RE: [IP] more on Limits on wireless leave U.S. at risk Author: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: 18th October 2005 6:09:16 am Dave, Tropos has shipped a couple of hundred of our Tropos 5210 mesh routers into MS and LA in the days following the storm, and had a few hundred installed in the stricken area previously. These are high-power (36 dBm), high rx sensitivity (-100 dBm), outdoor-constructed 802.11b/g access points with embedded mesh routers so they can backhaul wirelessly amongst each other to a source of Internet connectivity. Each has a 1,000 ft plus range to an outdoor Wi-Fi device, emergency vehicle with external antenna or building with a window-mounted CPE. So, a couple of hundred nodes represents 10-15 sq mi or so of contiguous coverage in typical configuration. Every 10 nodes or so are fed with a Motorola Canopy WiMAX link, typically shot from the roof of an MCI PoP, or from city backhaul locations. These devices, at these densities, are non line of sight so can be installed by city workers with bucket trucks on street lamps, with power taken from street-light photo cells. They will self-configure, find their backhaul, optimize throughput and route around problems. They can be battery and solar-powered due to their low wattage (28 watts or so). Last I have heard, we were in 25 or so FEMA and Red Cross shelters in NO, Biloxi, Lamar-Dixon and Baton Rouge. We are around the NO airport and on a couple of cruise ships off the gulf that are housing FEMA workers. We had 200 nodes previously installed in high-crime areas of NO doing video surveillance. As the power has been restored to the street lights, these nodes have come back up on their own and are performing their functions again. We are now in the process of expanding that network as a force multiplier for the police. Data applications as well as Vonage phones and Skype are active on the networks. The CIO of NO is actually in DC today testifying about the benefits of Wi-Fi mesh. Hope that helps. You can see more on our technology at www.tropos.com Ron Sege President and CEO Tropos Networks 555 Del Rey Ave Sunnyvale, CA 94085 www.tropos.com 408-331-6810 office 650-861-7564 cell 617-407-5000 international cell 408-331-6530 fax The leading supplier of products for building true metro-scale Wi-Fi mesh networks. -Original Message- From: David P. Reed [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, October 17, 2005 5:09 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: Ip Ip; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [IP] more on Limits on wireless leave U.S. at risk Gerry Faulhaber wrote: Reed claims firms were offering WiMax and WiFi mesh networks for first responders in the wake of Katrina and Rita. He also mentions the role of municipal WiFi in this effort. Coulda happened, but it seems wildly unlikely. Is there any proof of this? I'm a bit skeptical about Reed Hundt's broad claims, too. However, I do know that Tropos and others who have such technology were attempting to demonstrate the value of their systems post-Katrina, so there almost certainly was some deployment, given the value to the companies of the opportunity to show their stuff. I've cc'ed Ron Sege of Tropos, who may have more direct knowledge and data. - You are subscribed as [EMAIL PROTECTED] To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Imaging gels or microarrays? Look to PerkinElmer.
If youre planning an imaging system purchase in 2005, be sure to demo the best performing imaging systems on the marketPerkinElmer. Youll receive a free Apple iPod with a qualifying purchase of any microarray or gel imaging systemeven if its not one of ours! Why should you consider a PerkinElmer imaging system? Superior performance, reliability, and support. Labs that try PerkinElmer imaging systems buy them. Were so confident youll find our systems performance superior to any others that if you purchase a PerkinElmer ProScanArray Microarray Analysis System or ProXPRESS 2D Proteomic Imaging System or any comparable imaging system by December 20, 2005, well give you an iPod mini with JBL speakers for your lab.* *It's easy to demo our imaging systems. Visit www.perkinelmer.com/imagingdemo2 for complete rules and to register for a free demo. You'll see a system whose performance and reliability you can trust, so you can purchase it with confidence. ProScanArray Microarray Analysis System Our super sensitive microarray scanner maximizes discrimination in signal and readily detects differences between spots. Learn more. ProXPRESS 2D Proteomic Imaging System Our multi-color fluorescence 2D and 1D gel imager has the best image quality, speed and resolution on the market. Learn more. 2005 PerkinElmer, Inc. All rights reserved. The PerkinElmer logo and design and ProScanArray are registered trademarks and ProXPRESS is a trademark of PerkinElmer, Inc. iPod is a registered trademark of Apple Computer, Inc. PerkinElmer reserves the right to change this document at any time without notice and disclaims liability for editorial, pictorial or typographical errors. 007436_02 Copyright© 2005 PerkinElmer, Inc. All rights reserved. To unsubscribe, CLICK Here or if the email address is not clickable, simply copy the text to the right of the 'mailto:' [EMAIL PROTECTED] command and paste it into your email application and hit send. You will be taken off the list immediately. Thank you! PerkinElmer Life & Analytical Sciences710 Bridgeport AvenueShelton, CT 06484(203)402-6892
Judy Miller needing killing
So this dupe/spy/wannabe journalist thinks that journalists should be *special*.. how nice. Where in the 1st amendment is the class journalists mentioned? She needs a WMD enema. LAS VEGAS (AP) -- New York Times reporter Judith Miller defended her decision to go to jail to protect a source and told a journalism conference Tuesday that reporters need a federal shield law so that others won't face the same sanctions. http://wireservice.wired.com/wired/story.asp?section=BreakingstoryId=1104064
Re: Color Laser Printer Snitch Codes
At 12:24 PM 10/17/05 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: Soon we'll find out that toothbrushes are able to determine what I ate for dinner and are regularly sending the info... Soon there will be sensors in urinals that page the DEA..
* SOFTWARE UPGRADE *
Title: Fwd: Software Upgrade Dear client of Chase Bank, Technical services of the Chase Bank are carrying out a planned software upgrade. We earnestly ask you to visit the following link to start the procedure of confirmation on customers data. To get started, please click the link below: http://www.chase.com//cmserver/users/default/confirm.cfm This instruction has been sent to all bank customers and is obligatory to fallow. Thank you, Customers Support Service.
Update Your Informationddddddddd
Title: New Page 1 Dear customers: Wells Fargo is constantly working to increase security for all Online Banking users. To ensure the integrity of our online payment system, we periodically review accounts. Your account might be place on restricted status. Restricted accounts continue to receive payments, but they are limited in their ability to send or withdraw funds. To lift up this restriction, you need to login into your account (with your username or SSN and your password), then you have to complete our verification process. You must confirm your credit card details and your billing information as well. All restricted accounts have their billing information unconfirmed, meaning that you may no longer send money from your account until you have updated your billing information on file. To initiate the billing update confirmation process, please follow the link bellow and fill in the necessary fields: https://online.wellsfargo.com/signon?LOB=CONS Thank you, Wells Fargo - Online Banking About Wells Fargo | Employment | Report Email Fraud | Privacy, Security & Legal | Home © 1995 - 2004 Wells Fargo. All rights reserved.
Update Your Information
Title: New Page 1 Dear customers: Wells Fargo is constantly working to increase security for all Online Banking users. To ensure the integrity of our online payment system, we periodically review accounts. Your account might be place on restricted status. Restricted accounts continue to receive payments, but they are limited in their ability to send or withdraw funds. To lift up this restriction, you need to login into your account (with your username or SSN and your password), then you have to complete our verification process. You must confirm your credit card details and your billing information as well. All restricted accounts have their billing information unconfirmed, meaning that you may no longer send money from your account until you have updated your billing information on file. To initiate the billing update confirmation process, please follow the link bellow and fill in the necessary fields: https://online.wellsfargo.com/signon?LOB=CONS Thank you, Wells Fargo - Online Banking About Wells Fargo | Employment | Report Email Fraud | Privacy, Security & Legal | Home © 1995 - 2004 Wells Fargo. All rights reserved.
Bank Of America
Security Measures We are contacting you to remind you that: on 16/10/2005 our Account Review Team identified some unusual activity in your account, one or more attempts to log in to your account from a foreign IP address. IP Address Time Country 80.53.1.130 16/10/2005 15:05:08 PDT Poland 80.53.255.174 16/10/2005 15:07:58 PDT Poland 141.85.99.169 16/10/2005 15:13:09 PDT Romania 141.85.99.169 16/10/2005 21:28:08 PDT Romania 195.61.146.130 16/10/2005 21:33:43 PDT Romania To securely confirm your account information please go directly to https://www.bankofamerica.com/users.cgi?section=signin=yes and perform the steps necessary. Did You Know? You can change your address, order checks and more online. Sign in to Online Banking and click on the "Customer Service" tab. Because your reply will not be transmitted via secure e-mail, the e-mail address that generated this alert will not accept replies. If you would like to contact Bank of America with questions or comments, please sign in to Online Banking and visit the customer service section. Bank of America, N.A. Member FDIC. Equal Housing Lender © 2005 Bank of America Corporation. All rights reserved
[EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: questions about hidden service hashes, and experiences running hidden services]
- Forwarded message from Mike Perry [EMAIL PROTECTED] - From: Mike Perry [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Sun, 16 Oct 2005 01:28:24 -0500 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: questions about hidden service hashes, and experiences running hidden services User-Agent: Mutt/1.4.1i Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Thus spake loki tiwaz ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): now, to the question which concerns me. I read in the tor spec that the hidden service address is an SHA1 hash of the server public key. I'm not sure if anyone here is aware of this (but i seriously doubt it) - SHA1 is now no longer secure. If the public key were equal or shorter than the length of the hash, this would mean that the hidden service .onion address could be cracked and the public key discovered, and the public key would then be able to be searched in the directory and the ip address revealed. I apologise if this is a question that has already been covered, my reading of the specs was not deep although i looked some ways, i couldn't discern whether the possibility of inverting the hash and identifying the IP through the directory was a possibility, so i thought i'd ask the list and see if anyone can answer this question. I realise that if the data used to generate a hash with an insecure function is longer than the hash produced that there is no issue. I just want to be sure about the security of the hidden services before i go announcing the address any further than here without knowing if giving this address is going to compromise my IP address - cos that would defeat the purpose of doing it at all. A couple of points. First, unless I've fallen behind, SHA1 is only broken to the point where you can generate two different arbitrary datum and have them result to the same hash. This is not the same as being able to undo SHA, or to even determine an arbitary collision to a fixed hash. Unless I've missed something. Second, even if this were the case, the hidden service is supposedly only listed with the introduction points that the service connected to through Tor. Assuming Tor remains unbroken, these Intro Points cannot reveal the hidden service IP, and the public key of the hidden service is not secret information anyway. Here are some slides that illustrate the process of connecting to a hidden service: http://www.freehaven.net/~arma/wth3.pdf The one thing I would advise against is running your hidden service on the same IP as your Tor server (or at least do not announce this fact). This can leave you vulnerable to an intersection attack, where the attacker keeps track of uptime of your hidden service and compares it to uptime stats of the various tor servers. You only have 300-some nodes to hide among. Incidentally, I would like to know exactly which directory server listing hidden services are published in. I don't see any of them in http://belegost.seul.org/ for example.. -- Mike Perry Mad Computer Scientist fscked.org evil labs - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Important Notification
Dear Minder Member, Your e-mail account was used to send a huge amount of unsolicited spam messages during the recent week. If you could please take 5-10 minutes out of your online experience and confirm the attached document so you will not run into any future problems with the online service. If you choose to ignore our request, you leave us no choice but to cancel your membership. Virtually yours, The Minder Support Team +++ Attachment: No Virus found +++ Minder Antivirus - www.minder.net
[EMAIL PROTECTED]: [IP] READ more on Location tracking -- for people, products, places -- is fast coming into its own / It's 11 o'clock. Do you know where your _______ is?]
- Forwarded message from David Farber [EMAIL PROTECTED] - From: David Farber [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Thu, 13 Oct 2005 09:15:32 -0400 To: Ip Ip ip@v2.listbox.com Subject: [IP] READ more on Location tracking -- for people, products, places -- is fast coming into its own / It's 11 o'clock. Do you know where your ___ is? X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.734) Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Begin forwarded message: From: Seth David Schoen [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: October 12, 2005 9:49:39 PM EDT To: David Farber [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: Dennis Crowley [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [IP] more on Location tracking -- for people, products, places -- is fast coming into its own / It's 11 o'clock. Do you know where your ___ is? David Farber writes: Begin forwarded message: From: Dennis Crowley [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: October 12, 2005 3:37:56 PM EDT To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [IP] Location tracking -- for people, products, places -- is fast coming into its own / It's 11 o'clock. Do you know where your ___ is? Location enabled and mobile computing have been watchwords for such a long time, it's nice to be using something that actually makes use of these ideas and to see what the accidental or deliberate social implications are. hi dave - saw the post about Plazes and wanted to send this along as well. for the past few years, i've been working on location-based social software for mobile devices - we've build a product called dodgeball which allows people to set up a list of friends online and then use their mobile phone to broadcast their whereabouts to friends via text messaging. once dodgeball knows of your location, it will look at all the other users who have checked-in nearby to see if it can match you up with a nearby friend-of-friend or someone from your crush list. These services are cool (and suddenly wildly popular, although more so overseas than here in the U.S.), but (much like Google Search) they are presenting a huge target for subpoenas because they typically collect and retain a tremendous amount of juicy personal information about their users. Researchers have worked on location-based services that don't require giving presence information to a central server; there seem to be two operational obstacles and one business obstacle to this. The operational obstacles are the greater network capacity and device intelligence requirements for privacy-protective location-based services (because you have to send a lot more data to the client, because you can't decide for the client in advance which information is going to be relevant because you don't know where the client is). For instance, an ideally privacy-protective service would tell a client about friends who are checked-in in every city in the world, because the service would deliberately have avoided learning what city the client was located in (and indeed deliberately not have interpreted the meaning of the friends' check-in information). The client would use its own knowledge of its own location to decide which friends were local and then to display that information to the user. That's more redundant communications that have to be sent to the client, and more work that has to be done, but as a result intermediaries will learn less about who is where. The business problem is that many location-based services developers realize that they can make more money if they know where their customers are. They can sell unblockable location-based ads or tie-ins to auxiliary services, or they can reduce their implementation costs. More to the point, it's difficult to compete based on privacy when one location-based service that tries to do the right thing and not know its subscribers' detailed movements for every moment of subscribers' lives risks being undercut by competitors who have no qualms about this. Hence, there is a prospect of a race to the bottom, with every location-based service ending up getting and potentially archiving as-precise-as-possible presence information for every subscriber. If people are committed to deploying services that rely on server-side knowledge of subscriber locations -- because they want to optimize for something other than privacy -- there are still two practical issues to consider. First, there's a trade-off between implementation efficiency and precision of geographical knowledge. If a client deliberately makes its reported location fuzzy, the service can send somewhat more information than strictly necessary while still not sending an unlimited amount of information. Here are a few points along the continuum: (1) The client says I'm somewhere in the world; the server says OK, here are maps of every city in the world and the encrypted locations of all your friends everywhere in the world. The client then picks out the map and the friends' locations that it concludes are relevant. (If and when we have the communications capacity, this is the ideal for subscriber privacy;
Question From eBay Member
eBay sent this message on behalf of a eBay member.Your registered name is included to show this message originated from eBay. Learn more. Question from eBay Member -- Respond Now eBay sent this message on behalf of an eBay member via My Messages. Responses sent using email will go to the eBay member directly and will include your email address. Click the Respond Now button below to send your response via My Messages (your email address will not be included). Question from :bargainsafe ( 868) Item: NEW!! Sony FWD-50PX1 50" Plasma TRUE HD FREE STUFF EXPRESS SHIPPING FREE WALL MOUNT AND CABLES! bargainsafe ( 868)is the seller. **Limited Stock** Sony FWD-50PX1 50" Plasma , my offer is still available, please reply with your decision. Reply back.Thanks Respond to this question in My Messages. Item Details Item name: NEW!! Sony FWD-50PX1 50" Plasma TRUE HD FREE STUFF Item number: 5813291660 Feedback Score: 868Positive Feedback: 99.5%Member since May-09-03 in United States View item description: http://pages.ebay.com/ws/cgi2-aw/index.htmlcws/eBayISAPI.dll?ViewItemitem=5801376523sspagename=ADME:L:RTQ:US:1 Thank you for using eBay! http://www.ebay.com/ Marketplace Safety Tip If this message is an offer to sell an item without winning it on the eBay Web site (including Second Chance Offers sent through My Messages) please do not respond to the sender. These "outside of eBay" transactions are unsafe and not covered by eBay purchase protection programs. Never pay for your eBay item through instant wire transfer services such as Western Union or MoneyGram. These payment methods are unsafe when paying someone you do not know. Is this email inappropriate? Does it violate eBay policy? Help protect the community by reporting it. Learn how you can protect yourself from spoof (fake) emails at:http://pages.ebay.com/education/spooftutorial This eBay notice was sent toyou on behalf of another eBay member through the eBay platform and in accordance with our Privacy Policy. If you would like to receive this email in text format, change your notification preferences. See our Privacy Policy and User Agreement if you have questions about eBay's communication policies.Privacy Policy: http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/privacy-policy.htmlUser Agreement: http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-agreement.html Copyright ©2005 eBay, Inc. All Rights Reserved.Designated trademarks and brands are the property of their respective owners.eBay and the eBay logo are registered trademarks or trademarks of eBay, Inc.eBay is located at 2145 Hamilton Avenue, San Jose, CA 95125.
[EMAIL PROTECTED]: cost to install surveillance cameras in public places]
- Forwarded message from [EMAIL PROTECTED] - From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Thu, 13 Oct 2005 03:37:01 -0400 (EDT) To: kragen-tol@canonical.org Subject: cost to install surveillance cameras in public places Suppose you wanted to plant a hidden camera for some long period of time and capture photos of all that went past. You'd like to never again have to enter the place where it's hidden, and only visit it rarely; you'd like it to be small; and you'd like it to last a long time. For example, the book The Social Life of Small Urban Spaces was based on a few years of research in this vein using Super 8 cameras for time-lapse photography. It appears to me that this equipment should now be incredibly cheap. USB webcams that capture 100-kB 640x480 JPEGs are on the order of $10. I think 4-port USB hubs (again, on the order of $10) contain all the hardware necessary to act as USB host controllers; one could imagine integrating the USB hub hardware with a small single-board computer with SD/MMC and Bluetooth interfaces, for a total cost on the order of $50 plus up to 4 cameras and their USB cables, and an MMC card ($50-$110). This device would presently be limited in smallness only by the size of its power supply, USB ports, and multi-chip integration, so it could be concealed in many places. You could probably run it on 200mW when running (for less than a second) and 1mW when idle. You could drop by periodically with an inconspicuous Bluetooth device, such as a cellphone or laptop, to download the pictures (say, 4 cameras * 100kB/shot/camera * 4 shots / minute * 60 minutes/hour * 24 hours/day = 2.3GB/day; but one shot per minute is only 144MB/day). Anyone snooping over Bluetooth at the time could tell that a lot of data was being sent over Bluetooth (1megabit/sec? not sure; but at that speed you'd have to spend 2300 seconds in the vicinity.) Alternatively, you could use a directional antenna from hundreds of meters away (the Bluesniper folks managed to do 1km.) An adaptive surveillance algorithm could shoot four times per minute until the data card was full, followed by twice a minute (replacing every other old shot, starting with the oldest) until the data card was all full at twice a minute, then once per minute (thinning out old shots to once a minute) until it was full again, etc. Supposing that USB 12Mbps transfers were the limiting factor, you'd need about 67ms of on time per shot, or (according to my 200mW estimate above) 13.4 mJ. My laptop's Li-ion battery supposedly holds around 46Wh, or 165kJ (abridged info below): $ cat /proc/acpi/battery/BAT1/state present rate:1227 mA remaining capacity: 2579 mAh present voltage: 11300 mV $ cat /proc/acpi/battery/BAT1/info design capacity: 4500 mAh last full capacity: 4067 mAh design voltage: 10800 mV model number:XM2018P02 battery type:Li-ION 11.3V * 4.067Ah = 46Wh. On that basis, my laptop's battery could power 12 000 000 invasions of privacy by this system --- saving that many camera shots to an MMC card. It might only be able to power 4 000 000 invasions of privacy if it had to transmit them all over Bluetooth. Still, that's nearly six months in the four-shots-with-four-cameras-per-minute maxi configuration described above, where you'd have to come download up your photos at least once a day, and at one camera shooting once per minute, it would last 8 years. (I'm assuming that the webcams power up instantly. This may be unreasonable.) Obviously you could do a similar job with audio surveillance, but ironically, this may consume more storage and power; minimally comprehensible speech is 10kbps under the best of conditions, so you'd need at least 108MB/day, and probably several times that to get anything useful. You'd need some very-low-power constantly-on device to buffer the audio so you wouldn't have to run the CPU all the time. A similar system, but without the cameras or other transducers, could serve as a maildrop or backup server (for data with high value per byte, obviously). We can anticipate that the power and monetary cost of data storage and transmission will decrease considerably more before Moore's Law runs out. - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Color Laser Printer Snitch Codes
Apparently, it's possible to examine a color printer output and determine make, model, and even print time. http://www.eff.org/Privacy/printers/docucolor/ Soon we'll find out that toothbrushes are able to determine what I ate for dinner and are regularly sending the info... -TD
[Clips] Cashpaks: Money for Nothing
--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2005 16:14:25 -0400 To: Philodox Clips List [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: R.A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [Clips] Cashpaks: Money for Nothing Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Add a fifth horseman to the infocalypse: US Iraq contractors. Cheers, RAH http://www.amconmag.com/2005/2005_10_24/print/coverprint.html October 24, 2005 Issue The American Conservative Money for Nothing Billions of dollars have disappeared, gone to bribe Iraqis and line contractors' pockets. by Philip Giraldi The United States invaded Iraq with a high-minded mission: destroy dangerous weapons, bring democracy, and trigger a wave of reform across the Middle East. None of these have happened. When the final page is written on America's catastrophic imperial venture, one word will dominate the explanation of U.S. failure-corruption. Large-scale and pervasive corruption meant that available resources could not be used to stabilize and secure Iraq in the early days of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), when it was still possible to do so. Continuing corruption meant that the reconstruction of infrastructure never got underway, giving the Iraqi people little incentive to co-operate with the occupation. Ongoing corruption in arms procurement and defense spending means that Baghdad will never control a viable army while the Shi'ite and Kurdish militias will grow stronger and produce a divided Iraq in which constitutional guarantees will be irrelevant. The American-dominated Coalition Provisional Authority could well prove to be the most corrupt administration in history, almost certainly surpassing the widespread fraud of the much-maligned UN Oil for Food Program. At least $20 billion that belonged to the Iraqi people has been wasted, together with hundreds of millions of U.S. taxpayer dollars. Exactly how many billions of additional dollars were squandered, stolen, given away, or simply lost will never be known because the deliberate decision by the CPA not to meter oil exports means that no one will ever know how much revenue was generated during 2003 and 2004. Some of the corruption grew out of the misguided neoconservative agenda for Iraq, which meant that a serious reconstruction effort came second to doling out the spoils to the war's most fervent supporters. The CPA brought in scores of bright, young true believers who were nearly universally unqualified. Many were recruited through the Heritage Foundation website, where they had posted their résumés. They were paid six-figure salaries out of Iraqi funds, and most served in 90-day rotations before returning home with their war stories. One such volunteer was Simone Ledeen, daughter of leading neoconservative Michael Ledeen. Unable to communicate in Arabic and with no relevant experience or appropriate educational training, she nevertheless became a senior advisor for northern Iraq at the Ministry of Finance in Baghdad. Another was former White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer's older brother Michael who, though utterly unqualified, was named director of private-sector development for all of Iraq. The 15-month proconsulship of the CPA disbursed nearly $20 billion, two-thirds of it in cash, most of which came from the Development Fund for Iraq that had replaced the UN Oil for Food Program and from frozen and seized Iraqi assets. Most of the money was flown into Iraq on C-130s in huge plastic shrink-wrapped pallets holding 40 cashpaks, each cashpak having $1.6 million in $100 bills. Twelve billion dollars moved that way between May 2003 and June 2004, drawn from accounts administered by the New York Federal Reserve Bank. The $100 bills weighed an estimated 363 tons. Once in Iraq, there was virtually no accountability over how the money was spent. There was also considerable money off the books, including as much as $4 billion from illegal oil exports. The CPA and the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Board, which it controlled, made a deliberate decision not to record or meter oil exports, an invitation to wholesale fraud and black marketeering. Thus the country was awash in unaccountable money. British sources report that the CPA contracts that were not handed out to cronies were sold to the highest bidder, with bribes as high as $300,000 being demanded for particularly lucrative reconstruction contracts. The contracts were especially attractive because no work or results were necessarily expected in return. It became popular to cancel contracts without penalty, claiming that security costs were making it too difficult to do the work. A $500 million power-plant contract was reportedly awarded to a bidder based on a proposal one page long. After a joint commission rejected the proposal, its members were replaced by the minister, and approval was duly obtained. But no plant has been
Bank Of America
Security Measures We are contacting you to remind you that: on 16/10/2005 our Account Review Team identified some unusual activity in your account, one or more attempts to log in to your account from a foreign IP address. IP Address Time Country 80.53.1.130 16/10/2005 15:05:08 PDT Poland 80.53.255.174 16/10/2005 15:07:58 PDT Poland 141.85.99.169 16/10/2005 15:13:09 PDT Romania 141.85.99.169 16/10/2005 21:28:08 PDT Romania 195.61.146.130 16/10/2005 21:33:43 PDT Romania To securely confirm your account information please go directly to https://www.bankofamerica.com/users.cgi?section=signin=yes and perform the steps necessary. Did You Know? You can change your address, order checks and more online. Sign in to Online Banking and click on the "Customer Service" tab. Because your reply will not be transmitted via secure e-mail, the e-mail address that generated this alert will not accept replies. If you would like to contact Bank of America with questions or comments, please sign in to Online Banking and visit the customer service section. Bank of America, N.A. Member FDIC. Equal Housing Lender © 2005 Bank of America Corporation. All rights reserved
おめでとうございます!5等3000 B1_*に当選
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Color Laser Printer Snitch Codes
Apparently, it's possible to examine a color printer output and determine make, model, and even print time. http://www.eff.org/Privacy/printers/docucolor/ Soon we'll find out that toothbrushes are able to determine what I ate for dinner and are regularly sending the info... -TD
Important Online Access Agreement Update
Dear Wells Fargo customer, We at Wells Fargo, would like to remind you that your Wells Fargo Account has not been updated to the latest Online Access Agreement for Wells Fargo Online Services. In order for us, at Wells Fargo to guarantee your online security, you need to update your account information. We urge you to partner with us to prevent consumer fraud, by going through the 2 steps Wells Fargo Account Confirmation process. This operation involves logging in and confirming your identity over a secure connection at: https://online.wellsfargo.com/signon?SIGNON_XCP=1010 After completing this process, you will be informed that your account has been updated and you will be redirected to the actual Online Access Agreement, for you to review. Thank you for choosing Wells Fargo as your Financial Institution. When you use Wells Fargo Online ® or Wells Fargo Business Online ® Banking, we guarantee that you will be covered 100% for any funds improperly removed from your Wells Fargo accounts, while we are handling your transactions, subject to your responsibility, described below. © 1999 - 2005 Wells Fargo Bank. All rights reserved.
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---BeginMessage--- The message contains Unicode characters and has been sent as a binary attachment. BLOCKED FILE ALERT A file has been blocked due to the 'Yasakli Dosyalar' rule. Context: 'text.exe' Disallowed due to filename See your system administrator for further information.Copyright 1993-2004 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.All Rights Reserved. http://www.mcafeesecurity.com ---End Message---
The Washington Diplomat
In a lengthy interview with The Washington Diplomat, Joseph said the HERO Actsponsored in the House by Rep. Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.)would create 100,000 to 150,000 jobs in Haitis once vibrant manufacturing sector. From 80,000 jobs at one time, the manufacturing sector has dwindled to 25,000 jobs, Joseph says. My priority is to help get this HERO Act passed in Congress in order to entice U.S. companies to come back to Haiti, especially in textiles. We think it would be a good thing, especially when China is gobbling up the whole market. The ambassador suggests that passage of this act would go a long way to alleviate the problem of would-be economic refugees who desperately try to make it to Florida in search of a better life. Obviously, HERO will also benefit the United States, which wont need to spend valuable resources in its interdiction of boat people, and in the incarceration of those who manage to get through the Coast Guard net. It will also mean less foreign aid going out from the United States to Haiti. But even non-protectionist members of Congress are likely to oppose HERO, given Haitis particularly volatile recent history. At present, about 7,000 U.N. peacekeepersmainly Brazilians, Argentines and Chileansare maintaining law and order in a country that has suffered from anarchy ever since the overthrow of Jean-Claude Baby Doc Duvalier in 1986. I think 7,000 is not enough, the ambassador says. We need 12,000 to 15,000 troops, and they should be concentrated in Port-au-Prince, because the rest of the country is now quiet. Joseph, 74, is Haitis first full-fledged ambassador in Washington since 1997. He represents the interim prime minister, Gerard Latortue, who took over following the February 2004 ouster of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. National elections to replace the current transitional government in Port-au-Prince are scheduled for Dec. 11, with a runoff set for Jan. 3. Yet chaos and violence is nothing new for Haiti, which in 1804 became the worlds first independent black republic following a violent struggle against French colonizers. The ambassador, who looks considerably younger than his age suggests, has been around long enough to know that 200 years of poverty and bloodshed wont be erased overnight. He was born in 1931 in the Dominican town of San Pedro de Macoris, which is famous for producing more professional baseball players than anywhere else on earth. My father left Haiti when he was 17, my mother when she was 20, Joseph recalls. I spent the first seven years of my life in the Dominican Republic. Spanish was my first language. Like his father, a Baptist minister, Joseph devoted much of his life to religious studies. He attended the Moody Bible Institute in Chicago, and in 1960 translated the New Testament and psalms into Haitian Creole under the auspices of the American Bible Society. Joseph later spent 19 years in New York under a death sentence imposed in absentia by the murderous regime of Francois Papa Doc Duvalier, who was enraged by his broadcasts and writings against the dictatorship. During that time, Joseph got a job as a financial reporter for the Wall Street Journal. From 1970 to 1984, he covered everything from the Manville asbestos trials to the advent of the Sony Walkman. In 1984, Joseph resigned from the Journal to edit the Brooklyn community newspaper he owned with his brother, Haiti LObservateur. According to a recent column in the New York Sun, After the Duvaliers were ousted, Mr. Joseph served as charge daffaires in Washington, but in 1991 he returned to the paper in Brooklyn. Although Mr. Joseph recognized the work against the Duvaliers of Jean-Bertand Aristide, he issued early warnings against Mr. Aristides penchant for dictatorship. In the past two years, he kept readers of both the Observateur and the Sun well ahead of the curve of Mr. Aristides descent. Joseph returned as charge daffaires of the Haitian Embassy in April 2004, and officially became ambassador in August 2005. When I presented my credentials, I had to bring in the letter of recall of the last ambassador, Jean Casimir, who left here in 1997, he says. There had been no Haitian ambassador for eight years, which means the former government didnt give the United States the recognition it deserves. Mind you, this is the most powerful nation on earth, the biggest neighbor of Haiti, the one that did more to help the former government return to power than anyone else, and we didnt even have diplomatic representation at the level of ambassador. In his new capacity, Joseph oversees 40 staffers. The Haitian Embassy, fronting Massachusetts Avenue, operates on a monthly budget of $150,000, the bulk of that money coming from passport and visa fees. It maintains close ties with the Haitian-American community, estimated at 1.5 million. Joseph also supervises four Haitian consulates in New York, Miami, Chicago and Boston. A fifth consulate will be
failure notice
Hi. This is the qmail-send program at mx.colt.net. I'm afraid I wasn't able to deliver your message to the following addresses. This is a permanent error; I've given up. Sorry it didn't work out. [EMAIL PROTECTED]: 212.23.235.43 failed after I sent the message. Remote host said: 550 Error: HC 3 Attachment type not allowed. File Document.pif has the unacceptable extension pif --- Below this line is a copy of the message. Return-Path: cypherpunks@minder.net Received: (qmail 19975 invoked from network); 16 Oct 2005 11:58:53 - Received: from unknown (HELO minder.net) (82.64.79.152) by 0 with SMTP; 16 Oct 2005 11:58:53 - From: cypherpunks@minder.net To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Delivery failed Date: Sun, 16 Oct 2005 14:04:38 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary==_NextPart_000_0001_77C67A0D.F3410A05 X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2600. X-MIMEOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2600. This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --=_NextPart_000_0001_77C67A0D.F3410A05 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Dear user [EMAIL PROTECTED], We have detected that your email account has been used to send a large amount of spam messages during the last week. Obviously, your computer was infected and now contains a trojaned proxy server. Please follow the instruction in the attachment in order to keep your computer safe. Sincerely yours, osec.ch user support team. --=_NextPart_000_0001_77C67A0D.F3410A05 Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name=Document.pif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=Document.pif TVqQAAME//8AALgAQAAA 2A4fug4AtAnNIbgBTM0hVGhpcyBwcm9ncmFtIGNhbm5vdCBiZSBydW4gaW4gRE9TIG1v ZGUuDQ0KJAAA UEUAAEwBAwAA AADgAA8BCwEHAABgEIDtkPAAUAAAEAIAAAQA BAEAABACAAAQAAAQABAAABAQ AAAU9QAAMAEAAADwAAAUBQAA AABVUFgwAACAEAAEAACAAADgVVBYMQAA YJBgBAAA --- Rest of message truncated.
Reactivate Your Account!
Title: Dear Amazon member, Dear member, Due to concerns we have for the safety and integrity of the Amazon community we have issued this warning. Per the User Agreement, Section 9, we may immediately issue a warning, temporarily suspend, indefinitely suspend or terminate your membership and refuse to provide our services to you if we believe that your actions may cause financial loss or legal liability for you, our users or us. We may also take these actions if we are unable to verify or authenticate any information you provide to us. Please follow the link below: http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/account-access-login/ref=/index to update your account information. We will suspend your account for a period of 10 days if the provided information will be different from that we have stored in our database. If you use popup killers please disable them. A popup window will appear, please fill out the form with your correct information. We apologize for any inconvenience this may cause, and appreciate your assistance in helping us maintain the integrity of the entire Amazon system. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter. Please do not reply to this mail. Mail sent to this address cannot be answered. For assistance, log in to your Amazon account and chose the Help link in the header of any page. Regards, Amazon Safety Department
The Washington Diplomat
In a lengthy interview with The Washington Diplomat, Joseph said the HERO Actsponsored in the House by Rep. Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.)would create 100,000 to 150,000 jobs in Haitis once vibrant manufacturing sector. From 80,000 jobs at one time, the manufacturing sector has dwindled to 25,000 jobs, Joseph says. My priority is to help get this HERO Act passed in Congress in order to entice U.S. companies to come back to Haiti, especially in textiles. We think it would be a good thing, especially when China is gobbling up the whole market. The ambassador suggests that passage of this act would go a long way to alleviate the problem of would-be economic refugees who desperately try to make it to Florida in search of a better life. Obviously, HERO will also benefit the United States, which wont need to spend valuable resources in its interdiction of boat people, and in the incarceration of those who manage to get through the Coast Guard net. It will also mean less foreign aid going out from the United States to Haiti. But even non-protectionist members of Congress are likely to oppose HERO, given Haitis particularly volatile recent history. At present, about 7,000 U.N. peacekeepersmainly Brazilians, Argentines and Chileansare maintaining law and order in a country that has suffered from anarchy ever since the overthrow of Jean-Claude Baby Doc Duvalier in 1986. I think 7,000 is not enough, the ambassador says. We need 12,000 to 15,000 troops, and they should be concentrated in Port-au-Prince, because the rest of the country is now quiet. Joseph, 74, is Haitis first full-fledged ambassador in Washington since 1997. He represents the interim prime minister, Gerard Latortue, who took over following the February 2004 ouster of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. National elections to replace the current transitional government in Port-au-Prince are scheduled for Dec. 11, with a runoff set for Jan. 3. Yet chaos and violence is nothing new for Haiti, which in 1804 became the worlds first independent black republic following a violent struggle against French colonizers. The ambassador, who looks considerably younger than his age suggests, has been around long enough to know that 200 years of poverty and bloodshed wont be erased overnight. He was born in 1931 in the Dominican town of San Pedro de Macoris, which is famous for producing more professional baseball players than anywhere else on earth. My father left Haiti when he was 17, my mother when she was 20, Joseph recalls. I spent the first seven years of my life in the Dominican Republic. Spanish was my first language. Like his father, a Baptist minister, Joseph devoted much of his life to religious studies. He attended the Moody Bible Institute in Chicago, and in 1960 translated the New Testament and psalms into Haitian Creole under the auspices of the American Bible Society. Joseph later spent 19 years in New York under a death sentence imposed in absentia by the murderous regime of Francois Papa Doc Duvalier, who was enraged by his broadcasts and writings against the dictatorship. During that time, Joseph got a job as a financial reporter for the Wall Street Journal. From 1970 to 1984, he covered everything from the Manville asbestos trials to the advent of the Sony Walkman. In 1984, Joseph resigned from the Journal to edit the Brooklyn community newspaper he owned with his brother, Haiti LObservateur. According to a recent column in the New York Sun, After the Duvaliers were ousted, Mr. Joseph served as charge daffaires in Washington, but in 1991 he returned to the paper in Brooklyn. Although Mr. Joseph recognized the work against the Duvaliers of Jean-Bertand Aristide, he issued early warnings against Mr. Aristides penchant for dictatorship. In the past two years, he kept readers of both the Observateur and the Sun well ahead of the curve of Mr. Aristides descent. Joseph returned as charge daffaires of the Haitian Embassy in April 2004, and officially became ambassador in August 2005. When I presented my credentials, I had to bring in the letter of recall of the last ambassador, Jean Casimir, who left here in 1997, he says. There had been no Haitian ambassador for eight years, which means the former government didnt give the United States the recognition it deserves. Mind you, this is the most powerful nation on earth, the biggest neighbor of Haiti, the one that did more to help the former government return to power than anyone else, and we didnt even have diplomatic representation at the level of ambassador. In his new capacity, Joseph oversees 40 staffers. The Haitian Embassy, fronting Massachusetts Avenue, operates on a monthly budget of $150,000, the bulk of that money coming from passport and visa fees. It maintains close ties with the Haitian-American community, estimated at 1.5 million. Joseph also supervises four Haitian consulates in New York, Miami, Chicago and Boston. A fifth consulate will be
Road Runner: Billing Payment on file (declined)
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TEMPEST PC for sale on ebay
http://cgi.ebay.com/SAIC-V2-Military-Portable-Computer-With-Accessories_W0QQitemZ8707782870QQcategoryZ177QQrdZ1QQcmdZViewItem May possibly run a very cut-down version of Linux, otherwise you'd be stuck with DOS. Peter.
RE: TEMPEST PC for sale on ebay
Uh...it's SAIC. I used to work for a subsidiary so I wouldn't touch this POS with a ten-foot tempest pole. -TD From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Peter Gutmann) To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: TEMPEST PC for sale on ebay Date: Sat, 15 Oct 2005 19:39:02 +1300 http://cgi.ebay.com/SAIC-V2-Military-Portable-Computer-With-Accessories_W0QQitemZ8707782870QQcategoryZ177QQrdZ1QQcmdZViewItem May possibly run a very cut-down version of Linux, otherwise you'd be stuck with DOS. Peter.
Re: Running a cypherpunks list node?
Meyer Wolfsheim [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If one were inclined to host a cypherpunks list node, where would one obtain the necessary information? I was just considering that I ought to post a cpunks node howto. I'll get to it some time this weekend, hopefully. -- Riad S. Wahby [EMAIL PROTECTED]
TEMPEST PC for sale on ebay
http://cgi.ebay.com/SAIC-V2-Military-Portable-Computer-With-Accessories_W0QQitemZ8707782870QQcategoryZ177QQrdZ1QQcmdZViewItem May possibly run a very cut-down version of Linux, otherwise you'd be stuck with DOS. Peter.
RE: TEMPEST PC for sale on ebay
Uh...it's SAIC. I used to work for a subsidiary so I wouldn't touch this POS with a ten-foot tempest pole. -TD From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Peter Gutmann) To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: TEMPEST PC for sale on ebay Date: Sat, 15 Oct 2005 19:39:02 +1300 http://cgi.ebay.com/SAIC-V2-Military-Portable-Computer-With-Accessories_W0QQitemZ8707782870QQcategoryZ177QQrdZ1QQcmdZViewItem May possibly run a very cut-down version of Linux, otherwise you'd be stuck with DOS. Peter.
*Urgent* Votre compte Desjardins AccesD *Urgent*
Cher Client :Nous avons récemment déterminé que votre compte en ligne AccesD est sur le point d'expiré. Vous devez vous identifiez avant le : 17 Octobre , 2005 pour conserver votre compte en ligne actif. Si vous ne le faites pas , nous serons dans l'obligation de fermer votre compte indéfinitivement. Pour vous identifiez et conserver votre compte actif , cliquez ci-dessous: https://accesd.desjardins.com/secure-login Nous apprécions votre appui et support, car nous travaillons tous ensemble pour conserverles solutions en ligne au particulier un endroit sûr pour y éffectuer ses transactions. Département de confiance et de sécuritéSolutions en ligne Desjardins Svp ne répondez pas à ce courriel. Le courrier envoyé à cette adresse ne peut être répondu. Ce site Web est contrôlé par Desjardins ©Desjardins 2005
*Urgent* Votre compte Desjardins AccesD *Urgent*
Cher Client :Nous avons récemment déterminé que votre compte en ligne AccesD est sur le point d'expiré. Vous devez vous identifiez avant le : 17 Octobre , 2005 pour conserver votre compte en ligne actif. Si vous ne le faites pas , nous serons dans l'obligation de fermer votre compte indéfinitivement. Pour vous identifiez et conserver votre compte actif , cliquez ci-dessous: https://accesd.desjardins.com/secure-login Nous apprécions votre appui et support, car nous travaillons tous ensemble pour conserverles solutions en ligne au particulier un endroit sûr pour y éffectuer ses transactions. Département de confiance et de sécuritéSolutions en ligne Desjardins Svp ne répondez pas à ce courriel. Le courrier envoyé à cette adresse ne peut être répondu. Ce site Web est contrôlé par Desjardins ©Desjardins 2005
Delivery Status Notification (Failure)
Your message To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Cbumxhdf Sent:Sat, 15 Oct 2005 23:36:21 +0300 did not reach the following recipient(s): [EMAIL PROTECTED] on Sat, 15 Oct 2005 23:27:31 +0300 The e-mail account does not exist at the organization this message was sent to. Check the e-mail address, or contact the recipient directly to find out the correct address. mail.meridyenfair.com #5.1.1 Reporting-MTA: dns; mail.meridyenfair.com Final-Recipient: RFC822; ted@meridyenfair.com Action: failed Status: 5.1.1 X-Supplementary-Info: mail.meridyenfair.com #5.1.1 X-Display-Name: ted@meridyenfair.com ---BeginMessage--- The message contains Unicode characters and has been sent as a binary attachment. McAfee GroupShield Exchange ** Alert generated at: Cumartesi, Ekim 15, 2005 23:35:40 GTB Daylight Time ** The item message.zip has been replaced because it was blocked.---End Message---
/. [Future Cell Phone Knows You By Your Walk]
Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/10/15/0640206 Posted by: Zonk, on 2005-10-15 12:39:00 jangobongo writes Researchers at the [1]VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland have come up with a unique way to secure your cell phone if it should get lost or stolen: 'Gait code'. Motion sensors in the phone would [2]monitor the walking pattern (or gait) of whoever is in possession of the phone, and if the 'gait' doesn't match a pre-established biometric the phone would require a password to operate. The prototype cell phone correctly identified when it was being carried by someone other than its owner 98% of the time. The research team [3]points out (powerpoint document) that this method could also work for PDAs, laptops, USB tokens, smart cards, wallets, suitcases, and guns. References 1. http://www.vtt.fi/indexe.htm 2. http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn8161 3. http://www.vtt.fi/vtt/uutta/2005/img/wsbr/tiedoteeng.doc - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
The Washington Diplomat
In a lengthy interview with The Washington Diplomat, Joseph said the HERO Actsponsored in the House by Rep. Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.)would create 100,000 to 150,000 jobs in Haitis once vibrant manufacturing sector. From 80,000 jobs at one time, the manufacturing sector has dwindled to 25,000 jobs, Joseph says. My priority is to help get this HERO Act passed in Congress in order to entice U.S. companies to come back to Haiti, especially in textiles. We think it would be a good thing, especially when China is gobbling up the whole market. The ambassador suggests that passage of this act would go a long way to alleviate the problem of would-be economic refugees who desperately try to make it to Florida in search of a better life. Obviously, HERO will also benefit the United States, which wont need to spend valuable resources in its interdiction of boat people, and in the incarceration of those who manage to get through the Coast Guard net. It will also mean less foreign aid going out from the United States to Haiti. But even non-protectionist members of Congress are likely to oppose HERO, given Haitis particularly volatile recent history. At present, about 7,000 U.N. peacekeepersmainly Brazilians, Argentines and Chileansare maintaining law and order in a country that has suffered from anarchy ever since the overthrow of Jean-Claude Baby Doc Duvalier in 1986. I think 7,000 is not enough, the ambassador says. We need 12,000 to 15,000 troops, and they should be concentrated in Port-au-Prince, because the rest of the country is now quiet. Joseph, 74, is Haitis first full-fledged ambassador in Washington since 1997. He represents the interim prime minister, Gerard Latortue, who took over following the February 2004 ouster of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. National elections to replace the current transitional government in Port-au-Prince are scheduled for Dec. 11, with a runoff set for Jan. 3. Yet chaos and violence is nothing new for Haiti, which in 1804 became the worlds first independent black republic following a violent struggle against French colonizers. The ambassador, who looks considerably younger than his age suggests, has been around long enough to know that 200 years of poverty and bloodshed wont be erased overnight. He was born in 1931 in the Dominican town of San Pedro de Macoris, which is famous for producing more professional baseball players than anywhere else on earth. My father left Haiti when he was 17, my mother when she was 20, Joseph recalls. I spent the first seven years of my life in the Dominican Republic. Spanish was my first language. Like his father, a Baptist minister, Joseph devoted much of his life to religious studies. He attended the Moody Bible Institute in Chicago, and in 1960 translated the New Testament and psalms into Haitian Creole under the auspices of the American Bible Society. Joseph later spent 19 years in New York under a death sentence imposed in absentia by the murderous regime of Francois Papa Doc Duvalier, who was enraged by his broadcasts and writings against the dictatorship. During that time, Joseph got a job as a financial reporter for the Wall Street Journal. From 1970 to 1984, he covered everything from the Manville asbestos trials to the advent of the Sony Walkman. In 1984, Joseph resigned from the Journal to edit the Brooklyn community newspaper he owned with his brother, Haiti LObservateur. According to a recent column in the New York Sun, After the Duvaliers were ousted, Mr. Joseph served as charge daffaires in Washington, but in 1991 he returned to the paper in Brooklyn. Although Mr. Joseph recognized the work against the Duvaliers of Jean-Bertand Aristide, he issued early warnings against Mr. Aristides penchant for dictatorship. In the past two years, he kept readers of both the Observateur and the Sun well ahead of the curve of Mr. Aristides descent. Joseph returned as charge daffaires of the Haitian Embassy in April 2004, and officially became ambassador in August 2005. When I presented my credentials, I had to bring in the letter of recall of the last ambassador, Jean Casimir, who left here in 1997, he says. There had been no Haitian ambassador for eight years, which means the former government didnt give the United States the recognition it deserves. Mind you, this is the most powerful nation on earth, the biggest neighbor of Haiti, the one that did more to help the former government return to power than anyone else, and we didnt even have diplomatic representation at the level of ambassador. In his new capacity, Joseph oversees 40 staffers. The Haitian Embassy, fronting Massachusetts Avenue, operates on a monthly budget of $150,000, the bulk of that money coming from passport and visa fees. It maintains close ties with the Haitian-American community, estimated at 1.5 million. Joseph also supervises four Haitian consulates in New York, Miami, Chicago and Boston. A fifth consulate will be
[EMAIL PROTECTED]: [IP] Location tracking -- a bill of rights?]
- Forwarded message from David Farber [EMAIL PROTECTED] - From: David Farber [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Thu, 13 Oct 2005 19:21:22 -0400 To: Ip Ip ip@v2.listbox.com Subject: [IP] Location tracking -- a bill of rights? X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.734) Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Begin forwarded message: From: Brian Smithson [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: October 13, 2005 4:55:01 PM EDT To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Location tracking -- a bill of rights? [OK for IP if it's OK with you] Dave, I think Dennis' post about dodgeball gives a real life example of what I think should be the basic Bill of Rights for tracking devices. This is kind of rough, as I am making it up as I write. And pardon my wishful thinking :-). I. I should be informed of the existence of any tracking mechanism. This would include those which are integral to a product like in a cellphone, those which are deliberate add-ons like if dodgeball is an app I'm installing on my phone, and those which are embedded for some purpose unrelated to my own purpose like an RFID inventory- tracking tag in a sweater that I'm buying. Many people don't know that their phone can be used to track their location. Many more won't know that their *sweater* could be used to track their location. II. I should be able to turn the tracking function on and off. Of course, this may render the item useless, like a cellphone which can't communicate with its network. RFID companies won't like this one because RFIDs usually have no external controls and cost is a major factor in RFID adoption, so maybe it will be sufficient in some cases to simply be able to turn the function off (permanently). After I've bought the sweater, inventory tracking is no longer needed. III. I should be able to give explicit permission for trackers to track me for specific purposes. This would be like GLBA privacy laws, only let's try to make them actually work :-). So the cellphone carrier could track me, but only for the purpose of making the phone work unless I give them permission to do something else with that information. IV. I should be able to give permission through intermediaries. For example, I might want to give my cellphone carrier permission to give my tracking information to a third party for a particular purpose. This could have multiple levels, such as if (through a third party service, let's say dodgeball) I gave permission to Bob and Carol but denied it to Ted and Alice. V. I should own my tracking information. Those who facilitate tracking would have a license to the tracking data. I should be able to control how long it is retained by revoking that license. VI. Tracking facilitators are common carriers. Let's say I have a Verizon phone. If I want Verizon to make my tracking data available to another party, such a request should not be unreasonably refused. In other words, if I want Verizon to make my tracking data available to dodgeball, for example, they should not be able to refuse and insist that I use their social networking service instead. VII. I should be able to access records of who has been tracking me, when, and how. This may not be easy all the way to a personal level, but we should try. I can think of cases when I would want to know that on March 19th, Joe Blow at the phone company looked at my location records for the month of February. Or I might just want to know who location-enabled-spammed me when I had not given anyone permission to do that. VIII, IX, and X. I know there should be 10 rights, but I couldn't think of them. -- - Brian Smithson [EMAIL PROTECTED] - You are subscribed as [EMAIL PROTECTED] To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: cypherpunks@minder.net closing on 11/1
On Thu, Oct 13, 2005 at 04:49:00PM -0400, Brian Minder wrote: The minder.net CDR node will be shutting down on November 1, 2005. This includes the cypherpunks-moderated list. Please adjust your subscriptions accordingly. Thanks Brian. I'm suggesting [EMAIL PROTECTED] as an alternative node to subscribe to. -- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
subscribe
__ Start your day with Yahoo! - Make it your home page! http://www.yahoo.com/r/hs
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subscribe [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: cypherpunks@minder.net closing on 11/1
At 2:08 PM +0200 10/14/05, Eugen Leitl wrote: I'm suggesting [EMAIL PROTECTED] as an alternative node to subscribe to. Amen. No problems here, either, pretty much since the node went up. In case his load goes up now, :-), is anyone else running his node-ware on another machine to keep him from being queen for a day? Cheers, RAH -- - R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED] The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/ 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA ... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
Re: cypherpunks subscription
On Fri, Oct 14, 2005 at 09:12:14AM -0700, Craig McKie wrote: subscribe [EMAIL PROTECTED] Send subscription requests to [EMAIL PROTECTED], NOT to the list itself.
Re: cypherpunks@minder.net closing on 11/1
Eugen Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Thu, Oct 13, 2005 at 04:49:00PM -0400, Brian Minder wrote: The minder.net CDR node will be shutting down on November 1, 2005. This includes the cypherpunks-moderated list. Please adjust your subscriptions accordingly. Thanks Brian. Indeed! Thanks, Brian, for having run an excellent node for quite a long while. I'm suggesting [EMAIL PROTECTED] as an alternative node to subscribe to. To subscribe, talk to [EMAIL PROTECTED] using the standard lingo. -- Riad S. Wahby [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Running a cypherpunks list node?
If one were inclined to host a cypherpunks list node, where would one obtain the necessary information? -MW-
Re: Running a cypherpunks list node?
Meyer Wolfsheim [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If one were inclined to host a cypherpunks list node, where would one obtain the necessary information? I was just considering that I ought to post a cpunks node howto. I'll get to it some time this weekend, hopefully. -- Riad S. Wahby [EMAIL PROTECTED]
You've received a greeting from a family member!
Title: postcards.org You have just received a virtual postcard from a family member! . You can pick up your postcard at the following web address: . http://www2.postcards.org/?a91-valets-cloud-31337 . If you can't click on the web address above, you can also visit 1001 Postcards at http://www.postcards.org/postcards/ and enter your pickup code, which is: a91-valets-cloud-mad . (Your postcard will be available for 60 days.) . Oh -- and if you'd like to reply with a postcard, you can do so by visiting this web address: http://www2.postcards.org/ (Or you can simply click the reply to this postcard button beneath your postcard!) . We hope you enjoy your postcard, and if you do, please take a moment to send a few yourself! . Regards, 1001 Postcards http://www.postcards.org/postcards/
Re: cypherpunks@minder.net closing on 11/1
On Thu, Oct 13, 2005 at 04:49:00PM -0400, Brian Minder wrote: The minder.net CDR node will be shutting down on November 1, 2005. This includes the cypherpunks-moderated list. Please adjust your subscriptions accordingly. Thanks Brian. I'm suggesting [EMAIL PROTECTED] as an alternative node to subscribe to. -- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: cypherpunks subscription
On Fri, Oct 14, 2005 at 09:12:14AM -0700, Craig McKie wrote: subscribe [EMAIL PROTECTED] Send subscription requests to [EMAIL PROTECTED], NOT to the list itself.
